SOME WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF OPTIMAL STABILISATION POLICY IN AN ECONOMY WITH CAPITAL AND STICKY PRICES

In this paper we review and extend some of the key lessons that seem to be emerging from the Ramsey‐inspired theory of dynamic optimal monetary and fiscal policies. We construct measures of the key distortions in our economy; we label these ‘dynamic wedges’. Inflation, actual or anticipated, distorts these wedges in the present period, shrinks the tax base and increases the deadweight loss. We show that, if possible, labour as well as capital ought to be subsidised in steady state. We point to a number of extensions to the Ramsey literature that may help in the formulation of actual policy.     

EVALUATING AUTOMOBILE INSPECTION POLICY USING AUTO INSURANCE DATA

This paper examines the effect of mandatory periodic safety inspections on traffic accident rates. Using a data set of more than 15,000 auto insurance policyholders in Japan, we investigate the relationship between car age and accident rates and find little evidence that accident rates decline due to safety inspections, specifically in the inspection year. The result holds, even if we take the heterogeneity across drivers into account, and is robust to various parametric and nonparametric procedures. We conjecture that our results are obtained (a) because most motor vehicle accidents are not caused by mechanical failures and (b) because government regulations impose too strict and frequent inspections on car owners in Japan. ( JEL C14, K32, L51, L98, R41)     

FUTURES MARKETS AND BUBBLE FORMATION IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS*

Abstract. We construct asset markets of the type studied in Smith et al. (1988) , in which price bubbles and crashes are widely observed. In addition to a spot market, there are futures markets in operation, one maturing at the beginning of each period of the life of the asset. We find that when futures markets are present, bubbles do not occur in the spot markets. The futures markets seem to reduce the speculation and the decision errors that appear to give rise to price bubbles in experimental asset markets.     

A PBOBLEM IN PRICES AND QUANTITIES

"Most of us were brought up to employ such index numbers as Sauerbeck's… much too lightheartedly, and without sufficient warning that… the actual divergences between these indexes and the Purchasing Power of Money might prove to be, if we could calculate them, of very great significance both theoretical and practical."     

OLIGOPOLISTIC PRODUCT WITHHOLDING IN RICARDIAN MARKETS

We consider strategic behaviour in the rental market for quality-differentiated goods. In his classic analysis Ricardo showed that at the competitive equilibrium the price of the marginal unit is driven to zero. An oligopolistic market structure usually leads to a radically different equilibrium. Deliberate withholding of units often becomes part of a firm's best response, and whenever this occurs, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. A necessary but not sufficient condition for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist is for one firm to own all the best quality units. A mixed strategy equilibrium always exists and the associated payoff is aiways greater than the competitive payoff.     

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION FLOWS IN CUSTOMER MARKETS

In customer markets an information asymmetry exists between a firm's current customers and prospective customers. When a firm changes its price, current customers are instantly aware of the price change, while potential customers are informed slowly of the change. The paper explicitly models this information imperfection and the associated asymmetry in firms' customer flows. The main result of the paper is that, because of the information asymmetry, there will be a range of marginal cost and demand over which the firm has no incentive to change price. It is also shown that prices will be more upwardly flexible than downwardly flexible. The size of the range, and the extent of downward price inflexibility, depends on the rate at which information is transmitted to customers.     

EVIDENCE OF SPATIAL AUTOCORREILATION IN INTERNATIONAL PRICES

Data from the International Comparison Programme (ICP) generate a number of analyses examining price and quantity relationships across countries. Although geographic location is sometimes evoked to explain differences across observations, it is seldom used to measure the extent of this interrelationship. Using ICP Phase V benchmark studies (Summers and Heston, 1991) at the level of household consumption for approximately 64 countries and 23 aggregate headings in 1985, this paper introduces such a measure, testing for spatial autocorrelation among price relatives with respect to three different measures of relative location: the pairwise existence of a common boundary, the distance between capital cities and the amount of trade between two countries.     

ARE CHINESE STOCK MARKETS INCREASING INTEGRATION WITH OTHER MARKETS IN THE GREATER CHINA REGION AND OTHER MAJOR MARKETS?

This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai A and B-share market, and between these two markets and the Hong Kong, the Taiwanese, the Japanese and the US market of two sub periods between July 1993 and March 2007. On the basis of a new Granger non-causality test procedure developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995) and Johansen's (1988) cointegration test, my results suggest that a long-term equilibrium relationship measured by cointegration has been merged between the Chinese A-share market and the other markets in greater China region as well as the US market during the post-crisis period which covers the period since Chinese A-share market was opened to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. I also found that the Shanghai A-share market uni-directionally Granger-causes the other regional markets after the Asian financial crisis, while the A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market have had a significant feedback relationship since then. However, I found no evidence there has been cointegrating relationship between Shanghai B-share market and any other market ever since the B-share market was opened to the local retail investors in 2001.     

WELFARE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN EDUCATION

Distortive effects of government intervention, especially in international trade, have received considerable attention. But not much literature exists on similar effects of public policies toward education. This paper provides a review of government intervention in education and its likely effects on economic growth and equity. Although governments may act with good intentions, educational policies often have adverse effects on social welfare. Less government involvement in education might actually lead to greater and more equally distributed real income, especially in developing countries.
Section I of this paper identifies and documents the extent of government-induced distortions directly or indirectly related to education. Section II assesses the likely effect of such distortions on social welfare. The final section discusses the role of government in education.     

INEQUALITY AND WELFARE IN EEC COUNTRIES *

Inequality and welfare comparisons are performed using simple and generalized Lorenz curves and a number of ranking criteria suggested by Shorrocks and Foster, Dardanoni and Lambert, and Davis and Hoy, on Family Expenditure Survey data of nine EEC countries. The highest levels of inequality are observed in Italy and Greece and the lowest in Denmark, Belgium and France, whereas welfare is found to be relatively low in Greece and Ireland and relatively high in Belgium and France.     

STRATEGIC EXPORT POLICY IN VERTICALLY RELATED MARKETS

This paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.     

INTEREST RATE RULES AND WELFARE IN OPEN ECONOMIES

This paper analyses the welfare performance of a set of five alternative interest rate rules in an open economy stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model with nominal rigidities. A rule with a lagged interest rate term, high feedback on inflation and low feedback on output is found to yield the highest welfare for a small open economy. This result is robust across different degrees of openness, different sources of home and foreign shocks, alternative foreign monetary rules and different specifications for price-setting behaviour. The same rule emerges as both the Nash and cooperative equilibria in a two-country version of the model.     

WELFARE GAINS AND LOSSES IN SUNSPOT EQUILIBRIA*

We study a standard two period exchange economy with one nominal asset. As is well known, there is a continuum of sunspot equilibria around each efficient equilibrium. A sunspot equilibrium is inefficient but some households may gain in sunspot equilibria relative to the efficient equilibrium. We show that a household's equilibrium utility level is either locally maximized or locally minimized at the efficient equilibrium, and derive a condition which identifies whether or not a household's utility is locally minimized or maximized.     

WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY

In the Eaton and Grossman Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (1986), pp. 383–406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.