Bonus pay for teachers,spatial sorting,and student achievement

Bonus pay policy for teachers in the U.S. is analyzed in this paper. We quantitatively argue that, because of the decentralized education finance system in the U.S., this policy may lead to higher teacher and household sorting across school districts. This then may lead to higher variance of achievement and lower mean achievement. Formally, we use an equilibrium political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous in exogenously set income, and teachers, heterogeneous in exogenously set quality, are endogenously allocated across two school districts. Public education expenditures, which includes teachers’ wage payment and non-teacher related education spending, are financed through local income taxation. Income tax rate in each district is determined via majority voting. Achievement depends on the efforts chosen by teachers and non-teacher related education spending. Teacher efficiency wage per unit of quality is determined at the national teacher labor market. We first calibrate our benchmark model by matching certain statistics from the U.S. data. Then in a computational experiment, we introduce bonus pay for teachers which rises with average achievement. We find that for the recently observed level of average bonus pay (6.59% of average base salary), variance of achievement is 2.46% higher and mean achievement is 1.79% lower than the benchmark. Variance of achievement reaches its peak when average bonus pay is 14.06% and then it starts falling. Also, mean achievement always falls as average bonus pay rises.     

Industry specific effects in investment performance and valuation of firms

A necessary criterion for a performance measure in corporate governance is the degree to which it mirrors how well the management succeeds in maximizing firm value. Such a performance measure is marginal q which links changes in firm value to the investments undertaken by the management. Empirical studies of investment and performance based on marginal q have demonstrated the usefulness of this measure. Most research however, has mainly focused on long-term performance. This paper takes a short-term perspective and, based on the marginal q-theory, considers how firms’ market values change in the extreme stock price cycle of a stock market bubble. Using a data set of listed Swedish corporations we find an anomaly in form of a new industry specific effect that, in addition to investment, explains changes in firm value.

Privatizing public services and strategic behavior: The impact of incentives to reduce workers' compensation claim duration

During the 1990s, the state of Ohio contracted out Workers' Compensation (WC) case management, incorporating a large bonus payment intended to reward reduced claim duration. The bonus is essentially a decreasing function of average days away from work, excluding claims longer than 15 months. In response, duration is predicted to decrease for claims with moderate injuries and increase for some severe claims so that claimants will miss more than 15 months of work and be excluded from the calculation. I show that contractors increased duration for severe claims but find no evidence that contractors successfully reduced duration for moderate claims. However, contractors received large bonus payments. This is likely because the financial reward to merely excluding a small share of severe claims from the calculation of the bonus payment is large enough to enable TCMs to receive the full bonus. These contractor responses are inconsistent with state intentions, suggesting public entities should anticipate strategic behavior when crafting performance-based incentives.     

Reducing Teacher Moral Hazard in the U.S. Elementary and Secondary Educational System through Merit-pay: An Application of the Principal–Agency Theory

America’s elementary and secondary educational system is faced with an inefficiency stemming from a basic problem associated with unobservability: moral hazard. In this case, the teacher (agent) has an incentive to exert less effort (given cost associated with more work) if the school district (principal) cannot distinguish between low student performance due to a lack of teacher effort and low student performance due low student quality (random variable). This research develops an optimal incentive scheme that guarantees the teacher a fixed payment, plus a variable payment that would be a function of teacher ‘action’ variables thereby reducing moral hazard.

The State,Public Policy and Heterodox Economics: An Introduction

While most heterodox economists endorse some amount of policy activism, there is no unified conception of the state and public policy in heterodox economics. To help clarify the similarities and differences within heterodoxy – and between heterodox and mainstream economics – a panel addressing this subject was convened in 2007 at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Institutional Thought. This article introduces the essays prepared for that symposium. They include an examination of the position of Marx and Engels, a clarification of the institutionalist views of Veblen and Commons, an outline of the perspective of Post Keynesian Institutionalism, and an account of some essential contributions of Classical Pragmatism (a major school of thought within the philosophy of science). The collection advances what Robert Heilbroner called “the worldly philosophy” by seeking to understand the role of the state in a world where institutions, defined broadly as social habits, adjust to other institutions.

Some Empirical Evidence of the Efficacy of Job Matching in Urban Labor Markets

Theory predicts that workers in cities are more likely to engage in job search, ceteris paribus, due to market efficiencies associated with greater job density. However, if job search is more efficient in urban markets, then the quality of a given job match should also tend to be higher in cities, ceteris paribus. Employed workers living in cities might then be expected to search less than their nonurban counterparts. In this latter instance, it is not city residency itself that makes search less likely, but rather the positive correlation between city residency and job match quality. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979, this prediction is confirmed: The estimated coefficient on an indicator of urban residency is found to be near zero and statistically insignificant in models of employed search that omit proxies for job match quality. When job match proxies are included in the models, the estimated coefficient on urban residency becomes positive and highly significant. This result suggests that workers are not only more likely to engage in employed search in urban labor markets, but also tend to find more productive job matches in cities over time.

Is Pragmatism Good for Anything? Towards a Theory of Impractical Economics

This article discusses the relationship between classical pragmatism, political economy and economic policy. Classical pragmatism is contrasted with vulgar meanings and uses of the term pragmatism. Classical pragmatism aims at a deep, substantive theoretical understanding of real-world economic systems and supports application of well-warranted claims to knowledge to improve the human condition. The article reviews the contributions of the founder of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce, to the areas of ontology and epistemology as well as their further development by contemporary classical pragmatist philosopher Susan Haack. Hilary Putnam’s argument that we can have ethics without ontology and objectivity without objects is then critiqued. We need ethics based on an ontology that is rooted in actual human experience; this provides better guidance for evaluating policy proposals. The paper concludes by discussing the affinity of classical pragmatism with different approaches to political economy and policy.

Imagination and society. The affective side of institutions

Since the contributions by D. North [(1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: CUP] and his Nobel Prize lecture [(1994). Economic performance through time, Nobel Prize Lecture. The American Economic Review, 84(3), 359–368], the relationship between mind and institutions has been increasingly investigated by economists. Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq [(2004). Learning, institutions, and economic performance. Perspectives on Politics, 2(1), 75–84] introduced the expression cognitive institutionalism in order to define this stream of research. In the first part of the paper we discuss some recent findings of the cognitive approach to institutions and its roots in the history of economic ideas. We also claim that in such an approach, no place has yet been found for a crucial faculty of the human mind, imagination. We then explore the concept of radical imaginary developed by Cornelius Castoriadis in his book The Imaginary Institution of Society (1975; 1987). From the perspective of cognitive economics, and on the grounds of Castoriadis’ legacy, we aim at highlighting some basic mechanisms of interaction between imagination, affectivity and institutions.

后危机时代上市公司高管薪酬制度研究——风险控制的长效激励模式

本文通过分析金融危机中上市公司高管薪酬的特点,提出满足高管薪酬特殊性、风险管理特殊性和长期激励公平性的风险控制长效激励模式。该模式由薪酬主要关联因素、薪酬基础部分和薪酬风险控制激励部分组成,通过具体的制度安排,对短期薪酬、长期薪酬和福利进行调整,实现风险控制和长效激励的目标,具体涉及降低现金奖金、延期奖金机制、设定合理业绩、业绩股票组合及补充养老保险。该模式对于后危机时代高管薪酬制度改革具有一定现实意义。     

企业绩效评估与薪酬决策

目前很多企业尚无可信的行业绩效考评标准和绩效考核制度,企业无法合理确定职工工资。要解决这一问题,就要健全、合理地确定奖酬制度的步骤,并针对性地采取切实可行的措施。     

CEO turnover, firm performance, and enterprise reform in China: Evidence from micro data

In this paper, we use unique data on China's listed firms from 1998 to 2002 to show that CEO turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm performance, although the magnitude of the relationship is modest. In addition, we find that this turnover-performance link is weaker for listed firms that are still controlled by the state and those that have a relatively weak non-state controlling shareholder. In contrast, the appointment of independent directors enhances the turnover-performance link. Moreover, the listing suspension mechanism, adopted by China's securities regulatory agency, appears to be effective in improving the turnover-performance tie. Finally, listed firms with CEOs holding additional positions among the controlling shareholders have a weaker turnover-performance link. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 796–817.     

You Don't Always Get What You Pay For: Bonuses,Perceived Income and Effort

Abstract. Consider a principal–agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce effort and thus the probability of success. The reason is that bonuses increase the perceived income of the agent and can hence reduce his willingness to exert effort. This perceived income effect has to be weighed against the incentive effect of the bonus. The tradeoff is determined by the marginal effect of effort on the success probability in relation to this probability itself (success hazard‐rate of effort). The paper also discusses practical implications of the finding.     

Austrian themes,data, and sports economics

This paper uses data from Major League Baseball and themes from Moneyball by Michael Lewis to empirically illustrate Kirznerian entrepreneurship. While Kirzner envisioned competition in markets for profit, the sports economics literature shows that sporting competition has things in common with market competition. This is important because a strength of sports economics, namely, the abundant data, can help overcome a perceived weakness of Austrian economics, namely, the lack of empirical content. This paper describes and empirically confirms how certain front office decision makers of the Oakland Athletics were alert to opportunities that were being overlooked by other baseball executives.

Demand by product characteristics: measuring solar cell quality over time

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of innovation quality as a success factor of companies that satisfy demand in government-subsidized science-based markets. This paper focuses on the Photovoltaic market in Germany as a case study. It carries out the analysis in three stages. First, the efficiency of photovoltaic product characteristics is examined using data envelopment analysis (DEA). Second, by means of a metric re-scaling approach, the technical improvement of solar modules offered on the German market is analyzed over time. Next, the results of the second stage are compared to demand growth (evolution of market shares). In conclusion, it can be shown that innovation quality in science-based markets is often an explanation of long-term growth, but occasionally a reduction of performance characteristics meets demand.

INDUCING VARIETY: A THEORY OF INNOVATION CONTESTS

This article analyzes the design of innovation contests when the quality of an innovation depends on the research approach, but the best approach is unknown. Inducing a variety of research approaches generates an option value. We show that suitable contests can induce such variety. The buyer‐optimal contest is a bonus tournament, where suppliers can choose only between a low bid and a high bid. This contest implements the socially optimal variety for a suitable parameter range. Finally, we compare the optimal contest to scoring auctions and fixed‐prize tournaments.     

Coordination, “Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game

Previous experimental studies have documented quick convergence to equilibrium play in market entry games with a large number of agents. The present study examines the effect of the available information in a 12-player game in an attempt to account for these findings. In line with the prediction of a simple reinforcement learning model (Roth and Erev, 1995,Games Econ. Behav.8, 164–212), quick convergence to equilibrium is observed even given minimal information (unknown payoff rule). However, in violation of the basic model, information concerning other players' payoff increases the number of entrants. The information effect can be described by a variant of the basic reinforcement learning model assuming that the additional information changes the player's reference point.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C7, C92.     

Seize the state, seize the day: state capture and influence in transition economies

Data from the 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey is used to examine state capture and influence in transition economies. We find that a capture economy has emerged in many transition countries, where rent-generating advantages are sold by public officials and politicians to private firms. While influence is a legacy of the past inherited by large, incumbent firms with existing ties to the state, state capture is a strategic choice made primarily by large de novo firms competing against influential incumbents. Captor firms, in high-capture economies, enjoy private advantages in terms of more protection of their own property rights and superior firm performance. Despite the private gains to captor firms, state capture is associated at the aggregate level with social costs in the form of weaker economy-wide firm performance. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 751–773.     

WHY IS CASH (STILL) SO ENTRENCHED? INSIGHTS FROM CANADIAN SHOPPING DIARIES

One similarity among many developed economies is the predominance of cash over electronic payments in terms of payment frequency, especially for the low‐value transactions that are the bulk of retail payments. We use the Bank of Canada's 2009 Methods‐of‐Payment Survey, which collected information on consumers' payment choices through shopping diaries, to estimate a simple model of choice between cash and other payment methods. Results suggest that the main reasons cash is still a popular payment instrument in Canada, especially for low‐value transactions, are its wide acceptance among merchants compared with other alternatives, speed and ease of use, and low marginal cost when on hand. (JEL E41, D12, L81)     

How Successful Has Chinese Enterprise Reform Been? Pitfalls in Opposite Biases and Focus

We analyze two new data sets: one on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and another on town and village enterprises (IVEs). We find zero TFP growth in SOEs and positive TFP growth in COEs. The evidence suggests that the positive TFP growth in SOEs found by some recent studies might be due to underdeflation of gross output and overdeflation of intermediate inputs. The criterion for successful SOE reform should also include intertemporal efficiency and SOEs′ contribution so macroeconomic stability. Increases in technical efficiency do not necessarily improve SOEs′ financial performance. SOE personnel have received an increasing proportion of value added, hence creating a fiscal crisis for the state. J. Comp. Econom., June 1994, 18(3), pp. 410-437. University of California, Davis, California 95616; Fort Lewis College, Durango, Colorado 81301; University of California, Davis, California 95616; and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100836, People′s Republic of China.     

A critique of the new comparative economics

We examine the “new comparative economics” as proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) and their use of the concept of an institutional possibilities frontier. While we agree with their general argument that one must consider a variety of institutions and their respective social costs, including legal systems and cultural characteristics, when comparing the performance of different economic systems, we find various complications and difficulties with the framework they propose. We propose that a broader study of clusters of institutions and such newly emerging forms as the new traditional economy may be better suited as ways to approach the study of comparative economics in the era after the breakdown of the old comparison of market capitalism and command socialism that came to an end with the breakup of the Soviet Union.