The association between venture capitalists’ selection and value adding behavior: evidence from early stage high tech venture capitalists

Building upon self-efficacy and collective effort theories, we study the association between the selection behavior of venture capitalists and their involvement in value adding activities. We argue that investors, who prioritize different characteristics of a business proposal during selection, will be more or less confident of their own abilities and the abilities of entrepreneurial teams to effectively add value to portfolio companies and hence will be more or less involved in providing value adding activities. In order to test this claim, we use a stratified sample comprising 68 European early stage high tech venture capitalists. Results show that venture capitalists, who focus on entrepreneurial team characteristics or financial criteria during selection, are less involved in value adding activities compared to their peers, who focus on technological criteria. We discuss these findings from a theoretical and practical perspective.     

Dynamic capabilities and venture performance: The effects of venture capitalists

After going through the initial public offering (IPO), new ventures face increased competition, greater public examination, and increased government scrutiny. Resource base weaknesses and external forces pose severe threats to the survival and success of new ventures. Building from resource-based theory, we first examine and delineate dynamic capabilities from entrepreneurial capabilities in entrepreneurship. We then develop theory to explain how venture capitalists (VCs) endue their ventures with greater dynamic capabilities in order to address these weaknesses and threats. We test our hypotheses on a match-pair sample of VC-backed and non-VC-backed new ventures and find that VC-backed ventures demonstrate greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to product and management development but do not display any greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to legal and government regulation threats. Further analysis also revealed that VC experience and VC reputation were positively related to 1-year stock price returns.     

The critical relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs: Planning,decision-making,and control

On the basis of preliminary interview and survey data, evidence suggests that venture capitalists (VCs) are less involved with their affiliated new venture organizations than may be necessary for long term survival. The dual core model of innovation that emphasizes the need of a technical and administrative core for continued innovation is used as the foundation of this perspective. In the post investment relationship between the venture capitalist and the new venture, it is expected that the new venture has a well developed technical core. However, the administrative needs are often ignored by the new venture entrepreneurs. Therefore, it is recommended that VCs become more involved in the administrative component of the new venture organization (NVO) through either direct involvement or through the recruiting of key personnel. As the NVO moves through its life cycle the addition of an administrative component to its technical core provides for continued innovation necessary for long term survival and growth.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

Social capital of venture capitalists and start-up funding

How does the social capital of venture capitalists (VCs) affect the funding of start-ups? By building on the rich social capital literature, we hypothesize a positive effect of VCs?? social capital, derived from past syndication, on the amount of money that start-ups receive. Specifically, we argue that both structural and relational aspects of VCs?? social networks provide VCs with superior access to information about current investment objects and opportunities to leverage them in the future, increasing their willingness to invest in these firms. Our empirical results, derived from a novel dataset containing more than 1,500 first funding rounds in the Internet and IT sector, strongly confirm our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of venture capital and entrepreneurship, showing that the role and effect of VCs?? social capital on start-up firms may be more complex than previously argued in the literature.     

Corporate venture capitalists: Autonomy,obstacles, and performance

This report presents the results of a formal study of the corporate venture capital community in the United States, and is based upon responses to a questionnaire completed by 52 corporate venture capitalists (CVCs).The central question addressed in this study involves which approach to corporate venture capital is most likely to produce successful results.This question was addressed via cluster analysis which segregated the CVC community into two broad classes—“pilots,” which are marked by substantial organizational independence and “copilots,” which are highly dependent on corporate management with respect to venture funding and decision authority.Pilots achieve equal or higher levels of performance, and are plagued by far fewer obstacles, than their highly dependent counterparts. The results suggest the following: 1. The corporate venture fund should be established as an independent entity and should have access to a committed, separate pool of funds. This will enable CVCs to respond aggressively to, and manage, investment opportunities with minimal corporate interference. Such an independent entity will defuse justifiable concerns on the part of entrepreneurs related to such interference. 2. The fund should be managed by skilled venture professionals who may be drawn from the independent venture community or the small but growing pool of experienced CVCs. Corporate executives may comprise a part of the management team. 3. If the corporate venture fund hopes to attract top quality managers, it must be prepared to offer compensation and authority commensurate with their skill level. In short, corporate venture capitalists should be treated like independent venture capitalists. By organizing the fund as an independent entity, the political problem associated with establishing compensation levels above those of the corporation can be minimized. 4. All CVCs should establish a primary focus on the realization of financial objectives (i.e., return on investment). Strategic benefit objectives are not necessarily ill advised so long as they do not interfere with sound financial decision making. When they do, the corporate venture capital process is likely to become less effective. For instance, a corporate venture fund should only confine itself to investing in a few industries if there are sufficient high-grade investment opportunities within those industries to ensure adequate deal flow. The venture fund should not be pressured. Investments that appear exciting from a corporate perspective, for technological or marketing reasons, but are not financially attractive may well drain resources rather than produce opportunities. 5. Venture proposals failing on financial criteria might be referred to other parts of the corporation with the purpose of exploring an alternate relationship (e.g., a development contract or joint venture). If this is appealing to the corporation, a mechanism such as a corporate liaison or reporting system might be established to facilitate the flow of information. 6. A corporation should be willing to make a complete commitment of talent and capital if it establishes its own corporate venture fund. The corporation should then be willing to accept a limited role. If the corporation is unable to accept a limited role with respect to its own fund, it may be best for it to participate as an investor in a traditional fund, where such limitations will be enforced. However, this latter approach may significantly dilute or eliminate potential for strategic benefits.     

How venture capitalists respond to unmet expectations: The role of social environment

In this paper, we seek to explain venture capitalists' reactions to disappointments caused by entrepreneurs. Our basic assumption is that venture capitalists' social environment, defined as exposure to venture capital and business communities, will influence their responses to problematic situations. The results of our study suggest that venture capitalists with strong ties to their colleagues and with managerial experience are more inclined to use active and constructive approaches than venture capitalists with a lesser exposure to the venture capital and business communities.     

When do venture capitalists collaborate? Evidence on the driving forces of venture capital syndication

Using a sample of 2,373 unique capital contributions from 437 venture capitalists (VCs) over subsequent rounds into 961 start-ups during the period 1995–2005 in Germany we disentangle the circumstances under which lead VCs engage in syndicate relationships with partner VCs. The results indicate that syndication is more pronounced when VCs face higher risks that need to be diversified and capital burdens are larger. Moreover, we document that industry investment experience lends legitimacy to lead VCs, allowing them to enter syndicate relationships to enhance their network positions. In general, greater industry experience is associated with more syndication. Lastly, the results show that lead VCs involve new/additional partners in subsequent financing rounds to leverage their idiosyncratic skills and knowledge to improve deal selection and/or provide a better quality of managerial advice.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

Signaling in science-based IPOs: The combined effect of affiliation with prestigious universities,underwriters, and venture capitalists

This paper studies the combined effect of affiliation with prestigious universities, underwriters, and venture capitalists on the valuation of biotech ventures at IPO and their post-IPO performance. We argue that affiliation to a prestigious university provides the affiliated firm with a quality signal in the scientific domain. The pure quality signaling effect of the affiliation is isolated from the substantive benefits it provides by performing a difference-in-difference approach based on the scientific reputation of scientists in firms' upper echelons. The signal is stronger the weaker is the scientific reputation of scientists of the focal IPO-firm and is additive to those provided by prestigious venture capitalists and underwriters. Results for a sample of 254 European biotech ventures that went through an IPO between 1990 and 2009 confirm our predictions.     

The resource dynamics of international new venture networks

Building on network theory and the resource-based view of the firm, this paper uses three case studies to explore how networks facilitate resource development in the international new venture. Set in the context of the conception, commercialization and growth stages of venture development, four propositions are advanced. These pertain to the dynamics of organizational, human, physical, financial and social capital, and the nature of these resource flows as they pertain to the INV network. Implications for research and INV management are discussed.     

The role of private versus governmental venture capital in fostering job creation during the crisis

Small Business Economics - We analyze whether young entrepreneurial ventures backed by different types of venture capital firms, i.e., private (PVCs) vs. government-owned (GOVCs), experience higher...     

Efficiency of venture capital firms: evidence from Spain

In recent years the venture capital (VC) sector has played an increasingly important role in financial systems. In general, this type of specialised financial activity is conducted by two types of operators, VC firms and VC management companies, each with its specific characteristics. The main objective of this paper is to evaluate the operating efficiency of these financial intermediaries in Spain, using data envelopment analysis, and to carry out an exploratory study of the variables that affect their level of efficiency, using a truncated regression model, and taking into consideration the nature of the operator (an approach not previously undertaken). Our analysis reveals, first, differences in the levels of efficiency achieved by VC firms and VC management companies and, second, that the most efficient organisations are those with more diversified ownership structures and which have a portfolio of companies active in the most innovative sectors.     

Financial crises and venture capital development: evidence from Indonesia

This exploratory study examines how financial crises impede or support venture capital (VC) development in the context of Indonesia and the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis (AFC). Using a mixed-methods research methodology, the study finds that financial crises have divergent effects on VC development. Financial crises support VC development through accelerated VC practise diffusion, but impede that development by slowing VC enabling conditions. The effects of the substantial macro institutional changes often associated with financial crises are insufficient to overcome these impediments, resulting in a smaller VC industry.     

Understanding the dynamics of new venture top management teams: cohesion,conflict, and new venture performance

Research conducted under the upper echelon perspective has produced consistent evidence of a relationship between top management team (TMT) interaction and firm performance. We draw upon and extend this research in an effort to explain new venture performance as a function of cohesion and conflict within the top management team. Based upon data collected from a sample of 70 new ventures, we find that TMT cohesion is negatively related to affective conflict and positively related to cognitive conflict. As expected then, we also find that TMT cohesion is positively related to new venture growth.     

Contracting, signaling, and moral hazard: a model of entrepreneurs, ‘angels,’ and venture capitalists

Investment by wealthy individuals, known as ‘angels,’ in startup firms is quite significant and has taken off in the last few years. Angels invest in the company at an earlier stage than venture capitalists (VCs) do. This paper examines the relationship between an entrepreneur, an angel, and a VC from the seed investment made by the angel to the exit stage. The study characterizes the equilibrium contracts among the players and provides insights into the related institutional arrangements. Next, the study examines the signaling aspects of the game. The paper also analyzes the moral hazard problems of the entrepreneur and the VC. It shows that the outcome in a startup firm is not efficient because of the free-rider phenomenon.     

New venture internationalization: The role of venture capital types and reputation

This study examines how different types of venture capital relate to new venture internationalization. Using a sample of 646 U.S. new ventures that executed IPOs between 1995 and 2010, we find that ventures with foreign or corporate venture capital have higher levels of international intensity. We also investigate the moderating role of VC reputation on the relationship between foreign venture capital and international intensity and corporate venture capital and international intensity. Our results suggest that VC reputation weakens the positive relationship between corporate VC and international intensity.     

Technology strategy and new venture performance: A study of corporate-sponsored and independent biotechnology ventures

New ventures, companies eight years or younger, play a major role in the development of an emerging, high-technology industry. Corporate-sponsored new ventures (those supported by an established corporation) and independent ventures (those founded by independent entrepreneurs) frequently battle for industry leadership and financial success. Whereas both venture types use technology to achieve financial and market success, little is known about the differences in their technology strategies.Technology strategy is the plan that guides a new venture's decisions on the development and use of technological capabilities. This strategy covers six major areas. The first is selecting the pioneering posture, where a venture decides whether or not be among the industry's first companies to introduce new products (technologies) to the market. The second is determining the number of products to be introduced to the market. The third is choosing the extent of a venture's use of internal and external R&D sources. Internal sources usually refer to in-house R&D activities. External sources may include purchasing or licensing of technology from other companies, or joining strategic alliances to acquire that technology. The fourth is deciding the level of R&D spending. The fifth is selecting the combination (portfolio) of applied and basic research projects. Whereas basic R&D advances science, applied R&D leads to new products and technologies. The sixth, and final, dimension is the venture's use of patenting to protect any competitive advantages it might gain from its R&D activities.This article reports the results of a study that explored the differences in the technology strategies and performance of corporate and independent ventures. The biotechnology industry was chosen to test the study's hypotheses, using 112 ventures.Seven of the study's hypotheses focused on the potential variations in technology strategy between corporate and independent ventures. Independent ventures (IVs) were expected to surpass corporate ventures (CVs) in pioneering new products (technologies), using internal R&D, and emphasizing applied R&D. CVs were expected to surpass IVs in introducing new products, using external R&D sources, spending on R&D, and patenting. The study's remaining three hypotheses covered possible variations in new venture performance (NVP) and their sources.The results showed that IVs focused more on pioneering, pursued a more applied R&D portfolio, and emphasized internal R&D more than CVs. CVs utilized external technology sources, spent more heavily on R&D, stressed basic R&D, and used patenting more intensively than IVs. These results were consistent with the hypotheses. However, contrary to expectations, there were no significant differences between CVs and IVs in the frequency of new product introductions, probably because most ventures were at the invention, rather than the commercialization, stage.The results on the NVP of CVs and IVs were counter to expectations. IVs outperformed CVs, probably because of the high motivation of the IV owners who reaped the rewards of growth and profitability. Also, whereas CVs may have greater access to the resources of their sponsors, political conflicts and rigid corporate controls might have reduced their ability to achieve competitive advantages.The results also indicated that CVs and IVs appeared to gain competitive advantages from different technological choices. Pioneering, a focus on applied R&D, and extensive use of the internal R&D sources were also positively associated with the performance of IVs. Heavy R&D spending, the use of both internal and external R&D sources, frequent product introductions, and patenting were positively associated with the performance of CVs. Finding that technology strategies significantly impacted NVP should encourage executives to consider pursuing a formal technology strategy. Likewise, the finding that different dimensions of technology strategy influenced the performance of CVs and IVs in different ways has practical implications. CV managers can learn from their higher performing IV rivals. Also, because established companies frequently acquire IVs, information about their technology strategies can be valuable in assimilating the acquired ventures. Overall, the results show that technology strategy is an important factor in enhancing new venture performance.     

The advantage of experienced start-up founders in venture capital acquisition: evidence from serial entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs with prior firm-founding experience are expected to have more skills and social connections than novice entrepreneurs. Such skills and social connections could give experienced founders some advantage in the process of raising venture capital. This paper uses a large database of venture-backed companies and their founders to examine the advantage associated with prior founding experience. Compared with novice entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs with venture-backed founding experience tend to raise more venture capital at an early round of financing and tend to complete the early round much more quickly. In contrast, experienced founders whose earlier firms were not venture-backed do not show a similar advantage over novice entrepreneurs, suggesting the importance of connections with venture capitalists in the early stage of venture capital financing. However, when the analysis also takes into account later rounds of financing, all entrepreneurs with prior founding experience appear to raise more venture capital. This implies that skills acquired from any previous founding experience can make an entrepreneur perform better and in turn attract more venture capital.     

The structure and sustainability of current account deficit: Turkish evidence from regime switching

This study focuses on the current account deficit dynamics and sustainability, using data of the period between 1990:Q1 and 2014:Q2 in the context of Turkish economy. The main findings of the study can be put into two categories. The first category covers energy consumption, openness rate, gross domestic product, exchange rate and investments, which are the most important determinants of the current deficit. The second one asserts that sustainability is weak for Turkish economy; however, it is even weaker during the economic contraction. There is extensive literature about structure and sustainability of the current account deficit. However, many of the studies have analysed the sustainability of the current account deficits without considering the economic conjuncture. For this purpose, the study employs the Markov-switching method which is a non-linear time series model.