THE SIZE OF FISCAL MULTIPLIERS AND THE STANCE OF MONETARY POLICY IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

Implementing fiscal programs during monetary policy expansions seems to improve significantly their economic stimulus. We find this result by estimating the effect of government consumption shocks on gross domestic product (GDP) using a panel of 23 developing economies. Our goal is to better understand the reasons for the low fiscal multipliers found in the literature by performing estimations for alternative exchange rate regimes, business‐cycle phases, and monetary policy stances. In addition, we perform counterfactual simulations to analyze the possible gains from fiscal‐monetary policy coordination. Our results also show lower multipliers in developing economies with flexible regimes, especially during economic slowdowns. (JEL E62, E63, F32)     

IS TIGHTER FISCAL POLICY EXPANSIONARY UNDER FISCAL DOMINANCE?: HYPERCROWDING OUT IN LATIN AMERICA

Hypercrowding out occurs when fiscally dominated governments' domestic credit demands are so intrusive to a nation's financial system that a move toward fiscal surplus lowers interest rates and increases growth. We sample nine Latin American countries to test for these relationships. The impulse‐response results of vector error correction models, six nations test positive for these two connections, suggesting market concern despite recent efforts toward fiscal balance. (JEL E430, E620, O230, O540)     

THE GREAT RECESSION, “RAINY DAY” FUNDS,AND COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

We examine the fiscal policy options that were available to Latin American countries at the onset of the current global economic crisis, concluding that most of the major countries in the region possessed the fiscal space (as measured by credible fiscal sustainability and debt headroom) to run prudent countercyclical fiscal deficits. For those countries, the appropriate policy response involved a constrained fiscal expansion focused on productive public spending and financed by drawing on the “rainy day” funds—in the form of large stocks of foreign exchange reserves—that they accumulated in prior years, rather than by market borrowing. (JEL E62, E63, F34)     

THE FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE TO PUBLIC DEBT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Theoretical models on fiscal sustainability hypothesize that indebted governments can lower their current debt by generating future primary surpluses, ceteris paribus. While both developed and developing countries struggle with the issue of debt stabilization, the latter, in particular face heightened sensitivity from creditors, which provides them an impetus to respond more strongly to stabilize their debt. Based on a panel of 53 developing countries, we examine the fiscal response of these countries to changes in their debt‐to‐gross domestic product ratio. We find evidence of a positive relationship between the debt and primary surplus and that countries adjust along both the revenue and expenditure margins at roughly the same rate. (JEL E62, H50, O11)     

MONETARY–FISCAL INTERACTIONS WITH A CONSERVATIVE CENTRAL BANK

We study macroeconomic stabilization when monetary and fiscal policies interact via their effects on output and inflation and the monetary authority is more conservative than the fiscal. We find that monetary–fiscal interactions result in poor macroeconomic stabilization. With both policies discretionary, the Nash equilibrium is suboptimal with higher output and lower inflation than optimal; the Nash equilibrium may be extreme with output higher and inflation lower than either authority want. Leadership equilibria are not second best. Monetary commitment is completely negated by fiscal discretion and yields the same outcome as discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. Optimal macroeconomic stabilization requires either commitment of both monetary and fiscal policies, or identical targets for both authorities – output socially optimal and inflation appropriately conservative – or complete separation of tasks.     

INTERACTION BETWEEN MONETARY AND FISCAL AUTHORITIES UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

This paper analyzes the interaction between monetary and fiscal authorities under incomplete information. The inflation goal of the central bank is assumed to be unknown to the fiscal authority and the public. The central bank signals the goal by choosing the first‐period monetary policy before the fiscal authority joins the policy‐making game. If the central bank would like the fiscal authority and the public to believe that it is wet (dry), the central bank would distort the money supply upward (downward) in order to reveal its actual type.     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.     

FROM BUDGETARY FORECASTS TO EX POST FISCAL DATA: EXPLORING THE EVOLUTION OF FISCAL FORECAST ERRORS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

This paper splits the ex post error in the budget balance, defined as the final budget figure minus the planned figure, into implementation and revision errors, and investigates the determinants of these errors. The implementation error is the difference between the nowcast, published toward the end of the year of budget implementation, and the planned budget, while the revision error is the difference between the final figure and the nowcast. The split takes account of differences in reporting incentives at the different budgeting stages. The predictive content of fiscal plans is important, because it determines the reliability of the budget, while that of the nowcasts is important also because these figures are an input for the next budget and may contain important signals about the fiscal stance. Implementation and revision errors may arise for political and strategic reasons. Our results suggest that an improvement in the quality of institutions, whether measured by the tightness of national fiscal rules, the medium‐term budgetary framework or budgetary transparency, increases the quality of budgetary reporting at both the planning and the nowcast stage. This supports the recently adopted requirements on national fiscal frameworks. It also strengthens the case for a close monitoring by the European Commission of national budgeting. (JEL E6, H6)     

HOW DO FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND FISCAL STIMULI IMPACT ON THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF BUSINESS CYCLES?

Using quarterly data for a panel of advanced economies, we show that synchronized fiscal consolidation (stimulus) programmes in different countries make their business cycles more closely linked. We also find: (i) some evidence of decoupling when an inflation targeting regime is unilaterally adopted; (ii) an increase in business cycle synchronization when countries fix their exchange rates and become members of a monetary union; (iii) a positive effect of bilateral trade on the synchronization of business cycles. Global factors, such as a rise in global risk aversion and uncertainty and a reversal of nonstandard expansionary monetary policy, can also reduce the degree of co‐movement of business cycles across countries. From a policy perspective, our work shows that an inflation targeting regime coupled with simultaneous fiscal consolidations can lead to more business cycle synchronization.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON RECOVERY FROM RECESSIONS

Although negative shocks have persistent effects on output on average, this article shows that macroeconomic policies can influence the speed of recovery and mitigate the persistence of the shock. Indeed, monetary and fiscal stimulus and foreign aid can spur a rebound, with impacts that are asymmetrically stronger than in non‐recovery years. Real depreciation and the exchange rate regime also have asymmetric growth effects in a recovery year relative to other years of expansion. (JEL C23, E32, F43, O43)     

RIGHT ON TARGET: EXPLORING THE FACTORS LEADING TO INFLATION TARGETING ADOPTION

This paper examines which economic, fiscal, external, financial, and institutional characteristics of countries affect the likelihood that they adopt inflation targeting (IT) as their monetary policy strategy. We estimate a panel binary response model for 60 countries and two subsamples consisting of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and non‐OECD countries over the period 1985–2008. The findings suggest that past macroeconomic performance of a country, its fiscal discipline, exchange rate arrangements, as well as the structure and development of its financial system have a significant impact on the likelihood to adopt IT. However, the factors leading to IT adoption differ significantly between OECD and non‐OECD countries. (JEL E42, E52)     

THE EFFECTS OF FISCAL AND MONETARY DISCIPLINE ON BUDGETARY OUTCOMES

This article extends the model of Von Hagen and Harden that analyzed the impact of fiscal discipline on budgetary outcomes. We modify the model by adding monetary discipline to interact with fiscal discipline in order to analyze the effects of both on budgetary outcomes. The model predicts that while both inflation and budget deficits are negatively associated with fiscal discipline, they may be positively associated with monetary discipline, proxied by central bank independence. This result obtains due to optimizing agents internalizing the burden of spending: inflation. Although not conclusive due to data limitations, empirical findings also support these predictions. ( JEL D73, E58, H61, H72)     

CONTROLLING INFLATION WITH TIMID MONETARY–FISCAL REGIME CHANGES

Can monetary policy control inflation when both monetary and fiscal policies change over time? When monetary policy is active, a long-run fiscal principle entails flexibility in fiscal policy that preserves determinacy even when deviating from passive fiscal, substantially for brief periods or timidly for prolonged periods. In order to guarantee a unique equilibrium, monetary and fiscal policies must coordinate not only within but also across regimes, and not simply on being active or passive, but also on their extent. The amplitude of deviations from the active monetary/passive fiscal benchmark determines whether a regime is Ricardian: Timid deviations do not imply wealth effects.     

Crisis and Recovery: What We Have Learned from the South Korean Experience?*

This paper analyzes the process of recovery from the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea, and draws some lessons from it. The fast restoration of financial stability due to early closure of non‐viable financial institutions and quick resolution of non‐performing loans was critical for the speedy recovery of the South Korean economy. The swift adjustment in fiscal and monetary policies in addition to the large depreciation of real exchange rates also supported the fast recovery. Corporate and government bond markets played an important role in the financial restructuring and macroeconomic adjustment process. Structural reforms helped to alleviate the weaknesses in the corporate sector, particularly in chaebol groups. However, the fast recovery also generated unwelcome side‐effects. Because of aggressive fiscal expansion through government‐guaranteed bonds and public credit guarantee programs, sovereign liabilities increased greatly and transparency of the official fiscal stance deteriorated. Thanks to structural reform, corporate and financial sectors began to recognize the importance of micro risk management, but increased risk aversion contributed to the slowdown of corporate investment and, therefore, reduced long‐run growth perspective in South Korea. How to revive long‐term growth rates remains an important question in South Korea despite fast recovery from the crisis.     

FISCAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION BEFORE THE CRISIS

This article investigates fiscal convergence attained by EU countries in the period 1991–2008, by employing β‐ and σ‐convergence techniques complemented by a time series analysis. Overall our results highlight a distinctive convergence pattern in the European Union. Fiscal discipline leading to a fast convergence of deficit/GDP ratio over the 1990s markedly weakened in the following decade. Nonetheless, after the Euro debut a pronounced convergence in total revenue and total government spending emerges, with different patterns characterizing each expenditure component. Despite this evidence of fiscal harmonization, European treaties failed to attract countries toward a common share of government debt over GDP. (JEL E61, H11, C23)     

ROLE OF FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICY

Abstract.  This paper applies the GS-PD framework of Ho (1988) to show that the so-called 'battle of ideas' between 'Keynesians', who believe in intervention, and the champions of the market, who believe in non-intervention, as popularly depicted, diverts attention from the crux of the matter. It shows how monetary and fiscal policies have to be coordinated in specific situations and why some macroeconomic problems may require responses beyond the purview of monetary and fiscal policies.     

The effects of economic policy uncertainty on China’s economy: evidence from time-varying parameter FAVAR

ABSTRACT

This article explores the effects of China’s economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on its fiscal policy, monetary policy and a wide range of macro-economic variables using a time-varying parameter FAVAR model. Based on monthly data from 07/2003 to 08/2017, the time-varying structure of the model allows us to capture the time-varying characteristics of the macro-economic variables and which channel is relevant. Empirical results reveal that the reaction of monetary and fiscal policies to EPU is highly asymmetric across macro-economic circumstances. Loose monetary and fiscal policies are adopted in response to EPU shocks during the financial crisis, while policies are moderately tightened after the crisis. The China Interbank Offered Rate (Chibor) responds more sensitively and severely than M2 to EPU shocks. Additionally, EPU shocks have a significant and negative impact on economic growth, consumption, exchange rates, bonds and the stock market, but showing a positive impact on credit, real estate and fixed asset investment (which might be due to China’s special economic market environment and the high investment return). The results indicate that EPU shocks significantly affect macroeconomic fundamentals through precautionary savings and financial market channels but lose their effectiveness through a ‘real options’ effect.