The role of accounting conservatism in management forecast bias

We investigate whether management earnings forecasts fully incorporate information in historical accounting conservatism. We find that management earnings forecasts are more optimistic for firms with greater accounting conservatism in the previous year. We further examine whether this conservatism-related optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts varies with managers’ difficulty predicting earnings accurately, managers’ opportunistic incentives, and the firms’ litigation risk. We find that the negative association between management forecast errors and conservatism increases, to various extent, with the firms’ operating cycles, earnings volatility, and the width of forecast range but does not change with proxies for opportunistic incentives or litigation risk. These results suggest that forecast difficulty is the primary reason for managers’ failure to incorporate conservatism fully in their earnings forecasts.     

Serial Correlation in Management Earnings Forecast Errors

We examine whether management earnings forecast errors exhibit serial correlation and how analysts understand the serial correlation property of management forecast errors (MFEs). MFEs should not exhibit serial correlation if managers efficiently process information in prior forecast errors and truthfully convey their earnings expectations through management forecasts. However, for long‐horizon management forecasts of annual earnings, we find significantly positive serial correlation in MFEs, and sample self‐selection does not seem to drive this phenomenon. Further analyses suggest that managers’ unintentional information processing bias contributes to this positive serial correlation. Analysts anticipate the intertemporal persistence of MFEs but underestimate the persistence level when reacting to management forecasts. Our findings have implications for market participants who rely on management forecasts to form earnings expectations, and also shed light on the efficiency of managerial decision making.     

Management earnings forecasts and IPO performance: evidence of a regime change

Companies undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) in Greece were obliged to include next-year profit forecast in their prospectuses, until the regulation changed in 2001 to voluntary forecasting. Drawing evidence from IPOs issued in the period 1993–2015, this is the first study to investigate the effect of disclosure regime on management earnings forecasts and IPO long-term performance. The findings show mainly positive forecast errors (forecasts are lower than actual earnings) and higher long-term returns during the mandatory period, suggesting that the mandatory disclosure requirement causes issuers to systematically bias profit forecasts downwards as they opt for the safety of accounting conservatism. The mandatory disclosure requirement artificially improves IPO share performance. Overall, our results show that mandatory disclosure of earnings forecasts can impede capital market efficiency once it goes beyond historical financial information to involve compulsory projections of future performance.     

Additional Evidence on Analysts’ Decision to Issue Disaggregated Earnings Forecasts: Strategic Biasing

This study examines why analysts issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to I/B/E/S. Some recent studies suggest that analysts with superior forecasting ability issue disaggregated earnings forecasts to build reputation in the marketplace and stop forecast disaggregation once their reputation has been established. Based on an analysis of I/B/E/S forecast data for U.S. firms from 1998 to 2008, we find that, in a given year, about 20%–34% of analysts disaggregate for some, but not for all the firms that they follow. This evidence of selective disaggregation by analysts suggests that reputation building alone does not fully explain the decision to disaggregate forecasts. We hypothesize that the decision to disaggregate earnings forecasts is at the firm‐level as well and is systematically related to the analysts’ bias in the issued forecasts. Our findings are that (a) analysts’ overall optimistic bias and forecast errors decrease monotonically with the level of forecast disaggregation, and (b) analysts that selectively disaggregate their forecasts for some firms or who do not persistently disaggregate a given firm's forecasts exhibit more positive bias and larger forecast errors. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the analysts who issue biased forecasts, for example, to curry favour with the management, are less likely to provide disaggregated information as part of the forecast.     

Evidence That Management Earnings Forecasts Do Not Fully Incorporate Information in Prior Forecast Errors

Abstract:  This paper investigates whether managers fully incorporate the implications of their prior earnings forecast errors into their future earnings forecasts and, if not, whether this behavior is related to the post-earnings announcement drift. I find a positive association in consecutive management forecast errors, suggesting that managers underestimate the future implications of past earnings information when forecasting earnings. I also find that managers underestimate the information in their prior forecast errors to a greater extent when they make earnings forecasts with a longer horizon. Finally, I find that, similar to managers, the market also underreacts to earnings information in management forecast errors, which leads to predictable stock returns following earnings announcements.     

A new approach to predicting analyst forecast errors: Do investors overweight analyst forecasts?

I provide evidence that investors overweight analyst forecasts by demonstrating that prices do not fully reflect predictable components of analyst errors, which conflicts with conclusions in prior research. I highlight estimation bias in traditional approaches and develop a new approach that reduces this bias. I estimate characteristic forecasts that map current firm characteristics into forecasts of future earnings. Contrasting characteristic and analyst forecasts predicts analyst forecast errors and revisions. I find abnormal returns to strategies that sort firms by predicted forecast errors, consistent with investors overweighting analyst forecasts and predictable biases in analyst forecasts influencing the information content of prices.     

Improving the Precision of Analysts' Earnings Forecasts by Adjusting for Predictable Bias

This research demonstrates that publicly-available information can be used to develop estimates of analysts' optimistic bias in earnings forecasts. These bias estimates can be used to produce more accurate forecasts, resulting in significant reductions of both cross-sectional mean forecast error and error variance. When bias estimates are based on past observations of forecast error alone, however, reductions in mean forecast error are smaller, and forecast precision is unimproved. Further tests provide evidence of a significant association between returns and the bias predictable from contemporaneously-available information, suggesting that predictable bias is only partially discounted by market participants. This study has significant implications for researchers and investors. The pricing of predictable bias in analysts' forecasts may add error toinferences which are based on the association between returns and analyst forecast errors, and knowledge of the market's partial discounting of predictable bias may help investors to make more efficient resource allocations.     

The effect of management earnings forecast characteristics on cost of equity capital

This study uses a framework presented in Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) to assess how differences in management earnings forecast characteristics influence a firm's cost of equity capital. I find that less specific forecasts, pessimistic forecasts, and forecasts that predict a loss for the period are associated with higher cost of equity capital levels and more timely forecasts and forecasts with more information content are associated with lower cost of equity capital levels. Analysis interacting control variables and forecast antecedents with forecast characteristics indicates that the effects forecast characteristics have on cost of equity capital are either enhanced or moderated depending on firm beta, firm size, firm book-to-market ratios, analyst following, prior forecast bias, and earnings quality. The results highlight the importance of interacting key variables when interpreting the market effect of management earnings forecasts.     

Market implied future earnings and analysts’ forecasts

This study provides evidence on market implied future earnings based on the residual income valuation (RIV) framework and compares these earnings with analyst earnings forecasts for accuracy (absolute forecast error) and bias (signed forecast error). Prior research shows that current stock price reflects future earnings and that analyst forecasts are biased. Thus, how price-based imputed forecasts compare with analyst forecasts is interesting. Using different cost of capital estimates, we use the price-earnings relation and impute firms’ future annual earnings from three residual income (RI) models for up to 5 years. Relative to I/B/E/S analyst forecasts, imputed forecasts from the RI models are less or no more biased when cost of capital is low (equal to a risk-free rate or slightly higher). Analysts slightly outperform these RI models in terms of accuracy for immediate future (1 or 2) years in the forecast horizon but the opposite is true for more distant future years when cost of capital is low. A regression analysis shows that, in explaining future earnings changes, analyst forecasts relative to imputed forecasts do not impound a significant amount of earnings information embedded in current price. In additional tests, we impute future long-term earnings growth rates and find that they are more accurate and less biased than I/B/E/S analyst long-term earnings growth forecasts. Together, the results suggest that the RIV framework can be used to impute a firm’s future earnings that are high in accuracy and low in bias, especially for distant future years.     

On the Use of Intra-Industry Information to Improve Earnings Forecasts

We investigate whether earnings forecasts are improved by earlier earnings disclosures by firms in the same industry. We find improvements for time series forecasts, but not for analysts' forecasts. Considering prior earnings announcements reduces correlations between forecast errors and security price reactions to earnings announcements, even when incorporating these announcements improves forecast accuracy. Our explanation for this anomaly, which is supported by additional analysis, is that intra-industry information facilitates predicting transitory, rather than permanent, earnings components. The question of whether information transfers improve earnings forecasts provides the context for the analysis, but the primary contribution is the documentation of intra-industry information transfers in a setting other than capital markets.     

Investor sentiment and management earnings forecast bias

This study investigates whether investor sentiment is associated with behavioral bias in managers’ annual earnings forecasts that are generally issued early in the year when uncertainty is relatively high. I provide evidence that management earnings forecast optimism increases with investor sentiment. Furthermore, I find that managers’ annual earnings forecasts are more pessimistic during low‐sentiment periods than during normal‐sentiment periods. Since managers lack incentives to further deflate stock prices during a low‐sentiment period, this evidence indicates that sentiment‐related management earnings forecast bias is likely to be unintentional. In addition, I find that the relationship between management earnings forecast bias and investor sentiment is stronger for firms with higher uncertainty, consistent with investor sentiment having a greater influence on management earnings forecasts when uncertainty is higher.     

Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses

Listed firms in Japan are effectively compelled to report management forecasts of sales, ordinary income, and net income along with actual earnings and sales each year. Prior studies report that Japanese managers tend to announce optimistic forecasts of earnings. We show that a large part (61.6%) of the overall optimistic bias in management earnings forecasts in Japan can be explained by loss forecast avoiding behavior of a small fraction (5.25%) of firms. Such behavior is caused in part by the view of the main bank and power group that the management forecast of earnings is the manager's earnings target. Our findings suggest that the Japanese stock market recognizes such loss forecast avoidance and accordingly discounts new information in management forecasts.     

Financial Analyst Characteristics and Herding Behavior in Forecasting

This study classifies analysts' earnings forecasts as herding or bold and finds that (1) boldness likelihood increases with the analyst's prior accuracy, brokerage size, and experience and declines with the number of industries the analyst follows, consistent with theory linking boldness with career concerns and ability; (2) bold forecasts are more accurate than herding forecasts; and (3) herding forecast revisions are more strongly associated with analysts' earnings forecast errors (actual earnings—forecast) than are bold forecast revisions. Thus, bold forecasts incorporate analysts' private information more completely and provide more relevant information to investors than herding forecasts.     

Analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings: additional evidence

This article examines analysts' forecasts of Japanese firms' earnings during Japan's economic burst period in the 1990s. Using the evidence of analyst earnings forecasts in the United States as a benchmark, the article documents the following three findings. First, whereas the forecast accuracy of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms improves over time, the forecast accuracy of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms does not. Second, whereas decreases in forecast errors of U.S. analysts following U.S. firms are best explained by decreases in forecast bias of the analysts, increases in forecast errors of U.S. and Japanese analysts following Japanese firms are best explained by increases in the frequency of losses experienced by Japanese firms. Third, Japanese analysts forecast earnings less accurately than do U.S. analysts. These findings reflect the difficulty of producing accurate earnings forecasts during economic downturns. They also suggest that Japanese analysts are more bound than their U.S. counterparts by cultural ties that impede forecast accuracy.     

The accuracy of earnings forecasts in IPO prospectuses on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange

This paper examines the accuracy of earnings forecasts made by managers of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs) during the period 1984–1995. It is a mandatory requirement for Malaysian IPOs to furnish earnings forecasts together with the opinions thereon of the auditors and the lead underwriter in their prospectuses. Their accuracy is measured by forecast errors, absolute forecast errors, squared forecast errors and standardised forecast errors. The results suggest that, on average, managers under-forecast earnings by 33.37%. A comparison with the naive no change model in earnings suggests that 96 out of 122 companies outperform this model. A number of company specific characteristics (size, age, forecast interval, gearing, proportion of shares retained by owners, auditor reputation and industry) are tested. The results reveal that both the age and industry classification of the company are statistically significant, and that management earnings forecasts are particularly inaccurate where firms experience a decline in earnings. Key words: accuracy of prospectus earnings forecasts, initial public offerings, accounting in Malaysia.     

Are more able managers good future tellers? Learning from Japan

Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.     

The joint information role of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts

We study whether the relative magnitudes of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts convey information about the persistence and value relevance of reported earnings. We find that reported earnings are likely to be more (less) persistent and value relevant when analysts forecast relatively moderate (extreme) levels of operating cash flows, relative to earnings. We also find that the market’s response to a given earnings surprise is the strongest for moderate levels of cash flow forecasts relative to earnings. The joint information role of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts persists even after controlling for the absolute accruals in the model.     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

Initial public offering prospectus forecast errors and mandatory explanations: evidence from New Zealand

This paper examines management forecast errors in initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses of New Zealand firms and subsequent management explanations for earnings forecast errors in recent years. New Zealand has several unique features and recent changes that are worthy of research, including the requirement for management to make forecasts; a requirement to explain differences between forecast and actual; and a recent change that provides the voluntary opportunity to obtain a negative assurance opinion on forecasts. Using hand-collected IPO data between 1998 and 2014, we find that firms that include a negative assurance opinion on the prospective financial information in the prospectus have more accurate earnings and cash flow forecasts. We investigate the subsequent explanations for forecast errors, which are mandated by a financial reporting standard. We show that management tends to attribute negative and large forecast errors to external causes rather than their own actions. Our findings have implications for regulators and investors in New Zealand and other settings.