CONSTANT WEALTH NATIONAL INCOME: ACCOUNTING FOR WAR DAMAGE WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE NETHERLANDS, 1940–45

The issue of the proper way to address and document crisis and disaster in the national accounts is brought into focus by analyzing a practical case: the damage caused by the Second World War as discussed at a 1945 Paris reparations conference. It is concluded that "what if" damage e.g. output not produced due to the war should not be included in the national accounts, but factual damage should. The method by which factual damage should be included must then be decided. The option of just showing the damage in the reconciliation accounts is rejected. Instead the introduction of an additional income concept into the accounts, constant wealth national income is proposed. This Hicksian concept deducts from standard national income the damage to all produced goods lasting longer than a year. The concept is illustrated with guesstimates for the Netherlands, 1940–45. Finally, by way of an illustration, the paper employs 1945 estimates of damage in the Netherlands in order to arrive at a constant wealth national income for 1940–45. It is shown that, in 1938 prices, constant wealth national income is very much lower than standard national income and thus far better reflects the decline in prosperity during these years.     

The Welfare Economic Theory of Green National Accounts

This paper takes a critical look at the literature on green national accounts. The problem studied is to find a linear index of economic variables that responds to perturbations in the same direction as social well-being. The thesis of a large literature, that net national product (which is a flow) is that index in closed economies, is shown in some interpretations to be simply false and in others to suffer from deep estimation problems. It is argued that capital depreciation using shadow prices should certainly be included in national accounts, but that the right welfare index is a comprehensive measure of wealth, defined as the shadow value of an economy’s stock of all capital assets. It is shown that comprehensive wealth is usable as a criterion for policy evaluation as well as for determining sustainable economic development.     

THE ACCOUNTING TREATMENT OF HUMAN INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL

Defining investment as outlays that increase income- and output-producing capacity, the author presents estimates of human investment in the United States 1929–69, comprising rearing costs, education, training, health, safety and mobility outlays. He develops an economic accounting framework to accommodate human investments and research and development in national and sector capital accounts, with appropriate adjustments to the current accounts to provide consistency. The associated balance sheets and wealth statements are also developed.
The wealth and corresponding income estimates are used to compute rates of return on human, non-human, and total capital. In the business economy the average net rate of return on total capital was 10.6 percent in 1969, compared with 10.0 percent in 1929. The average and marginal rates of return on human capital were generally somewhat higher than on non-human capital throughout the period.     

Behind rising inequality and falling growth

This paper investigates why the upsurge of top income shares has coincided with economic slowdowns in the US since the late 1970s. I argue that a fast-growing unearned income from ‘wealth residual’ – the unexplained increase in wealth that is not accompanied by any increase in real output – lies behind them. To support this hypothesis, I measure wealth residual from the national accounts and associated statistics, and then perform a set of panel regressions using a comprehensive panel dataset of the US at the state level. The estimation results demonstrate that the rapid growth of wealth residual during the last four decades has contributed to a co-evolution of fast-growing inequality and falling growth.     

A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's ‘Fundamental Contradiction of Capitalism’

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution.     

A Behavioral Model of Stock Market Investors' Impact on Consumption

This paper offers a theory of investor/consumer behavior in the context of an adaptive relationship. It shows how consumer spending and stock market gains and losses interact in a "gradual diffusion" process. The model offers predictions about likely changes in investor behavior, and the impact on the underlying economy in general and consumption in particular. These predictions are validated empirically. Specifically, the paper finds that investors/consumers gradually smooth their "wealth spending" and accelerate consumption as they become more convinced that their gains are permanent. This is somewhat reminiscent of the "income smoothing" suggested by Friedman [1957]. We present evidence that the consumption wealth spending peaks at approximately 2.5%-3% of the stock market wealth cumulative gain in the previous twelve- to twenty-four-month period, while concurrent effects are negligible. The results also provide a partial explanation for the long cycle of a strong economy in the 1990s, and point out the danger to the economy from a prolonged stock market decline.     

Redistributive Tax and Growth in a Model with Discrete Occupational Choice

An optimal redistributive tax-subsidy formula is derived for a growth model where income inequality is endogenously driven by an adult's choice of occupation between work and management. Investment in human capital is the engine of growth. The world's stock of exploitable knowledge as well as the economy's average human capital determine the potential rate of return from investment in human capital in an economy. How much available knowledge would be exploited in the economy depends on the proportion of innovators in our model. A redistributive tax reform impacts growth as well as income inequality via its influence over the occupational choice. The optimal redistributive tax rate is path-dependent in the sense that it depends on the initial wealth distribution. The normative implication of the model is that the optimal capital income tax rate could very well be positive if the initial wealth inequality exceeds a threshold. The optimal capital income tax rate depends inversely on the initial wealth inequality.     

Stochastic dominance and thick-tailed wealth distributions

Right-skewed and thick-tailed wealth distributions have been documented as an empirical regularity across space and time. A key mechanism for explaining these distributional features is proportional random growth. We investigate the comparative statics of a well-defined class of random growth models when allowing for stochastically ordered shifts in the wealth return process. An order-contingent monotone comparative statics property is identified, according to which pure increases in risk (e.g. higher volatility of capital returns) foster top wealth concentration whereas first-order stochastically dominated shifts in the return process (induced by e.g. proportional capital income taxation) rather lower inequality at the upper end of the distribution. Our analysis points to the potentially ambiguous effects on top wealth inequality of introducing or modifying capital income tax treatments in the presence of stochastic returns.     

THE EFFECT ON POVERTY STATUS IN ISRAEL OF CONSIDERING WEALTH AND VARIABILITY OF INCOME

This paper assesses the effects of including wealth and the variability of income on the incidence of poverty and the degree of income inequality in Israel. A special survey, which includes data on the wealth and income of a national sample of Israeli families in 1963–64 and 1964–65, allows us to go beyond measures based on current income alone.
The first section reviews earlier studies of poverty in Israel. The next section looks at poverty and inequality in terms of current income, current wealth, and a combined measure of income and wealth. The combined measure is the Hansen-Weisbrod measure (HW), which equals income plus the annuity value of wealth, assuming all wealth is just consumed at the time of death. It is interesting that, in spite of the much higher wealth inequality than income inequality, the HW measure was slightly more equally distributed than income. This result occurred because the annuity component made up a low share of the total HW measure and the correlation between income and wealth was well under 1. Although overall inequality and poverty were similar for income and HW measures, the incidence of poverty by subgroup depended on the measure used.
The final section presents a dynamic view of poverty and inequality. Year-to-year changes in poverty were substantial. Because of the use of a relative poverty concept and the rise in real incomes, the real income poverty line rose by 15 percent between 1963 and 1964. Still, of those in income poverty in 1963, 37 percent managed to escape poverty in 1964. The paper shows how the degree to which poverty was stable or transitory varied substantially by age and country of origin.     

长假制度一定能促进消费吗——论假日消费的“陷阱”

收入与时间是决定消费的两个最重要因素。因此,单独增加可用时间,不一定能够促进消费。然而,1999年开始的黄金周政策,使得总消费出现了明显的增加。同时,长假导致财富在各部门间发生了明显的转移。     

Capital in the Twenty-First Century: Reinterpreting the fundamental contradiction of capitalism

At a theoretical level this article discusses Piketty’s hypothesis that the distribution of income and wealth tends to become more concentrated over time when the rate of return on capital is greater than the growth rate of real output. We develop a post Keynesian model of growth and distribution showing that once capital is differentiated from wealth, the increase in income and wealth concentration actually occurs when the rate of valorization of financial and real estate assets is greater than the growth rate of real output, and that this situation may be triggered by financial liberalization.     

DISTRIBUTIONS OF REAL INCOME: WITHIN COUNTRIES AND BY WORLD INCOME CLASSES

Income and expenditure data from 14 countries (representing one-third of the world's population), mostly from the 1970s, are used to construct national income distributions and , after normalizing by purchasing power parities, to construct a "world" distribution of real income. The density of real-income equivalent groups (socio-economic classes) across countries is measured for the "affluent," the "well-off," and the "poor." In comparison with earlier studies, most national distributions of income seem to have been improving, the numbers of those in poverty (based on real income) are lower, and, most important (and disturbing for some) is that the "affluent" class (and those above "middle class" income levels) has (prematurely) swelled in a number of developing countries.     

Income Distribution,Econophysics and Piketty

Piketty, Atkinson and Saez have put the analysis of income distribution back on center stage. The distinction between property income and labor income plays a central role in this framework. Property income derives from the rate of return on stocks of income-earning wealth and is more unequally distributed than labor income. Piketty argues that, because the rate of return (r) is generally greater than the rate of growth of the economy (g), property income tends to grow more rapidly than labor income, so that rising income inequality is an intrinsic tendency of capitalism despite interruptions due to world wars and great depressions. This article argues the exact opposite. The rise of unions and the welfare state were the fruits of long-term historical gains made by labor, and the postwar constraints on real and financial capital arose in sensible reaction to the Great Depression. The ‘neoliberal’ era beginning in the 1980s significantly rolled back all of these. The article uses the econophysics two-class argument of Yakovenko to show that we can explain the empirical degree of inequality using two factors alone: the profit share and the degree of financialization of income. The rise of inequality in the neoliberal era then derives from a reduction in the wage share (rise in the profit share) in the face of assaults on labor and the welfare state, and a sharp increase in the financialization of incomes as financial controls are weakened. These are inherently socio-political outcomes, and what was lost can be regained. Hence, there is no inevitable return to Piketty’s ‘patrimonial capitalism’.     

The money-age distribution: Empirical facts and the limits of three monetary models

The money-age distribution is hump-shaped for the US post-war economy. There is no clear-cut relation between the variation of money holdings within generations and age. Furthermore, money is found to be only weakly correlated with both income and wealth. We analyze three motives for money demand in an overlapping generations setup in order to explain these observations: (1) money-in-the-utility, (2) an economy with costly credit service, and (3) limited-participation. All three models are consistent with the hump-shaped relation between average money holdings and age, yet they predict a much closer association between money holdings, income, wealth, and age than we find in the data. Only the limited-participation model partly replicates the low bivariate correlation between money and income as well as between money and interest-bearing assets. None of the three models satisfactorily explains these stylized facts.     

Investing in innovation to enable global competitiveness: The case of Portugal

The concept of leveraged innovation to create wealth within regions, countries and economies is not a new concept. Competitiveness of regions in the increasingly global economy now requires not only that innovation be present within a regional economy, but also that mechanisms exist to effectively transfer those developed innovations from the research laboratory to the marketplace. It is surmised that increased innovation, and the transfer of this innovation, can lead to increased prosperity of regions (Porter). As such, many developing countries around the world are looking at investments in innovation as a means to spur regional economic development and wealth creation while preserving national competitiveness. That said, innovation investment is by no means an exact science. Historically, typical “innovation investments” have been focused on “tangible” capital infrastructure projects such as the establishment of incubators and science parks. While many regions point to the existence of such tangible innovation assets as proof of investment in innovation, it has been discovered that in some cases, an investment in the capacity building of human networks to engage in technology transfer and commercialization related activities can act as a stronger facilitator for the transformation of economies and produce a larger return on investment in innovation for the country. Given not only Portugal's, but other regions throughout the EU-Zone, recent financial and economic woes, it bears examination on whether investing in the innovation and technology transfer knowledge and “know how” of key human networks within a struggling economy is a worthwhile investment for financially struggling countries during the current times of fiscal crisis.     

Trends in real income in Britain: A microeconomic analysis

Trends in real national income are typically assessed using aggregate indicators such as GDP per capita, or mean household income, whereas the income distribution literature focuses on trends in income inequality. By contrast this paper takes an integrated approach to real national income measurement; it uses methods incorporating both size and distributional considerations, and applies them to household income microdata in order to measure changes in real income in the U.K. during the 1980s. A parametric class of decomposable real income indisces is proposed which complements quasi-ordering methods such as rank and generalised dominance criteria by telling us how much real income increased over the period (if at all). The indices are also additively decomposable by population subgroup, a property which helps reveal who the gainers and losers were. The analysis also draws attention to the normative and statistical issues raised by the presence of a few very small incomes.     

PROBLEMS OF A CENSUS OF NATIONAL WEALTH

This paper is essentially a summary of the book Measuring the Nation's Wealth (Volume 29, Studies in Income and Wealth, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1964), which is the report of study directed by the author. The purpose o f the study was to assess the problems and possibilities of conducting a national census of real wealth as a basis for continuing wealth and balance sheet estimates for the U.S. economy, by major sector.
It is stressed that the balance sheets and wealth estimates should be designed as a consistent part of an integrated system of national income accounts. Thus, valuation (at market prices and/or depreciated replacement costs), sectoring, and type-of-asset detail in the basic data and derived estimates should be compatible with the flow estimates contained in the economic accounts. Consistency of stock and flow estimates facilitates analysis of inter-relationships, and is helpful in the estimation process.
It is recommended that in the U.S. asset data by broad categories be collected as part of the recurring economic censuses and other reporting systems, but that detail on fixed reproducible assets (construction and equipment) at cost, by year or period of acquisition, be obtained from a small sample of respondents in each industry. The detail would be useful in its own right, and also permit revaluation of the assets by use of price indexes and depreciation rates to a current depreciated replacement cost basis. Where feasible, respondent estimates of market values would also be obtained.
The proposal is thus a compromise between the Japanese 1955 sample survey of assets, and the detailed wealth inventory of the U.S.S.R. which was begun in 1959. Preliminary work is now underway in the U.S. federal statistical agencies to expand collection of asset data, and to prepare comprehensive wealth estimates in the framework of the national income accounts.     

Money velocity and asset prices in the euro area

Monetary growth in the euro area has exceeded its target since several years. At the same time, the money demand function seems to be increasingly unstable if more recent data are used. If the link between money balances and the macroeconomy is fragile, the rationale of monetary aggregates in the ECB strategy has to be doubted. In fact, a rise in the income elasticity after 2001 can be observed, and may reflect the exclusion of real and financial wealth in conventional specifications of money demand. This presumption is explored by means of a cointegration analysis. To separate income from wealth effects, the specification in terms of money velocity is preferred. Evidence for the presence of wealth in the long run relationship is provided. In particular, both stock and house prices have exerted a negative impact on velocity after 2001 and lead to almost identical equilibrium errors. The extended error correction model is stable over the entire sample period and survive a battery of specification tests.

Die Entwicklung des österreichischen Volkseinkommens und seiner Hauptkomponenten 1956 bis 1973

Summary The study ist based on the work of M. Kalecki who anticipated the main elements of the Keynesian theory by constructing a dynamic modell of business cycles. Kalecki's theory includes i.a. a theory of profits, saving, income distribution and investment decisions. Until he died in 1970 Kalecki never ceased in his endeavour to adapt his intuition to the new questions posed by the postwar developments in the industrialised capitalist countries. This led him to develop a theory of growth that incorporated the problems of effective demand; he succeeded in making his theory operational in the field of empirical economic analysis.The authors of the study apply Kalecki's method to data on the Austrian GNP and its main components during 1955–1973. (Mr. Szeworski, while being one of Kalecki's assistants in the sixties, applied the analytical method to an investigation of the economic development in some of the most important capitalist economies together with Kalecki.)Chapter 1. represents an introduction into the analytical method and its foundation in Kalecki's work. At first we show how to distinguish that part of production which is subject to the laws of motion of a capitalist economy more precisely than is usual from the part which is not. This serves to open the way to a better understanding of the influences of government activities. With the same intention taxes are divided into consumption-diminishing and accumulation-absorbing taxes. All this results in a modified concept of GNP, in volume as well as in arrangement.Chapter 2. investigates the long-term development of the Austrian economy; it makes evident its chief characteristics and discusses possible reasons emphasizing the importance of foreign trade. An examination of the changes in the main components of GNP leads us to observe an increase in the importance of governmental intervention. Finally, income distribution is shown to tend towards increasing polarisation — which means increasing shares of corporate profits and income of employees in the national income.