On the time-consistency of optimal capital taxes

This paper studies the time-inconsistency problem of optimal capital taxes. In the absence of full-commitment, it is well known that debt restructuring cannot solve the time-inconsistency problem for economies with a private stock of capital. We re-examine this result by exploring the role of institutional delays in government policies. We show that, when the implementation of government policy requires time, debt restructuring can enforce commitment to the optimal capital taxes. We conclude that, since institutional delays characterize democratic decision making, the time-inconsistency problem of capital taxes is not so severe.     

Fiscal hedging with nominal assets

We analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy with distortionary labor income taxes, nominal rigidities, nominal debt of various maturities and short-selling constraints. Optimal policy prescribes the almost exclusive use of long term debt. Such debt mitigates the distortions associated with hedging fiscal shocks by allowing the government to allocate them efficiently across states and periods.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.     

On the optimal timing of capital taxes

For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.     

On the International Dimension of Fiscal Policy

This paper analyzes the international dimension of fiscal policy in a small open economy framework. We consider the case in which the government finances its spending by levying distortionary taxes and issuing state‐contingent debt. While in a closed economy taxes are essentially invariant, in an open economy taxes can be as volatile as output. This is because the presence of a terms of trade externality introduces efficient fluctuations in the consumption–leisure wedge driven by movements in the real exchange rate. As a result, the optimal fiscal rule suggests that taxes should be varied to replicate these fluctuations.     

Growth and Public Debt: What Are the Relevant Trade‐Offs?

The interplay between growth and public debt is addressed considering a Barro‐type (1990) endogenous growth model where public spendings are financed through taxes on income and public debt. The government has a target level of public debt relative to GDP, and the long‐run debt‐to‐GDP ratio is used as a policy parameter. We show that when debt is a large enough proportion of GDP, two distinct balanced‐growth paths (BGPs) may coexist, one being indeterminate. We exhibit two types of important trade‐offs associated with self‐fulfilling expectations. First, we show that the lowest BGP is always decreasing with respect to the debt‐to‐GDP ratio while the highest one is increasing. Second, we show that the highest BGP, which provides the highest welfare, is always locally indeterminate while the lowest is always locally determinate. Therefore, local and global indeterminacy may arise and self‐fulfilling expectations appear as a crucial ingredient to understand the impact of debt on growth, welfare, and macroeconomic fluctuations. Finally, a simple calibration exercise allows to provide an understanding of the recent experiences of many OECD countries.     

Did the repeated debt ceiling controversies embed default risk in US Treasury securities?

We examine whether the financial market charged a default risk premium to US Treasury securities when the US Federal government repeatedly reached the legally binding debt limits between 2002 and 2006. We show that for the first two of the four recurrences since the first episode in 1996, the financial market charged a small default risk premium to the Treasury securities. However, we find no significant evidence of a pricing effect in the last two recurrences. The results suggest that the financial market gradually perceived the budget standoffs as the boy who cried wolf.     

Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The ‘Golden Rule of Public Finance’ Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting*

In this paper, we look for long‐run and short‐run effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in a standard endogenous growth model. We show that, under very general hypotheses, the ‘golden rule of public finance’, which allows a government to run public‐investment‐oriented fiscal deficits, leads to a lower balanced‐growth path in the long run, and eventually in the short run, compared with balanced‐budget rules. Welfare effects are more difficult to assess, and depend on the form of the utility function. Our model shows that debt rules such as the golden rule may improve (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘low’) or weaken (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘high’) intertemporal welfare. Consequently, a balanced‐budget rule does not necessarily dominate debt rules from the point of view of welfare, while it does from the point of view of long‐run economic growth.     

Optimal taxation and OECD labor taxes

We derive simple expressions for optimal labor taxes under different assumptions about government bond markets. We use these to examine OECD labor taxes, estimate the excess burden of taxation and assess the ability of optimal tax models to match the data.Optimal labor taxes are driven by: (i) a term reflecting Ramsey considerations which makes labor taxes vary positively with employment and (ii) a martingale component, reflecting the excess burden of tax, which shows persistent responses to shocks to the government's intertemporal budget constraint. Under complete markets (when governments can issue a full set of contingent securities) only the first factor is relevant. We find substantial evidence that incorporating incomplete markets into the optimal taxation model is critical for empirical success. However, we find strongest support for the martingale component and only weak evidence for the Ramsey component.     

Public debt in economies with heterogeneous agents

We study public debt in competitive equilibria in which a government chooses transfers and taxes optimally and in addition decides how thoroughly to enforce debt contracts. If the government enforces perfectly, asset inequality is determined in an optimum competitive equilibrium but the level of government debt is not. Welfare increases if private debt contracts are not enforced. Borrowing frictions let the government gather monopoly rents that come from issuing public debt without facing competing private borrowers. Regardless of whether the government chooses to enforce private debt contracts, the level of initial government debt does not affect an optimal allocation.     

A comparison of nominal and indexed debt under fiscal constraints

This paper makes a welfare comparison between the issuance of price-indexed and nominal public debt in the presence of fiscal constraints, viz. a debt constraint, a deficit constraint and a combination of both. Distortionary taxes or public consumption are regulated to avoid the violation of the relevant fiscal constraint(s). Under a debt constraint indexed debt is generally preferred, while under a deficit constraint the results are more mixed. Introducing inflation persistence and raising the maturity of the debt tend to increase the magnitude of the welfare differences between the two types of debt. Welfare differences are further affected by the degree to which public consumption and tax revenues are indexed to actual versus structural nominal GDP.     

财政限制下政府债务与通货膨胀研究

随着人口老龄化,许多发达经济体都步入了财政压力时代,政府对养老金的承诺大大高于财政收入,政府为了实现承诺将利用发行新债务进行融资,这将带来未来的高税收预期.随着债务水平和税率水平的上升,人们对税收的容忍度将下降,从而触碰财政限制的可能性增大.在采取固定税率情况下,调整税收不再能稳定债务,必须采取政策转变来应对.在财政限制之前债务增长与政策调节如何相互作用,若采用货币政策的被动调节来满足稳定债务,那么政府债务将影响到通货膨胀,从而使货币政策失去对通货膨胀的控制,进而需要通过财政政策来解决通胀问题.     

An analysis of eurobonds

We analyse different forms of debt mutualisation in a union of countries. One country suffers from a political distortion and may resort to (partial) debt default. We consider a debt repayment guarantee, which can be “unlimited” or ”limited”, i.e. only be invoked when the guarantee threshold is not exceeded. We also explore the ”blue–red” bonds proposal, under which blue debt is guaranteed, while red debt is not guaranteed. Only a suitably chosen limited guarantee induces the government to reduce debt and raises union welfare. This result is upheld under the time-consistent solution when there are costs to the rest of the union of not providing financial rescue. Making the guarantee also conditional on sufficient structural reform may in addition stimulate reform effort, thereby raising union welfare.     

Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance

This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.     

Funding a PAYG pension system: the case of Italy

Italy is characterised by a mature pay‐as‐you‐go social security system and by particularly adverse population projections. Given these trends, the social security contribution rate is expected to increase above its current high level. This hinders the development of employer‐provided pension funds and introduces a significant wedge between labour cost and earnings that discourages both labour demand and labour supply. Any proposal to reduce payroll taxes and to reform the system in the direction of partial funding has to cope with the state of Italian public finances. Italy has to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact that imposes constraints on budget deficit and debt trends. Using micro data from the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth and official population projections, we estimate future employment trends under different demographic and macroeconomic scenarios and compute the cost of the transition. We show that it would be substantially reduced if positive effects on employment were induced by the payroll tax reduction.     

Sovereign bond yield spreads: A time-varying coefficient approach

We study the determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads across 10 EMU countries between Q1/1999 and Q1/2010. We apply a semiparametric time-varying coefficient model to identify, to what extent an observed change in the yield spread is due to a shift in macroeconomic fundamentals or due to altering risk pricing. We find that at the beginning of EMU, the government debt level and the general investors’ risk aversion had a significant impact on interest differentials. In the subsequent years, however, financial markets paid less attention to the fiscal position of a country and the safe haven status of Germany diminished in importance. By the end of 2006, two years before the fall of Lehman Brothers, financial markets began to grant Germany safe haven status again. One year later, when financial turmoil began, the market reaction to fiscal loosening increased considerably. The altering in risk pricing over time period confirms the need of time-varying coefficient models in this context.     

The Capital Structure of Large Firms and the Use of Dutch Financing Entities

Large firms may issue debt securities to obtain external financing or set up lowly‐taxed affiliates for internal debt‐shifting purposes. In addition, they may channel interest payments through Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs) to avoid withholding taxes, a widely‐used arbitrage strategy. Analysing the capital structure of large EU‐based multinationals, this paper provides evidence that the use of Dutch‐issuing SPEs is associated with higher debt financing relative to equity. Furthermore, it shows that EU subsidiaries of larger firms are more leveraged and that the use of Dutch on‐lending SPEs is also associated with higher subsidiary leverage. Thus, the paper provides evidence that Dutch SPEs facilitate higher external debt financing as well as internal debt shifting. The findings indicate that withholding taxes on interest payments to entities outside the EU, determined by individual EU member states, are not very effective. The national tax systems of EU countries such as the Netherlands, which does not impose interest withholding tax, allow large firms to avoid those taxes.     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。     

International evidence on fiscal solvency: Is fiscal policy “responsible”?

We conduct a cross-country empirical analysis of fiscal solvency based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium conditions. The results show evidence of fiscal solvency, in the form of a robust positive conditional response of the primary balance to changes in public debt, in panels for emerging and industrial economies and in a combined panel. Emerging economies show a stronger response and hence converge to lower mean debt-output ratios, as observed in the data. The results are weaker for countries with debt ratios exceeding panel means and medians. Hence, we can separate countries where fiscal solvency holds from those where it remains in doubt.     

Determinants of sovereign yield spreads in the Eurozone: A Bayesian approach

We analyze the determinants of sovereign yields spreads of EMU member states applying Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) to annual panel data from 1999 to 2009. BMA is well-suited in cases of small samples and high model uncertainty. This seems to be the case in modeling sovereign yield spreads in the Eurozone since the literature reports heterogeneous results with respect to significant explanatory variables. We are testing a number of variables reported to be significant in the literature and find that the most likely country specific drivers of yield spreads are fiscal variables such as budget balance and government debt, as well as external sector variables, such as terms of trade, trade balance and openness. Global financing conditions, indicated by the US interest rate, and market sentiments, indicated by corporate bond spreads, are likely to influence sovereign yield spreads.