On the empirics of international smoothing

By fully exploiting the statistical properties of panel data, this paper improves upon existing methodologies to estimate consumption smoothing at least in three respects. First, we model explicitly incomplete risksharing as well as incomplete intertemporal smoothing, and couch the two mechanisms in a unified framework. Second, we fully exploit simple panel data analysis in order to measure degrees of both risksharing and intertemporal smoothing taking place in a given set of economic regions. In particular, we are able to measure not only the smoothing of idiosyncratic shocks, but also the dependence on aggregate (non-diversifiable) shocks. Third, we distinguish neatly between the effects of temporary vs. permanent shocks. This can be done by taking advantage of the complementarity between the “within” estimator and the “between” estimator in a panel regression.     

The Great Recession: US dynamics and spillovers to the world economy

This paper provides an empirical investigation of both the within-US and international channels of transmission of macroeconomic and financial shocks by means of a 50-country macroeconometric model (estimated over the 1980-2009 period), including measures of excess liquidity and financial fragility, specifically designed in order to evaluate the relevance of the boom-bust credit cycle view put forward as an interpretation of the recent “Great Recession” episode. We find that such a view is consistent with the empirical evidence. Moreover, concerning the real effects of financial shocks within the US, we detect stronger evidence of an asset prices channel, rather than a liquidity channel. Concerning the spillovers to the world economy, we find that while financial disturbances are transmitted to foreign countries through US house and stock price dynamics, as well as excess liquidity creation, the trade channel is the key trasmission mechanism of real shocks.     

Market concentration and the likelihood of financial crises

According to theory, market concentration affects the likelihood of a financial crisis in different ways. The “concentration-stability” and the “concentration-fragility” hypotheses suggest opposing effects operating through specific channels. Using data of 160 countries for the period 1970–2009, this paper empirically tests these indirect effects of financial market structure. We set up a simultaneous system in order to jointly estimate financial stability and the relevant channel variables as endogenous variables. Our findings provide support for the assumption of channel effects in general and both the concentration-stability and the concentration-fragility hypothesis in particular. The effects are found to vary between high and low income countries.     

“Black Swans” before the “Black Swan” evidence from international LIBOR–OIS spreads

The LIBOR–OIS spread is a closely monitored indicator of the financial health of economy. Previous research has used this spread to identify and anticipate abrupt changes in financial markets. Taylor and Williams (2009) refer to the drastic increase in the US LIBOR–OIS spread on August 7th, 2007 as a “Black Swan” in the money market. In this paper, rather than rely on visual observations of “Black Swans” we estimate them using Bai and Perron’s (1998) procedure. We estimate structural breaks, Granger causality tests, and innovation accounting in international LIBOR–OIS spreads and a CDS index to better understand their dynamics during the recent crisis. Our results reveal that “Black Swans” appeared in smaller economies prior to that in large ones during the financial crisis. In addition, we find that only shocks to the US LIBOR–OIS spread has any statistically significant effects after 30 days.     

Securitized banking and the run on repo

The panic of 2007–2008 was a run on the sale and repurchase market (the repo market), which is a very large, short-term market that provides financing for a wide range of securitization activities and financial institutions. Repo transactions are collateralized, frequently with securitized bonds. We refer to the combination of securitization plus repo finance as “securitized banking” and argue that these activities were at the nexus of the crisis. We use a novel data set that includes credit spreads for hundreds of securitized bonds to trace the path of the crisis from subprime-housing related assets into markets that had no connection to housing. We find that changes in the LIB-OIS spread, a proxy for counterparty risk, were strongly correlated with changes in credit spreads and repo rates for securitized bonds. These changes implied higher uncertainty about bank solvency and lower values for repo collateral. Concerns about the liquidity of markets for the bonds used as collateral led to increases in repo haircuts, that is the amount of collateral required for any given transaction. With declining asset values and increasing haircuts, the US banking system was effectively insolvent for the first time since the Great Depression.     

Fiscal Policy Shocks in the Euro Area and the US: An Empirical Assessment*

We analyse the impact of fiscal policy shocks in the euro area as a whole, using a newly‐available quarterly data set of fiscal variables for the period 1981–2007. To allow for comparability with previous results on euro‐area countries and the US, we use a standard structural vector autoregressive (VAR) framework, and study the impact of aggregated and disaggregated government spending and net‐tax shocks. In addition, to frame euro‐area results, we apply the same methodology for the same sample period to US data. We also explore the sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of variables aiming to control for underlying financial and fiscal conditions. The main new findings are that: expansionary fiscal shocks have a short‐term positive impact on GDP and private consumption, with government spending shocks entailing, in general, higher effects on economic activity than (net) tax reductions; output multipliers to government expenditure shocks are of similar size in the euro area and in the US; the persistence of a fiscal spending shock is higher in the US than in the euro area, which appears to be related to military spending in the US; and fiscal multipliers have increased over the recent past in both geographical areas.     

Default, insurance, and debt over the life-cycle

The widespread use of debt and default suggests that unsecured credit markets play an important role in consumption smoothing. In this paper, I address two previously unanswered questions. First, how does policy towards debt default affect the evolution of consumption and net worth over the life-cycle? Second, how does debt default policy interact with social insurance over the life-cycle? The findings are as follows. First, US default policy appears “lax”, in the sense that it creates severe credit constraints, especially for the young. Second, eliminating default will lower consumption inequality among the young, but will increase it among the old. Third, social insurance alters default risk and, in turn, loan pricing, and therefore matters for purely intertemporal smoothing.     

Credit market shocks and economic fluctuations: Evidence from corporate bond and stock markets

To identify disruptions in credit markets, research on the role of asset prices in economic fluctuations has focused on the information content of various corporate credit spreads. We re-examine this evidence using a broad array of credit spreads constructed directly from the secondary bond prices on outstanding senior unsecured debt issued by a large panel of nonfinancial firms. An advantage of our “ground-up” approach is that we are able to construct matched portfolios of equity returns, which allows us to examine the information content of bond spreads that is orthogonal to the information contained in stock prices of the same set of firms, as well as in macroeconomic variables measuring economic activity, inflation, interest rates, and other financial indicators. Our portfolio-based bond spreads contain substantial predictive power for economic activity and outperform—especially at longer horizons—standard default-risk indicators. Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity is embedded in securities issued by intermediate-risk rather than high-risk firms. According to impulse responses from a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression, unexpected increases in bond spreads cause large and persistent contractions in economic activity. Indeed, shocks emanating from the corporate bond market account for more than 30 percent of the forecast error variance in economic activity at the two- to four-year horizon. Overall, our results imply that credit market shocks have contributed significantly to US economic fluctuations during the 1990-2008 period.     

The evolution of cost-productivity and efficiency among US credit unions

Advances in information-processing technology have eroded the advantages of small scale and proximity to customers that traditionally enabled small lenders to thrive. Nonetheless, the membership and market share of US credit unions have increased, though their average size has also risen. We investigate changes in the efficiency and productivity of US credit unions during 1989–2006 by benchmarking the performance of individual firms against an estimated order-α quantile lying “near” the efficient frontier. We construct a cost analog of the Malmquist productivity index, which we decompose to estimate changes in cost and scale efficiency, and changes in technology. We find that cost-productivity fell on average across all credit unions but especially among smaller credit unions. Smaller credit unions confronted a shift in technology that increased the minimum cost required to produce given amounts of output. All but the largest credit unions also became less scale efficient over time.     

Costs of financial instability, household-sector balance sheets and consumption

Extant work on costs of financial instability focuses on fiscal costs and declines in aggregate GDP following banking crises. We estimate effects of banking and currency crises on consumption in 19 OECD countries, showing consumption plays an important role in the adjustment following a crisis, and effects are not captured solely by the impact of crises on standard consumption determinants, income and wealth. Additional effects, attributable to factors such as time-varying confidence, uncertainty and credit rationing, are aggravated by high and rising leverage, despite financial liberalisation easing liquidity constraints. High leverage implies that banking crises taking place now could have greater incidence than in the past.     

The interbank market after the financial turmoil: Squeezing liquidity in a “lemons market” or asking liquidity “on tap”

After August 2007 the plumbing system that supplied banks with wholesale funding, the interbank market, failed because toxic assets obstructed the pipes. Banks were forced to squeeze liquidity in a “lemons market” or to ask for liquidity “on tap” from central banks. This paper disentangles the two components of the 3-month Euribor–Eonia swap spread, credit and liquidity risk and then evaluates the decomposition. The main finding is that credit risk increased before the key events of the crisis, while liquidity risk was mainly responsible for the subsequent increases in the Euribor spread and then reacted to the systemic responses of the central banks, especially in October 2008. Moreover, the level of the spread between May 2009 and February 2010 was influenced mainly by credit risk, suggesting that European banks were still in a “lemons market” and relied on liquidity “on tap” even before sovereign debt crisis unfolded in Europe.     

Vertical fiscal imbalances and fiscal performance in advanced economies

The paper examines empirically, using a measure of “vertical fiscal imbalances” (VFI), the relationship between overall fiscal performance and the financing structure of subnational governments. It presents stylized facts regarding the size, evolution, and components of measured VFI using data from 28 OECD countries. On average, the general government fiscal balance is found to improve by 1 percent of GDP for each 10 percentage point reduction in VFI.     

Cross‐Country Spillovers from Fiscal Consolidations

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, many OECD countries adopted fiscal consolidation strategies to reduce their debt‐to‐GDP ratios. This paper investigates the effects of fiscal consolidation on trading partners’ growth through trade linkages. Using a measure of exogenous fiscal shocks in export markets, fiscal consolidation spillovers are found to slow down domestic growth and decrease employment. To the extent that fiscal consolidations are synchronised, fiscal policies have large spillover effects on output. Spillovers of fiscal consolidations on growth are found to be initially larger between countries belonging to currency unions, though this larger impact vanishes over the medium term. Larger spillovers of fiscal consolidation coincide with lower bilateral exports, higher bilateral imports and relative increases in unit labour costs in currency unions. Spillovers of fiscal consolidation are also found to be more detrimental to domestic growth during economic downturns in export markets.     

Fiscal Transparency,Fiscal Performance and Credit Ratings

Fiscal transparency can provide policymakers with incentives to adopt better policies by enhancing the public debate on the design and sustainability of fiscal policy and establishing accountability for their implementation. Fiscal transparency can also reduce uncertainty about fiscal policy and fiscal outturns by providing more information on the underlying fiscal position and fiscal risks. Both effects suggest that countries should benefit from adopting transparency enhancing policies through better market assessments of their sovereign risk. In this paper, we investigate whether fiscal transparency has an effect on market perceptions of sovereign risk, as measured by sovereign credit ratings, and if so, through which channels. We find that fiscal transparency has a positive and significant effect on ratings – one standard deviation increase in fiscal transparency increases credit ratings by 0.7 and 1 notches (or steps in the credit rating scale) in advanced and developing economies, respectively – but its effect works through different channels in advanced and developing economies. In advanced economies, fiscal transparency is associated with better fiscal outcomes, leading indirectly to higher credit ratings. In developing economies, the direct uncertainty‐reducing effect of fiscal transparency seems to be more important. Indeed, the effect of fiscal transparency on fiscal performance is found to increase with the level of institutional development.     

Why hasn’t tax competition triggered a race to the bottom? Some quantitative lessons from the EU

The integration of European financial markets in the early 1980s created an environment of near-perfect capital mobility across countries that had harmonized indirect taxes but maintained large differences in factor taxes. The years that followed witnessed several rounds of competition in capital taxes with puzzling results. Instead of the dreaded “race to the bottom” in capital taxes, the UK lowered its capital tax to a rate closer to those of France, Germany and Italy, while capital taxes changed slightly in these countries. The UK increased its labor tax marginally, but the other countries increased theirs sharply. This paper shows that these results are consistent with the quantitative predictions of a dynamic, Neoclassical general equilibrium model of tax competition that incorporates the key international externalities of tax policy operating via relative prices, wealth distribution and fiscal solvency. Tax competition is modeled as a one-shot game over time-invariant capital taxes with dynamic payoffs relative to a status quo calibrated to European data. The calibration is preceded by an empirical analysis that shows that the relationship linking taxes to labor supply and the investment rate in the model are in line with empirical evidence and that domestic taxes seem to respond to foreign taxes. The solutions of the games show that when countries compete over capital taxes adjusting labor taxes to maintain fiscal solvency, there is no race to the bottom and the Nash equilibrium is close to observed taxes. In contrast, if consumption taxes adjust to maintain fiscal solvency, competition over capital taxes triggers a “race to the bottom,” but this outcome entails large welfare gains. Surprisingly, the gains from coordination are small in all of these experiments.     

Sovereign risk premiums in the European government bond market

This paper provides a study of bond yield differentials among EU government bonds on the basis of a unique data set of issue spreads in the US and DM (Euro) bond market between 1993 and 2009. Interest differentials between bonds issued by EU countries and Germany or the USA contain risk premiums which increase with fiscal imbalances and depend negatively on the issuer’s relative bond market size. The start of the European Monetary Union has shifted market attention to deficit and debt service payments as key measures of fiscal soundness and eliminated liquidity premiums in the euro area. With the financial crisis, the cost of loose fiscal policy has increased considerably.     

On the consequences of demographic change for rates of returns to capital, and the distribution of wealth and welfare

This paper employs a multi-country large-scale Overlapping Generations model with uninsurable labor productivity and mortality risk to quantify the impact of the demographic transition towards an older population in industrialized countries on world-wide rates of return, international capital flows and the distribution of wealth and welfare in the OECD. We find that for the U.S. as an open economy, rates of return are predicted to decline by 86 basis points between 2005 and 2080 and wages increase by about 4.1%. If the U.S. were a closed economy, rates of return would decline and wages increase by less. This is due to the fact that other regions in the OECD will age even more rapidly; therefore the U.S. is “importing” the more severe demographic transition from the rest of the OECD in the form of larger factor price changes. In terms of welfare, our model suggests that young agents with little assets and currently low labor productivity gain, up to 1% in consumption, from higher wages associated with population aging. Older, asset-rich households tend to lose, because of the predicted decline in real returns to capital.     

Incomplete Intertemporal Consumption Smoothing and Incomplete Risk Sharing

This paper develops a method to estimate jointly the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing and the degree of “inter‐regional” risk sharing. The empirical results for the U.S. states and OECD and EU countries suggest that: (i) regardless of the assumption on the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing, the degree of risk sharing within a country is larger than across countries; (ii) the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing within a country is also larger than across countries; and (iii) the difference between the degree of intertemporal consumption smoothing within U.S. states and across OECD and EU countries is as large as the difference between the degree of risk sharing, contrary to the findings of some past studies.     

Understanding the Backus–Smith puzzle: It's the (nominal) exchange rate,stupid

Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (BKK 1992) demonstrated that if international capital markets are complete, consumption growth correlations across countries should be higher than their corresponding output growth correlations. In stark contrast to the theory, however, in actual data the consumption growth correlation is lower than the output growth correlation. By assuming trade imperfections due to non-traded goods, Backus, D.K., Smith, G.W. [1993 Consumption and real exchange rates in dynamic economies with non-traded goods. Journal of International Economics 35(3–4), 297–316] showed that there is an additional impediment at work that can lower the consumption growth correlation. While their argument was successful in partially explaining the puzzlingly low cross country correlation of consumption growth rates, it contributed to generating another puzzle because the data forcefully show that consumption growth is negatively correlated with the real exchange rate, which is also a violation of the theory. Using data for OECD countries, we decompose real exchange rate growth into its nominal exchange rate growth and inflation differential components, and find that nominal exchange rate movements are the main source for the Backus-Smith puzzle. We demonstrate the robustness of this finding by examining sub-samples of the data, by allowing for imperfect risk sharing due to ‘rule of thumb’ consumers, and by examining intranational data across the U.S. states where the nominal exchange rate is fixed.     

Consumption smoothing channels in open economies

Many intertemporal open economy macro models imply a theory of consumption smoothing channels; thus we build an empirical model to analyze the intertemporal smoothing role of saving components (fixed investments, inventories and trade balance) through the use of VAR impulse responses to different types of shocks. We find that for the OECD countries the bulk of intertemporal smoothing has been carried out domestically, via gross fixed investments and inventories, but the trade balance has also played a relevant – albeit volatile – smoothing role. We also characterize the dynamic behavior of each component: the trade balance and inventories are mostly used as short-run smoothing tools while fixed investment provides more and more smoothing over time. We can also address some empirical puzzles, such as the “excess sensitivity of investment” anomaly (Glick, R., Rogoff, K., 1995. Global versus country-specific productivity shocks and the current account. Journal of Monetary Economics, 35, 159–192) and the “saving-investment correlation puzzle” (Feldstein, M., Horioka, C., 1980. Domestic saving and international capital flows. Economic Journal, 90, 314–329).