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1.
In this paper we study how bargainers impact on markets in which firms set a list price to sell to those consumers who take prices as given. The list price acts as an outside option for the bargainers, so the higher the list price, the more the firms can extract from bargainers. We find that an increase in the proportion of consumers seeking to bargain can lower consumer surplus overall, even though new bargainers receive a lower price. The reason is that the list price for those who do not bargain and the bargained prices for those who were already bargaining rise: sellers have a greater incentive to make the bargainers’ outside option less attractive, reducing the incentive to compete for price takers. Competition Authority exhortations to bargain can therefore be misplaced. We also consider the implications for optimal seller bargaining. 相似文献
2.
Stine Wamberg Broch Suzanne Elizabeth Vedel 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2012,51(4):561-581
Agri-environmental contracts are used to provide incentives for nature management on private land in, e.g. the European Union.
The aim of this article is to investigate preference heterogeneity for agri-environmental contracts among farmers in order
to discuss potential policy improvements utilising heterogeneity. We used a choice experiment to elicit farmers’ stated preferences
for afforestation contracts. Four attributes are investigated: purpose of afforestation, option of cancelling the contract,
monitoring, and compensation level. All attributes present a potential conflict between farmers’ and authorities’ interests,
which emphasises the importance of knowing how to handle these interests. A random parameter logit model shows that having
the option to cancel the contract decreases farmers’ required compensation level and monitoring increases it. Furthermore,
farmers are willing to accept a lower compensation when the aim is to protect biodiversity and ground water relative to recreation.
Latent class models with class probability variables reveal discrete heterogeneity and support a division into four groups
with divergent preferences. For example, a group of farmers who already have forest areas does not find the option of cancelling
the contract important, whereas another group relying on the farm for income requires higher compensation. The findings indicate
potential for efficiency gains from targeting the contracts. 相似文献
3.
A weak bargaining set for contract choice problems 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
In this paper, we consider the problem of choosing a set of multi-party contracts, where each coalition of agents has a non-empty finite set of feasible contracts to choose from. We call such problems, contract choice problems. The main result in this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty weak bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well-known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core may be empty. We also show by means of an example that an analog of the bargaining set due to Mas-Colell [Mas-Colell, A., 1989. An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set. Journal of Mathematical Economics 18, 129–139], as well as the natural analog of the bargaining set due to Aumann and Mashler [Aumann, R., Maschler, M., 1964. The bargaining set for cooperative games. In: Dresher, M., Shapley, L., Tucker, A. (Eds.), Advances in Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ] may be empty for contract choice problems. 相似文献
4.
The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework
in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is
the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement
on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining
models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes
a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We
embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and
the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise
if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining
impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement
is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original
viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant
examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist
for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at
the same competitive prices. 相似文献
5.
Gender pairing and bargaining—Beware the same sex! 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Matthias Sutter Ronald Bosman Martin G. Kocher Frans van Winden 《Experimental Economics》2009,12(3):318-331
We study the influence of gender and gender pairing on economic decision making in an experimental two-person bargaining game
where the other party’s gender is known to both actors. We find that (1) gender per se has no significant effect on behavior, whereas (2) gender pairing systematically affects behavior. In particular, we observe much more competition and retaliation and, thus, lower efficiency
when the bargaining partners have the same gender than when they have the opposite gender. These findings are consistent with
predictions from evolutionary psychology. Implications of our results for real-world organizations are discussed. 相似文献
6.
不完全合同背景下,产权分配在参与方的投资决策中至关重要。利用产权理论讨论了研发合作中的序贯投资决策和创新的产权分配问题。研究表明,最优产权结构随着参与方的谈判力变动,谈判力较低的一方单独拥有产权能够平衡其投资积极性;随着投资关系专用性程度的增加,最优产权为联合产权在产品开发者谈判力区间的范围更广。为了提高双方合作效率,可考虑采用由一个产品开发者出价并按照研究单位投资积极性分配初始产权的期权合同。比较分析发现:期权合同能够缓解投资不足问题,并进一步提高双方合作效率。 相似文献
7.
We introduce non-enforceable property rights over a bargaining surplus in a dictator game with production, where the agent’s
effort is differentially rewarded and subsequently determines the size of the surplus. Using experimental data, we elicit
individual preferences over the egalitarian, accountability and libertarian principles and provide evidence to support the
inability of these justice principles to individually account for the observed behavior. We show that the justice principle
that can be used to explain dictators’ choices depends on whether dictators are paid more or less than recipients for their
effort. Our findings suggest that dictators do employ justice principles in self-serving ways and choose in each context the
justice principle that maximizes their financial payoffs. 相似文献
8.
We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power on the design and the selection of
contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type.
In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between
the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how different ratios of principals and agents affect
outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against
each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast,
when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because
competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level
and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical
predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’
(and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade,
and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. 相似文献
9.
A solution to Rubinstein (1982)'s open‐ended, alternating‐offer bargaining problem for two equally patient bargainers who exhibit similar degrees of inequality aversion is presented. Inequality‐averse bargainers may experience envy if they are worse off, and guilt if they are better off, but they still reach agreement in the first period under complete information. If the guilt felt is strong, then the inequality‐averse bargainers split a pie of size one equally regardless of their degree of envy. If the guilt experienced is weak, then the agreed split is tilted away from the Rubinstein division towards a more unequal split whenever the degree of envy is smaller than the discounted degree of guilt. Envy and weak guilt have opposite effects on the equilibrium division of the pie, and envy has a greater marginal impact than weak guilt. Equally inequality‐averse bargainers agree on the Rubinstein division if the degree of envy equals the discounted degree of guilt. As both bargainers' sensation of inequality aversion diminishes, the bargaining outcome converges to the Rubinstein division. 相似文献
10.
Tobias Kronenberg 《Spanish Economic Review》2008,10(4):303-320
Traditional wage setting models assume that unions maximise the total income of workers, whereas actually they should maximise
worker utility. These models implicitly equate utility with income, but this is not valid if workers’ utility depends on their
sense of fairness and includes a non-pecuniary benefit from work. This paper presents a model combining efficiency wages with
bargaining theory, drawing inspiration from the gift-exchange approach by Akerlof [Q J Econ 97(4):543–569, 1982]. It shows
that the mutual gift exchange between firms and workers generates a non-pecuniary benefit which contributes to the workers’
utility in a non-monotonic way depending on the strength of workers’ sense of fairness. The model shows that if an employment
subsidy is paid to workers it generates more jobs than when paid to firms.
This paper is based on research which was performed while the author was employed at the University of Maastricht (The Netherlands).
The author wishes to thank Thomas Ziesemer, Erik de Regt, Sabine Fuss and Kristin Vetter for many helpful comments and assumes
full responsibility for any remaining flaws. 相似文献
11.
People do bargain over how to bargain. We examine the role of individuals’ ability to pursue certain bargaining protocols
in a multi-agent bilateral bargaining model. Bargaining protocols are not completely settled, but will emerge endogenously
in equilibrium. We show that players’ ability to partially influence bargaining protocols plays a crucial role in determining
equilibrium outcomes. When discounting is not too high, there are multiple subgame perfect equilibria, including inefficient
ones. As the number of players increases, both the set of discount factors that support multiple equilibrium outcomes and
the set of the first proposing player’s equilibrium payoffs expand. The maximum loss of efficiency increases with respect
to the discount factor.
We would like to thank Hongbin Cai, John Conlon, Andrew Daughety, Taiji Furusawa, Byoung Heon Jun, Akira Okada, Ping Wang,
and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. 相似文献
12.
We investigate whether fairness concerns overrule strategic behaviour in legislative bargaining with entitlements. In a lab experiment, we vary bargaining power by using either majority rule or dictator rule to implement a division. We apply coarse measures in order to assess whether entitlements are respected. Our results show that with experience over one third of proposers make “extreme” offers, assigning at most 10% of the surplus to partners whose consent is not needed under the respective rule. Having observed extreme outcomes in the past increases the likelihood of own extreme proposals. Overall, we find significant limitations in the acknowledgment for others' entitlements, in particular for groups in which individual contributions differ. 相似文献
13.
We develop rules for pricing and capacity choice for an interruptible service that recognize the interdependence between consumers’
perceptions of system reliability and their market behavior. Consumers post ex ante demands, based on their expectations on aggregate demand. Posted demands are met if ex post supply capacity is sufficient. However, if supply is inadequate all ex ante demands are proportionally interrupted. Consumers’ expectations of aggregate demand are assumed to be rational. Under reasonable
values for the consumer’s degrees of relative risk aversion and prudence, demand is decreasing in supply reliability. We derive
operational expressions for the optimal pricing rule and the capacity expansion rule. We show that the optimal price under
uncertainty consists of the optimal price under certainty plus a markup that positively depends on the degrees of relative
risk aversion, relative prudence and system reliability. We also show that any reliability enhancing investment—though lowering
the operating surplus of the public utility—is socially desirable as long as it covers the cost of investment. 相似文献
14.
We present an experiment designed to separate the two commonplace explanations for behavior in ultimatum games—subjects’ concern
for fairness versus the failure of subgame perfection as an equilibrium refinement. We employ a tournament structure of the
bargaining interaction to eliminate the potential for fairness to influence behavior. Comparing the results of the tournament
game with two control treatments affords us a clean test of subgame perfection as well as a measure fairness-induced play.
We find after 10 iterations of play that about half of all non-subgame-perfect demands are due to fairness, and the rest to
imperfect learning. However, as suggested by models of learning, we also confirm that the ultimatum game presents an especially
difficult environment for learning subgame perfection.
Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at
.
JEL Classification C91, D64, J52 相似文献
15.
Stores 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary There is scope and incentive for stores to endogenously arise in an exchange economy when agents possess different levels of bargaining power and coalition formation is costly. In the absence of stores, agents face a trading lottery where the expected outcome for an individual agent depends upon his relative bargaining strength. By setting appropriate, preannounced prices, a store can profitably offer relatively weak bargainers trading opportunities which they prefer to the trading lottery. While relatively weak bargainers are attracted to the store, relatively strong bargainers prefer the trading lottery to the store. Thus, the simultaneous existence of barter and mediated trade is explained.The work reported here was conceived while both authors were visiting the University of Southern California. We thank Martine Quinzii and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
16.
Ram RANJAN 《Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics》2017,88(4):589-610
A model of concessional bargaining among farmers explains the success (or lack thereof) of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings in the developing regions. Concessional bargaining in day‐to‐day interactions generates goodwill, which helps smoothen future dealings amongst farmers as well as with outside agents. In particular, we model the existence of goodwill amongst farmers as enhancing their ability to collectively bargain with an outside dealer that buys their farm produce. Results suggest that when dealing with each other, farmers offer higher concessions when the risk of loss or reversal in bargaining power is high; however, the level of concession is also influenced by the degree of reciprocity and parameters that affect bargaining surplus. Findings provide further insights over the success of cooperative institutions in rural farm settings where inter‐farmer goodwill dynamics determines the cooperative's bargaining outcomes. Specifically, when farmers generously reciprocate each other's goodwill gestures, it leads to better outcomes through increasing their cooperative reservation price. In contrast, when the degree of reciprocity is lower, or when the risk of bargaining power switching is higher, farmers extract more surplus from other farmers, and this also lowers the cooperative's bargaining outcomes and makes the cooperative arrangement unviable in the long term. 相似文献
17.
The extant microeconomic literature on matching markets assumes ordinal preferences for matches, while bargaining within matches
is mostly excluded. Central for this paper, however, is bargaining over joint profits from potential matches. We investigate,
both theoretically and experimentally, a seemingly simple allocation task in a 2×2 market with repeated negotiations. When
inefficiency is possible, about 1/3 of the complete matches are inefficient and, overall, more than 3/4 of the experimental
allocations are unstable. These results strongly contradict existing bargaining theories requiring efficient matches. Even
with regard to efficient matches, the tested theories perform poorly. Standard bargaining and behavioral concepts, such as
Selten’s (1972) Equal Division Core, are outperformed by the simplistic ε-Equal Split, i.e., an equal split of the joint profit plus/minus ε. 相似文献
18.
Yasunori Ouchida 《Applied economics letters》2019,26(10):799-806
This article presents an examination of a linear bilateral monopoly model with endogenous and cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) level. This article also describes an investigation of the effects of cooperative choice of CSR on the market and welfare. New findings are explicit derivation of the necessary and sufficient condition for solving a double marginalization problem in the bilateral monopoly model with CSR. In addition, this report is the first demonstrating that cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining improves consumer surplus, social welfare and each firm’s profit to a level higher than that achieved through noncooperative CSR. Furthermore, cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining is shown to be capable of completely solving the double marginalization problem generated by a bilateral monopoly, although the manufacturer and the retailer are not vertically integrated. 相似文献
19.
Synopsis Humans have a rational reason to seek out and selectively play Prisoner’s Dilemma games with others who (for whatever reason)
will play cooperatively, while avoiding those who will defect. It follows that they also have reason to try and persuade others
that they will personally cooperate if a game is joined (using the term from Evolutionary Psychology, to ‘manipulate’ others’ beliefs) and, thus, to penetrate to the truth
underlying such efforts (to ‘mindread’ others intentions). We develop an economic model of mindreading and manipulation that
can govern exchange relationships in natural circumstances, and report laboratory data showing that, absent constraining institutions
that make play with cooperators likely, intending defectors are more likely to be chosen as partners than are intending cooperators. Intending defectors’ efforts at manipulation appear to be
more successful than their potential victims’ efforts at mindreading. The findings suggest the nature of the problem that
must be addressed for would-be traders in the absence of well-enforced rules governing contracts, and we discuss the patterns
of behavior that are likely responses in such circumstances. 相似文献
20.
Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto 《Constitutional Political Economy》2010,21(3):288-307
Buchanan’s constitutional economics takes social conflict (the ‘Hobbesian jungle’, ‘Hobbesian anarchy’) as the starting point
for the analysis of social contract. Buchanan argues that in the presence of social conflict either some social contract (e.g.
some system of formal laws) or some generally shared moral precepts are needed to resolve the predicament that social conflict
presents. The present paper argues that a social conflict model also served the Old Testament as an analytical starting point.
However, contrary to both standard theological interpretation and Buchanan’s explicit claims, I argue that the Old Testament
had already made an attempt to model ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ in order to approach social conflict in an essentially modern, non-metaphysical manner. I argue that figures like Adam and Eve or Jacob,
in the tradition of Hobbesian anarchists, questioned godly authority and the associated imposed, authoritarian, metaphysical
social contract. In this way, one can detect a modern, contractarian constitutional economics in pre-Enlightenment literature
(and in Genesis, specifically) in direct contrast to Buchanan’s claims. 相似文献