An experimental investigation of soft price caps in uniform price auction markets for wholesale electricity

This paper presents the results from an auction experiment using industry professionals and student participants who compete in a simulated wholesale market for electricity. Motivated by the intervention by FERC in response to the “meltdown” of the California spot market, we investigate the effect of including a “soft” price cap in a uniform price auction as a means of mitigating high prices. When prices are driven above the soft cap, offer curves become flat, in contrast to the hockey stick shape observed in a typical uniform price auction for electricity. This flat offer curve leads to market prices that are relatively insensitive to both generation costs and demand reductions.      

The set of sunspot equilibria in economies with incomplete financial markets: variable asset prices

Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1). Moreover, the map from states o f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium. Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000     

Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence

Summary. Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have also searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some probability distributions of the valuations. This paper proves that the Nash equilibrium of the first price auction depends continuously, for the weak topology, on the valuation distributions and thus brings robustness to the numerical results as well as some theoretical results. As an example of application, we disprove a conjecture of comparative statics. Received: February 1, 1999; revised version: July 27, 2001     

Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach

Summary. Collusion is a serious problem in many procurement auctions. In this research, I study a model of first price sealed bid procurement auctions with asymmetric bidders. I demonstrate that the equilibrium to the model is unique and describe three algorithms that can be used to compute the inverse equilibrium bid functions. I then use the computational algorithms to compare competitive and collusive bidding. The algorithms are useful for structural estimation of auction models and for assessing the damages from bid-rigging. Received: January 14, 2000; revised version: February 28, 2001     

More on phantom bidding

Summary. A phantom bidding model is analyzed for a sale auction. The following issues are addressed: the effects of phantom bidding on overall social welfare and buyers' profits. It is shown that social welfare may increase or decrease as the auctioneer switches from the fixed reserve price policy to phantom bidding. The buyers' profits will increase whenever social welfare increases. Received: November 4, 1998; revised version: February 8, 1999     

The analytics of search with posted prices

Summary. This paper investigates the characteristics of the optimal posted price in the standard sequential search paradigm. Much of the intuition gleaned from the extensive sequential search literature in which the seller adopts a reservation price does not carry over to the posted price setting. For example, an increase in buyer valuations can lead to a reduction in the optimal posted price. We do, however, provide sufficient conditions on the hazard rate function h which ensure that an increase in demand induces an increase in the optimal posted price. As exhibited herein, the analysis of the posted price model depends critically upon analytical properties of h. Amongst the issues treated are the elasticity of demand, finite horizon, sale of multiple units, and competitive equilibrium. Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: March 7, 2000     

The option of joint purchase in vertically differentiated markets

Summary. Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978) for modelling quality differentiation, consumers are assumed to make mutually exclusive purchases. A unique pure strategy equilibrium exists in this case. In this note, we allow consumers to buy simultaneously different variants of the differentiated good. We call this the “joint purchase option”. The paper proposes a detailed analysis of price competition when this option is opened: first, we show that either uniqueness, or multiplicity, or absence of price equilibrium arise, depending on the utility derived from joint purchase relative to exclusive purchase. Second, we characterize these equilibria, whenever they exist. Received: July 25, 2001; revised version: October 21, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The second author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from Interuniversity Attraction Pole Program- Belgian State- Federal Office for Scientific, Technical and Cultural Affairs under contract PAI 5/26. Correspondence to: X.Y. Wauthy     

Boiteux's solution to the shifting-peak problem and the equilibrium price density in continuous time

Summary. Bewley's condition on production sets, imposed to ensure the existence of an equilibrium price density when is the commodity space, is weakened to allow applications to continuous-time problems, and especially to peak-load pricing when the users' utility and production functions are Mackey continuous. A general form for production sets with the required property is identified, and examples are given of technologies which meet the weakened but not the original condition: these include industrial use and storage of cyclically priced goods. This gives a framework for settling Boiteux's conjecture on the shifting-peak problem. To make clear the restriction implicit in Mackey continuity, we interpret it as interruptibility of demand; and we point out that, without this assumption, the equilibrium can feature pointed peaks with singular, instantaneous capacity charges. The general equilibrium results are supplemented by results for prices supporting individual consumer or producer optima. Received: February 16, 2000; revised version: July 7, 2001     

Profitability of price and quantity strategies in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation

Using a model according to Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) we consider a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a two-stage game in a duopolistic industry in which the products of the firms are vertically differentiated. In the industry, there are a high quality firm and a low quality firm. In the first stage of the game, the firms choose their strategic variables, price or quantity. In the second stage, they determine the levels of their strategic variables. We will show that, under an assumption about distribution of consumers' preference, we obtain the result that is similar to Singh and Vives (1984)' proposition (their Proposition 3) in the case of substitutes with nonlinear demand functions. That is, in the first stage of the game, a quantity strategy dominates a price strategy for both firms. Received: April 23, 1999; revised version: May 31, 2000     

Indeterminacy in a small open economy with endogenous labor supply

Summary. We establish conditions under which indeterminacy can occur in a small open economy business cycle model with endogenous labor supply. Indeterminacy requires small externalities in technologies with social constant returns to scale, independently of the intertemporal elasticities in both consumption and labor. Received: December 12, 2001; revised version: May 17, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"The paper has benefited from discussions with Jess Benhabib and Mark Weder, as well as from the comments of an anonymous referee. Correspondence to: Q. Meng     

Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

   Summary. A no-show paradox occurs each time a single voter or a group of voters can manipulate the outcome by not participating to the election process. Among other voting procedures, the scoring run-off methods, which eliminate progressively the alternatives on the basis of scoring rules, suffer from this flaw. We here estimate how frequent this paradox is for three candidate elections under the classical Impartial Culture and Impartial Anonymous Culture assumptions, for different population sizes. The conditions under which this paradox occurs are also described, as well as the relationships with manipulations for a fixed number of voters. Received: October 21, 1999; revised version: January 12, 2000     

The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information

This paper extends the analysis of the n-player all-pay auction with complete information to cover the case of m≤n prizes, valued in weakly decreasing order, but symmetrically across players. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium distributions for this class of auctions and provide an exact expression for the expected revenue generated.     

Price discrimination and price dispersion in a duopoly

This paper analyses the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e. the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market.     

Endogenous technological change with leisure-dependent utility

Summary. This paper investigates the effect of introducing leisure-dependent utility into two models of endogenous technological change. Due to the flexibility in the labour supply the dynamics of the models change significantly. It is shown that if agents attach enough value to leisure in comparison to consumption two balanced growth paths may exist. This implies that economies with the same preferences and the same technology may experience different long-run growth rates. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 6, 1999     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Macro foundations of micro-economics

This paper attempts to circumvent the nonsense of the representative agent which arises in macroeconomics. It recognises that macro data are relevant to agents' decisions, and so excess demands should contain macro variables as arguments. The macro variables I consider are the price index, unemployment and GNP. This paper should be regarded as a tentative beginning to make macroeconomic theory literate. Received: September 19, 2001; revised version: July 24, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"I am delighted to contribute to this Festschrift for Mordecai now that he has reached the appropriate age.     

A formal model of theory choice in science

Summary. Since the work of Thomas Kuhn, the role of social factors in the scientific enterprise has been a major concern in the philosophy and history of science. In particular, conformity effects among scientists have been used to question whether science naturally progresses over time. Using neoclassical economic reasoning, this paper develops a formal model of scientific theory choice which incorporates social factors. Our results demonstrate that the influence of social factors on scientific progress is more complex than previously thought. The patterns of theory choice predicted by the model seem consistent with historical episodes of theory change. Received: April 8, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998     

The limit theorem on the core of a production economy in vector lattices with unordered preferences

Summary. We prove Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw's (1987) theorem on the equivalence of Edgeworth production equilibria and pseudo-equilibria in a more general setting. We consider production economies with unordered preferences and general consumption sets in a vector lattice commodity space. We adapt the approach of Mas-Colell and Richard (1991) and prove our theorem by applying a separating hyperplane argument in the space of all allocations. We also generalize Podczeck's (1996) important result on the relationship between continuous and discontinuous equilibrium prices to the case of production. Received: April 18, 1997; revised version: February 6, 1998     

Allocating multiple units

Summary. This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution in multi-unit, combinatorial-bid auctions under complete information. We focus on the natural multi-unit analogue of the first-price auction, where buyers bid total payments, pay their bids, and where the seller allocates goods to maximize his revenue. While there are many equilibria in this auction, only efficient equilibria remain when the truthful equilibrium restriction of the menu-auction literature is used. Focusing on these equilibria we first show that the first-price auction just described is revenue and outcome equivalent to a Vickrey auction, which is the multi unit analogue of a second-price auction. Furthermore, we characterize these equilibria when valuations take a number of different forms: diminishing marginal valuations, increasing average valuations, and marginal valuations with single turning points. Received: December 23, 1999; revised version: December 10, 2001