Multi-unit auctions with uniform prices

Summary. Auctions in which individuals can purchase more than one unit of the good being sold differ in striking ways from multi-unit auctions in which individuals may purchase only one unit. The uniform price auction in particular frequently yields Nash equilibria in which bidders underbid for their second unit and therefore pay very low prices for the good. This paper characterizes equilibria for the uniform price auction. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version: May 28, 1997     

Universal service obligations in LDCs: The effect of uniform pricing on infrastructure access

This paper develops a model to analyze the impacts of asymmetric information on optimal universal service policy in the public utilities of developing countries. Optimal universal service policy is implemented using two regulatory instruments: pricing and network investment. Under discriminatory pricing asymmetric information leads to a higher price and smaller network in the rural area than under full information. Under uniform pricing the price is also lower but the network is even smaller. In addition, under both pricing regimes not only the firm but also taxpayers have incentives to collude with the regulator.     

Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential, and (2) Bidding above stand-alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units. The latter creates a potential “exposure problem,” as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits. Bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. However, there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium, with patterns of out-of-equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats. These patterns of out-of-equilibrium play are analyzed, along with their effects on revenue and efficiency.     

Multi-unit demand auctions with synergies: behavior in sealed-bid versus ascending-bid uniform-price auctions

We construct a relatively simple model of bidding with synergies and solve it for both open outcry and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. The essential behavioral forces involved in these auctions are: (1) A demand reduction force resulting from the monopsony power that bidders with multiple-unit demands have when synergies are relatively inconsequential, and (2) Bidding above stand-alone values in order to capture significant complementarities between units. The latter creates a potential “exposure problem,” as bidders may win only parts of a package and earn negative profits. Bidding outcomes are closer to equilibrium in clock compared to sealed-bid auctions. However, there are substantial and systematic deviations from equilibrium, with patterns of out-of-equilibrium play differing systematically between the two auction formats. These patterns of out-of-equilibrium play are analyzed, along with their effects on revenue and efficiency.     

Simultaneous versus sequential all-pay auctions: an experimental study

While both simultaneous and sequential contests are mechanisms used in practice such as crowdsourcing, job interviews and sports contests, few studies have directly compared their performance. By modeling contests as incomplete information all-pay auctions with linear costs, we analytically and experimentally show that the expected maximum effort is higher in simultaneous contests, in which contestants choose their effort levels independently and simultaneously, than in sequential contests, in which late entrants make their effort choices after observing all prior participants’ choices. Our experimental results also show that efficiency is higher in simultaneous contests than in sequential ones. Sequential contests’ efficiency drops significantly as the number of contestants increases. We also discover that when participants’ ability follows a power distribution, high ability players facing multiple opponents in simultaneous contests tend to under-exert effort, compared to theoretical predictions. We explain this observation using a simple model of overconfidence.     

Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

In 1961, Vickrey posed the problem of finding an analytic solution to a first-price auction with two buyers having valuations uniformly distributed on ${[\underline{v}_{1}, \overline{v}_{1}]}$ and ${[\underline{v}_{2}, \overline{v}_{2}]}$ . To date, only special cases of the problem have been solved. In this paper, we solve this general problem and in addition allow for the possibility of a binding minimum bid. Several interesting examples are presented, including a class where the two bid functions are linear.     

Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior

Second chance offers in online marketplaces involve a seller conducting an auction for a single object and then using information from the auction to offer a losing bidder a take-it-or-leave-it price for another unit. We theoretically and experimentally investigate this practice and compare it to two sequential auctions. We show that the equilibrium bidding strategy in the second chance offer mechanism only exists in mixed strategies, and we observe that this mechanism generates more profit for the auctioneer than two sequential auctions. We also observe virtually no rejections of profitable offers in the ultimatum bargaining stage.      

The relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly: The role of price-cap regulation

This paper examines the role of price-cap regulation in influencing the relationship between the costs and prices of a multi-product monopoly. Based on a simple model of mark-up pricing, a combination of analytical and numerical analysis is used to show how cost increases among the firm's products can cause a divergence of prices from the Ramsey structure if the cost increases are non-uniform or if the demand elasticities for the products are non-uniform. However, in the absence of additional cost changes, profit-maximising prices which are subject to a price-cap constraint converge to the Ramsey structure if the previous period's quantities are used as weights in the firm's price-cap constraint. Consequently, given this formulation of the firm's price-cap constraint, only in situations of recurring cost changes are prices likely to show on-going divergence from the Ramsey structure.This paper reports on research funded by the Australian Electricity Supply Industry Research Board. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions.     

Meeting the broadband access infrastructure demands: The promise of Gigabit Ethernet

Global Internet traffic growth continues to create bandwidth demand in the telecommunications network. As 100 Mb/s Ethernet and Gigabit Ethernet LANs are widely installed in enterprises, the Intranet bandwidth grows quickly. With active adoption of ADSL and cable modem broadband accesses in the SOHO and residential markets, more data traffic is generated in these markets as well. Presently, most telecom carriers use synchronous optical network/synchronous digital hierarchy (SONET/SDH) equipment to “aggregate” data traffic in the metropolitan area network (MAN) before accessing the Internet backbone network. Because of the intrinsic limitations of SONET/SDH equipment in transporting data traffic, especially in terms of bandwidth scalability and provisioning efficiency, there is a need to find a broadband access solution that can overcome the drawbacks of SONET/SDH. Because the inherent simplicity of the technology, Ethernet offers cost effectiveness, ease of networking, packet-based IP friendly protocol, and rapid provisioning advantages while competing with other networking technologies. These advantages coupled with the newly developed gigabit WAN capability have well-positioned Gigabit Ethernet as a compelling technology to break the bandwidth bottleneck in the MAN environment. In this paper, we review the enhancement of Gigabit Ethernet technology and discuss the pros and cons of using Gigabit Ethernet technology in the MAN. We also address the implications of this technology evolution on telecom carriers.     

Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions

We consider a market for indivisible items with m buyers and m sellers. Traders privately know their values/costs, which are statistically dependent. Two mechanisms are considered. The buyer's bid double auction collects bids and asks from traders and determines the allocation by selecting a market-clearing price. It fails to achieve all possible gains from trade because of strategic bidding. The designed mechanism is a revelation mechanism in which honest reporting of values/costs is incentive compatible and all gains from trade are achieved. This optimality, however, comes at the expense of plausibility: (i) the monetary transfers among the traders are defined in terms of the traders' beliefs about each other's value/cost; (ii) a trader may suffer a loss ex post; (iii) the mechanism may run a surplus/deficit ex post. We compare the virtues of the simple yet mildly inefficient buyer's bid double auction to the flawed yet perfectly efficient designed mechanism.     

Pricing access: Forward-looking versus backward-looking cost rules

Regulators across many different jurisdictions and industries have recently adopted the practice of setting access prices based on the current costs of providing the relevant facilities. Though widely regarded as being efficient, the efficiency implications of using current costs instead of historical costs have not been formally analyzed. Our analysis shows that given stochastic costs, forward-looking access prices retard investment and are generally dominated by access prices determined by historical cost whenever investment is desired.     

Worksharing,access and bypass: the structure of prices in the postal sector

This paper studies a liberalized postal market where entrants may offer end-to-end products or concentrate on one of the segments of the network. Absent effective bypass, entry does not appear to be a serious financial threat to the incumbent, even when the products are perfect substitutes. This is no longer true when the entrant offers cheaper service in delivery. Then, the universal service provider may loose the entire pre-sorted mail market. It is left with probably low volume demand from households and from firms with high preparation cost, and its financial viability may be jeopardized. This paper has been presented at 13th CRRI Conference on Postal and Delivery Economics, June 2005.     

Money,prices and causality: monetarist versus structuralist explanations using pooled country evidence

The direction of causality between changes in money supply and aggregate prices has long been a matter of controversy between structuralists and monetarists. This paper addresses deficiencies in this literature in three ways. First, a large sample of countries with alternate measures of money and price variables is used to evaluate the evidence on money, inflation and causality. Second, combined data are tested for causality, with the combinations based on variables suggested by the literature - level of per capita income, magnitude of inflation, degree of financial market development, and independence of the central bank. Finally, because the choice of lag length is often arbitrary, results are generated with varying lags and consistency across different lag periods looked for. Two presentation methods are developed - categorical and graphical. Evidence of structural inflation, was found only in Chile and Sri Lanka. Evidence of money supply exogeneity on the other hand was found to be strongest in Kuwait, Paraguay and the USA. Most countries exhibited mixed evidence of money supply endogeneity, with bidirectional causation between money supply and aggregate prices a common result.     

Market access in regulated and unregulated markets: The continuing cost of interstate motor carrier regulation

This study examines the effect of regulatory reform in the interstate trucking industry. In our model, carriers travel in round trips and choose to serve different markets corresponding to each leg of the trip. Some carriers have authority to haul freight subject to regulation while other carriers do not. Unlike previous studies, our model applies to decisions acrossmultiple legs. Using a bivariate probit, we find differences in the determinants of accessacross markets. Entry regulation has a significant influence only in markets dominated by regulated traffic, whereas location has a significant influence only in markets dominated by unregulated traffic.Name order was determined by a coin toss. Kenneth Boyer, Victoria Dailey, Gregory Duncan, Jo Anna Gray, Shane Greenstein, Edward H. Rastatter, and Joe A. Stone made a number of useful comments that improved the paper, and Marylynne Diggs made a number of editorial comments.     

The impact of infrastructure and service-based competition on the deployment of next generation access networks: Recent evidence from the European member states

This work identifies the most important determinants of next generation access (NGA) network deployment, using data from the EU27 member states for the years 2005–2011. Our results indicate that the more service-based competition is pronounced the more negative is the impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure from broadband cable and mobile affects NGA deployment in an inverted U-shaped manner. We further find that there are severe adjustment costs and stickiness towards the desired long-term level of NGA infrastructure. It appears that the approach of the European Commission to force service-based competition via cost-based access regulation will not elicit the huge new investment needed for a comprehensive NGA roll-out.