Corruption and economic growth: New empirical evidence

The nexus between corruption and economic growth has been examined for a long time. Many empirical studies measured corruption by the reversed Transparency International's Perception of Corruption Index (CPI) and ignored that the CPI was not comparable over time. The CPI is comparable over time since the year 2012. We employ new data for 175 countries over the period 2012–2018 and re-examine the nexus between corruption and economic growth. The cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real per capita GDP decreased by around 17% when the reversed CPI increased by one standard deviation. The effect of corruption on economic growth is especially pronounced in autocracies and transmits to growth by decreasing FDI and increasing inflation.     

Inflation‐Growth Profiles Across Countries: Evidence from Developing and Developed Countries

There is growing evidence from multi‐country studies indicating that there is a turning point in the relationship between inflation and economic growth beyond which the detrimental effects of high inflation offset the stimulating effects of mild inflation on growth. However, it is not clear whether it is appropriate to assume an identical turning point in the inflation and growth relation across countries at various stages of development. Using a non‐linear specification and the data from four groups of countries at various stages of development, this paper examines the possibility for a family rather than a single inverted U relation across countries at various stages of development. The estimated turning points are found to vary widely from as high as 15% per year for the lower‐middle‐income countries to 11% for the low‐income countries, and 5% for the upper‐middle‐income countries. No statistically detectable, long‐run relationship between inflation and growth is evident for the OECD countries. The results indicate the potential bias in the estimation of inflation–growth nexus that may result from combining various countries at different levels of development. The existence of such a degree of heterogeneity across countries at various stages of development also suggests the inappropriateness of setting a single, uniform numerical policy target applicable to all (developing) countries.     

Thresholds in finance–growth nexus: Evidence from G‐7 economies

This study explores the finance and economic growth nexus in G‐7 economies as these countries experience significantly higher levels of financial development. Using a balanced panel of 31 years from 1983 to 2013, we provide new evidence on the finance–growth relationship. We show the presence of nonlinearity as there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between finance and growth in the long run. Estimating the thresholds in the finance–growth nexus, we notice that there exists a threshold effect of finance at 109% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). We observe that exceeding the threshold would hinder the countries instead of furthering economic growth as too much finance is harmful. Based on the panel Granger causality test results, we claim that financial development should be associated with optimal growth performance. Our findings for the G‐7 economies offer some useful policy inferences to the emerging and developing economies in designing their financial development strategies.     

THE TWO‐WAY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND CORRUPTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC GROWTH

The existing empirical evidence suggests that in low‐income economies, an increase in government spending leads to a reduction of growth. This article aims to explain this empirical fact by considering a growth model that incorporates a two‐way relationship between corruption and government spending. That is, government spending gives rise to corruption and rent seeking, which feeds back by distorting the structure and size of government spending. In addition, the cost of corruption depends on the wage rate. Therefore, in low‐income economies, increases in government spending tend to generate larger social losses caused by a higher level of rent dissipation and a concomitant rise in corruption and government inefficiency. Consequently, in such economies, an increase in government spending is more likely to result in a decline of economic growth. (JEL H3, O11, O41)     

Non‐linear finance–growth nexus

This paper revisits the question of whether the finance–growth nexus varies with the stages of economic development. Using a novel threshold regression with the instrumental variables approach proposed by Caner and Hansen (2004) to the dataset used in Levine et al. (2000) we detect overwhelming evidence in support of a positive linkage between financial development and economic growth, and this positive effect is larger in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The data also reveal that financial development tends to have stronger impacts on capital accumulation and productivity growth in the low‐income countries than in the high‐income ones. The findings are robust to alternative financial development measures and conditioning information sets.     

IS THERE A CASE FOR LOW INFLATION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN SELECTED ASIAN ECONOMIES?

The authors examine the evidence on the relationship between inflation and productivity growth for nine Asian economies using causality analysis in a multivariate model with money supply as a possible effective monetary policy tool. The inflation-productivity growth relationship is found to be non-uniform, as the evidence of uni-directional, bi-directional, and no causality between the two variables is varied and significant for some countries and insignificant for others. An attempt is made to explain the inflation-productivity nexus for these countries and to discuss implications for anti-inflationary policies such as inflation targeting. ( JEL E31, O47, C32)     

Does Inequality Lead to a Financial Crisis? Revisited

Financial crises have been attributed to rising income inequality via its induced high household leverage as observed in the USA and similar economies. Alternatively it has been suggested this is not a general relationship since it was found that inequality had no bearing on crises in 14 advanced countries over 1920–2008; instead, low interest rates and business cycle expansions are found to be the only two robust determinants of credit booms leading to crises. Using a similar dataset, this paper provides no support for the generality of the above findings by embracing country heterogeneity. The paper shows that real evidence still points back to the inequality‐leverage–crisis nexus for financialized economies. The implication is that finance can hardly be sustainable under rising inequality.     

Drivers of the real effective exchange rates in high and upper‐middle income countries

This paper revisits the nexus between real effective exchange rate (REER) and total factor productivity (TFP) by controlling for trade openness, financial development and natural resources rents. We use a sample of 60 high‐income and upper‐middle income countries over the period 1995–2015 and employ the GMM estimation framework. Our results advance the empirical knowledge on the drivers of REER by providing robust evidence that the impact of TFP is not uniform across different country clusters. We find that in high‐income countries, increasing productivity causes the REER to depreciate hence becoming more trade competitive while the opposite is true for upper‐middle income countries. Furthermore, financial development and natural resources rents have no meaningful impact in the case of upper‐middle income countries but retain a significant effect in high‐income countries. Trade openness plays a key role in explaining the variation in REER in both country clusters.     

Short- and long-term relation between economic development and government spending: the role of quality of institutions

ABSTRACT

This paper tests the Wagner’s assumption of the one-sided directional flow moving from economic growth to public spending considering an international database over the 1996–2012 period. By using indicators on the level of country control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, regulatory quality and voice and accountability, the paper analyses the economic performance-public spending nexus controlling for the quality of the institutions. The empirical evidence supports the existence of the Wagner’s law, showing that, in the short-run, public spending positively reacts to a positive shock in national income, with a lower magnitude for democratic countries. In the long run, the error-correction model shows the convergence between public spending and national output occurring less quickly for non-democratic, low-income and to a smaller extent for non-OECD countries. Institutional quality, such as effort in controlling corruption and the presence of regulations that permit and promote private sector development, may help reducing the amount of per capita public spending and making it more productive. Higher expenses in compositional amenities such as public services for the elderly may explain why public spending per capita will increase the most in economies with a higher share of the population that need healthcare facilities.     

How should resource‐rich countries diversify? Estimating forward‐linkage effects of mining on productivity growth

Resource‐rich countries willing to diversify their economies are faced with dual policy options; to either develop resource‐based industries, or diversify their economies as a whole and invest into new activities that are not necessarily resource dependent. Not only does the economic theory fail to provide a consensual guidance on this issue but empirical evidence is also lacking. This paper empirically assesses which of these two patterns of diversification is associated with higher productivity growth outcomes for resource‐rich countries. Using panel data for 50 resource‐abundant countries over the period 1970–2010, I find that stronger downstream linkages to mining and extractives do not lead to productivity enhancements. Broadening and diversifying the production structure as a whole offers potential for productivity growth at higher levels of income.     

An empirical characterization of the effects of public debt on economic growth

Based on a data set of 115 economies, this article empirically investigates the relation between public debt and economic growth. Using the World Bank’s classification for income groups, we initially find that those countries that present the lowest public debt are characterized by the highest economic growth, while the smallest growth rates are associated with the highest public debt. Nevertheless, this conclusion is tempered when we analyse the countries by income level: low-income countries have a different behaviour with respect to lower-middle, upper-middle and high-income countries. When using the IMF’s country classification, the results do not suggest a clear pattern in the public debt–economic growth nexus across different countries, but indicate a heterogeneous relationship between such key macroeconomic variables.     

The non‐monotonic relationship between seigniorage and inequality

Abstract. We present an analysis of how political factors may come into play in the equilibrium determination of inflation. We employ a standard overlapping generations model with heterogenous young‐age endowments, and a government that funds an exogenous spending via a combination of non‐distortionary income taxes and the inflation tax. Agents have access to two stores of value: fiat money and an inflation‐shielded, yet costly, asset. The model predicts that the relationship between elected reliance on the inflation tax (for revenue) and income inequality may be non‐monotonic. We find robust empirical backing for this hypothesis from a cross‐section of countries. JEL classification: E5, P16     

Evidence on inflation–output trade-off in developing and industrial countries

This paper subjects Lucas's output–inflation trade-off study to further empirical investigation. The cross-country study divides the 111 countries covered into 90 developing countries and 21 advanced countries. Lucas's proposition is that volatility of aggregate demand growth should reduce the impact of aggregate demand growth on the cyclical output and the implication of this is that there is no output–inflation trade-off in line with the natural rate theory. We employ annual data over periods that fall between 1958 and 1985 in order to conduct the test. Our findings suggest that Lucas's proposition is valid for developed economies but not for developing economies.     

Inflation and income distribution in Central America,Mexico, Panama,and the Dominican Republic

Analyses of the impact of inflation on income distribution typically only consider the general inflation rate. However, when the consumption structure of households is shaped by its income level and inflation varies across goods and services, they are affected differently by inflation. The aim of this study is to contribute to the analysis of this effect in Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica), Panama, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic (CAPMDR) for the period 2007–2018. According to our findings, there have been significant differences in the inflation rates faced by different income groups. By employing these percentile‐specific inflation rates, we have computed an “inflation‐corrected Gini index.” This adjustment is important because although inequality has been decreasing during past years in the countries in our sample, on average, about half of the gains observed using the standard Gini index are lost once the Gini indices are corrected for inflation, a clearly nonnegligible magnitude.     

Corruption and public debt: a cross-country analysis

Using data from a large panel of countries over the period 1995–2015, this article empirically investigates the effect of corruption on public debt. Overall, the estimates reveal that corruption increases public debt. The effect, however, appears to be heterogeneous across income-related sample splits: it is stronger for advanced economies, but weaker and less statistically robust for less-developed countries, where external factors such as foreign aid may also affect public debt. The analysis suggests the inadequacy of conventional wisdom assuming that more detrimental fiscal effects of corruption arise in low-income countries.     

Do currency undervaluations affect the impact of inflation on growth?

In this paper, we investigate how the level of currency undervaluations affects the effect of inflation on growth in a sample of 62 countries over the 1980–2015 period. While previous studies find a positive effect of an undervalued currency, we show that higher currency undervaluations reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth. As an undervalued currency is associated with supplementary inflation pressures arising from a cost-push inflation phenomenon and economy overheating, growth is thus penalized. This result is shown to be robust to the exclusion of currency crises episodes from our sample, and dependent of the development level of countries. Specifically, it holds in the case of emerging countries, but not for developing economies. Consequently, policies based on undervaluations should not be encouraged for emerging economies as they tend to reinforce the contractionary effect of inflation on growth.     

Democracy,Rule of Law,Corruption Incentives,and Growth

We bridge the gap between the standard theory of growth and the mostly static theory of corruption. Some public investment can be diverted from its purpose by corrupt individuals. Voters determine the level of public investment subject to an incentive constraint equalizing the returns from productive and corrupt activities. We concentrate on two exogenous institutional parameters: the “technology of corruption” is the ease with which rent‐seekers can capture a proportion of public spending. The “concentration of political power” is the extent to which rent‐seekers have more political influence than other people. One theoretical prediction is that the effects of the two institutional parameters on income growth and equilibrium corruption are different according to the constraints that are binding at equilibrium. In particular, the effect of judicial quality on growth should be stronger when political power is concentrated. We estimate a system of equations where both corruption and income growth are determined simultaneously and show that income growth is more affected by our proxies for legal and political institutions in countries where political rights and judicial institutions, respectively, are limited.     

The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America,Sub‐Saharan Africa,and Transition Countries*

Most of the empirical studies that analyze the impact of corruption on investment have three common features: they employ country‐level data on investment, corruption is measured at the country level, and data for countries from several regions are pooled together. This paper uses firm‐level data on investment and measures corruption at the firm and country level, and allows the effect of corruption to vary by region. Our dependent variable is firms' investment growth and we employ six measures of corruption from four different sources—two firm‐level measures and four country‐level measures. We find that the effect of corruption on investments varies significantly across regions: corruption has a negative and significant effect on investment growth for firms in Transition countries but has no significant impact for firms in Latin America and Sub‐Saharan Africa. Furthermore, for Transition countries, corruption is the most important determinant of investment.     

Product and process innovation and total factor productivity: Evidence for manufacturing in four Latin American countries

The literature on firm productivity recognizes the important role played by firm innovation activities on firm productivity in developed countries. However, the literature for developing and emerging economies is scarce and far from conclusive. The aim of this paper is to study the innovation–productivity link (distinguishing between process and product innovations) for manufacturing at the firm level for four Latin American countries (two classified as upper‐middle income countries by the World Bank—Argentina and Mexico—and two as lower‐middle income—Colombia and Peru). We aim testing whether the level of development is a mediating factor in the innovation–productivity link. The data used have been drawn from the World Bank panel enterprise surveys, for 2006 and 2010. First, we estimate total factor productivity (TFP) and, second, we use the estimated TFP as a regressor or as dependent variable, in two models for testing self‐selection of the most productive firms into innovation or the existence of returns to innovation in terms of productivity. Our results confirm the mediating role of the level of development in the innovation–productivity link: both the self‐selection and the returns‐to‐innovation hypotheses work only for the upper‐middle income countries.     

Inflation, Inflation Variability, and Corruption

We present a model where agents can inflate the cost of goods needed to start an investment project and inflation variability increases monitoring costs. We show that inflation variability can lead to higher corruption and lower investment. We document a positive relationship between corruption and inflation variability in a sample of 75 countries. The effect is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects, other controls, and 2SLS estimation. The results are economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in inflation variance from the median increases corruption by 12 percent of a standard deviation and reduces growth by 0.33 percentage points. Our paper highlights a new channel through which inflation reduces investment and growth, thus bridging the perception gap over the costs of inflation between economists and the public. We also find evidence that political competition reduces corruption and that corruption is pro-cyclical.