Aggregate liquidity shortages, idiosyncratic liquidity smoothing and banking regulation

This paper develops a model of banking fragility driven by aggregate liquidity shortages. Inefficiencies arise from a failure of the interbank market to smooth the available liquidity in such a shortage. We find that a standard lender of last resort policy is ineffective in restoring efficiency as it leads to offsetting changes in the banks’ supply of liquidity. In contrast, subsidizing the purchase of assets from troubled banks increases welfare by improving the banks’ liquidity holdings. The first best, however, is achieved by redistributing existing liquidity from healthy to troubled banks in a crisis.     

Dynamic liquidity in endowment economies

This paper analyzes endogenous variations in aggregate liquidity that arise in standard representative-agent endowment economies. I introduce a natural definition of liquidity, essentially a shadow elasticity, that characterizes the price impact function or bid/ask spread that a small trader would experience. I compute this quantity for some tractable examples and uncover a rich variety of predictions that, in some cases, appear consistent with levels and covariations observed in the data. The results have important implications for the pricing and hedging of liquidity risk.     

Market liquidity, asset prices, and welfare

This paper represents an equilibrium model for the demand and supply of liquidity and its impact on asset prices and welfare. We show that, when constant market presence is costly, purely idiosyncratic shocks lead to endogenous demand of liquidity and large price deviations from fundamentals. Moreover, market forces fail to lead to efficient supply of liquidity, which calls for potential policy interventions. However, we demonstrate that different policy tools can yield different efficiency consequences. For example, lowering the cost of supplying liquidity on the spot (e.g., through direct injection of liquidity or relaxation of ex post margin constraints) can decrease welfare while forcing more liquidity supply (e.g., through coordination of market participants) can improve welfare.     

金融衍生工具与银行系统性风险

从巴林银行倒闭到中航油、中石化衍生品交易巨亏,重新审视金融衍生工具与系统性风险的关系成为必然。金融衍生工具运用规模和比例呈急剧上升趋势,其初衷为对冲风险,契合金融服务实体经济功能,但由于其交易规则具有复杂性和不透明性,实施效果亟待检验。本文采用金融衍生工具视角,探索了分类金融衍生工具对银行系统性风险的影响及作用机理。结果表明,金融衍生工具会加剧银行系统性风险,包括外汇类和利率类金融衍生工具。金融衍生工具运用总体效果并不理想,且存在情境依赖,作用发挥呈现异质性。在后金融危机时代以及股市处于熊市时,金融衍生工具均加剧了银行系统性风险,在危机前则降低了银行系统性风险,但当处于牛市时则无显著影响。此外,在市场化进程高、机构持股比例高时,金融衍生工具加剧银行系统性风险的作用更为明显。本文从一个新的视角检验了银行系统性风险的影响因素,为探究其成因提供了新解释,也为未来系统性风险防控提供了新思路。     

The price of liquidity: The effects of market conditions and bank characteristics

We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes.     

资产价格波动与银行系统稳定

有关金融危机的理论研究表明,资产价格波动与银行脆弱性之间存在很强的相关性。资产价格波动主要通过信贷风险渠道、市场风险渠道、经纪业务收入渠道、为附属机构注资的风险渠道及“第二回合”渠道等传导渠道影响到银行系统的稳定。发生在斯堪的纳维亚和日本的银行危机证明,资产价格剧烈波动确实会造成严重的银行问题,所以为维持银行系统的稳定,监管当局应该密切关注资产价格可能出现的剧烈下跌对银行部门可能产生的风险并采取应对方法。     

资产价格泡沫化与金融危机

本文从文献述评的角度,归纳研究了资产价格与金融危机的特征和相互作用的机理。在金融危机的孕育阶段,金融自由化、经济上升周期、货币政策、国际资本流动和心理等因素导致或助涨资产价格向上运动和泡沫化现象。金融危机通常在局部地区和市场首先触发,并向实体经济蔓延并实现国际传导,在泡沫崩溃和危机传导过程中,流动性枯竭和金融系统的脆弱性发挥了重要作用。最后,本文给出了加强金融体系改革和宏观审慎管理的几点建议。     

Banking fragility and liquidity creation: options as a substitute for deposits

Diamond and Rajan (J Finance 55:2431–2465, 2000; Am Econ Rev Papers Proc 91:422–425, 2001a; Carnegie–Rochester Conf Series Public Policy 54:37–71, 2001b; J Pol Econ 109:287–327, 2001c) have shown in a series of papers that it is precisely the fragility of their capital structure which allows banks to create liquidity. This is because the threat of runs by depositors forces bankers to extract full repayment on otherwise illiquid assets. This result has important implications for financial regulation, such as for capital requirements and deposit insurance. This note shows that put options held by bank owners dominate deposit financing in that they also discipline bankers but do not give rise to inefficient runs. Fragility is thus not necessary for liquidity creation in the Diamond–Rajan framework. This paper has substantially benefitted from the comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee.     

全球流动性过剩、对冲基金发展与中国金融稳定

全球流动性过剩导致全球金融资产激增,推动对冲基金业规模迅速膨胀,也使得对冲基金业在结构和投资动向上也出现了新的变化。对冲基金在全球寻找套利和投机机会,对全球的金融稳定产生一定的影响,在此背景下,中国需要审慎资本项目开放和加强对冲基金的监管。     

Illiquidity or credit deterioration: A study of liquidity in the US corporate bond market during financial crises

We investigate whether liquidity is an important price factor in the US corporate bond market. In particular, we focus on whether liquidity effects are more pronounced in periods of financial crises, especially for bonds with high credit risk, using a unique data set covering more than 20,000 bonds, between October 2004 and December 2008. We employ a wide range of liquidity measures and find that liquidity effects account for approximately 14% of the explained market-wide corporate yield spread changes. We conclude that the economic impact of the liquidity measures is significantly larger in periods of crisis, and for speculative grade bonds.     

国际资本流动“突然停止”、银行危机及其产出效应

国际资本流动突然停止是新兴市场国家金融全球化和金融开放早期面临的重要障碍。本文运用20个新兴市场国家1976~2006年间的面板数据,考察突然停止和银行危机对宏观经济产出的影响。研究发现:突然停止或银行危机都不必然导致产出的大幅下降;如果银行部门不发生系统性的危机,突然停止对产出没有显著影响;给定国际资本流动不出现大幅的逆转,银行危机对产出的影响也不显著;突然停止和银行危机的叠加则对产出造成严重的负面冲击,经济增长率显著下滑。研究结论有重要的政策含义,表明构建一个稳固的银行体系对于一国金融开放和金融自由化过程中的经济安全至关重要。     

Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in Croatia

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures.

Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.     

Liquidity,assets and business cycles

The objective here is to evaluate the quantitative importance of financial frictions in business cycles. The analysis shows that a negative financial shock can cause aggregate investment, employment and consumption to fall with output. Despite this realistic comovement among macro quantities, a negative financial shock generates an equity price boom as the shock tightens firms׳ financing constraint. This counterfactual response of the equity price is robust to a wide range of variations in how financial frictions are modeled and whether financial shocks affect asset liquidity or firms׳ collateral constraints. Some possible resolutions to this puzzle are discussed.     

大资管、影子银行与货币政策传导

近年来,我国资产管理业务快速发展,逐渐进入“大资管时代”。大资管的发展使中国式影子银行的特点逐步显现。本文对传统银行和影子银行的金融摩擦进行了深入刻画,并建立含有影子银行和传统银行二元金融结构的动态随机一般均衡模型。通过对我国影子银行的内在机制进行深入分析发现:影子银行形成的非正规金融市场使我国金融双轨制日趋显著。由于目前我国资产管理业务发展仍不规范,影子银行的金融摩擦高于传统银行。影子银行形成的非正规金融市场对货币政策的敏感性较低,在一定程度上削弱了价格型货币政策的传导效果。未来需进一步规范资产管理业务发展,完善我国影子银行体系。有一种理论认为,利率双轨制是利率市场化改革一个重要环节,依据本文结论,双轨制不利于建立有效的利率调控体系,下一步应加快利率双轨并轨,融合二元金融结构,进而加强货币政策的有效性。     

Governance and bank valuation

This paper assesses the impact of the ownership structure of banks and shareholder protection laws on bank valuations while controlling for differences in bank regulations. Except in a few countries with very strong shareholder protection laws, banks are not widely held. Rather, families or the State control banks. Furthermore, (i) larger cash-flow rights by the controlling owner boost valuations, (ii) stronger shareholder protection laws increase valuations, and (iii) greater cash-flow rights mitigate the adverse effects of weak shareholder protection laws on valuations. These results suggest that ownership structure is an important mechanism for governing banks.     

Liquidity,liquidity risk,and information flow: Lessons from an emerging market

This paper examines the role of public and private information flows in intraday liquidity and intraday liquidity risk in the Tunisian stock market. Our empirical results are based on ARMA and GARCH-type models and show that, for major Tunisian stocks, gradually elapsed public information together with gradually elapsed private information in the market is the dominant factor in liquidity improvements in the Tunisian stock market. Liquidity improvements are generated by a decrease in the bid-ask spread accompanied by an increase in the depth at best limit. Our results clearly indicate that the arrival of public information in a sequential manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the bid-ask spread, while the advent of private information in a contemporaneous manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the depth at best limit. Additionally, our results show that liquidity risk persistence disappears when trading volume and order imbalance are included as explanatory variables in the conditional variance equation.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

影子银行体系的脆弱性、监管改革及对我国的启示

影子银行体系的超常规发展和信用扩张,是全球金融危机爆发的重要原因之一。本文对影子银行体系的内涵、运作特点和崩溃原因开展研究,分析危机后西方主要国家的金融监管改革举措,并结合中国影子银行体系的现状,提出有助于我国金融体系发展的启示与建议。