欧洲主权债务危机的贸易溢出效应研究

欧洲主权债务危机爆发后,欧元大幅贬值。欧元的贬值使欧元区国家在国际贸易中增强了竞争力,赢得了出口优势;另一方面,紧缩的财政政策和减少的居民收入使欧元区国家对进口商品的需求持续低迷。与欧元区具有贸易关系的国家则因本币升值和需求减少使出口处于被动地位,经济增长受到影响。欧洲主权债务危机通过贸易中的价格机制和收入机制把危机传导至世界各国,国际贸易成为欧洲主权危机传导的主要渠道之一。     

西班牙主权债务危机下的经济前景分析

从2009年10月希腊主权债务危机爆发开始,欧元区主权债务危机有愈演愈烈趋势。西班牙成为第五个因为主权债务危机而导致现任政府下台的欧元区国家。在深入分析欧洲主权债务危机爆发的原因和影响的基础上,通过对西班牙经济现状的具体研究,进一步探讨西班牙未来经济发展的前景和政府应该采取的措施。     

日本债务问题是否会引爆新的国际金融危机？

近来,国际舆论的焦点转向了日本,担心日本可能将是全球金融危机的下一个引爆点。尽管日本的债务水平是不可持续的,可能会因公债余额占GDP比重持续上升招致国际评级机构继续调降其主权债务评级,但日本债务问题与美国和欧洲均不同,至少在短期引发日本债务危机乃至全球金融风险的可能性较小,而其长期债务风险不容小觑。     

浅议欧债问题

自欧债危机爆发以来,主权债务危机在欧元区国家内不断蔓延和升级,暴露了欧元区财政与货币不能协调一致的软肋,严重打击了欧洲经济。欧债危机继续发酵有其内在的逻辑。欧元区外围国家的债务负担沉重,经济增长停滞,而财政赤字严重超标,各国赤字早已突破了构筑欧盟基石的《马斯特里赫特条约》所要求的限制,但欧盟决策机构对此并未良策,从2009年开始的多次救助无果;面临债务问题,欧元区德法与债务国之间、欧洲央行与民间债权人之间,甚至于各国内部政府与民众之间矛盾重重,无法形成有效的救助方案与长期解决债务的机制,导致欧债阴影不散。     

从主权债务危机论欧元区财政与货币政策协调

2010年,欧元区国家相继陷入主权债务危机,让世界哗然,同时也凸显了欧元区现行货币与财政政策非对称性制度安排的缺陷。本文针对这些问题,研究了历史上政策协调的成功经验,并针对主权债务危机后欧元区内财政与货币政策协调机制提出建议。     

从主权债务危机论欧元区财政与货币政策协调

2010年,欧元区国家相继陷入主权债务危机,让世界哗然,同时也凸显了欧元区现行货币与财政政策非对称性制度安排的缺陷.本文针对这些问题,研究了历史上政策协调的成功经验,并针对主权债务危机后欧元区内财政与货币政策协调机制提出建议.     

从全球主权债务危机看中国地方政府债务风险

美国金融危机后,各国主权债务问题浮出水面。从冰岛债务危机到迪拜债务危机,再到欧元区债务危机,欧美发达经济体的债务风险凸现。虽然中国政府的债务还处于安全界限之内,但地方政府债务膨胀到令人担忧的地步,如何化解地方政府债务风险成了当务之急。     

地方经济发展与企业债务期限结构关系研究

本文选择1994—2006年中国上市公司数据为研究样本,检验地方经济发展以及地方经济发展因素与公司内因素的交互作用如何影响企业债务期限结构。研究发现,人均居民消费水平越高,企业长期债务融资比例越低;人均GDP较高的地区,人均居民消费水平对企业长期债务融资影响较小;企业规模越大,人均GDP对其长期债务融资比例影响越小;有形资产比重较高的企业,人均GDP对其长期债务融资比例影响较小;资本形成总额越高的地区,企业长期债务融资比例越低;城乡储蓄年度余额越高的地区,企业长期债务融资比例越高。     

欧元区主权债务危机爆发的原因及影响

2010年,欧元区主权债务危机成为国内外世界经济学界研究的重点问题,许多学者从不同角度对其原因、影响等进行了研究。本文在以往研究的基础上,从直接原因、助推器以及深层原因的角度对欧元区主权债务危机发生的原因进行探讨,并就其对欧元区发展前景的影响做了详细的分析。     

欧元区主权债务危机根源研究:综述与启示

欧元区主权债务危机自2009年12月在希腊显现以来,事件不断升级,危机逐渐向欧元区其他国家蔓延,转变为一场欧元区的主权债务危机。国内外学者从不同的视角对本次欧元区债务危机的根源进行了深入的探讨和分析,本文主要从次贷产物论、评级机构论、欧元区制度缺陷论、经济发展失衡论、高福利制度与人口老龄化论以及政治矛盾论这几个方面对国内外的相关文献与论述进行了梳理,以期对这次危机的根源有较全面的了解,为理论与实务界加深认识,从中吸取教训,为找到解决欧债危机的思路提供一定的借鉴。     

Contagion across Eurozone’s sovereign spreads and the Core-Periphery divide

This paper investigates the causes of disproportionate increases of sovereign yields with respect to the interest rate on the 10 years German Bund within the Eurozone. Empirical evidence drawn from the Bank for International Settlements dataset on banks’ portfolios shows that rapid financial integration, following the launch of the monetary union, resulted in excess exposure of Core countries’ banks in the Peripheral countries’ financial assets. In order to endogenize the possibility of contagion effects, we conduct econometric estimates through a Global Vector Autoregressive model, where each country’s spread depends upon all Eurozone countries’ spreads. Results show that after the burst of the financial crisis the Core countries’ sovereign yields are essentially determined by the international risk aversion, whereas the spreads of Peripheral countries mainly depend on fundamentals, namely the public debt/GDP ratio and the Real Effective Exchange Rate values with respect to the Eurozone average. These results are supported by the estimate of an impulse response analysis. Macroeconomic failures in public finances and competitiveness seem to originate the exceptional increases in sovereign spreads of the Periphery, through a contagion effect which is limited to this group of Eurozone countries.     

Increase in home bias in the Eurozone debt crisis: The role of domestic shocks

One of the most striking consequences of the recent episode of sovereign debt market stress in the Eurozone has been the increase in the share of public debt held by the domestic sector in fragile economies. However, the causes and potential consequences of this increase were only given scarce attention in the literature on the Euro area sovereign debt crisis. In order to fill this gap, we first determine the shocks that impact the variation in the share of sovereign debt held at home in an SVAR model on a sample of Eurozone countries between 2002 and 2014, distinguishing between external and domestic shocks. Thanks to several alternative tests, we show that home bias in sovereign debt responds positively to country-specific fundamentals and expectation shocks but we find no evidence that the increase in home bias is destabilizing per se in the short-run. Second, a stylized theoretical model backed by the empirical results predicts that the consequences for sovereign debt crisis depend on the relative impact of domestic initial destabilizing shocks and increased home bias. The analysis suggests that an increase in home bias in times of sovereign debt stress, despite reflecting deteriorating fiscal conditions, may make default less likely.     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

An Alternative Approach to the Institutional Economics of the Eurozone Crisis

I argue that the Eurozone crisis is neither a crisis of European sovereigns in the sense of governmental over-borrowing, nor a crisis of sovereign debt market over-lending. Rather, it is a function of the “sovereign debt market” institution itself. Crisis, I argue, is not an occurrence, but an element fulfilling a precise technical function within this institution. It ensures the possibility of designating — in the market’s day-to-day mechanisms rather than analytical hindsight — normal (tranquil, undisturbed) market functioning. To show this, I propose an alternative view on the institutional economics of sovereign debt markets. First, I engage literature on the emergent qualities of the institutions “market” and “firm” in product markets, concluding that the point of coalescence for markets is the approximation of an optimal observation of consumer tastes. I then examine the specific institution “financial markets,” where the optimal observation of economic fundamentals is decisive. For the specific sub-institution “sovereign debt market,” I conclude that the fundamentals in question — country fundamentals — oscillate between a status of observable fundamentals outside of markets and operationalized fundamentals influenced by market movements. This, in turn, allows me to argue that the specific case of the Eurozone crisis is due to neither of the two causes mentioned above. Rather, the notion of “crisis” takes on a technical sense within the market structure, guaranteeing the separation of herd behavior and isomorphic behavior on European sovereign debt markets. By the same token, the so-called Eurozone crisis ceases to be a crisis in the conventional sense.     

Institutional arrangements and public debt threshold limits

Inter-governmental Organisations, such as the IMF and OECD, advocate a medium-term reduction in deficit spending and public debt accumulation among advanced economies to satisfy conditions of fiscal sustainability. Buttressing the need for fiscal austerity, Reinhart and Rogoff claim to have identified a so-called tipping point, beyond which public debt accumulation negatively affects economic growth. While recent data seem to indicate that some Eurozone (non-sovereign) economies have reached a tipping point, for other advanced (sovereign) economies, such as the US, UK and Japan, this is not clear. The mainstream tipping point literature however does not recognise the importance of institutional arrangements for the conduct of fiscal and monetary policy. Furthermore, the literature sheds little light on the transmission mechanism between high public debt and low economic growth. This article draws on the principles of Modern Monetary Theory to discuss institutional arrangements and to justify the theoretical and empirical focus on Eurozone economies. The empirical analysis unpacks the transmission mechanism(s) to reveal that Eurozone economies have reached a public debt threshold limit with respect to long-term interest rates.     

Financial illness and political virus: the case of contagious crises in the Eurozone

Abstract

This paper investigates the volatility spillover effects from the southern to northern part of the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Focusing on different phases of the crises, we propose using the dynamic conditional correlation model and the BEKK model to identify possible linkages during the period of 2005–2015. The findings showed that both models behave satisfactorily and are flexible in presenting spillover effects. However, regarding conditional correlations, the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model seems to fit better. Additionally, Spain and Italy can significantly damage all strong northern economies, while Greece’s negative shocks are capable of co-moving the French index. Finally, France is the most correlated country within the southern Eurozone.     

‘Whatever it takes’ and the role of Eurozone news

This letter shows that the ‘Whatever it takes’ speech by ECB President Draghi on 26 July 2012 and the ensuing installation of the Outright Monetary Transactions’ framework are associated with a reduction in the domestic and cross-border effect of Eurozone news on absolute yield changes in Eurozone sovereign debt. These results are consistent with the popular view that these actions helped to avoid a collapse of the Eurozone.     

Macro-uncertainty and financial stress spillovers in the Eurozone

This paper studies macro-uncertainty and financial distress spillovers within the Eurozone. We propose a novel methodology to derive the indices of spillovers, by using a Global Vector autoregressive model fitted to data sampled at mixed-frequencies. We find that macro-uncertainty and financial stress are relatively disconnected in the Eurozone. We also show that connectedness between core and periphery Eurozone countries mainly operates through financial stress and it decreases since the outbreak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (with an increasing role played by peripheral countries). As a result, investors and policymakers should monitor separately macro-uncertainty and financial stress. Finally, we find that the mixed-frequency data should be taken into account in this context, otherwise, the spillovers can be underestimated.     

The sovereign spread in Asian emerging economies: The significance of external versus internal factors

This paper investigates the dynamic relations between external factors, domestic macroeconomic factors with sovereign spreads, debt to GDP ratio, etc. in Asian emerging countries. First, we develop a theoretical model that determines the equilibrium debt level, probability of default and sovereign spread and draw empirical implications. We then employ a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to investigate empirically how the spread of sovereign debt is influenced over time by both external and domestic factors. The empirical results show that variations in sovereign spreads are mainly driven by external shocks, with the term structure of US interest rate and the global risk aversion having the most important role. The findings also indicate that shocks from the US have a direct effect on sovereign spread and an indirect effect via domestic macroeconomic fundamentals. Finally, the evidence produced validates the presence of some response patterns of sovereign spread to the external shocks.     

The Eurozone Sovereign Debt Problem: What It Means for U.S. Exports

The European sovereign debt problem became the focus of world attention in 2010, when the interest rates on Greek government bonds rose dramatically, requiring immediate action by the European Union to avoid an imminent default. It has become clear that the problem is not limited to Greece, but a more general problem of the fundamental imbalances and underlying inconsistencies in the Eurozone economic system of using a single currency for a set of countries that lack a unified economic and political system. Financial markets reacted to the debt offering of the other deficit countries in the Eurozone by increasing interest rates on their sovereign debt as well. The major consequences are likely to be largely felt by the Eurozone countries themselves, some of whom will be forced to go through significant structural adjustments over the coming years. The adjustment process could generate a range of alternative macroeconomic outcomes for affected countries??including differences in growth, exchange rates, and investment??which could have significant implications for U.S. trade. This paper attempts to allay some of that uncertainty by exploring a wide range of alternative global macroeconomic outcomes and their potential impact on U.S. exports. The analysis extends the work done in a previous paper which focused on U.S. agricultural exports and its major components. While U.S. exports vary across the scenarios, continued strong economic growth in developing countries supports demand for U.S. exports. Because the EU has represented a declining share of U.S. exports, the direct impact of changes in European demand affects U.S. exports less than the secondary effects of changes in exchange rates and global investment patterns associated with alternative EU outcomes.