Strategy as revolution

How often does the strategic-planning process start with senior executives asking what the rest of the organization can teach them about the future? Not often enough, argues Gary Hamel. In many companies, strategy making is an elitist procedure and ?strategy? consists of nothing more than following the industry's rules. But more and more companies, intent on overturning the industrial order, are rewriting those rules. What can industry incumbents do? Either surrender the future to revolutionary challengers or revolutionize the way their companies create strategy. What is needed is not a tweak to the traditional strategic-planning process, Hamel says, but a new philosophical foundation: strategy is revolution. Hamel offers ten principles to help a company think about the challenge of creating truly revolutionary strategies. Perhaps the most fundamental principle is that so-called strategic planning doesn't produce true strategic innovation. The traditional planning process is little more than a rote procedure in which deeply held assumptions and industry conventions are reinforced rather than challenged. Such a process harnesses only a tiny proportion of an organization's creative potential. If there is to be any hope of industry revolution, senior managers must give up their monopoly on the creation of strategy. They must embrace a truly democratic process that can give voice to the revolutionaries that exist in every company. If senior managers are unwilling to do this, employees must become strategy activists. The opportunities for industry revolution are mostly unexplored. One thing is certain: if you don't let the revolutionaries challenge you from within, they will eventually challenge you from without--in the marketplace.     

Stop making plans; start making decisions

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.     

The perfect message at the perfect moment

Marketers planning promotional campaigns ask questions to boost the odds that the messages will be accepted: Who should receive each message? What should be its content? How should we deliver it? The one question they rarely ask is, when should we deliver it? That's too bad, because in marketing, timing is arguably the most important variable of all. Indeed, there are moments in a customer's relationship with a business when she wants to communicate with that business because something has changed. If the company contacts her with the right message in the right format at the right time, there's a good chance of a warm reception. The question of "when" can be answered by a new computer-based model called "dialogue marketing," which is, to date, the highest rung on an evolutionary ladder that ascends from database marketing to relationship marketing to one-to-one marketing. Its principle advantages over older approaches are that it is completely interactive, exploits many communication channels, and is "relationship aware": that is, it continuously tracks every nuance of the customer's interaction with the business. Thus, dialogue marketing responds to each transition in that relationship at the moment the customer requires attention. Turning a traditional marketing strategy into a dialogue-marketing program is a straightforward matter. Begin by identifying the batch communications you make with customers, then ask yourself what events could trigger those communications to make them more timely. Add a question or call to action to each message and prepare a different treatment or response for each possible answer. Finally, create a series of increasingly urgent calls to action that kick in if the question or call to action goes unanswered by the customer. As dialogue marketing proliferates, it may provide the solid new footing that Madison Avenue seeks.     

A situational analysis of how barriers to systemic failure are undermined during accident sequences

The concept of barriers to accident sequences is an important one in reasoning about the ways in which risks in a system can be reduced to acceptable levels. An attempt was made to characterize the phenomena that, in practice, undermine such barriers. This involved an analysis of 50 accident reports from the hydrocarbons drilling industry. The analysis characterized the barriers that had failed in terms of their source and effect, and it identified what had undermined them – concentrating on aspects of the situation, rather than the dispositions of the people involved in the accidents. These undermining phenomena varied widely, but in general there was some element that made them intrinsically difficult for designers of systems to discern: for example, the indirectness of causal paths in which some aspect of the design induced some behaviour on the part of an operator, which then created some condition that circumvented the action of a barrier. In a few cases it was the barrier itself that lay at the start of this causal path, making the barrier essentially self-limiting. A simple planning tool was developed to exploit this analysis by helping system designers reason about the ways in which the barriers they incorporate are vulnerable to being defeated.     

Financial Flexibility and Opportunity Capture: Bridging the Gap Between Finance and Strategy

Logically, the practice of corporate finance and corporate strategy should be closely coordinated, but in reality there remains a massive gap between the two. This can lead strategically oriented firms to de‐emphasize or even discard NPV. Neither financial theory nor competitive strategy has been very open to the economic value of investment opportunity capture. Strategy must recognize that financial flexibility provides powerful advantages and financial theory must evaluate entire strategic programs rather than discrete, stand‐alone projects. Necessarily, the financial discussion of cost of capital and capital structure has to change. The authors offer two specific concepts to bridge the Gap between Finance and Strategy: 1) Reserve Financial Capacity is the annual sum of Free Cash Flow, Financing Flexibility and Cash Reserves over the period envisioned for strategy execution. Individual projects must belong to strategic programs in the sense that they either: 1) keep the base business running; 2) preserve an existing competitive position; or 3) form part of a program to enhance advantage or fashion a strategic breakout. 2) Strategically Sustainable Cost of Capital is the true, blended cost of capital required to complete an entire capital program. These concepts provide financial rigor to firms with well‐defined strategies and allow managements to wield Financial Flexibility as a strategic weapon, creating options on unique buying opportunities, such as at the bottom of industry cycles.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Developing your leadership pipeline

Why do so many newly minted leaders fail so spectacularly? Part of the problem is that in many companies, succession planning is little more than creating a list of high-potential employees and the slots they might fill. It's a mechanical process that's too narrow and hidebound to uncover and correct skill gaps that can derail promising young executives. And it's completely divorced from organizational efforts to transform managers into leaders. Some companies, however, do succeed in building a steady, reliable pipeline of leadership talent by marrying succession planning with leadership development. Eli Lilly, Dow Chemical, Bank of America, and Sonoco Products have created long-term processes for managing the talent roster throughout their organizations--a process Conger and Fulmer call succession management. Drawing on the experiences of these best-practice organizations, the authors outline five rules for establishing a healthy succession management system: Focus on opportunities for development, identify linchpin positions, make the system transparent, measure progress regularly, and be flexible. In Eli Lilly's "action-learning" program, high-potential employees are given a strategic problem to solve so they can learn something of what it takes to be a general manager. The company--and most other best-practice organizations--also relies on Web-based succession management tools to demystify the succession process, and it makes employees themselves responsible for updating the information in their personnel files. Best-practice organizations also track various metrics that reveal whether the right people are moving into the right jobs at the right time, and they assess the strengths and weaknesses not only of individuals but of the entire group. These companies also expect to be tweaking their systems continually, making them easier to use and more responsive to the needs of the organization.     

Strategic Management Thinking and Practice in the Public Sector: A Strategic Planning for All Seasons?

This paper explores how strategic management thinking manifests itself in strategic management practice in the public sector. Mintzberg's framework of ten strategic management schools of thought is chosen for mapping strategic management thinking. The paper analyses a convenience sample of 35 strategic management processes, observation of an agency's strategy reformulation process and interviews of managers in the public sector in Norway for informing the discussion. Strategic planning is heavily criticised in some of the business strategy literature. The analysis indicates that strategic management in the public sector extensively uses strategic planning, bundled with certain other schools of thought, despite tendencies to downplay formal, mechanistic planning in contemporary strategic management theory.     

Factors influencing the role of management accounting in the development of performance measures within organizational change programs

Many companies are undergoing organizational changes encompassing innovative approaches to organizing production processes, restructuring work practices and developing new planning and control mechanisms. This paper explores the role that management accounting played in the development of performance measurement systems within five organizations implementing change programs. The major case study is of a large manufacturing firm undertaking changes which included the development of team structures, the adoption of a customer-focused strategy and the implementation of new performance measurement systems. In this company, a lack of integration of operational performance measures with strategic priorities contributed to poor integration of team activities with overall strategy. The paper proposes five interrelated factors that may help explain the extent to which management accountants contribute to the development of integrated performance measures and change programs. Case evidence drawn from a further four firms is presented to provide some validation of conclusions drawn from the primary case study.     

Strategy under uncertainty

At the heart of the traditional approach to strategy lies the assumption that by applying a set of powerful analytic tools, executives can predict the future of any business accurately enough to allow them to choose a clear strategic direction. But what happens when the environment is so uncertain that no amount of analysis will allow us to predict the future? What makes for a good strategy in highly uncertain business environments? The authors, consultants at McKinsey & Company, argue that uncertainty requires a new way of thinking about strategy. All too often, they say, executives take a binary view: either they underestimate uncertainty to come up with the forecasts required by their companies' planning or capital-budging processes, or they overestimate it, abandon all analysis, and go with their gut instinct. The authors outline a new approach that begins by making a crucial distinction among four discrete levels of uncertainty that any company might face. They then explain how a set of generic strategies--shaping the market, adapting to it, or reserving the right to play at a later time--can be used in each of the four levels. And they illustrate how these strategies can be implemented through a combination of three basic types of actions: big bets, options, and no-regrets moves. The framework can help managers determine which analytic tools can inform decision making under uncertainty--and which cannot. At a broader level, it offers executives a discipline for thinking rigorously and systematically about uncertainty and its implications for strategy.     

Optimal dividend policies for a class of growth-restricted diffusion processes under transaction costs and solvency constraints

In this paper, we consider a company whose surplus follows a rather general diffusion process and whose objective is to maximize expected discounted dividend payments. With each dividend payment, there are transaction costs and taxes, and it is shown in Paulsen (Adv. Appl. Probab. 39:669?C689, 2007) that under some reasonable assumptions, optimality is achieved by using a lump sum dividend barrier strategy, i.e., there is an upper barrier $\bar{u}^{*}$ and a lower barrier $\underline{u}^{*}$ so that whenever the surplus reaches $\bar{u}^{*}$ , it is reduced to $\underline{u}^{*}$ through a dividend payment. However, these optimal barriers may be unacceptably low from a solvency point of view. It is argued that, in that case, one should still look for a barrier strategy, but with barriers that satisfy a given constraint. We propose a solvency constraint similar to that in Paulsen (Finance Stoch. 4:457?C474, 2003); whenever dividends are paid out, the probability of ruin within a fixed time T and with the same strategy in the future should not exceed a predetermined level ??. It is shown how optimality can be achieved under this constraint, and numerical examples are given.     

Charting your company's future

Few companies have a clear strategic vision. The problem, say the authors, stems from the strategic-planning process itself, which usually involves preparing a large document, culled from a mishmash of data provided by people with conflicting agendas. That kind of process almost guarantees an unfocused strategy. Instead, companies should design the strategic-planning process by drawing a picture: a strategy canvas. A strategy canvas shows the strategic profile of your industry by depicting the various factors that affect competition. And it shows the strategic profiles of your current and potential competitors as well as your own company's strategic profile--how it invests in the factors of competition and how it might in the future. The basic component of a strategy canvas--the value curve--is a tool the authors created in their consulting work and have written about in previous HBR articles. This article introduces a four-step process for actually drawing and discussing a strategy canvas. Readers will learn how one European financial services company used this process to create a distinct and easily communicable strategy. The process begins with a visual awakening. Managers compare their business's value curve with competitors' to discover where their strategy needs to change. In the next step--visual exploration--managers do field research on customers and alternative products. At the visual strategy fair, the third step, managers draw new strategic profiles based on field observations and get feedback from customers and peers about these new proposals. Once the best strategy is created from that feedback, it's time for the last step--visual communication. Executives distribute "before" and "after" strategic profiles to the whole company, and only projects that will help move the company closer to the "after" profile are supported.     

The Panzar–Rosse revenue test and market power in banking

The Panzar–Rosse H statistic is a commonly used measure of market power in banking. It is widely believed that $H>0$ is inconsistent with significant market power. This study rigorously disproves that perception. Instead, the possibility of $H>0$ under conditions of substantial market power turns out robust to the timing of banks’ actions, relative costs, choice of strategic variable, degree of product differentiation, strategy (static or dynamic), and degree of heterogeneity in banks’ conduct (collusive versus fringe), and hence may be common in practice.     

Realizing the promise of personalized medicine

Scientific advances have begun to give doctors the power to customize therapy for individuals. However, adoption of this approach has progressed slowly and unevenly because the trial-and-error treatment model still governs how the health care system develops, regulates, pays for, and delivers therapies. Aspinall, the president of Genzyme Genetics, and Hamermesh, chair of a Harvard Business School initiative to improve leadership in health care organizations, discuss the barriers to personalized medicine and suggest ways to overcome them. The blockbuster model for developing drugs, the authors point out, is still what most major pharmaceutical companies follow, even though its days are numbered. What the industry must embrace in its place is a business model based on a larger portfolio of targeted--and therefore more effective and profitable--treatments, not a limited palette of one-size-fits-all drugs. The current regulatory environment overemphasizes large-scale clinical trials of broad-based therapies. Instead, the focus should be on enrolling subpopulations, based on diagnostic testing, in trials of targeted drug treatments and on monitoring and assessing effectiveness after drugs are approved. A dysfunctional payment system complicates matters by rewarding providers for performance of procedures rather than for accurate diagnosis and effective prevention. Aspinall and Hamermesh call for coordinating regulation and reimbursement so that incentives are provided for the right outcomes. Finally, the authors urge changing physicians' habits through education about genomics, diagnostic testing, and targeted therapies. They say that medical schools and physician organizations must become committed advocates of personalized medicine so that patients and the medical industry can get all the benefits it offers.     

Lofty missions, down-to-earth plans

Most nonprofits make program decisions based on a mission rather than a strategy. They rally under the banner of a particular cause, be it "fight homelessness" or "end hunger." And since their causes are so worthwhile, they support any programs that are related--even tangentially--to their core missions. It's hard to fault people for trying to improve the state of the world, but that approach to making decisions is misguided. Acting without a clear long-term strategy can stretch an agency's core capabilities and push it in unintended directions. The fundamental problem is that many nonprofits don't have a strategy; instead, they have a mission and a portfolio of programs. But they hardly make deliberate decisions about which programs to run, which to drop, and which to turn down for funding. What most nonprofits call "strategy" is really just an intensive exercise in resource allocation and program management. This article outlines for nonprofits a four-step process for developing strategy. The first step is to create a broad, inspiring mission statement. The second step is to translate that core mission into a smaller, quantifiable operational mission. For instance, an agency whose core mission is to fight homelessness must decide if its focus is rural or urban and if it should concentrate on low-income housing loans or on establishing more shelters. The third step is to create a strategy platform; that is, the nonprofit decides how it will achieve its operational mission. Decisions about funding and about client, program, and organizational development are all made here. Once that platform is established, the nonprofit is ready to move to step four--making reasoned, strategic decisions about which programs to run and how to run them. The agency that follows these steps will improve its focus and its effectiveness at fulfilling its mission.     

战略群组与绩效关系的实证研究——以我国酒、饮料和精制茶制造业为例

基于消费品行业移动壁垒的特点,从竞争战略和企业资源两个维度选取相应变量指标对我国酒、饮料和精致茶制造业上市企业进行战略群组的划分,并进一步探索战略群组与绩效的关系。实证结果表明:战略群组间存在显著的绩效差异,对差异的来源进行剖析,得出明确清晰的战略定位才能给企业带来更多的效益。其中,采取低成本战略的群组绩效最优,差异化战略的群组次之,无明确战略定位的企业绩效最差。     

When to walk away from a deal

Deal making is glamorous; due diligence is not. That simple statement goes a long way toward explaining why so many companies have made so many acquisitions that have produced so little value. The momentum of a transaction is hard to resist once senior management has the target in its sights. Companies contract "deal fever," and due diligence all too often becomes an exercise in verifying the target's financial statements rather than conducting a fair analysis of the deal's strategic logic and the acquirer's ability to realize value from it. Seldom does the process lead managers to kill potential acquisitions, even when the deals are deeply flawed. In a recent Bain & Company survey of 250 international executives with M&A responsibilities, only 30% of them were satisfied with the rigor of their due diligence. And fully a third admitted they hadn't walked away from deals they had nagging doubts about. In this article, the authors, all Bain consultants, emphasize the importance of comprehensive due diligence practices and suggest ways companies can improve their capabilities in this area. They provide rich real-world examples of companies that have had varying levels of success with their due diligence processes, including Safeway, Odeon, American Sea-foods, and Kellogg's. Effective due diligence requires answering four basic questions: What are we really buying? What is the target's stand-alone value? Where are the synergies--and the skeletons? And what's our walk-away price? Each of these questions will prompt an even deeper level of querying that puts the broader, strategic rationale for acquisitions under a microscope. Successful acquirers pay close heed to the results of such in-depth investigations and analyses--to the extent that they are prepared to walk away from a deal, even in the very late stages of negotiations.     

Corporate Portfolio Management Roundtable

The dean of a top ten business school, the chair of a large investment management firm, two corporate M&A leaders, a CFO, a leading M&A investment banker, and a corporate finance advisor discuss the following questions:

• ? What are today's best practices in corporate portfolio management? What roles should be played by boards, senior managers, and business unit leaders?
• ? What are the typical barriers to successful implementation and how can they be overcome?
• ? Should portfolio management be linked to financial policies such as decisions on capital structure, dividends, and share repurchase?
• ? How should all of the above be disclosed to the investor community?

After acknowledging the considerable challenges to optimal portfolio management in public companies, the panelists offer suggestions that include:

• ? Companies should establish an independent group that functions like a “SWAT team” to support portfolio management. Such groups would be given access to (or produce themselves) business‐unit level data on economic returns and capital employed, and develop an “outside‐in” view of each business's standalone valuation.
• ? Boards should consider using their annual strategy “off‐sites” to explore all possible alternatives for driving share‐holder value, including organic growth, divestitures and acquisitions, as well as changes in dividends, share repurchases, and capital structure.
• ? Performance measurement and compensation frameworks need to be revamped to encourage line managers to think more like investors, not only seeking value‐creating growth but also making divestitures at the right time. CEOs and CFOs should take the lead in developing a shared value creation model that clearly articulates how capital will be allocated.

     

Information technology and the board of directors

Ever since the Y2K scare, boards have grown increasingly nervous about corporate dependence on information technology. Since then, computer crashes, denial of service attacks, competitive pressures, and the need to automate compliance with government regulations have heightened board sensitivity to IT risk. Unfortunately, most boards remain largely in the dark when it comes to IT spending and strategy, despite the fact that corporate information assets can account for more than 50% of capital spending. A lack of board oversight for IT activities is dangerous, the authors say. It puts firms at risk in the same way that failing to audit their books would. Companies that have established board-level IT governance committees are better able to control IT project costs and carve out competitive advantage. But there is no one-size-fits-all model for board supervision of a company's IT operations. The correct approach depends on what strategic "mode" a company is in whether its operations are extremely dependent on IT or not, and whether or not it relies heavily on keeping up with the latest technologies. This article spells out the conditions under which boards need to change their level of involvement in IT decisions, explaining how members can recognize their firms' IT risks and decide whether they should pursue more aggressive IT governance. The authors delineate what an IT governance committee should look like in terms of charter, membership, duties, and overall agenda. They also offer recommendations for developing IT policies that take into account an organization's operational and strategic needs and suggest what to do when those needs change. Given the dizzying pace of change in the world of IT, boards can't afford to ignore the state of their IT systems and capabilities. Appropriate board governance can go a long way toward helping a company avoid unnecessary risk and improve its competitive position.