Interbank liquidity risk transmission to large emerging markets in crisis periods

In this paper, we conduct two investigations regarding funding liquidity risk in large emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — BRICS. In the first, we track the relevance of monetary policy decisions originating in developed economies for interbank funding liquidity risk in BRICS economies during crisis periods by applying a time-varying parameter model in a Bayesian framework. The results indicate weak associations between interbank credit market and US monetary policy and market conditions. In contrast, the Federal Reserve's National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI) — a representative of the health of both real and financial sectors in the US — matters more. The temporal patterns of the results imply that key central banking decisions precede or coincide with low degrees of associations. In the second, we examine whether interbank credit crunch exerts an influence on market liquidity risk in BRICS economies using a Granger causality approach. The results reveal that interbank credit crunch depresses market liquidity in the corresponding domestic market and that the state of fear and credit market conditions in the US exert some influence in this regard. Overall, our findings hint at judicious market intervention and liquidity management by BRICS central banks.     

Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System Following Wide‐Scale Disruptions

We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide‐scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions—operational problems and changes in participants’ behavior. If the disruption is large enough, hits a key geographic area, or hits a “too‐big‐to‐fail” participant, then the smooth processing of payments can break down, and central bank intervention might be required to reestablish the socially efficient equilibrium. The paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of events such as the September 11 attack. In addition, the model can be reinterpreted to analyze shocks to fundamentals that affect the parameters of the intraday liquidity management game. We demonstrate this by showing how processing behavior changed in response to heightened credit risk at the time of the Lehman Brothers failure.     

Explaining cross-border large-value payment flows: Evidence from TARGET and EURO1 data

We analysed the distribution of the TARGET cross-border interbank payment flows from both a cross-section and a time-series point of view using average daily data for the period 1999–2002. Our findings were, first, that “location matters” in the sense that bilateral payment flows seem to reflect an organisation of interbank trading between countries in which the size of the banking sector, geographic proximity and cultural similarities play a significant role. This result was also confirmed by a model developed drawing on the gravity models literature. Second, we found that the payment traffic in TARGET is strongly affected by technical market deadlines. In addition, such traffic is positively related mainly to the liquidity conditions and to the turnover of the euro area money market (particularly the unsecured overnight segment). Our model also provides a good explanation of the determinants of the interbank payments settled in the EURO 1 system.     

The credit quality channel: Modeling contagion in the interbank market

We propose an algorithm to model contagion in the interbank market via what we term the “credit quality channel”. In existing models on contagion via interbank credit, external shocks to banks often spread to other banks only in case of a default. In contrast, shocks are transmitted also via asset devaluations and deteriorations in the credit quality in our algorithm. First, the probability of default (PD) of those banks directly affected by some shock increases. This increases the expected loss of the credit portfolios of the initially affected banks’ counterparties, thereby reducing the counterparties’ regulatory capital ratio. From a logistic regression we estimate the increase in the counterparties’ PD due to a reduced capital ratio. Their increased PDs in turn affect the counterparties’ counterparties, and so on. This coherent and flexible framework is applied to the bilateral interbank credit exposure of the entire German banking system in order to examine policy questions. For that purpose, we propose to measure the potential cost of contagion of a given shock scenario by the aggregated regulatory capital loss computed in our algorithm.     

Should the Federal Reserve Pay Competitive Interest on Reserves?

In 2008, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves. How should the Fed use this new policy instrument? As the Fed reduces its balance sheet, should it continue to satiate reserve demand and pay competitive interest on reserves? Here, we argue that this may be an inefficient use of the new policy instrument. Using a standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model (DSGE), augmented to include a banking sector and an interbank market, our benchmark calibration implies an optimal tax on reserves of about 20 to 40 basis points in the steady state, and a fluctuating tax rate in response to shocks.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Learning from a rival bank and lending boom

When bankers observe a rival winning in the interbank competition for lending to a firm, they infer that the firm may be more promising than they had thought. From this consideration, they loosen their creditworthiness tests and lower the interest rates they offer in the next lending competition for the firm. Increased interbank competition reduces the impact of this observational learning and decreases the credit risk taken by each bank because of a severe winner's curse, while it increases the aggregate risk taken by the entire banking sector.     

Interbank Credit Lines as a Channel of Contagion

This paper assesses the potential for contagion in the Swiss interbank market using new data on bilateral bank exposures as well as on credit lines. A simulation approach is applied to assess the banking system's inherent instability. Moreover, the spill-over effects of a simulated default situation in the interbank market on the liquidity and solvency of banks are measured. The main findings are, first, that there is a substantial potential for contagion. Second, the exposure as well as the credit line contagion channel are relevant for Switzerland. Third, a lender of last resort intervention could reduce spill-over effects remarkably. Finally, the structure of the interbank market has considerable impact on its resilience against spill-over effects: Centralized markets are more prone to contagion than homogenous ones. JEL classification: C81, G21. The opinions expressed herein are my own and not those of the Swiss National Bank.     

Interbank connections,contagion and bank distress in the Great Depression✰

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.     

Credit risk transfer and contagion

Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises.     

Lending-of-last-resort is as lending-of-last-resort does: Central bank liquidity provision and interbank market functioning in the euro area

This paper investigates the impact of ample liquidity provision by the European Central Bank on the functioning of the overnight unsecured interbank market from 2008 to 2014. We use novel data on interbank transactions derived from TARGET2, the main euro area payment system. To identify exogenous shocks to central bank liquidity, we exploit the timing of ECB liquidity operations and use a simple structural vector auto-regression framework. We argue that the ECB acted as a de facto lender-of-last-resort to the euro area banking system and identify two main effects of central bank liquidity provision on interbank markets. First, central bank liquidity replaces the demand for liquidity in the interbank market, especially during the financial crisis (2008–2010). Second, it increases the supply of liquidity in the interbank market in stressed countries (Greece, Italy and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis (2011–2013).     

Using Interest Rate Derivative Prices to Estimate LIBOR-OIS Spread Dynamics and Systemic Funding Liquidity Shock Probabilities

Following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, there were severe disruptions in international money markets and banks reportedly faced severe liquidity shocks in particular US dollar funding shortages, prompting central banks around the world to adopt unprecedented policy measures to supply funds to the banks. A better understanding of the forward-looking information content about funding liquidity risk in interest rate derivative prices is therefore necessary to gauge pressures building surrounding systemic liquidity. Using the market prices of the US dollar LIBOR-overnight index swap spread, we estimate the probability of the systemic funding liquidity shock during the crisis period, which deviated from zero on 17 September 2008 to a significant level. This provided an early warning signal of the systemic liquidity shock on 29 September 2008 when the interbank market was totally paralysed.     

Banking and interest rates in monetary policy analysis: A quantitative exploration

The paper reconsiders the role of money and banking in monetary policy analysis by including a banking sector and money in an optimizing model otherwise of a standard type. The model is implemented quantitatively, with a calibration based on US data. It is reasonably successful in providing an endogenous explanation for substantial steady-state differentials between the interbank policy rate and (i) the collateralized loan rate, (ii) the uncollateralized loan rate, (iii) the T-bill rate, (iv) the net marginal product of capital, and (v) a pure intertemporal rate. We find a differential of over 3% p.a. between (iii) and (iv), thereby contributing to resolution of the equity premium puzzle. Dynamic impulse response functions imply pro- or counter-cyclical movements in an external finance premium that can be of quantitative significance. In addition, they suggest that a central bank that fails to recognize the distinction between interbank and other short rates could miss its appropriate settings by as much as 4% p.a. Also, shocks to banking productivity or collateral effectiveness call for large responses in the policy rate.     

Can banks default overnight? Modelling endogenous contagion on the O/N interbank market

We propose a new model of the liquidity-driven banking system focusing on overnight interbank loans. This significant branch of the interbank market is commonly neglected in the banking system modelling and systemic risk analysis. We construct a model where banks are allowed to use both the interbank and the securities markets to manage their liquidity demand and supply as driven by prudential requirements in a volatile environment. The network of interbank loans is dynamic and simulated every day. We show how the intrasystem cash fluctuations alone, without any external shocks, may lead to systemic defaults, and what may be a symptom of the self-organized criticality of the system. We also analyze the impact of different prudential regulations and market conditions on the interbank market resilience. We confirm that the central bank’s asset purchase programmes, limiting the declines in government bond prices, can successfully stabilize banks’ liquidity demands. The model can be used to analyze the interbank market impact of macroprudential tools.     

银行业市场集中度对货币政策传导有效性影响研究——基于信贷传导视角

选取我国17家商业银行2006－2017年数据构建固定效应面板数据模型进行实证分析,结果表明:银行业市场集中度的变化会对货币政策信贷传导有效性产生影响。当银行集中度较高时,银行集中度与货币政策信贷传导有效性间呈正向变动关系;但是反向关系存在于较低银行集中度时,临界点位于银行集中度为39.795%时。中小型银行的信贷增速较之大型国有商业银行受到货币政策影响更大。银行集中度越低意味着竞争程度越强,货币政策信贷传导的有效性越高。     

新常态下中国货币政策的宏观经济效应研究 ——基于不同中介目标的实证检验

以中国2003-2020年的季度宏观经济数据为样本,通过构建时变系数向量自回归模型分析银行间同业拆借利率、M2、信贷规模、社会融资规模四项货币政策中介目标对实际产出、通货膨胀、房地产市场以及股票市场的动态影响效应.结果表明:同业拆借利率对产出的影响呈增强趋势,M2、信贷以及社会融资规模等数量型货币政策对产出的影响效应更显著;信贷与社会融资规模对通货膨胀的影响效应较显著;同业拆借利率对房地产市场的短期影响效应较大;M2、信贷与社会融资规模对房地产与股票市场的长期影响效应较大.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

Modelling the emergence of the interbank networks

Interbank contagion has become a buzzword in the aftermath of the financial crisis that led to a series of shocks to the interbank market and to periods of pronounced market disruptions. However, little is known about how interbank networks are formed and about their sensitivity to changes in key bank parameters (for example, induced by common exogenous shocks or by regulatory initiatives). This paper aims to shed light on these issues by modelling endogenously the formation of interbank networks, which in turn allows for checking the sensitivity of interbank network structures and hence, their underlying contagion risk to changes in market-driven parameters as well as to changes in regulatory measures such as large exposures limits. The sequential network formation mechanism presented in the paper is based on a portfolio optimization model, whereby banks allocate their interbank exposures while balancing the return and risk of counterparty default risk and the placements are accepted taking into account funding diversification benefits. The model offers some interesting insights into how key parameters may affect interbank network structures and can be a valuable tool for analysing the impact of various regulatory policy measures relating to banks’ incentives to operate in the interbank market.     

The effect of the interbank network structure on contagion and common shocks

This paper proposes a dynamic multi-agent model of a banking system with central bank. Banks optimize a portfolio of risky investments and riskless excess reserves according to their risk, return, and liquidity preferences. They are linked via interbank loans and face stochastic deposit supply. Comparing different interbank network structures, it is shown that money-centre networks are more stable than random networks. Evidence is provided that the central bank stabilizes interbank markets in the short run only. Systemic risk via contagion is compared with common shocks and it is shown that both forms of systemic risk require different optimal policy responses.     

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy ( magnitude effect ), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy ( Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect ).