Market Power in Emissions Trading Markets Ruled by a Multiple Unit Double Auction: Further Experimental Evidence

We discuss selected methodological problems of previous Double Auction (DA) experiments and test the hypothesis that a Multiple Unit Double Auction (MUDA) is able to prevent market power in an emissions trading market. Additionally, we analyze how the information subjects receive about the market structure and different levels of subjects’ experience influence the behavior. Based on a larger number of independent observations than analyzed in previous studies, the experiment generates two main results. First, emissions trading markets ruled by a MUDA realize a high degree of efficiency even under market power conditions. However, a MUDA is, in general, not able to restrict market power. We observe persistent price discrimination in two market power environments, i.e., the distribution of profits is strongly shifted in favor of the strong market side without greatly harming efficiency. This result is independent of the information to subjects about the market structure. Second, when subjects are experienced, the efficiency is higher and the ability of the strong market side to exercise market power declines strongly. However, the variability of behavior is large and the strong market side is still able to realize supracompetitive profits in some groups.      

Endogenous market power in an emissions trading scheme with auctioning

This paper contributes to the literature on market power in emissions permits markets, modeling an emissions trading scheme in which polluters differ with respect to their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions. The polluters play a two-stage static complete information game in which their market power arises endogenously from their characteristics. In the first stage all polluters bid in an auction for the distribution of the fixed supply of permits issued by the regulator, and in the second stage they trade these permits in a secondary market. For compliance, they can also engage in abatement activity at a quadratic cost. Under the assumptions of the model, in equilibrium all polluters are successful in the auction. In the secondary market the low-cost emitters are net sellers and the high-cost emitters are net buyers. Moreover, the high-cost emitters are worse off as a result of the strategic behavior. In addition, the secondary market price is unambiguously above the auction clearing price. I find that the aggregate compliance cost when polluters act strategically increases in the heterogeneity of their marginal abatement costs at the business-as-usual emissions, but there exists a threshold of the fixed supply of permits above which strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters. Finally, for a low enough variance of the marginal abatement cost at the business-as-usual emissions, strategic behavior is compliance cost-saving for the polluters, regardless of the level of the available supply of permits.     

Abuse of EU Emissions Trading for Tacit Collusion

In this paper, we show that loopholes in EU emissions trading law foster tacit collusion that impacts oligopolistic product markets. The abuses originate from the covert misuse of EU emissions trading institutions, such as pooling or project-based mechanisms. We analyse two types of these loopholes by means of game theoretical methods to show how oligopolistic firms establish output restrictions, even if those firms are price takers on the~permit market (which might actually be the case for the majority of obligated firms in the EU). The identified misuse of emissions trading law increases firms’ profits, decreases the consumers’ surplus and has negative effects on social welfare for specified parameter ranges. Consequently, public authorities should not allow emissions trading’s overall good reputation—based upon its efficient abatement of pollution—to blind them to options in European emissions trading legislation that would eventually restrict competition.      

Assessing the performance of the UK Emissions Trading Scheme

The UK’s Climate Change Programme introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gases. Firms in over 40 industrial sectors which have negotiated “Climate Change Agreements” setting quantitative energy efficiency targets can use the ETS to trade over-and under-compliance with these targets. In parallel, a limited number of firms have become major participants in the ETS as a result of an auction of subsidies for additional abatement commitments. The paper describes the UK arrangements and assesses the economic efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the ETS, drawing on evidence of participants’ behaviour both in the incentive auction, and in subsequent trading.     

排放交易体系与新西兰农业

本文在分析新西兰国情的基础上,阐明了新西兰为何有别于其他发达国家,将农业一并纳入排放交易体系的原因。扼要叙述排放交易立法将农业纳入减排体系的机制和过程。通过个案研究,定量分析农业成本的增长幅度。深入研究农业减排所面临的困难和风险、可能产生的经济社会效应、带来的发展机遇以及存在着的不确定性。     

基于排放权交易的节能减排项目融资模式研究

融资问题一直是制约企业节能减排项目发展的关键因素,排放权交易的试点运作开启了基于排放权交易市场的节能减排融资模式的新篇章。利用节能减排项目的减排效果,能够构建一个基于排放权交易的节能减排项目融资模式,有效拓宽了节能减排项目的融资渠道。     

欧美碳排放交易市场发展对我国的启示与借鉴

随着世界气候问题的凸现,发展低碳经济已经成为世界各国的共识,而发展碳排放交易则是引领低碳经济发展的必由之路.目前,我国碳排放交易虽取得较大发展,但仍缺乏一个统一的市场交易体系.在全国建立起碳排放交易市场已是刻不容缓.本文基于碳排放交易的内涵,结合欧美碳排放交易市场的发展经验,分析得出其对我国建设碳交易市场的启示,探讨我国建立碳排放交易市场的有效路径:逐步建立起完善的碳排放交易市场体系,构建基于分权化管理模式的区域性碳交易市场布局,完善碳排放交易法规制度,健全碳排放交易监管机制.     

Strategic Behavior,Private Information,and Decentralization in the European Union Emissions Trading System

In the European Union Emissions Trading System, the supply of carbon permits is determined in a decentralized manner by Member States. Alternatively, the supply could be determined by an EU central authority. We analyze whether decentralization leads to lower total abatement costs under various assumptions about the behavior of Member States and the privacy of information about their abatement costs. If Member States do not behave strategically, then decentralization is preferred, regardless of whether abatement costs are private information. If the Member States behave strategically, then decentralization may or may not be preferred, depending on the degree of uncertainty about abatement cost parameters, the variation in emission endowments, and the number of Member States.     

排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的传导机制研究

从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现：排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。     

中国区域碳排放的因素分解模型及实证分析

本文测度了1995—2008年中国29个省市的碳排放量,分析了中国碳排放的区域差异,通过构建“LMDl分解模型”,将各地区人均碳排放分解为人均GDP、能源结构、能源强度等影响因素,同时将能源强度进一步分解为各产业能源强度和产业结构两类因素。研究结果表明：几类因素对各省市自治区碳排放增长的影响方向和影响程度存在差异,但从全国及东中西三大区域看,人均GDP是促进碳排放量增长的决定因素,能源强度下降是抑制碳排放增长的主要因素,而能源强度变化主要由工业部门能源强度的变化决定,产业结构变化通过促进能源强度的增加,间接推动了碳排放量的增长。能源结构推动了碳排放的增长,但影响程度较小。现阶段应根据各地区碳排放的区域差异及碳排放增长的影响因素,制定差异化的区域碳减排政策,包括：优化区域能源结构、降低区域能源强度、调整区域产业结构、积极推进区域低碳经济增长方式转变。     

噪声交易与市场质量

本文通过行业、规模、负债和成长能力的配对,建立起32家上证50成份股上市公司的控制样本,然后运用合理的计量方法,首次估计出符合我国股市微观结构的噪声交易高频时间序列,在此基础上深入分析噪声交易与信息不对称、流动性、波动性和有效性等市场质量指标之间的经验关系,发现:我国股市私人信息具有较高的相关性和持久性;噪声交易提高了交投活跃程度,同时却扩大了执行成本和价格波动幅度;噪声交易与信息不对称的关系不大;噪声交易使实际价差缩小,进而削弱了市场有效性。由此可见,噪声交易是一把"双刃剑",只有继续改革价格形成机制、增强价值投资力量、引导长期资金入市、完善信息披露制度并强化交易监控,才能进一步提高我国股市的质量。     

自主研发、产业结构变迁与中国碳排放绩效

运用环境方向性距离函数与序列DEA,测度了1995—2013年中国内地28个省区碳排放绩效,然后,基于省际面板数据,检验了自主研发、产业结构变迁及其互动效应对碳排放绩效的作用,并进一步对碳排放绩效省际差距形成与变迁的影响因素进行了分析,研究表明:1样本期间全国碳排放绩效呈稳步上升态势,无论从静态水平,还是动态特征来看,地区间碳排放绩效差距都比较明显;2自主研发、产业结构变迁对碳排放绩效具有积极作用,前者对碳排放绩效的影响程度远低于后者,两者在提升碳排放绩效方面存在协同效应;3提高人均收入、优化能源结构、改革产权制度能够改善碳排放绩效;4人均收入对碳强度省际差距的贡献度最高,其它因素由高到低依次是能源结构、产权结构、对外开放、自主研发,以及产业结构与自主研发的交叉项。     

关于中国碳排放权交易机制的构想

在碳排放量跃居全球首位的严峻压力下,中国清洁发展机制项目的发展成绩卓著。然而,碳排放权售价过低造成的巨大损失迫切要求中国构建自身的碳排放权交易机制。文章首先阐述了中国碳排放权交易的现状,接着分析了中国碳排放权交易存在的问题,并在此基础上提出了中国碳排放权交易机制的构想。     

自愿减排对构建国内碳排放交易市场的作用和对策

自愿减排指自愿碳减排市场中,个人、企业、政府为了对自己排放的温室气体作出抵偿,力图实现"碳中和",而购买碳信用额的一种交易模式。目前,我国尚未形成真正意义上的碳排放交易市场,自愿减排是建立碳排放交易市场前的有力尝试,具有重要意义。从自愿碳减排的角度,分析了自愿碳减排在建立国内碳排放交易市场中的重要作用,结合自愿碳减排现状,分析其不足之处并提出了相应的对策。     

Permit Trading and Credit Trading: A Comparison of Cap-Based and Rate-Based Emissions Trading Under Perfect and Imperfect Competition

This paper compares emissions trading based on a cap on total emissions (permit trading) and on relative standards per unit of output (credit trading). Two types of market structure are considered: perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly. We find that output, abatement costs and the number of firms are higher under credit trading. Allowing trade between permit-trading and credit-trading sectors may increase welfare. With perfect competition, permit trading always leads to higher welfare than credit trading. With imperfect competition, credit trading may outperform permit trading. Environmental policy can lead to exit, but also to entry of firms. Entry and exit have a profound impact on the performance of the schemes, especially under imperfect competition. We find that it may be impossible to implement certain levels of total industry emissions. Under credit trading several levels of the relative standard can achieve the same total level of emissions.     

我国碳排放权交易遵约机制的关键问题探析

首先总结了欧盟、美国、新西兰及韩国在实施碳排放权交易过程中制订遵约机制的经验,其次初步分析了为保证我国碳排放权交易的顺利实施,在遵约机制设计过程中所涉及的诸多关键问题,包括法律基础、惩罚形式、罚款额度、罚款机构、罚款所得管理办法等。最后,根据我国国情,针对这些问题的解决提出了相应的政策建议。     

The Trading Friction between America and Japan

With finance upheaval endlessly and global economic environment become more complex, the trading disputes among the western developed countries is more, and this kind of tendency is dangerous to the prospect of the world economic growth. This paper tries to analyze the major reasons of the intense trading friction between America and Japan and the countermeasures two sides took. Since the trading friction between America and Japan began from the middle of the 1950s, it never be disconnected, and escalate constantly.     

Trading Sulphur Emissions in Europe: `Guided Bilateral Trade'

In this paper a system of `guided permit trading' is developed for SO₂emissions reduction which considers permit trading as a bilateral andsequential process. This implies that in order to meet the deposition targetsat the end of the trading process, not every single trade transaction hasto meet the deposition targets. To ensure that the target is ultimately met,the number of permits traded should be controlled by a trade coordinatinginstitution. A simulation of the system of guided bilateral trading ofSO₂ permits among European countries on the basis of the SecondSO₂ Protocol indicates that some non-profitable trade transactionstake place. This prevents the cost effective emission allocation from beingfully achieved. However, the calculations show that guided bilateral permittrading may generate substantial cost savings while contributing toenvironmental protection.     

Market Power and Emissions Trading: Theory and Laboratory Results

Policymakers are concerned with market power being exploited by dominant firms in emission permit markets. Two types of market power may emerge: simple and exclusionary manipulation. Simple manipulation should result in reduced pollution‐control cost relative to command‐and‐control regulation. Exclusionary manipulation may result in increased cost. The paper reports results of an economic experiment to determine whether (i) such opportunities are successfully exploited when a dominant firm has the opportunity to do so, and (ii) the resulting outcomes are serious enough to merit consideration by regulators. Market power outcomes emerge and market efficiency is far below predicted levels.