Monetary policy, taxes, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes the interaction of inflation with the tax code and its contribution to aggregate fluctuations. We find significant effects operating through the tax on realized nominal capital gains. A tax on nominal bond income magnifies these effects. Our innovation is to combine monetary policy shocks with non-indexed taxes in a model where the central bank implements policy using an interest rate rule. Monetary policy had important effects on the behavior of the business cycle before 1980 because policymakers did not exert effective control over inflation. Monetary policy reform around 1980 led to better control, and with more stable inflation, the effect of the interaction between monetary policy and the nominal capital gains tax has become negligible.     

Managerial incentives,capital reallocation,and the business cycle

We argue that when managers have private information about the productivity of assets under their control and receive private benefits, substantial bonuses are required to induce less productive managers to declare that capital should be reallocated. The need to provide incentives for managers to relinquish control links executive compensation to capital reallocation and managerial turnover over the business cycle, rendering them procyclical if expected managerial compensation increases when more managers are hired. Moreover, capital is less productively deployed in downturns because agency costs make reallocation more costly. Empirically, we find that both CEO turnover and executive compensation are remarkably procyclical.     

Entrepreneurial activity, risk, and the business cycle

This paper analyzes a model in which the risk associated with entrepreneurial activity implies that the amount of such activity is procyclical and results in amplification and intertemporal propagation of productivity shocks. In the model risk averse agents choose between a riskless project and a risky project with higher expected output (‘the entrepreneurial activity’). Agents who become entrepreneurs need to bear part of the project-specific risk for incentive reasons. More agents become entrepreneurs when productivity is high, because agents are more willing to bear risk and need to bear less risk for incentive reasons. Furthermore, cross-sectional heterogeneity can be countercyclical.     

Firm dynamics, markup variations, and the business cycle

We present a model in which net business formation is endogenously procyclical. Variations in the number of operating firms lead to countercyclical variations in markups that give rise to endogenous procyclical movements in measured total factor productivity (TFP). Based on this result, the paper suggests a simple structural decomposition of variations in TFP into those originating from exogenous shocks and those originating endogenously from the interaction between firms’ entry and exit decisions and the degree of competition. The decomposition suggests that around 40% of the movements in measured TFP can be attributed to this interaction. Moreover, the paper analyzes the effects on (i) the measurement of the volatility of exogenous shocks in the U.S. economy and (ii) the magnification of shocks over the business cycle.     

Learning asymmetries in real business cycles

When a boom ends, the downturn is generally sharp and short. When growth resumes, the boom is more gradual. Our explanation rests on learning about productivity. When agents believe productivity is high, they work, invest, and produce more. More production generates higher precision information. When the boom ends, precise estimates of the slowdown prompt decisive reactions: investment and labor fall sharply. When growth resumes, low production yields noisy estimates of recovery. Noise impedes learning, slows recovery, and makes booms more gradual than downturns. A calibrated model generates growth rate asymmetry similar to macroeconomic aggregates. Fluctuations in agents’ forecast precision match observed countercyclical errors of forecasters.“There is, however, another characteristic of what we call the trade cycle that our explanation must cover; namely, the phenomenon of the crisis—the fact that the substitution of a downward for an upward tendency often takes place suddenly and violently, whereas there is, as a rule, no such sharp turning point when an upward is substituted for a downward tendency.” J.M. Keynes (1936)     

Instability of sunspot equilibria in real business cycle models under adaptive learning

We provide conditions under which a general, reduced-form class of real business cycle (RBC) models has rational expectations equilibria that are both indeterminate and stable under adaptive learning. Indeterminacy of equilibrium allows for the possibility that non-fundamental “sunspot” variable realizations can be used to drive the model, and several researchers have offered calibrated structural models where sunspot shocks play such a role. However, we show that the structural restrictions researchers have adopted lead to reduced-form systems that are always unstable under adaptive learning dynamics, thus calling into question the plausibility of these sunspot-driven RBC models.     

Comparing New Keynesian models of the business cycle: A Bayesian approach

The baseline New Keynesian model cannot replicate the observed persistence in inflation, output, and real wages for sensible parameter values. As a result, several extensions have been suggested to improve its fit to the data. We use a Bayesian approach to estimate and compare the baseline sticky price model of Calvo's [1983. Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 383-398.] and three extensions. Our empirical results are as follows. First, we find that adding price indexation improves the fit of Calvo's [1983. Staggered prices in a utility maximizing framework. Journal of Monetary Economics 12, 383-398.] model. Second, models with both staggered price and wage setting dominate models with only price rigidities. Third, introducing wage indexation does not significantly improve the fit. Fourth, all model estimates suggest a high degree of price stickiness. Fifth, the estimates of labor supply elasticity are higher in models with both staggered price and wage contracts. Finally, the estimated inflation parameters of the Taylor rule are stable across models.     

Do long swings in the business cycle lead to strong persistence in output?

This paper investigates how the occasional long swing in the business cycle can produce long-memory behavior in US output. To prove this theoretical relationship, we extend the Hamilton Markov chain regime switching model of real aggregate output to include the occasional long regime. We do this by modeling the duration length of the expansion and recession regimes as draws from a fat-tailed distribution with realized durations that are high in variability and occasionally extreme in value. Empirically, we find that the tail indices for the length of US economic booms and busts correspond with the long-memory parameter estimates of Diebold and Rudebusch [1989. Long memory and persistence in aggregate output. Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 189-209] and Sowell [1992a. Modeling long-run behavior with the fractional ARIMA model. Journal of Monetary Economics 29, 277-302] for real US output. Estimates of our extended regime switching model produce better short- and long-run forecasts of output in comparison to forecasts with a fractionally integrated model. Furthermore, our estimated regime-switching model finds US expansions to be fragile during their infancy, but become more and more likely to continue after surviving the first seven quarters.     

Bank-specific shocks and the real economy

Governments often justify interventions into the financial system in the form of bail outs or liquidity assistance with the systemic importance of large banks for the real economy. In this paper, we analyze whether idiosyncratic shocks to loan growth at large banks have effects on real GDP growth. We employ a measure of idiosyncratic shocks which follows Gabaix (forthcoming). He shows that idiosyncratic shocks to large firms have an impact on US GDP growth. In an application to the banking sector, we find evidence that changes in lending by large banks have a significant short-run impact on GDP growth. Episodes of negative loan growth rates and the Eastern European countries in our sample drive these results.     

Financial shocks and the US business cycle

Employing the financial accelerator (FA) model of Bernanke et al. [1999. The Financial accelerator in a quantitative business cycle framework. In: Taylor, J.B., Woodford, M. (Eds.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, vol. 1C. Handbooks in Economics, vol. 15. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 1341-1393] enhanced to include a shock to the FA mechanism, we construct and study shocks to the efficiency of the financial sector during post-war US business cycles. These shocks are found to (i) be very tightly linked with the onset of recessions, more so than TFP or monetary shocks; (ii) remain contractionary after recessions have ended; (iii) account for a large part of the variance of GDP; (iv) be generally much more important than money shocks and (v) be strongly negatively correlated with the external finance premium.     

Understanding the inventory cycle

Careful examination of aggregate data from the U.S. and other OECD countries reveals that production and inventory behavior exhibit paradoxical features: (1) Inventory investment is strongly countercyclical at very high frequencies (e.g., 2-3 quarters per cycle); it is procyclical only at relatively low-cyclical frequencies such as the business-cycle frequencies (e.g., 8-40 quarters per cycle). (2) Production is less volatile than sales around the high frequencies; it is more volatile than sales only around business-cycle or lower frequencies. (3) Unlike capital investment or GDP, the bulk of the variance of inventory investment is concentrated around high frequencies rather than around business-cycle frequencies. These features of production and inventory behavior at the low and high frequencies provide a litmus test for inventory theories. This paper shows that the stockout-avoidance theory [Kahn, J., 1987. Inventories and the volatility of production. American Economic Review 77, 667-679.] has much better potential than other competing theories for explaining the seemingly paradoxical features of inventory fluctuations observed at different cyclical frequencies. My analysis suggests that demand shocks are the main source of the business cycle.     

Stock returns,aggregate earnings surprises,and behavioral finance

We study the stock market's reaction to aggregate earnings news. Prior research shows that, for individual firms, stock prices react positively to earnings news but require several quarters to fully reflect the information in earnings. We find a substantially different pattern in aggregate data. First, returns are unrelated to past earnings, suggesting that prices neither underreact nor overreact to aggregate earnings news. Second, aggregate returns correlate negatively with concurrent earnings; over the last 30 years, for example, stock prices increased 5.7% in quarters with negative earnings growth and only 2.1% otherwise. This finding suggests that earnings and discount rates move together over time and provides new evidence that discount-rate shocks explain a significant fraction of aggregate stock returns.     

Costs of business cycles for unskilled workers

Unskilled workers are subject to a much larger risk of unemployment during recessions than are skilled workers. Moreover, unskilled workers earn less income, which limits their ability to self-insure. We examine how this heterogeneity in unemployment risk and income across different skill groups translates into heterogeneity in the cost of business cycles. We find that the welfare cost of business cycles for unskilled workers is substantially higher than the welfare cost for skilled workers.     

Anticipated growth and business cycles in matching models

In a business cycle model that incorporates a standard matching framework, employment increases in response to news shocks, even though the wealth effect associated with the increase in expected productivity reduces labor force participation. The reason is that the matching friction induces entrepreneurs to increase investment in new projects and vacancies early. If there is underinvestment in new projects in the competitive equilibrium, then the efficiency gains associated with an increase in employment make it possible that consumption, employment, output, as well as the investment in new and existing projects jointly increase long before the actual increase in productivity materializes. If there is no underinvestment, then investment in existing projects decreases, but total investment, consumption, employment, and output still jointly increase.     

Idiosyncratic production risk, growth and the business cycle

We introduce a neoclassical growth economy with idiosyncratic production risk and incomplete markets. Each agent is an entrepreneur operating her own technology with her own capital stock. The general equilibrium is characterized by a closed-form recursion in the CARA-normal case. Incomplete markets introduce a risk premium on private equity, which reduces the demand for investment. As compared to complete markets, the steady state can thus have both a lower capital stock due to investment risk, and a lower interest rate due to precautionary savings. Furthermore, the anticipation of high real interest rates in the future feeds back into high risk premia and low investment in the present, thus slowing down convergence to the steady state. Our results highlight the importance of private risk premia for capital accumulation and business cycles.     

Disentangling demand and supply in credit developments: A survey-based analysis for Italy

This paper combines qualitative information from the Eurosystem Bank Lending Survey with micro-data on loans for the participating Italian banks to assess the role of supply and demand factors in lending to enterprises developments, with a focus on the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Both demand and supply have played a relevant role, in the whole sample period and during the crisis. A counterfactual exercise shows that the effect of supply factors on the growth of lending was strongest after the Lehman collapse. On average, over the crisis period the negative effect on the annualized quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the panel banks’ lending to enterprises can be estimated in a range of 2.3-3.1 percentage points, depending on the specification. About one fourth of the total supply effect can be attributed to costs related to the banks’ balance sheet position, the rest to their perception of credit risk.     

Time series decomposition and measurement of business cycles, trends and growth cycles

A study of business cycles does not require trend estimation and elimination, but a study of growth cycles does. Major cyclical slowdowns and speedups deserve to be analyzed, but the needed time series decomposition presents difficult problems, mainly because trends and cycles influence each other. We compare cyclical movements in levels, deviations from trend, and smoothed growth rates for both the quarterly real GDP and the monthly U.S. Coincident Index—using the phase average trend (PAT). Then we compare alternative trend estimates, deterministic and stochastic, linear and nonlinear, and the corresponding series of deviations from these trends. We discuss how the resulting estimates differ for U.S. growth cycles in the post-World War II period. The results of PAT show great similarity to the results obtained with the Hodrick-Prescott, local linear trend, band-pass filtering methods.     

Self-enforcing employment contracts and business cycle fluctuations

This paper incorporates risk-sharing employment contracts into an economy in which matching frictions characterize the labour market and in which agents cannot commit. In equilibrium, the terms of ongoing contracts are affected by those being negotiated in the job market because contracts must be self-enforcing. In this context, risk-sharing implies that hours worked and wages are negatively related, while enforcement considerations imply the converse. Overall, the sign of this relationship is ambiguous. Therefore, the existence of such contracts may explain why movements in hours worked appear weakly related to those in real wages in U.S. aggregate data.     

The (ir)relevance of real wage rigidity in the New Keynesian model with search frictions

We develop a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. We show that the model generates counterfactual labor market dynamics. In particular, it fails to generate the negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment in the data, i.e., the Beveridge curve. Introducing real wage rigidity leads to a negative correlation, and increases the magnitude of labor market flows to more realistic values. However, inflation dynamics are only weakly affected by real wage rigidity. The reason is that labor market frictions give rise to long-run employment relationships. The measure of real marginal costs that is relevant for inflation in the Phillips curve contains a present value component that varies independently of the real wage.     

Time-to-build, monetary shocks, and aggregate fluctuations

The idea that the investment process takes time to produce finished capital goods was an integral part of Kydland and Prescott's early work on real business cycles, but this feature has been dropped in much recent work, mainly because it seemed to have little effect on macroeconomic dynamics. With a generalization of the “time-to-build” feature that incorporates multiple types of capital, however, a New Keynesian model can produce “u-shaped” responses in output, investment, and inflation to a monetary policy shock. Such responses are not found in many studies that assume no time-to-build friction. In addition, different specifications of the time-to-build structure result in substantially different response patterns for these aggregate variables.