非银行金融科技与上市公司借贷成本——竞争压力还是信息溢出？

金融科技作为技术驱动的金融创新,是深化金融供给侧结构性改革、增强金融服务实体经济能力的重要引擎。基于我国A股上市公司数据,本文实证分析了针对中小微企业和个人的非银行金融科技发展对上市公司借贷成本的溢出效应。结果表明,非银行金融科技发展每提高10%,上市公司借贷成本平均下降1.6个百分点。进一步分析表明,这一结果同时受到“竞争压力”与“信息溢出”两种机制的作用:前者表现为在银行业竞争程度更高的地区,非银行金融科技的发展更能显著降低企业的借贷成本;后者表现为,非银行金融科技的发展能够显著降低商业银行不良贷款率,同时也能降低商业银行业务及管理费用开支。本文探索金融科技如何影响上市公司融资成本,为金融科技进一步增强金融服务实体经济能力提供了新的启示。     

Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability

We develop a macroeconomic model in which commercial banks can offload risky loans to a “shadow” banking sector, and financial intermediaries trade in securitized assets. The model can account both for the business cycle comovement between output, traditional bank, and shadow bank credit, and for the behavior of macroeconomic variables in a liquidity crisis centered on shadow banks. We find that following a liquidity shock, stabilization policy aimed solely at the market in securitized assets is relatively ineffective.     

Flight to liquidity and the Great Recession

This paper argues that counter-cyclical liquidity hoarding by financial intermediaries may strongly amplify business cycles. It develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which banks operate subject to agency problems and funding liquidity risk in their intermediation activity. Importantly, the amount of liquidity reserves held in the financial sector is determined endogenously: Balance sheet constraints force banks to trade off insurance against funding outflows with loan scale. A financial crisis, simulated as an abrupt decline in the collateral value of bank assets, triggers a flight to liquidity, which strongly amplifies the initial shock and induces credit crunch dynamics sharing key features with the Great Recession. The paper thus develops a new balance sheet channel of shock transmission that works through the composition of banks’ asset portfolios.     

WHY BANKS HAVE A FUTURE: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

According to some observers, the commercial bank–an institution that conducts the twin activities of accepting deposits payable on demand and originating loans–has outlived its usefulness and is in a state of terminal decline. The broad statistical evidence for this contention, however, is somewhat mixed. While some studies suggest that the role of banks in the United States is declining, others suggest that banks are simply using new vehicles to offer their services and that their role has not diminished at all. This article takes a different approach to analyzing the future of banks by examining the economic rationale for their past existence and exploring the extent to which this rationale can be expected to hold up in the future. The author begins by explaining why the two core banking activities–taking in deposits payable on demand and originating non-marketable loans–are performed by the same institutions. The explanation turns on the recognition that both activities essentially require the institution to come up with cash on short notice–that is, to provide liquidity. Scale economies in providing liquidity explain why both activities are provided by the same entity. Deregulation and innovation have increased competition in the financial services industry, which has forced banks to concentrate on the essentials of liquidity provision. This is why the outward nature of banks' activities has changed (for example, banks today often sell instead of holding loans, and provide back-up lines for commercial paper instead of originating loans), though not their underlying economic rationale (particularly the credit evaluation and monitoring involved in “relationship” banking). Beneath the surface reality of dramatic changes in financial products and services, the fundamental banking business of liquidity provision is alive and well. Moreover, in the course of performing their traditional activities, banks have acquired competencies that enable them to perform a variety of other financial and nonfinancial activities that deregulation and innovation have opened up to them. As part of their evaluation of these nontraditional activities, bankers must ensure that their organizational structures, controls, and compensation policies are appropriate for the new environment of deregulation and technological change.     

The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquidity and risk taking over the business cycle

We examine how the banking sector could ignite the formation of asset price bubbles when there is access to abundant liquidity. Inside banks, to induce effort, loan officers are compensated based on the volume of loans. Volume-based compensation also induces greater risk taking; however, due to lack of commitment, loan officers are penalized ex post only if banks suffer a high enough liquidity shortfall. Outside banks, when there is heightened macroeconomic risk, investors reduce direct investment and hold more bank deposits. This ‘flight to quality’ leaves banks flush with liquidity, lowering the sensitivity of bankers’ payoffs to downside risks and inducing excessive credit volume and asset price bubbles. The seeds of a crisis are thus sown.     

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.     

货币政策对流动性风险的影响——基于银行信贷行为视角

本文基于我国现实背景和《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,利用2008年至2017年间194家商业银行的相关数据,对我国银行净稳定资金率进行了度量,并在此基础上,检验了货币政策对我国商业银行流动性风险的影响,探究了其影响机理和传导渠道。研究表明:扩张型货币政策会提高商业银行的流动性风险;不同经济环境下,货币政策对流动性风险的影响存在差异但不具备异质性;不同类型的商业银行中,货币政策对流动性风险的影响不具有异质性;在货币政策对流动性风险的影响中,银行信贷行为是重要的传导渠道。因此,央行可基于货币政策对流动性风险的影响差异进行相机抉择;商业银行则要加强信贷规模和质量的管理,优化资产结构,通过弱化信贷渠道作用来降低货币政策对银行流动性风险的不良影响。     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity matter?

This paper uses a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that the effect of an increase in bank capital on credit growth, defined as growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity only for large banks and that this positive relationship has been more substantial during the recent financial crisis period. This result suggests that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending only after large banks retain sufficient liquid assets.     

Supply of bank loans and business debts: A view from historical bankruptcy cases

As bank loans fell in the 2008 crisis, business bankruptcy increased. To study how bank loans affect business balance sheets and bankruptcy, we use new data on bankrupt businesses in Missouri between 1898 and 1942. We confirm that when banks curtail loans, courts see more bankruptcies among businesses with high exposure to bank debt. To reduce real volatility, policy‐makers can set tough bank liquidity requirements in the upswing of business cycle but allow weaker requirements in the downswing. We also find that between 1914 and 1933, businesses in St. Louis were more sensitive to changes in bank loans than businesses in Kansas City, probably due to the tight monetary policy conducted by the conservative St. Louis Fed. The Glass‐Steagall Act weakened the relationship between bank loans and business debt structure. The takeaway is that lender‐of‐last‐resort practices stabilize both the financial sector and the real economy.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

Bank regulation and supervision in the context of the global crisis

We provide novel evidence on regulatory and supervisory practices around the world in the context of the global financial crisis, using data from a new World Bank survey covering 143 countries. Analyzing differences between crisis and non-crisis countries, we find that crisis countries had less stringent and more complex definitions of capital but exhibited lower actual capital ratios, faced fewer restrictions on non-bank activities, were less strict in the regulatory treatment of bad loans, were less able to demand banks to adjust their equity, provisions or compensation schemes, and had greater disclosure requirements but weaker incentives for private agents to monitor banks. Comparing regulatory and supervisory practices before and after the global crisis, there is evidence of few changes. While capital ratios increased, bank governance and resolution regimes were strengthened, private sector incentives to monitor banks deteriorated.     

Winners and losers from supervisory enforcement actions against banks

We investigate how supervisory enforcement actions (EAs) against banks affect their business borrowers. We find negative short-term valuation effects of EAs for large relationship borrowers, which are reversed after new loans are granted. Large non-relationship borrowers' valuations are unaffected by EAs, but turn negative after relationships are established with sanctioned banks. Additionally, sanctioned banks appear to offset uncertainty and reputational damage of EAs by improving credit terms and availability for relationship and non-relationship large businesses, but decrease credit availability to small businesses. The small business credit contraction may have significant negative economic consequences due to bank dependency and credit constraints.     

Asset management and investment banking

We find evidence that conflicts of interest are pervasive in the asset management business owned by investment banks. Using data from 1990 to 2008, we compare the alphas of mutual funds, hedge funds, and institutional funds operated by investment banks and non-bank conglomerates. We find that, while no difference exists in performance by fund type, being owned by an investment bank reduces alphas by 46 basis points per year in our baseline model. Making lead loans increases alphas, but the dispersion of fees across portfolios decreases alphas. The economic loss is $4.9 billion per year.     

Inside the black box: Bank credit allocation in China’s private sector

This study examines how the Chinese state-owned banks allocate loans to private firms. We find that the banks extend loans to financially healthier and better-governed firms, which implies that the banks use commercial judgments in this segment of the market. We also find that having the state as a minority owner helps firms obtain bank loans and this suggests that political connections play a role in gaining access to bank finance. In addition, we find that commercial judgments are important determinants of the lending decisions for manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms located in regions with a more developed banking sector; political connections are important for firms in service industries, large firms, and firms located in areas with a less developed banking sector.     

The integration of bank syndicated loan and junk bond markets

This paper hypothesizes that the special role of banks as corporate quasi-insiders has been changing due to developments in informational, legal and institutional infrastructures of syndicated loan markets. We investigate the integration of intermediated and disintermediated financial markets through highly leveraged transaction (HLT) syndicated loans during the 1990s. We demonstrate that, with the emergence of traded HLT syndicated loans as an alternative high-yield asset to high-yield bonds, market integration has dramatically increased. Taking the late 1980s and 1990s together, different factors explain the movement of credit spreads of the two markets. HLT loan market’s spreads are strongly affected by bank liquidity. Bank liquidity’s effect on HLT loan spreads disappears after 1993. From 1994–1999, junk bond market liquidity factors affect bank loan pricing. We interpret these changes as evidence of the erosion of bank specialness.     

我国上市银行风险抵补能力解析及其启示

《商业银行风险监管核心指标》是目前衡量国内商业银行风险状况及其抵补能力的权威规定。本文应用新的核心监管指标框架,以实证方法比较分析了我国5家上市股份制商业银行的信用风险状况及风险抵补能力和水平,透过指标及数据表象分析了背后存在的深层问题和原因。在此基础上,作者得出了国有商业银行海外上市必须提高资产质量和强化风险管控能力、加强业务转型和提高盈利能力、提高拨备及资本充足水平、与国际惯例接轨和加大信息披露等启示;并提出了完善《核心指标》、统一贷款损失准备计提办法及衡量指标、统一信息披露格式及口径等的政策建议。     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

数字金融、银行信贷渠道与货币政策传导

作为新兴金融业态,数字金融发展会对既有金融体系带来怎样的冲击和影响?聚焦于货币政策传导机制这一宏观命题,立足于我国以银行信贷渠道为主导的数量型中介,运用我国商业银行、A股上市公司的微观面板数据,本文深度剖析了数字金融发展与货币政策银行信贷渠道传导之间的内在联系和影响机理。研究发现:(1)数字金融发展显著弱化了货币政策银行信贷渠道的传导效应,采用工具变量法克服内生性和控制影子银行变量等一系列稳健性检验后的结果依然支持该结论。(2)具体而言,数字金融削弱银行信贷渠道传导效果是通过改变银行资产负债结构和弱化实体企业对银行贷款的依赖而实现的。(3)上述弱化效应在以城市和农村商业银行为主的中小型金融机构以及低资本、低流动性和低报酬的银行中尤为突出。