Negative externalities and welfare improving preference changes

When the over-consumption of open access resources and congestible public goods generate negative externalities and social welfare losses, many individuals and environmental advocacy organizations offer as an alternative nongovernmental solution the adoption of new ecology sustaining preferences. This paper shows that exogenously inducing a change in preferences and the adoption of new externality internalizing preferences, which increase an individual's marginal rate of substitution between a private good and a good whose consumption imposes external costs on others, not only reduces the aggregate output of the negative externality but also produces an economic state that is socially superior to the initial state. Because it is based on both the initial and new preferences, the social superiority welfare criterion makes possible meaningful welfare comparisons of economic states generated by preference changes. A computational general equilibrium model is then used to simulate preference changes and to calculate the resulting allocative and welfare effects. The computer simulations reveal that important factors in the attainment of a socially superior state include (i) the particular characteristics of an individual's negative externality reaction function, (ii) the magnitude of the preference change, and (iii) the number of individuals changing preferences.     

Exchange rates and bertrand oligopoly

The impact of exchange-rate changes on industrial prices seems ambiguous. Incomplete and even perverse pass-through has been observed: the import prices in the depreciating country decrease while those in the appreciating country increase. To explain these counterintuitive price reactions we consider a situation of international Bertrand competition: two firms, based in different countries, are selling in both countries simultaneously. The profit-maximizing duopolists set the prices for their products in each of the two markets which are segmented on the demand side. We then study the qualitative effect of an exogenous exchange-rate change on the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Under the strong assumption of linear demand and cost functions we have normal exchange-rate pass-through. However, allowing for more general cost structures in this simple static model enables us to show that the import prices in both countries might move in counterintuitive directions.     

Finance,investment and innovation: A theoretical and empirical comparative analysis

The paper compares the relative efficiency of country models in the relationship between finance and investments. Results, confirmed under three different panel data estimates (Arellano-Bond GMM method, random and fixed effect estimates) suggest that: i) the UK thick market reduces informational asymmetries for large firms and for those firms providing good signals to shareholders; ii) the Japanese vertical (between firms and banks) integration and horizontal (among firms) integration almost eliminates financial constraints (the horizontal integration effect) and equates agency costs across firms (the vertical integration effect). These results are consistent with the short-termist hypothesis which assumes that the Japanese economic system can process information more efficiently reducing managerial myopic behaviour and thereby determining positive effects on long term growth.     

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

Summary We consider the problem of choosing an allocation in an economy in which there are one private good and one public good. Our purpose is to identify the class of procedures of choosing an allocation which satisfy strategy-proofness, individual rationality, no exploitation and non-bossiness. Any such procedure is a scheme of semi-convex cost sharing determined by the minimum demand principle.I wish to thank Professors Salvador Barbera, Matthew Jackson, Herve Moulin and William Thomson for their helpful suggestions and two anonymous referees for their detailed comments. Conversations with Professors Hideo Konishi, Shinji Oseto Ken-ichi Shimomura and Stephen Ching were helpful. This work is supported by the Japan Economic Research Foundation and Research Grants PB89-0294 and PB89-0075 from the Direcion General de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnica, Spanish Ministry of Education.     

Electoral Balancing in Federal and Sub-national Elections: The Case of Canada

The major premise of this study is that in federal countries voters can balance and moderate national policy by dividing electoral support between different parties in federal and sub-national elections. We compare the non-concurrent federal and provincial elections in Canada to assess the balancing properties of sub-national elections. The balancing hypothesis implies that the federal incumbent party may suffer additional electoral losses in provincial elections. We use several statistical tests - ordinary OLS, fixed effect and unbalanced random effect cross-section time series - to analyze Canadian electoral data for the period of 1949-1997. All tests sustain that the incumbent party at the federal level loses votes in provincial elections.     

On designing economic agents that behave like human agents

This paper explores the idea of constructing theoretical economic agents that behave like actual human agents and using them in neoclassical economic models. It does this in a repeated-choice setting by postulating artificial agents who use a learning algorithm calibrated against human learning data from psychological experiments. The resulting calibrated algorithm appears to replicate human learning behavior to a high degree and reproduces several stylized facts of learning. It can therefore be used to replace the idealized, perfectly rational agents in appropriate neoclassical models with calibrated agents that represent actual human behavior. The paper discusses the possibilities of using the algorithm to represent human learning in normal-form stage games and in more general neoclassical models in economics. It explores the likelihood of convergence to long-run optimality and to Nash behavior, and the characteristic learning time implicit in human adaptation in the economy.     

From “tax state” to “debt state”

The paper is motivated by Joseph A. Schumpeter's The Crisis of the Tax State. It inquires whether the buildup of government debt in peacetimeprosperity is a threat to the stability, existence or creation of viable tax states. The paper begins by setting out Schumpeter's conception of the tax state and the nature of recent political-economic events which have reinvigorated the concept. Next the paper sets out some simple debt dynamics and sketches a debt-induced business cycle arising from heavy reliance on debt finance in peacetimeprosperity. Finally, the paper assesses threats to the tax state in light of recent work on path dependence and positive feedback. An attempt is made to throw some light on whether the plethora of new, and often small, states spawned by the demise of communism can be viable tax states.Essay on Government, the Tax State and Economic Dynamics submitted to the Third Schumpeter Prize Competition.     

Hugging Trees: Claiming de Facto Property Rights by Blockading Resource Use

This paper explores conflicts between two groups,the industry and theenvironmentalists, over whether an indivisible resource (e.g., an ancient tree) should be harvested or preserved. In a complete information war ofattrition the environmentalists' willingness to blockade harvest attemptsmay control resource use as effectively as if they held property rights. Optimal government intervention will override this ability for somebenefit/cost combinations but may augment it for other combinations.Introducing uncertainty about the environmentalists' benefits results inextended disputes and consequent lack of efficiency. Governmentintervention for welfare reasons generally reduces these efficiencylosses.     

An essay on the “New” Kaldorian macrodynamics

Conclusion Considering that employment and output are positively related, and that productivity growth and inflation are inversely related, we see that Kaldor, through the hypothesis of embodied technical progress and induced investment, has presented us with the elements of a general theory of stagflation. As such, this Kaldorian theory constitutes the only serious opposition to the various monetarist explanations (most notably Milton Friedman's 1977 Nobel Lecture) of a positively sloped Phillips curve, based on the inflationary expectations mechanism and the notion of a changing natural rate of unemployment. Not so long ago, people were talking about the so-called locomotive theory of export-led growth, with such surplus countries as Germany and Japan, or large economies as the U. S., playing the role of the engine, given that the equally surplus oil-producing countries will also maintain a strong import-demand for industrial output. Fears (perhaps legitimate ones) about inherent inflationary tendencies have caused the abandonment of this approach to pull the world economy from its vicious stagflationary circle. Contrary to the monetarists' view that a recession is needed in order to combat inflation, Kaldor's own theory can serve as a guide to those who, more optimistically, believe or simply hope that investment and output growth is the only longterm weapon against both inflation and unemployment.The importance of the writings of Professor Kaldor, influential as they have proved to be well beyond his immediate Cambridge milieu, cannot be overestimated. He is a truly great economist, one of the few who make economic theory rather than simply repeat established dogmas. All economists will be educated by reading and re-reading his collected essays.     

Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development

We estimate the respective contributions of institutions, geography, and trade in determining income levels around the world, using recently developed instrumental variables for institutions and trade. Our results indicate that the quality of institutions trumps everything else. Once institutions are controlled for, conventional measures of geography have at best weak direct effects on incomes, although they have a strong indirect effect by influencing the quality of institutions. Similarly, once institutions are controlled for, trade is almost always insignificant, and often enters the income equation with the wrong (i.e., negative) sign. We relate our results to recent literature, and where differences exist, trace their origins to choices on samples, specification, and instrumentation.     

Wettbewerb und langfristige Wirtschaftspolitik

Ohne ZusammenfassungÜberarbeitete Fassung eines Vortrages, gehalten am 27. September 1965 in Bad Ischl auf der 20. Tagung der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für Oberösterreich über Probleme einer langfristigen Wirtschaftspolitik. Die Vortragsfassung trug den Titel Die Wettbewerbspolitik im Rahmen der langfristigen Wirtschaftspolitik.     

The Coming Slavery: The Determinism of Herbert Spencer

Herbert Spencer (1820–1930) believed that Victorian Britain was moving toward a society of total regimentation (slavery). This movement was part of a cosmic process of evolution and dissolution. While the long-run (but not ultimate) destination of society was a higher form of social organization based on voluntary and complex interpersonal relationships, the immediate tendency was retrograde—a movement away from the liberation of mankind from the bondage of previous eras. This Article explores (1) the reasons for the retrograde movement, (2) its inevitability, and (3) the role of ideas in the process. The general conclusion is that in an effort to explain the general movement of social institutions and practices, Spencer develops a mechanical and deterministic approach which undermines his ability to pass normative judgements on changes in society.     

The “Dorfman Steiner” rule

Conclusion When this research was started, it was guessed that the Dorfman-Steiner rule would lose its relevance in an intertemporal setting. This belief has turned out to be false: along the optimal paths ofp (t) ands (t), and must be equal. The only difference with the Dorfman-Steiner result is that they will be different from unity.The author is chargé de cours at the Faculté Universitaire Catholique de Mons (Belgium). He has greatyl benefited from comments by M. Beuthe and J. J. Lambin.     

Cross-country catch-up in the manufacturing sector: Impacts of heterogeneity on convergence and technology adoption

We analyze how technology transfer from a leading economy affects followers productivity growth in manufacturing sectors and Gross Domestic Product. Allowing for heterogeneous technology levels we explore how this impacts rates of catch-up in labor productivity across manufacturing sectors and GDP for 16 OECD nations. Our results indicate that aggregate studies bias downward the estimated rates of catch-up. These rates of catch-up, as well as efficiency levels, also differ across countries. We find that institutional factors such as bureaucratic efficiency are important determinants of the estimated catch-up rates.First version received:October 2001/Final version received:September 2003Earlier versions of this paper have been presented under the titles of Cross-Country Catch-up in Manufacturing and Heterogeneous Rates of Catch-up in Manufacturing Industries. The authors would like to thank participants of the North American Productivity Conference, June 2000, at Union College, N, Y., and the Associate Editor for helpful comments and criticisms.     

Public-Choice Analysis of a New International Organization: The International Sea-Bed Authority

The usefulness of the public-choice approach for a better understanding of international organizations can be demonstrated by applying it to the analysis of the structure and functions of a new international organization, the International Sea-Bed Authority, established in 1994, after two decades of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, with the aim to control the oceans' mineral resources beyond the limits of national jurisdictions (which have been proclaimed by the U.N. Assembly common heritage of mankind). First, the reasons for establishing this organization, whose basis is the common heritage of mankind nature of ocean resources, are examined under two aspects: 1) definition and protection of property rights; 2) environmental control of sea-bed mining activities. Secondly, the organization's decisionmaking system is presented, including such features as the assembly, council with chamber voting, finance committee with decision by consensus, features that balance the voting power of members and protect those countries that bear the financial responsibility for the budget. Finally, some comments are offered about more general aspects of the theory of international organizations: the bureaucracy (and diplomacy) of these organizations as well as the interdependence among international organizations, which opens the way to forms of international logrolling and makes it advisable for countries not to exit from these organizations, even when they have no primary interest in them.     

Friedrich Hayek's Theory of Spontaneous Order: Two Problems

The paper finds Hayek's basic building block, the natural/artificialcontrast, to be illuminating. But the manner in which Hayek classifiesentities according to the contrast generates two major problemsin his socio-economic theory. First, Hayek's concept designconfuses the technical construction of, e.g., a chair with thedeliberate organization of division of labor within the firm.Second, Hayek's notion spontaneous order fails to note twokinds of natural order — firms and markets.     

On the strategic inconsistency of the meta-rights approach

Among many attempts to circumvent Sen's impossibility result Gibbard's theory of alienable rights has attracted attention of many researchers. Basu's (1984) theorem essentially depends on a Nash-type equilibrium concept. In this paper we introduce an alternative behavioral assumption where individuals have conjectures about the responses of others and investigate the robustness of Basu's result under this new solution concept. We also examine a possibility of coalition formation and cooperation under the meta-rights approach.For helpful discussions I would like to thank Rajat Deb, Joseph Greenberg, and Shlomo Weber. I am also indebted to an anonymous referee of this Journal for many valuable comments.     

Der Weg zur Konvertibilität

Ohne ZusammenfassungVortrag, gehalten am 26. Mai 1955 in der Nationalökonomischen Gesellschaft in Wien.     

Mutually Destructive Bidding: The FCC Auction Design Problem

In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process. Theory suggests that a simple (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently in such an environment. This difficulty increases with increases in fitting complexity. In some environments, bidding may become mutually destructive. Experiments indicate that a properly designed combinatorial auction is superior to a simple auction in terms of economic efficiency and revenue generation in bidding environments with a low amount of fitting complexity. Concerns that a combinatorial auction will cause a threshold problem are not borne out when bidders for small packages can communicate.     

Full-cost pricing in the classical competitive process: A model of convergence to long-run equilibrium

In the last 10–15 years a lot of attempts has been devoted to study the calssical process of convergence of market prices toward natural prices. The two forces that one has thought could achieve this target were capital mobility, that determines the dynamics of output, and demand-supply forces, that determine the dynamics of prices. In this article a model of classical competition is proposed in which a full-cost pricing mechanism is adopted in the rule of evolution of market prices. An asymptotical stability result of long-run equilibrium is proved for a two-commodity model with and without a final demand.