Loyalty Rewards Facilitate Tacit Collusion

Using a dynamic overlapping‐generations model, we show that loyalty rewards robustly facilitate tacit collusion. We compare the sustainability of tacit collusion when uniform prices are used, when loyal customers are rewarded without using commitment, and when loyalty rewards are implemented by committing to offering customers either lower fixed repeat‐purchase prices or fixed repeat‐purchase discounts. We find that, relative to uniform prices, rewarding loyalty without using commitment on the equilibrium path makes tacit collusion easier to sustain, because a deviating firm is unable to steal one period of industry profit before losing all future profits. When loyalty rewards are offered by firms committing to repeat‐purchase prices, collusion is even easier to sustain, because a deviating firm cannot renege on its discounted price for repeat‐purchase customers. When firms commit to repeat‐purchase discounts, they also commit to lowering the price for their repeat‐purchase customers if they undercut the regular price, rendering tacit collusion to be even more readily sustainable. Our results hold whether products are homogeneous or horizontally differentiated as in a Hotelling model.     

合作策略性行为的产业组织分析

本文按信息条件将合作策略性行为分为默契合作策略性行为和明确合作策略性行为。首先介绍了默契合作策略性行为三种策略 ,然后分析了十种明确合作策略性行为的商业实践 ,最后是对合作策略性行为的公共政策评论。     

Market structure,common ownership,and coordinated manager compensation

We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.     

Physical distribution service performance and Internet retailer margins: The drop-shipping context

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between Internet retailer margins and retailer promises regarding product distribution service. We focus particularly on Internet retailing in a drop-ship context, because this model provides a purer separation of these activities and the related costs and constitutes a critical context for the empirical examination of the relationship between retailer margins and promises. Drawing upon retailer and consumer perspectives, we articulate and justify a set of propositions regarding the relationships among different Internet retailer margins and promised product distribution service performance. We examine a sample comprising over 2000 retail transactions with customers and find partial empirical support for the set of propositions. Specifically, the results show that product margins and the margins on shipping and handling are inversely proportional. We also find a direct relationship between promised product distribution service performance and shipping and handling margins even after key product characteristics known to influence the cost side of the margin equation are controlled for. These results confirm an intuitively logical view of the relationships among pricing and promised product distribution service performance. The study also offers insights for practitioners regarding the opportunity to enhance performance in this domain and demonstrates the benefit and power of employing objective measures drawn from the vast array of information captured via online transactions.     

供应链中需求预测信息共享时零售商扭曲信息的动机分析

摈弃了以往研究中普遍采用的信息能被真实共享这一假设,探讨了在两层供应链中共享需求预测信息时,零售商进行人为信息扭曲的动机和趋势,并分析了信息失真对制造商和供应链整体利润的影响,最后指出若制造商和零售商按事先约定的比例来分配整个供应链的利润,则能有效消除此种信息失真现象。     

基于制造商服务的供应链竞争策略分析

本文以一个具有两家制造商和一家零售商组成的供应链结构为研究对象,探讨了制造商向顾客提供服务的重要性,并着重分析了在零售商占据市场优势的情况下,制造商的定价与服务策略,以及零售商制定产品零售价格时要考虑的主要因素,其结果对企业在供应链体系中制定经营策略具有一定的帮助。     

供应链分销系统奖金优化与仿真分析

研究由多个制造商与一个零售商组成的分销系统，他们以各自的利润最大化为目标，制造商给零售商提供奖金激励，零售商提供对应于奖金激励的服务水平，制造商需要进行为零售商提供多大奖金激励的决策。利用强化学习的启发式学习算法来优化制造商应提供的最优奖金激励。     

需求受促销投资影响的供应链协调模型

本文以一个供应商与一个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象。市场需求受零售商进行促销投资的影响,供应商采取了共同补给期和补偿促销投资的协调策略。本文分别建立无协调策略与协调策略下零售商与供应商的利润模型,并对促销投资额与补给期的进行决策。共同补给期条件下,零售商的利润会比无协调策略条件下有所减少。供应商通过补偿促销投资的方式使得双方的利润都有所增加。最终,在共同补给期与补偿促销投资的双重策略下,零售商与供应商可以有效协调。     

Optimal joint trade-in rebate strategies in a retailer-led supply chain

This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.     

On the relationship between product substitutability and tacit collusion

This paper examines the effect of increased product substitutability on quantity‐setting firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in a market. It uses a general demand function and the trigger strategy of Friedman (Friedman JW. 1971. A non‐cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic Studies 38: 1–12) to show that while increased product substitutability hinders sustainability of tacit collusion in the case of linear and concave demand functions, it may either hinder or facilitate firms’ ability to sustain tacit collusion in the case of convex demand functions. Thus, this paper adds to the growing view that one must use a case‐by‐case analysis in judging whether firms in more homogenous product markets find it easier or harder to tacitly collude. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

考虑强势零售商压价和投资行为的供应链协调

中国流通产业的零供矛盾日益凸显,针对强势零售商的压价问题构建博弈模型并分析其对供应链协调的影响。在由单制造商和单零售商构成的二级供应链中,考虑零售商在主导产品零售价格的同时,通过增加广告投入或提高服务水平等市场投资措施刺激产品需求,探讨当零售商运用其较强的议价能力对制造商提出的批发价进行强制压价时,双方如何通过合作博弈寻找最佳策略。发现在一定的条件下,强势零售商的压价行为不仅可以提升品牌商誉,更能帮助实现供应链协调。     

The effect of entrant brand's ownership on national brands' positioning strategies

National brand manufacturers face the threat of new product entry from not only their traditional competitors (other national brand manufacturers) but also from their own customers (the retailer). We compare how national brands can limit the loss due to entry of these two types of entrants by positioning of their brands. Our results show that national brands position farther from one another when the new entrant is a store brand than when the entrant is another national brand. We also find that due to different positioning strategies of these two types of entrant brands—the entrant store brand positioning “in‐between” incumbent national brands whereas the entrant national brand positioning “away” from incumbent national brands—incumbent national brands may lose more from the entry of a weaker store brand than from the entry of a stronger national brand. Finally, we find that taking into consideration both pricing and product positioning decisions, consumer and social welfare are generally higher from store brand entry than from national brand entry.     

The Relationships Between Adhocracy and Clan Cultures and Tacit Oriented KM Strategy

Abstract

In this study knowledge is considered as explicit and tacit; and in line with this, knowledge management strategy that focuses on tacit knowledge is identified as tacit oriented knowledge management strategy. Organizational culture, which is one of the crucial antecedents of knowledge management process, is categorized into four types by using two dimensions—external versus internal orientation and formal versus informal organizational process—as adhocracy, clan, market and hierarchy. And the relationships between adhocracy, and clan culture and tacit oriented knowledge management strategy are investigated. Also the industrial environment hostility is used as a moderator between adhocracy and clan cultures, and tacit oriented knowledge management strategy.

According to the regression analyses, adhocracy and clan cultures have positive effects on tacit oriented knowledge management strategy; and the impact (magnitude) of adhocracy culture is approximately the same as the clan culture on tacit oriented knowledge management strategy. Also it was found that greater industry environment hostility, the greater relationship between adhocracy and clan cultures, and tacit oriented knowledge management Strategy.     

基于零售商促销的渠道协调及数量折扣契约设计

定量研究当零售商具有促销策略时的渠道协调。在此种情形下，渠道成员独立决策时线形契约无法促成渠道协调，通过博弈模型分析，给出一种协调数量折扣价格契约，并对渠道协调后的利润分配作了初步探讨。结果表明，制造商促使该类渠道达成协调的数量折扣有无穷多个，在一定条件下渠道成员双方利润均会增加，并给出了算例分析。同时根据数量折扣形式，对传统的“入场费”问题进行了再讨论，得出了“入场费”与渠道协调之间的关系，进而揭示出“入场费”在实践中深层含义。     

Reverse Pricing and Revenue Sharing in a Vertical Market

Advancing in information technology has empowered firms with unprecedented flexibility when interacting with each other. We compare welfare results in a vertical market (e.g., manufacturers and retailers) for several types of pricing strategies depending upon the following: (1) which side (retailers or manufacturers) chooses retail prices; and (2) whether there is revenue sharing or linear pricing between the two sides. Our results are as follows. Under revenue sharing, retail prices (and thus industry profits) are higher if and only if they are chosen by the side featuring less competition. Under linear pricing, however, retail prices are higher if they are chosen by the side featuring more competition (for linear demand functions). Relative to linear pricing, revenue sharing always leads to lower retail prices, higher consumer surplus and social surplus. However, the comparison on industry profits depends on the demand elasticity ratios. Revenue sharing raises industry profits when the elasticity ratios are small, but the results are reversed when the elasticity ratios are large. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bait and ditch: Consumer naïveté and salesforce incentives

We analyze a model of price competition between a transparent retailer and a deceptive one in a market where a fraction of consumers is naïve. The transparent retailer is an independent shop managed by its owner. The deceptive retailer belongs to a chain and is operated by a manager. The two retailers sell an identical base product, but the deceptive one also offers an add‐on. Rational consumers never consider buying the add‐on while naïve ones can be “talked” into buying it. By offering the manager a contract that pushes him to never sell the base good without the add‐on, the chain can induce an equilibrium in which both retailers obtain more‐than‐competitive profits. The equilibrium features price dispersion and market segmentation, with the deceptive retailer targeting only naïve consumers whereas the transparent retailer serves only rational ones.     

The strategic effect of retailers' in‐store advertising services under product variety competition

We study a retailer service model of in‐store advertising, in which a neutral retailer provides product information to consumers for free but charges manufacturers. Our results show that the retailer's optimal pricing induces the manufacturers to decrease the number of items they offer. Nevertheless, this relaxes the competition between the manufacturers so that they benefit from using the in‐store service, unless the cost of communicating with consumers about the between‐firm products is lower. Furthermore, the service can be made socially beneficial by reducing the inefficiency resulting from an excessive number of items when manufacturers are not well differentiated.     

Chain-Store Pricing Across Local Markets

Chain‐stores now dominate most areas of retailing. While retailers may operate nationally or even internationally, the markets they compete in are largely local. How should they best operate pricing policy in respect of the different markets served—price uniformly across the local markets or on a local basis according to market conditions? We model this by allowing local market differences, with retail markets differing by their size and the number of players present. We show that practising price discrimination is not always best for a chain‐store. Competitive conditions exist under which uniform pricing can raise profits.     

Why should firms manufacture retailer brands?

For firms manufacturing convenience goods there are three branding policies available, a proprietory brand policy, a retailer brand policy and a mixed brand policy. A firm's choice depends on differences in demand and promotion costs between the proprietory and retailer brand markets. This can be analysed using a simple elaboration of the standard 3rd degree price discrimination model. But if the two markets are not independent over the long-term there may be other consequences of following the optimization rules of the model. If retailers develop consumers' preference for their own shops and their own brands, the demand advantage enjoyed by manufacturers' brands may be reduced further. The more willing are manufacturers to supply retailer brands, the more retailers win undermine the demand for manufacturers' proprietory brands.     

Strategic Delegation with Multiproduct Firms

This paper shows that a multiproduct firm may find it optimal not to delegate the sales of all products and therefore to employ different distribution channels for different products. It faces the following trade-off: There is a strategic effect associated with delegation, but if both products' sales are delegated, intrafirm competition is not internalized. By delegating the sales of just one of the products while selling the other product directly—partial delegation—the multiproduct manufacturer strikes just the right compromise: The externalities between its owns products are internalized partially while a strategic advantage is achieved against its rival single-product manufacturer. Partial delegation also holds if both products are sold by a common retailer; it dominates full delegation when both manufacturers are multiproduct firms .