Location and lease intensity

U.S. firms lease assets extensively. We find that, during 1980–2011, the average U.S. firm has a lease intensity of about 40%. Or, the average firm has present and future (up to five years) rent commitments equal to 16.6% of their total assets. We investigate whether agency costs between the lessor and the lessee affect the lease intensity of firms. To do so, we examine the impact of firms' location on the use of operating leases. The main idea of our paper is that, because obtaining information and monitoring is costly for potential lessors, especially when a lessee is relatively far away from financial centers, rural firms are less likely to use operating leases. Consistent with this hypothesis, we show that rural firms tend to have lower lease intensities than similar urban and small city firms. In addition, we find that firms with higher levels of debt capacity lease less and firms that face more financial constraint lease more. Our findings are robust to industry and lease maturity controls and consistent with the existence of an agency problem associated with leasing.     

Valuation of asset leasing contracts

This paper describes the relation among a variety of asset leasing contracts, including: (1) cancellable operating leases; (2) leases which grant the lesse an option to extend the life of the lease; (3) leases that grant the lessee an option to purchase the leased asset at a fixed price at the maturity date of the lease; (4) leases that grant the lessee the right to purchase the leased asset at its ‘fair market value’ at the maturity date of the lease; (5) leases that grant an option to the lessee to purchase the leased asset at a prespecified price anytime during the life of the lease; (6) leases that require the lessee to purchase the leased asset at a fixed price at the maturity date of the lease; and (7) leases that contain non-cancellation provisions. The paper uses a compound option pricing framework to develop a general model for valuing (or evaluating) each of the types of leasing contracts. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the effect of the various elements of a leasing contract — including cancellation risk and residual value risk — on equilibrium rental payments.     

The Debt Equivalence Of Leases In The UK: An Empirical Investigation

In finance theory, leasing is viewed as a form of borrowing. Prior studies have indicated that secured debt and lease are regarded as equivalent by the capital market.The following questions are addressed: i) do debt and lease have the same effects on the volatility of equity return? ii) Have changes in the accounting regulations altered the effect of lease obligation on the volatility of equity return? The results indicate that, on average, finance leases have a positive effect on the volatility of the return on equity as debt does. It is also found that the market considers leases more favourably (less risky) than debt.Two explanations are possible for the favourable treatment: i) the finance lease obligations are less like debts due to the imposed capitalisation requirements; ii) firms pay high costs of leasing because of the benefits from leasing relative to debt and the market reacts to those benefits favourably.     

Operating and synthetic leases: Exploiting financial benefits in the post-Enron era

Applying constructive lease capitalization to operating leases of firms in the 2003 S&P 500 index, we demonstrate that currently companies can hide billions of liabilities, enhance retained earnings, income, and ratios by reporting leases as operating. With the rekindled interests of the International Accounting Standards Board and Financial Accounting Standards Board on lease reporting, our study provides valuable and timely information for their decisions.Results indicate that by reporting operating leases, firms avoided on average $582 million of liabilities (11% of total liabilities) and $450 million of assets (4% of total assets) for our 366 sample firms. Partitioning sample into negative and positive income impact subgroups provides additional insight into firm's motivation for using operating leases. Under lease capitalization the top quartile positive subgroup experienced an 18% increase in income while the top quartile negative subgroup had an 11% decline in income. There was also a significant negative impact on liquidity, leverage and performance ratios.     

SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE USE OF FINANCIAL LEASES

In this paper, the impact of certain firm-specific factors on the level of financial leases used by corporations is examined. An industry analysis indicates that firms in certain industries tend to lease more than other firms. A Tobit analysis of the degree to which approximately 600 firms lease assets indicates that certain factors—including the debt ratio, presence of mortgage debt, level of subordinated debt, presence of restrictions on leasing, number of bonds in a firm's capital structure, and the firm's debt rating—are significantly related to the degree of leasing. Other factors, including the firm's tax rate, were not found to be significant, contrary to popular expectations.     

Evaluating Constructive Lease Capitalization and Off‐Balance‐Sheet Financing: An Instructional Case with FedEx and UPS

This case illustrates the effects of the proposed new lease standard by the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board on existing outstanding operating leases. Specifically, the case examines the effects of the proposal that all firms report existing operating leases as capital leases upon the initial adoption of the proposed standard. By applying a constructive capitalization model to two firms who rely on operating leases for financing, FedEx and UPS, we found that both companies would have to record billions of dollars of liabilities that had only appeared in the footnotes of their financial statements under the current lease standards. In addition, the firms would experience a decline in retained earnings and key financial ratios, such as the debt‐to‐equity, return‐on‐assets, and interest coverage ratios, by reporting operating leases as capital leases under the new proposed standard. Furthermore, the magnitude of the lease capitalization impact is much smaller for UPS than for FedEx.     

The Effect of Firm Characteristics on the Use of Percentage Retail Leases

Choice of lease payments has been widely studied in the literature. There are three—not necessarily exclusive—explanations that have received attention. The first attributes the choice of fixed versus percentage lease payments to risk-sharing preferences. The second explanation views percentage-of-sales lease agreements as a way discriminating monopolists can appropriate economic rents. The third attributes percentage-of-sales lease agreements to a metering and bonding argument. This paper examines the proposition that the choice of percentage retail leases is driven in part by managements' desire to circumvent the cost of violating debt covenant restrictions. The evidence presented here supports the prediction that retail firms with higher debt–asset ratios are more likely to adopt percentage lease agreements.     

State ownership and the structuring of lease arrangements

The existing literature provides extensive evidence that firms intentionally structured lease arrangements to achieve off-balance-sheet accounting treatment prior to ASU 842 (FASB, 2016) and IFRS 16 (IASB, 2016). However, this study finds the opposite for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs): compared to non-SOEs, SOEs in China have a higher tendency to use finance leases rather than operating leases. This result remains significant after we control for the possibility that Chinese capital providers are discriminatively extending credit to SOEs in the form of finance leases. We explain SOEs' preference for finance leases by their executives' empire building incentives. Such incentives are created by the executives' hunger for compensation, promotion and subsidies, which are determined by the government. Consistently, we find that SOEs' engagement in finance leases increases with their incentives to expand the firms' size. And indeed, SOE executives obtain more compensation and subsidies by growing their firms with finance leases. Finally, we find that SOEs with higher borrowing costs structure more finance lease arrangements. Such structuring further increases SOEs' financial leverage and, to some extent, decreases their corporate value. Taken together, these results suggest that the benefit of the ASU 842 (or IFRS 16), which aims to bring leased assets onto the balance sheet, may be impaired in situations where executives have strong incentives to build empires.     

The Leasing Puzzle

Prevailing theories in finance and economics suggest that leases and debt are substitutes; an increase in one should led to a compensating decrease in the other. In particular, there are three views on the magnitude of the substitution coefficient. Standard finance theory treats cash flows from lease obligations as equivalent to debt cash flows, thus describing the tradeoff between debt and leases as one-to-one. Others are willing to use a tradeoff of leases for debt which is less than, but close to, one. The rationale for a dollar of leases using less of debt capacity than a dollar of debt obligation is based upon the differences in the terms and nature of lease and debt contracts. Finally, there are some who argue that since leased assets may be firm-specific, the risk of moral hazard may be great, resulting in a tradeoff of greater than one-to-one; that is, a dollar of a lease obligation uses more of debt capacity than a dollar of a debt obligation. A series of empirical tests are performed in this study on samples of approximately 600 firms, covering the years 1976 through 1981, with none of the three views supported by the results. Instead, the results indicate that leases and debt are complements; greater use of debt is associated with a greater use of leasing. This finding reappears consistently for each year, each definition of leverage ratios, and each approach to analysis. This complementary relationship persists even after refinements are made to the estimation technique.     

Lessee Reactions to Regulation of Accounting for Leases

This study examines lessee firms’ responses to Australian Accounting Standard 17, Accounting for Leases (AAS 17, 1987) and Approved Accounting Standard ASRB 1008, Accounting for Leases (ASRB 1008, 1987). Both Standards required that lessees capitalize finance leases, thus bringing the finance leases of many firms‘on balance sheet’ and increasing reported leverage. If the capitalization requirement altered firms’ equilibrium contracting cost distributions sufficiently, firms would take actions to mitigate its effect, possibly by altering their capital structures. The study examines whether the capital structures of these firms did change in response to the requirement, and if so, how. The results indicate that firms responded to the Standards by reducing their reliance upon finance leasing and increasing their reliance upon non-lease debt and shareholders’ funds. Firms do not appear to have used definitional interpretations to classify leases as operating rather than finance leases. As expected, the firms previously disclosing finance leases in footnotes experienced increases in non-lease debt reliance while the control sample (firms that previously capitalized the lease obligations) experienced decreases. Differences between control firms’ and footnote disclosure firms’ reactions to the Standard are generally consistent with contracting theory predictions. Control firms reacted to the loss of the potential to off balance sheet finance. Footnote-disclosure firms reacted to the loss of an already utilized off balance sheet financing technique.     

Canadian Evidence on the Constructive Capitalization of Operating Leases*

One type of relevant ex ante research supporting the accounting standard‐setting process is the study of a proposed standard's impact on reported figures. The International Accounting Standards Board recently decided to review the lease accounting standard, which will naturally involve consideration of the G4 + 1 recommendation to capitalize all noncancellable lease contracts, including operating leases. National evidence of the impact of the G4 + 1 proposals provides feedback for the international standard‐setter. This study developed and used a refined constructive capitalization method, in which company‐specific assumptions — interest rate, total/expired/remaining lives of leased assets, and tax rate — were used to compute the impact of operating‐lease capitalization on key financial indicators for a sample of Canadian public companies. The results indicate that capitalizing operating leases would lead to the recognition of important additional assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. It would therefore significantly increase the debt‐to‐asset ratio and significantly decrease the current ratio. These results were noted across all industry segments in the sample. Income statement effects were generally less material. Significant impacts on return on assets, return on equity, and / or earnings per share were noted in only three industry segments: merchandising and lodging, oil and gas, and financial services. Intercompany comparability would not be affected overall nor within industries, because of similar rankings for each financial indicator before and after operating‐lease capitalization.     

A theory of contractual provisions in leasing

We develop a non-tax rationale for leasing in a double-sided asymmetric information setting, and analyze how various contractual provisions in leasing contracts arise in equilibrium. In our model, a manufacturer of capital goods has private information about their quality; entrepreneurs (users of these capital goods) come to learn this quality only by using them over a period of time. Each unit of the capital goods requires a certain level of maintenance in each period. Entrepreneurs differ in their cost of providing this maintenance; this maintenance cost is information private to each entrepreneur. Leasing emerges as an equilibrium solution to this double-sided asymmetric information problem. Various contractual provisions in leasing contracts (e.g., short-term versus long-term leases with non-cancellation provisions, option to buy at lease termination, and service leases) also emerge as equilibrium solutions under alternative settings. Leases with metering provisions emerge in equilibrium when, in addition to the maintenance cost, entrepreneurs differ in other dimensions, such as their intensity of usage of the capital good. Our model has implications for the lease-versus-sell decision, the situations under which various leasing contract provisions will be used, and for the relative magnitudes of sales prices and leasing costs (for leases with different contractual provisions).     

Proposed Changes in Lease Accounting and Private Business Bankers' Credit Decisions*

This study contributes to the debate on lease accounting currently ongoing at the international level and to future discussions at the Canadian level for private enterprise standards following a potential revision of lease accounting in international financial reporting standards (IFRS). A user perspective is adopted to examine private business bankers' preferences on the issue of capitalizing all noncancelable lease contracts, including operating leases, as suggested by the G4+1. While bankers use both capital and operating lease information, they give significantly more consideration to the former when analyzing private business loan requests. Accordingly, operating lease information receives less attention than capital lease information in the credit‐granting decision process. In addition, private business bankers consider a number of aspects of the current lease accounting standard to be inadequate and are in favor of the principles governing the approach suggested by the G4+1. They feel that the capitalization of operating leases would improve their ability to evaluate lessees' long‐term financial commitments and increase their estimates of the risks involved in providing financing to lessees. This study also demonstrates that the capitalization of operating leases would have a significant impact on key financial indicators of a sample of Canadian private companies. Bankers perceive that these realistic changes in financial indicators would affect their assessment of borrowers' capital structure/solvency, liquidity, ability to repay, and risk rating. From a cost‐benefit perspective, the findings provide standard‐setters with an indication of the benefits of the G4+1 proposals to users.     

Lease Valuation When Taxable Earnings Are a Scarce Resource

In this paper, we examine leasing as a tax-arbitrage instrument. Analysis of a sample of UK leases presented in this paper suggests that lessors earn large positive NPVs. Our theoretical model seeks to explain these positive NPVs in terms of a market price for a scarce resource that we identify as scarce taxable earnings. Using these prices, the model permits a lessor to determine whether the profitability of a proposed set of lease contracts can be improved by writing a different set of contracts that makes better use of the lessor's taxable earnings. There may be two reasons why an initial portfolio of contracts may be suboptimal. Either there may be clienteles or the leasing market may be inefficient. Subsequently, we discuss reasons why the leasing market may be characterized by clienteles, and, using two different samples of leases, we test whether the leasing market is segmented and efficient.     

The determinants of yields on financial leasing contracts

This study tests hypotheses about the valuation of leasing contracts. We examine the determinants of the yields of a relatively large, reasonably heterogeneous, and nationally representative sample of financial leases. We find lease yields to be significantly related to treasury bond yields and our proxies for the systematic risk of the leased asset's residual value and the transaction and information costs associated with the lease. There is also some evidence of a relationship between lease yields and the default-risk of the lessee.     

Pricing the Credit Risk of Secured Debt and Financial Leasing

Abstract:  This paper presents closed form solutions to price secured bank loans and financial leases subject to default risk. Secured debt fair credit spreads always increase in the debtor's default probability, whereas financial leasing fair credit spreads may well decrease in the lessee's default probability and even be negative. The reason is that the lessor, unlike the secured lender, can gain from the lessee's default, especially when the leasing contract envisages initial prepayments or the lessee's terminal options to either purchase the leased asset or to extend the lease maturity. This result, which critically depends on contractual and bankruptcy code provisions, can explain some of the empirical evidence and the use of financial leases as an alternative to secured bank lending to finance small, risky and relatively opaque firms.     

The impact of constructive operating lease capitalisation on key accounting ratios

Current UK lease accounting regulation does not require operating leases to be capitalised in the accounts of lessees, although this is likely to change with the publication of FRS 5. This study conducts a prospective analysis of the effects of such a change. The potential magnitude of the impact of lease capitalisation upon individual users' decisions, market valuations, company cash flows, and managers' behaviour can be indicated by the effect on key accounting ratios, which are employed in decision-making and in financial contracts. The capitalised value of operating leases is estimated using a method similar to that suggested by Imhoff, Lipe and Wright (1991), adapted for the UK accounting and tax environment, and developed to incorporate company-specific assumptions. Results for 1994 for a random sample of 300 listed UK companies show that, on average, the unrecorded long-term liability represented 39% of reported long-term debt, while the unrecorded asset represented 6% of total assets. Capitalisation had a significant impact (at the 1% level) on six of the nine selected ratios (profit margin, return on assets, asset turnover, and three measures of gearing). Moreover, the Spearman rank correlation between each ratio before and after capitalisation revealed that the ranking of companies changed markedly for gearing measures in particular. There were significant inter-industry variations, with the services sector experiencing the greatest impact. An analysis of the impact of capitalisation over the five-year period from 1990 to 1994 showed that capitalisation had the greatest impact during the trough of the recession. Results were shown to be robust with respect to key assumptions of the capitalisation method. These findings contribute to the assessment of the economic consequences of a policy change requiring operating lease capitalisation. Significant changes in the magnitude of key accounting ratios and a major shift in company performance rankings suggest that interested parties' decisions and company cash flows are likely to be affected.     

The valuation and reliability implications of FIN 46 for synthetic lease liabilities

We examine whether adoption of FASB Interpretation No. 46/R (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities–an Interpretation of ARB No. 51, changed the market valuation and related measurement reliability of synthetic lease liabilities. Adopted in 2003, FIN 46 requires financial statement recognition of many previously off-balance sheet structures, including synthetic leases. Synthetic leases are hybrid financing structures that, prior to FIN 46, allowed firms to maximize the benefits of asset ownership for tax purposes while retaining operating lease treatment within the firm’s financial statements. We identify a sample of 125 synthetic leasing firms impacted by FIN 46. Utilizing methodology consistent with Dhaliwal et al. (2011), we constructively capitalize these lease liabilities in the period preceding FIN 46 and compare market valuation of these liabilities with capitalized leases after adoption of the standard. We find that the market places greater weight on synthetic lease obligations recognized within the body of the financial statements than it does liabilities disclosed within the associated notes. Finally, we rely on econometric procedures developed in Barth (1991) and extended in Choi et al. (1997) to examine whether the differential market valuation of lease liabilities post FIN 46 is due in part to perceived differences in measurement reliability. The results indicate there is a post FIN 46 reliability effect for all lease liabilities examined. However, while the synthetic lease amounts are the most unreliable examined, they also experience the greatest increase in reliability post FIN 46, indicating that perceived measurement reliability explains in part differential market valuation associated with FIN 46. Our findings have the potential to inform the ongoing standard setting debate surrounding the possible capitalization of all leases. Further, our study also has economic implications for managers concerned with the potential constraints on asset financing options imposed by accounting regulation.     

Collateral and capital structure

We develop a dynamic model of investment, capital structure, leasing, and risk management based on firms' need to collateralize promises to pay with tangible assets. Both financing and risk management involve promises to pay subject to collateral constraints. Leasing is strongly collateralized costly financing and permits greater leverage. More constrained firms hedge less and lease more, both cross-sectionally and dynamically. Mature firms suffering adverse cash flow shocks may cut risk management and sell and lease back assets. Persistence of productivity reduces the benefits to hedging low cash flows and can lead firms not to hedge at all.     

LEASING AND THE US 1986 TAX REFORM ACT

The US 1986 Tax Reform Act (TRA) contains several tax provisions affecting many areas of corporate finance including lease financing. One of the more important provisions is the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) which determines an alternative in addition to the usual tax computation, and consequently results in a new lessee-lessor tax-asymmetry. To investigate the overall impact on the net advantage of leasing (NAL) of both the AMT and the other relevant provisions of the TRA, a leasing model is developed which incorporates these tax provisions. In the context of this leasing model, the following results are derived. When the AMT provision does not apply, the Tax Reform Act (TRA) reduces substantially the net advantage of leasing (NAL) over buying. In contrast, the effect of the AMT symmetry is positive. As a result, the combined effect of the AMT and the other changes in the TRA on the NAL is negligible for property class of assets of the more common length of time (about ten years), but becomes negative for real-property type of assets.