Financial constraints and entrepreneurial investment

There is a well documented interdependence between the investment and saving decisions of entrepreneurial households. I study this interdependence in a dynamic, general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents and occupational choice. The simulated economy replicates U.S. data on the distribution of wealth and income, and the shares of wealth and income for each occupation. The dominant incentive behind the high level of savings of business households is the desire to relax a wealth constraint in financing entrepreneurial projects in order to operate their firms at an optimal size. Because successful firms grow over time, entrepreneurs enter business despite lower initial earnings than they would receive in paid employment.     

Uncertainty,Incentives, and Misallocation

This paper identifies a new propagation mechanism by which the effects of business cycle shocks amplify in the context of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. Business cycle shocks, such as heightened uncertainty, and positive monetary shocks endogenously magnify the cross-sectional dispersion in idiosyncratic productivity. This induces entrepreneurs, who have asset substitution incentive, to distort the quality of an investment project, which amplifies the response of investment and output. Moreover, lenders reallocate credit from firms with a high marginal product of capital, in which the asset substitution problem is more prevalent, to firms with a low marginal product of capital, which in turn further depresses aggregate economic activities. A policy that subsidizes lenders to firms with a high marginal product during a recession improves the allocation of loans. Empirical evidence from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database provides support for the model's predictions.     

Entrepreneurial risk aversion,net worth effects and real fluctuations

This paper examines the combined effect of asymmetric information and private entrepreneurial risk aversion on investment decisions. The standard optimal debt contract becomes modified by the introduction of insurance and a risk premium that entrepreneurs demand due to the uncertainty of their investment returns: the private equity premium. In general equilibrium, the private equity premium may become a mechanism that magnifies the effects of shocks. A structural estimation of the model's parameters using Chilean and U.S. data shows that the entrepreneurial risk aversion assumption has more empirical relevance in an economy where smaller privately-held businesses are relatively more prevalent than where the corporate sector predominates, like the U.S.     

Public Policy for Venture Capital

This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.     

Entrepreneurial risk,investment, and innovation

I estimate the effect of uncertainty on risky innovation using a panel of 11,417 manufacturing firms. I find that an increase in uncertainty has a large negative effect on the risky innovation of entrepreneurial firms, while it does not have any significant impact on other firms. This negative effect is stronger for the less diversified entrepreneurial firms in the sample. The estimation results are consistent with the innovation dynamics generated in a model in which entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot diversify the risk of their business.     

Bank capital, firm liquidity, and project quality

We construct an economy where a two way interaction between bank capital and project quality propagates negative shocks to technology or regulation. By shrinking the available liquidity and the scale of their activity, a contraction in bank loans discourages entrepreneurs from sustaining the set-up effort of high quality projects, inducing them to shift to low quality ones. The deterioration in project quality erodes the value of bank assets and, hence, banks’ capitalization and loanable funds. Lack of information in the secondary market for bank assets amplifies the propagation.     

Testing Agency Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and Wealth

We develop a principal‐agent model in an entrepreneurial setting and test the model's predictions using unique data on entrepreneurial effort and wealth in privately held firms. Accounting for unobserved firm heterogeneity using instrumental‐variables techniques, we find that entrepreneurial ownership shares increase with outside wealth and decrease with firm risk; effort increases with ownership; and effort increases firm performance. The magnitude of the effects in the cross‐section of firms suggests that agency costs may help explain why entrepreneurs concentrate large fractions of their wealth in firm equity.     

Entrepreneurship,College, and Credit: The Golden Triangle

We develop a model to evaluate the aggregate impact of college finance in an environment with entrepreneurship. The calibrated model captures the stylized fact that entrepreneurs with college are more common and more profitable in the United States. The calibration indicates this is mainly because higher labor earnings allow college‐educated agents to ameliorate credit constraints if and when they eventually become entrepreneurs. Changes in financing constraints on entrepreneurs can thus affect college attendance, and changes in financing constraints on college can affect entrepreneurship rates as well.     

The Consumption–Income Ratio,Entrepreneurial Risk,and the U.S. Stock Market

The owners of small noncorporate businesses face substantial and largely uninsurable entrepreneurial risk. They are also an important group of stock owners. This paper explores the role of entrepreneurial risk in explaining time variation in expected U.S. stock returns in the period 1952–2010. It proposes an entrepreneurial distress factor that is based on a cointegrating relationship between aggregate consumption and income from proprietary and nonproprietary wealth. This factor, referred to here as the cpy residual, signals when entrepreneurial income is low in relation to aggregate consumption and other forms of income in the economy. It is highly correlated with cross‐sectional measures of idiosyncratic entrepreneurial and default risk, and it has considerable forecasting power for the expected equity premium. However, the correlation between cpy and the stock market started to decline at the beginning of the 1980s. The decline in this correlation can be associated with increased stock market participation and with the progress of U.S. state‐level bank deregulation. This pattern is consistent with the view that entrepreneurial risk became more easily diversifiable in the wake of U.S. state‐level bank deregulation.     

Strategic alliances,equity stakes,and entry deterrence

I study how strategic alliances and their impact on future competitive incentives can motivate interfirm equity sales. In the model, an alliance between an entrepreneurial firm and an established firm improves efficiency for both. However, the requisite knowledge transfer heightens the established firm's incentive to enter one of its partner's markets. I show that equity can eliminate the entry incentive, but accommodation is sometimes chosen to encourage entrepreneurial effort on future growth options. I analyze stake sizes, block pricing, and welfare effects. The results have implications for equity alliances, corporate venture capital, and the organization of research activities.     

On the consequences of demographic change for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare

This paper employs a multi-country large-scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital.     

The Role of Collateral in Entrepreneurial Finance

Abstract:  Previous research has suggested collateral has the role of sorting entrepreneurs either by observed risk or by private information. In order to test these roles, this paper develops a model which incorporates a signalling process (sorting by observed risk) into the design of an incentive-compatible menu of loan contracts which works as a self-selection mechanism (sorting by private information). It then tests this Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model, using the 1998 US Survey of Small Business Finances. It reports for the first time that: high type entrepreneurs are more likely to pledge collateral and pay a lower interest rate; and entrepreneurs who transfer good signals enjoy better contracts than those transferring bad signals. These findings suggest that the Sorting by Signalling and Self-Selection Model sheds more light on entrepreneurial debt finance than either the sorting-by-observed-risk or the sorting-by-private information paradigms on their own.     

Anticipated growth and business cycles in matching models

In a business cycle model that incorporates a standard matching framework, employment increases in response to news shocks, even though the wealth effect associated with the increase in expected productivity reduces labor force participation. The reason is that the matching friction induces entrepreneurs to increase investment in new projects and vacancies early. If there is underinvestment in new projects in the competitive equilibrium, then the efficiency gains associated with an increase in employment make it possible that consumption, employment, output, as well as the investment in new and existing projects jointly increase long before the actual increase in productivity materializes. If there is no underinvestment, then investment in existing projects decreases, but total investment, consumption, employment, and output still jointly increase.     

Revisiting the supply side effects of government spending

We revisit the macroeconomic effects of government consumption in the neoclassical growth model when agents face uninsured idiosyncratic investment risk. Under complete markets, a permanent increase in government consumption has no long-run effect on interest rates and capital intensity, while it increases work hours due to the negative wealth effect. These results are upset once we allow for incomplete markets. The same negative wealth effect now causes a reduction in risk taking and the demand for investment. This leads to a lower risk-free rate and, under certain conditions, also to a lower capital-labor ratio and lower productivity.     

Understanding Bank and Nonbank Credit Cycles: A Structural Exploration

We explore the structural drivers of bank and nonbank credit cycles using a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with two types of financial intermediation. We posit economywide and sectoral disturbances in both macro and financial sectors. We estimate that sectoral shocks to the balance sheets of entrepreneurs are important for fluctuations in bank and nonbank credit growth at the business cycle frequency. Economywide entrepreneurial risk shocks gain predominance for explaining the lower frequency comovement between the two series. Macro shocks play very little role in explaining financial cycles.     

Productivity-based asset pricing: Theory and evidence

In a general real business cycle model, we derive a pricing kernel that involves only production function arguments. The productivity shock is the single factor and the capital stock relative to a productivity measure is the conditioning variable. The model compares favorably with the complementary consumption-based and market-based approaches and with the Fama-French three-factor model. A size premium arises from differences in unconditional sensitivities—small firms are more sensitive to productivity shocks—and a value premium from differences in conditional sensitivities to productivity shocks—growth firms are more sensitive to productivity shocks when the productivity risk premium is low.     

Learning and shifts in long-run productivity growth

An extensive literature has analyzed the macroeconomic effects of shocks to the level of aggregate productivity; however, there has been little corresponding research on sustained shifts in the growth rate of productivity. In this paper, we examine the effects of shocks to productivity growth in a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents do not directly observe whether shocks are transitory or persistent. We show that an estimated Kalman filter model using real-time data describes economists’ long-run productivity growth forecasts in the United States extremely well and that filtering has profound implications for the macroeconomic effects of shifts in productivity growth.     

An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity,product quality,and absenteeism

Using data from three production units of a large manufacturing plant that employs production teams in its assembly operations, this paper examines how changes made to an existing team-based incentive plan affects labor productivity, product quality, and worker absenteeism. The firm switched from a piece-rates contract and an attendance bonus and instituted a two tier incentive plan comprising two different but complementary performance-based bonus schemes: one tier based on individual team performance and the other tier on plant-wide performance. The incentives were introduced concurrently with management control initiatives intended to facilitate cooperation and monitoring among the teams. I find significant productivity gains and improvements in quality and absenteeism associated with the new incentive plan. These findings underscore two important points that have not been emphasized in existing empirical studies of incentive pay: incentive contracts for teams generate superior performance using combination of incentives, and the need to introduce organizational changes to facilitate cooperation and peer monitoring in tandem with incentive pay to capture greater incentive effects in team production.     

Push or pull? Performance-pay,incentives, and information

We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both an observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high- and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage Research and Development (R&D) activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts.     

Entrepreneurship and asymmetric information in input markets

Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets, and entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. The market equilibrium can involve an excess supply of workers entering the entrepreneurial sector, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of both entrepreneurs and workers opting for the entrepreneurial sector. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and on wages can improve efficiency, but a second-best optimum can only be achieved if it is optimal to induce an excess supply of workers to enter the entrepreneurial sector.