Output Pay and Ethnic Wage Differentials: Canadian Evidence

Using the Workplace and Employee Survey, we are the first to examine the association between payment method and ethnic wage differentials in Canada. Following earlier theory, we hypothesize that output pay tying earnings to productivity makes it more difficult for employers to discriminate. The empirical estimations show that non‐Europeans in Canada paid by time rates receive lower earnings than Europeans paid by time rates. Yet, non‐Europeans paid by output pay receive virtually identical earnings to their European counterparts.     

Public- and Private-Sector Wage Differentials in Canada Revisited

Using a variety of techniques, we estimate the wage premium for federal, provincial, and municipal public-sector employees in Canada. We find that females in the public sector are paid a wage premium, with federal government workers enjoying the highest rents, followed by local and provincial public-sector employees. Estimates for males suggest that rent payments are comparably less, but results are inconclusive.     

Job Attributes and Federal Wage Differentials

As part of the debate on how to treat attributes of a job (as opposed to a worker) when measuring federal differentials, the focus has been on the proper treatment of employer size. Using employer size, we highlight the two extremes in the literature of either holding job attributes constant or of assuming attributes do not transfer between sectors. A third alternative-estimating the extent to which the attribute will transfer-is much closer in value to that generated by holding employer size constant.     

Industry Wage Differentials and Wait Unemployment

This analysis uses individual-level data to test the industry wage differential-wait unemployment hypothesis. Using the 1988 Bureau of Labor Statistics Displaced Worker Survey, it examines the role of predisplacement industry in determining the length of jobless spells and finds some evidence consistent with wait unemployment. The analysis also considers the incidence of joblessness separately from duration and finds that factors positively related to the occurrence of a spell are not necessarily positively related to its ultimate length.     

Compensating Wage Differentials in the Union and Nonunion Sectors

This paper tests for the existence of structurally different compensating payments in the union and nonunion sectors of the economy. Significant differences may stem from the different mechanisms by which such payments are determined: markets are the primary mechanism in the nonunion sector, while Political processes play a major role in the union sector. The empirical results provide tentative support for the structural differences hypothesis; They also reveal an absence of positive and significant compensating payments in nonunion labor markets.     

Unobserved Worker Quality and Inter-Industry Wage Differentials*

This study quantitatively assesses two alternative explanations for inter-industry wage differentials: worker heterogeneity in the form of unobserved quality and firm heterogeneity in the form of a firm's willingness to pay (WTP) for workers' productive attributes. Building on hedonic models of differentiated product demand, we develop an empirical hedonic model of labor demand and apply a two-stage nonparametric procedure to recover worker and firm heterogeneities. In the first stage we recover unmeasured worker quality by estimating market-specific hedonic wage functions nonparametrically. In the second stage we infer each firm's WTP parameters for worker attributes by using first-order conditions from the demand model. We apply our approach to quantify inter-industry wage differentials on the basis of individual data from the NLSY79 and find that worker quality accounts for approximately two thirds of the inter-industry wage differentials.     

Wage Differentials in São Paulo's Labor Force

To explain the variation in the salaries of specialized workers in São Paulo's industries of transformation, we have used a model made up of five variables: the person's occupational preparation, the influence he may exert within the company because of his occupation, his age, his seniority in the company, and his time on the job. The data obtained for the total sample show clearly that the status of the worker within the company (occupational influence) as well as his occupational preparation and age, are powerful partial determinants of salary levels in São Paulo. On the whole, training is the most powerful of these variables because it has a strong direct effect on wages and because it has an indirect effect on wages through its impact on occupational influence level. Variables indicating experience in the company (seniority) and in the present job are almost negligible. The results suggest the presence of a modern industrial structure where one's technical preparation and position in the company are closely related and where these factors weigh far more heavily than experience on the job and in the company. Except for age, the viable variables used here are special cases of major status dimension: wealth (wages); power (occupational influence); informational status (occupatibnal preparation or education). Occupational prestige was also investigated and, in a stepwise regression, was found useless as a determinant of wages. In this research we explore, possibly for the first time, the use of a power variable, occupational influence, as a determinant of a reward variable, hourly wages. Though theoretically promising, power has previously been remarkably resistant to empirical analysis. Although our use of occupational influence has been successful, the introduction of new variables is always risky. We hope that others will conduct studies leading either to refinements in the use of this and similar indicators or to their rejection. Also, recent publications report only a small effect of most known variables on individual income differentials in the United States. Perhaps adding occupational influence might help. It is worth repeating that in the present data-set, this variable alone explains just about as much variance in hourly wages (23 per cent) as a set of 13 repressors does on job income (27 per cent) in data analyzed by Spaeth. The whole set of five variables is, of course, more effective here, with 36 per cent of the variance explained. These differences may be due to many factors. It would seem that education may be more influential in Brazil—or at least in this sample —than in the United States. Clearly, educated personnel are in shorter supply than in the United States, and the relative rewards may be greater. If this is true, the rewards for education should decrease as Brazil's education system improves. In any case, by its clear elimination of job experience and seniority, and its strong support for occupational training, occupational influence level, and age, we hope the present work may add to the growing body of evidence regarding the determinants of wage differentials, especially in Brazil and perhaps in other dynamic third world sectors.     

Are Union Wage Differentials in the United States Falling?

This paper addresses several estimation and specification issues in estimating union wage differentials in the United States over the last two decades. Estimates provide strong evidence of a decline in the differential for women. For men, the differential appears to have declined for a person with overall average characteristics, but not for a male with characteristics of the average unionized male.     

Public Wage Differentials and the Public Administration "Industry"

The public sector consists of two broad sub samples, administrators and no administrators. The two groups have very different occupational compositions and contrasting patterns of compensation. Inconsistent treatment of these sub samples has led to past government differentials, which are not comparable. While administrators remain overpaid relative to their private sector counterparts, no administrators are underpaid relative to their counterparts. Moreover, public wage differentials way substantially in sign and magnitude from industry to industry. Such results demonstrate that no simple, homogeneous government differential exists.     

Low Pay and Wage Regulation in the European Community

The prospect of direct intervention in the process of wage determination as envisaged in the Social Charter has met with considerable criticism. In particular, employers' organizations and certain governments have rejected outright the proposal to require firms to pay an equitable wage. However, in all member-states except the UK and Ireland, arrangements exist to ensure that nearly all workers are covered by minimum wage protection (through national minimum wages or full-coverage collective agreements). In this article the nature of low-paid employment in member-states is examined and different methods of wage regulation are described. After reviewing the economic effects of wage regulation, we discuss possible initiatives on wage regulation at the Community level.     

Rhetoric in Economic Research: The Case of Gender Wage Differentials

Scientific rhetoric can have a profound impact on the perception of research; it can also drive and direct further research efforts. What determines whether results are discussed in a neutral or a judgmental way? How precise and convincing do results have to be so that authors call for significant policy changes? These questions are in general difficult to answer, because rhetoric on the one hand, and content and methodology of the paper on the other, cannot be separated easily. We therefore used a unique example to examine this question empirically: the analysis of gender wage differentials. Here, the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition represents a standard research method that compares male and female earnings, holding observable factors constant. We analyzed close to 200 papers to investigate what drives authors to talk about discrimination, whether and when they call for policy activism, or when they are more hesitant to do so. Our results show that American authors are more reluctant to refer to discrimination. So are women, but only with respect to the titles of their papers. Furthermore, we find that the better the data and method used in a paper, the more likely an author is to assign his/her estimate of unequal wages to discrimination. The contrary is true the higher the prestige of the author or the research outlet.     

Collective Wage Contracts,Opt‐Out Clauses,and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.     

Interindustry Wage Differentials and Unobserved Ability: Siblings Evidence from Five Countries

We examine the role of unobserved ability in explaining interindustry wage differentials. By using data on brothers, we account for unmeasured abilities shared by siblings. The data came from four Nordic countries and the United States. In the Nordic countries, only a moderate proportion of the variability in industry wages can be attributed to unobserved ability, while unmeasured factors explain as much as half of the U.S. industry‐wage variation. Accounting for such differences, we show that the U.S. interindustry wage dispersion is similar with that in the Nordic countries.     

Pay Secrecy and the Gender Wage Gap in the United States

Legislators and advocates claim that pay secrecy perpetuates the gender wage gap and that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) should be amended to outlaw these practices. Using a difference‐in‐differences fixed‐effects human‐capital wage regression, I find that women with higher education levels who live in states that have outlawed pay secrecy have higher earnings, and that the wage gap is consequently reduced. State bans on pay secrecy and federal legislation to amend the FLSA to allow workers to share information about their wages may improve the gender wage gap, especially among women with college or graduate degrees.     

Compensating Wage Differentials versus Efficiency Wages: An Empirical Study of Job Autonomy and Wages

Efficiency wage theory as incorporated in the shirking model predicts that firms may substitute wage premiums for costly monitoring. This means that wage premiums should be expected for loosely monitored workers. By regarding extensive monitoring as a lack of job autonomy, efficiency wage theory predicts a positive relation between autonomy and wages. The theory of compensating wage differentials, however, predicts a negative relation between autonomy and wages. When workers prefer autonomous jobs, employers have to offer higher wages for less autonomous jobs in order to recruit labor.
Swedish micro data are analyzed in order to examine the predictions of these theories. A proxy for the monitoring problem of the firm measures workers' possibilities of effort variation. Since this proxy is autonomy, it enables us to test the two rival hypotheses on the relation between job autonomy and wages. We find a positive relation in the private sector as predicted by the efficiency wage hypotheses and a negative relation in the case of the public sector, which accords with the theory of compensating wage differentials.     

The Price is Right? Pay Settlements and Nominal Wage Rigidity in Britain

We examine representative, group‐level wage settlement data to augment the debate on nominal pay rigidity in Britain. We investigate the characteristics of groups that settle at zero and the role of within‐firm and external influences. Nominal settlement cuts are rare. Zero nominal wage settlements are more common, but still relatively unusual, highest during (low‐inflation) recessionary periods. Small groups, above all firms under duress, appear most likely to settle at zero. Once a group settles at zero it is unlikely to do so again in the short run.     

Wage Differentials by Race and Sex: The Roles of Taste Discrimination and Labor Market Information

Using a unique dataset, this article first documents that gaps in starting wages by race and sex persist after accounting for performance on the job. Evidence suggests that simple statistical discrimination, and not just taste discrimination, is partly responsible for race differences in starting wages. But because women's average performance in the sample is higher than men's, simple statistical discrimination cannot explain the sex gap. In more complex models of statistical discrimination, worse information about a group can lower its average wage. Estimates of the quality of labor market information indicate that this may explain women's lower starting wages.