Declining State Funding and Efficiency Effects on Public Higher Education: Government Really Does Matter

A stochastic cost frontier with inefficiency effects is estimated to investigate the impacts of decreases in state funding support on the operating efficiency of public colleges and universities in the U.S. Panel data for 378 institutions spanning 10 academic years, 2004 through 2013, captures the efficiency effects of declines in state funding from 32 % to 23 %. There are several improvements over early work of like kind that was, however, confined to four academic years, 2005 through 2008, and could not account for the accelerated effects of state funding decreases that followed the financial crisis. Inefficiency effects are extended to include both private giving as a substitute revenue source and federally funded Pell Grants. Empirical results are robust and support the notion that government does matter. Decreases in state funding create inefficiency in producing public higher education. Results also suggest the same for private giving and Pell Grant support, although the former was statistically weak at best. On the cost side, the results, not surprisingly, indicate that university administrators held costs down with hiring increases in non-tenure track faculty and staff relative to tenure track and tenured faculty.     

Does Distribution Matter? Efficiency, Equity and Flexibility in Greenhouse Gas Abatement

This paper analyses banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission rights within the framework ofa simple, integrated assessment model. Breaking the world economy in just two regionsit will be shown: (1) Increasing intertemporal flexibility in greenhouse gasabatement through banking and borrowing ofcarbon emission permits has a positive effecton welfare for regions with a poor endowment incarbon emission rights, but negatively affectsrich-endowed regions. (2) Intergenerationalfairness advocates intertemporal flexibility ingreenhouse gas abatement, irrespectively of theinitial allocation of carbon rights. (3)Optimal carbon accumulation is not independentof the initial allocation of carbon rights. Different initial sharing rules clearlyinfluence the development of atmospheric carbonconcentration.     

The Role of Market Size in the Formation of Jurisdictions

Administrative and political reorganization is being actively debated even in the mature, stable economies of Western Europe. This paper investigates the possibility that such a reorganization is tied to the integration of economic markets. The paper describes a model where heterogeneous individuals form coalitions for the provision of a public good and shows that the number and composition of these jurisdictions depend on the overall size of the market. The range of economic activities engaged in by jurisdiction members increases when the size of the market increases, and so does the range of their preferences over the public good. The result is a change in the endogenous borders of the jurisdictions, and a reorganization of all coalitions. The optimal number of jurisdictions is unique and increases with market size. In the absence of compensating transfers, however, the decentralized equilibrium need not be optimal and is not unique, although     

税收竞争的效率与规范

政府收入最大化不符合效率的要求。西方经济理论中一个基本的观点是,在市场作为资源基础性配置手段的条件下,政府的职能是弥补市场的失灵和不足,满足社会公共需要,如抑制垄断、解决信息不对称、提供公共产品、消除坏的外部效应等。政府要履行以上职能,必然需要一定的财力支,一定条件下政府的职能一定,那么中央政府聚集的收入也就应该有一个客观的界限,并非是越大越好。中央政府的收入最大化要求,如果与经济发展水平相适应,与增长的公共需求相匹配,也无可厚非。     

Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does Random Tax Policy Discourage Investment

We consider the impact of tax policy uncertainty on firm level and aggregate investment, comparing investment behaviour when uncertainty is due to a shock following Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) versus when random discrete jumps in tax policy occur. Expectations of the likelihood of a tax policy switch have an important negative impact on the gain to delaying investment in the latter model and time to investment can fall with increasing tax policy uncertainty. Aggregate investment simulations indicate that capital formation is adversely affected by increases in uncertainty in the traditional GBM model but can be enhanced in the jump process model.     

Efficiency of Tax Collection and Tax Management in Taiwan's Local Tax Offices

This study investigated the performance of individual departments and the efficiency of resource utilization in tax offices. The results can be used to improve the performance of tax offices and to increase tax revenues. In this study, the operational flow of local tax offices was divided into two stages: tax collection and tax management. Network data envelopment analysis (NDEA) and a Russell directional distance function were used to evaluate operating efficiency in departments of 20 Taiwanese local tax offices for 2013. The results indicated that, first, efficiency was significantly different for tax collection and tax management. Second, the input inefficiency of tax collection was mainly due to total floor area, which was 15% larger than required, and the input inefficiency of tax management was mainly due to total floor area (23% larger than required), followed by direct labour input (19% larger than required). Finally, on average, the amount of collected property transfer taxes was 23% smaller than required. The model used in the present study included undesirable outputs. The findings indicated that the highest levels of overall inefficiency were due to inability to collect taxes (intermediate outputs) in Hsinchu County (9.27%), Chiayi County (3.25%) and Pingtung County (20.44%), which required reduction in the number of instances of inability to collect property taxes by 5619, 1258 and 12 350 cases, respectively. In total, 19 227 fewer cases of uncollectable property taxes in Taiwan would indicate improved arrears settlement and tax prevention measures.     

Tax Ratios in Macroeconomics: Do Taxes Really Matter?

In various empirical studies so-called tax ratios (tax revenues expressed as a ratio of some aggregate tax base) are employed as approximations for tax burdens. The most difficult problem in calculating tax ratios is the way in which personal income tax revenues are attributed to labour and capital. We argue that the methodology of Mendoza et al. (1994) is seriously flawed in this respect. Using information from national sources, we calculate more accurate tax ratios for eight OECD countries that differ substantially from those of Mendoza et al. (1997). Still, the results of the empirical analysis of Mendoza et al. (1997) do not change significantly if we use our tax ratios instead of those of Mendoza et al.. However, the results change once country specific effects are taken up in the model. Capital taxes are, e.g., shown to reduce economic growth. We find that the results of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) are neither sensitive to the use of the tax ratios nor to the specification of the model: high labour taxes have increased unemployment in Europe.     

Tax efficiency in selected Indian states

This paper attempts to measure pure tax efficiency of fifteen major Indian states (Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Haryana, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) for the period 1980–81 to 1992–93 in a manner that allows this efficiency to vary both across time as well as across states. It is discovered that there is a moral hazard problem in the design of central grants in that higher grants by the central government to the state governments reduce efficiency of tax collection by these states. The less poor states are more efficient in tax collection. The rankings of states by tax efficiency for the various years do not converge. An index of aggregate tax efficiency is calculated and it appears that this index has been stagnating. It is argued that the weight placed on tax effort in the formula determining central grants to state governments should be increased to improve tax efficiency of state governments. First version received: November 1997/final version received: November 1998     

Politics and Income Inequality: Does Politics Still Matter in New Democracies

Does politics still matter for reducing income inequality in new democracies? The standard explanation is that political institutions, in particular the left government and proportional representation, are negatively associated with income inequality among advanced industrial countries, but there have been so few studies attempting to explain the variation of distributional outcomes across new democracies. This article tests the hypotheses about the effects of political institutions on income inequality with unbalanced pooled time-series cross-sectional data that cover 26 fledgling democracies for 1975–2006. The evidence presented here suggests that, other things being equal, a parliamentary system and PR are substantially more likely to be associated with lower levels of income inequality, but a left government and more years of democracy do not appear to be related to lower income inequality.     

The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions

This paper shows how a popular system of federal revenue equalization grants can limit tax competition among subnational governments, correct fiscal externalities, and increase government spending. Remarkably, an equalization grant can implement efficient policy choices by regional governments, even in the presence of differences in regional tax capacity, tastes for public spending, and population. If aggregate tax bases are elastic, however, equalization leads to excessive taxation. Efficiency can be achieved by a modified formula that equalizes a fraction of local revenue deficiencies equal to the fraction of taxes that are shifted backward to factor suppliers.     

经济转轨时期投资需求的规模与效率

改革以来我国投资需求的实际变动过程与“钱纳里标准结构”相比，显示出很大的差异性，突出表现为投资率显偏高、投资规模过大。这种被人为拉大的投资需求的结果表现为低效率的投资形成过程。即存货增加在GDP中的比重过高、投资对经济增长的贡献质量不高。本从分析我国投资需求规模大而效率低的现象入手，指出低效率的政府投资需求过度是造成以上局面的主要原因，进而探讨了政府投资规模和范围调整的必要性。     

Scale Economies In Cellular Telephony: Size Matters

Strategic positioning and potential cost savings are popular explanations for growing consolidation in the wireless telephone industry. This research estimates economies of scale for a large panel of GTE Wireless cellular market areas. Contrary to previous findings, our results indicate scale economies exist throughout the system and provide a rationale for the industry trend of consolidation.     

最优银行业结构存在地区差异吗

以WBES提供的问卷调查数据开展实证研究后发现:在全样本下,银行业结构与中小企业受到融资约束的概率之间呈现U型相关,即存在最优的银行业结构;而江苏省的样本则体现出银行业结构越集中,中小企业受到融资约束的概率反而越小的特征。这些结论与传统上认为发展小银行有利于中小企业融资的观点不完全相符。进一步的分析表明,城市的信用环境改善、中小企业发展水平的提高以及大银行审批权的上升能推动最优银行业结构朝着大银行占比更高的方向变化。不同地区的最优银行业结构水平存在差异。因此,一个城市在构建有利于中小企业融资的银行业结构时,要充分关注地区差异的影响,寻找到适合本地的最优银行业结构。     

Production Efficiency and the Direct-Indirect Tax Mix

In the design of the optimal direct/indirect tax mix, the canonical view was laid by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) who showed that commodity taxes are unnecessary in an economy in which there is an optimal nonlinear income tax provided that commodities are separable from labor in the utility functions of all taxpayers, that the aggregators over these commodities are ordinally equivalent and that wages are fixed. When wages are endogenous, Naito (1999) showed that this result may not hold and in addition that production efficiency may not be Pareto optimal. Given an optimal nonlinear income tax, we show that production inefficiency is Pareto optimal if the aggregate technology set is strictly concave. The Atkinson–Stiglitz condition is neither necessary nor sufficient for zero commodity taxation and commodity taxes are part of almost all Pareto optima.     

国家软件产业基地的制度效率与规模效率评价:基于DEA的方法

以11个国家软件产业基地为研究对象，通过建立规范的评价相对效率的DEA模型。从制度效率和规模效率两个角度对它们进行了评价。基于这些评价结果，分析并指出，目前我国国家软件产业基地的数量仍然偏多。要发展我国软件因应该遵循资源集中、重点发展的思路，特色与制度环境是确定效率的关键要素；人为分割、缺乏协作是损害效率的重要原因；西部软件基地应加大制度建设力度，东部和南部软件基地应加大资源整合力度。     

公平与效率:资产证券化的税收政策取向

资产证券化作为当今国际资本市场上最具活力与最有效的一种金融工具正风靡全球,也进入了中国.资产证券化作为一项复杂的结构性融资安排,将受法律、税务、会计等多种制度的影响.本文力图在资产证券化税负分析框架的基础上,阐释税收作用机理,剖析我国税收政策缺失,探索税制优化路径.     

Energy Tax and Competition in Energy Efficiency: The Case of Consumer Durables

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of anenergy tax on technical improvements and on prices ofconsumer durables induced by strategic competition inenergy efficiency. If the gasoline tax is raised thisdoes in principle not affect the producers of carsbecause the motorist pays for it in terms of a highercost of using the car. This, however, affects the unitsales of car producers because of substitution towardsother modes of transportation. A second element ofreaction to energy price variation is an indirect oneand relates to the effect of energy prices ontechnology. Competition forces car producers todevelop more energy efficient cars in order to reducethe cost of using a car. This indirect effect canpartly offset the direct effect of higher energyprices on demand if it is profitable for theautomobile industry to engineer more energy efficientequipment. We will analyze the impact of an energy taxon energy efficiency and on the price of a durablegood. This will be done within the framework of aduopoly competing in prices and in the energyefficiency of its products. The government chooses awelfare maximizing energy tax as an incentive toinnovate. Then we will analyze a strategic two-stagedecision process in which the duopolists first decideabout energy efficiency and then compete in prices.