Free Trade Agreement with Endogenous Market Structure

We examine the incentives of free trade agreement (FTA) formation between two countries under endogenous market structure with leaders and followers. We demonstrate that establishing a FTA is neither an equilibrium outcome nor socially optimal when consumer demand and fixed cost are intermediate, products are close substitutes and countries are asymmetrical. This is because the FTA induces exit of followers, which makes the market less competitive and shrinks the leader’s production both in the domestic and foreign markets. We also show that large developing countries are less likely to establish a FTA than small developed countries.     

市场结构与技术创新——以美国AT&T公司的拆分为例

本文以美国AT&T的拆分为模型案例 ,探讨和分析垄断与竞争 ,哪种市场结构更有利于企业的技术创新。本文的模型和实证的结果表明 ,在分割之前公司规模和研发之间存在显著的正相关 ,这说明规模在电信业中依然具有优势。本文的重点在于揭示出效率 (由TFP来衡量 )和竞争的关系 ,因此 ,本研究的一个更为重要的结果是 :TFP与研发之间在分割前是完全不相关 ,分割后却强烈正相关。这一结果表明 ,从受保护的垄断地位转移到竞争性的垄断迫使AT&T提高研发投资 ,以保持其竞争优势。     

Emission Taxes and Optimal Refunding Schemes with Endogenous Market Structure

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal schemes for refunding the emission tax in a free-entry market where the production process generates emissions. We consider the regulation by a three-part tax policy: the government sets an emission tax, a refunding scheme, and an entry-license tax. In contrast to the case of the two-part tax-refund policy under no entry, we show that even if it is impossible to obtain subsidies from outside, the first-best outcome is always attained. Further, the government’s budget constraint is binding under the optimal schemes. Our result implies that the tax-refund system works effectively in a market with endogenous entry.     

行政许可制度与市场经济

行政许可制度是现代国家管理的重要手段 ,已被世界各国广泛运用于政治、经济、文化等众多行政领域 ,但行政许可制度在市场经济条件下暴露的弊端 ,已严重影响了我国经济的进一步发展。本文作者针对这一问题 ,对行政许可制度的改革提出清除不适当的行政许可 ,将行政许可权纳入立法范畴、科学界定许可范围、建立简便公正的许可程序 ,建立许可机关与收费机构相分离的制度等五点建议     

Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper examines the optimal output taxes for polluting oligopolists under endogenous market structure, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. For general functional forms, we show that (i) the equilibrium number of firms in an industry may differ from the socially optimal number of firms and (ii) the second-best optimal taxes under imperfect competition could be less than, equal to, or greater than marginal external damages depending upon the curvature of market demand.     

Market Size, Technology Choice, and Market Structure

We introduce technology choice into a model of monopolistic competition and analyze the structural effects of changes in market size. A larger market leads to the adoption of a large-scale technology. If a technology switch occurs, the number of firms decreases, and a rationalizing effect arises: individual and aggregate output increases; prices fall. This need not benefit consumers since a technology switch is associated with a decrease in product variety.     

Fiscal Policy and Long-run Growth in R&D-based Models with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper shows that in a model of endogenous growth that does not exhibit the scale effect, taxes on consumption and labor income and the level and composition of public expenditure have no effect on steady-state growth. The only fiscal instruments that affect steady-state growth are taxes on asset and corporate income. In line with standard intuition, tax rates and public expenditure have level effects on income per capita. These results emphasize that although growth is endogenous, in the sense that it is determined by the model and it is subject to policy action, instruments that work by changing market size do not affect it. Effective growth-enhancing policies operate through the interest rate.     

Stackelberg竞争结构中质量提高型创新技术授权和企业兼并

本文基于Stackelberg双头垄断竞争模型,分析比较了质量提高型创新技术拥有企业的技术授权策略和企业兼并。研究结果表明:不论技术拥有企业是市场先行者还是跟随者,其总是偏向于企业兼并,而不会选择固定费用授权方式;如果政府禁止企业的兼并行为,那么当技术拥有企业在市场中是产量跟随者时,其愿意以提成许可方式进行技术授权;从社会福利角度考虑,技术授权可提高社会福利,而企业兼并一般不利于社会福利的提高,只有当创新技术拥有企业是Stackelberg竞争结构中的产量跟随者且其创新规模较大时,企业兼并才可提高社会福利。     

Patent Protection,Innovation and Technology Licensing

We show that the common wisdom suggesting higher investment in innovation under a stronger patent protection may not be true if the innovator can license its technology ex‐post innovation. If the initial cost of production is high and the slope of the marginal cost of undertaking innovation is moderate, investment in innovation is maximised at a patent protection that is weaker than the strongest patent protection. Otherwise, strongest patent protection maximises investment in innovation. We also show that welfare is maximised neither at the strongest patent protection nor at the weakest patent protection but at an intermediate patent protection. Our results are important for patent policies.     

The Inefficiency of Private Adaptation to Pollution in the Presence of Endogenous Market Structure

The paper considers an industry where production costs rise due to pollution, but where this effect can be partially off-set by investing in adaptation as a private good. The focus is not on external effects, but industries where economies of scale are introduced from adapting to pollution. The structure of the resulting oligopolistic market is endogenous, since the level of adaptation is chosen by the firms. The analysis of externalities usually disregards defensive or adaptation measures, with a few exceptions that point to considerable complications. The present debate on adaptation to climate change shows the importance of understanding defensive measures. I show that the market failure caused by economies of scale leads to production costs above the social optimum, i.e. to under-adapation. When pollution increases, adaptation only increases if demand is price inelastic. Otherwise, welfare loss from market failure decreases with pollution. The total welfare loss is only convex if demand is price inelastic and the influence of pollution on production costs is stronger than the influence of adaptation. Concave welfare loss has crucial implications for abatement policies.     

技术创新与市场结构:最优化分析

从静态意义上.各种市场结构通过市场垄断程度、产品差异、企业规模、进入退出壁垒等机制影响技术创新的条件、动力及效率.从动态意义上讲,技术创新又推动着市场结构的转变.于是旨在评介各种市场结构,在分析上述机制对技术创新及其对市场结构影响的基础上,找到最有利于技术创新的某一市场结构或几种市场结构的最优组合,以加快中国经济增长方式的转变,并给出一些政策建议.     

Endogenous Product Differentiation,Market Size and Prices

This paper provides a framework to understand how market size affects firms' investments in product differentiation in a model of monopolistic competition. The theory proposes that consumers' love of variety makes them more sensitive to product differentiation efforts by firms, which leads to more differentiated products in larger markets. The framework also predicts an inverted U ‐shaped effect of trade liberalization on product differentiation, with trade liberalization leading to more differentiated products when starting from autarky but then leading to less differentiated products as the countries approach free trade.     

市场过程内生的垄断:市场权势和自然垄断

作为内生的垄断现象,市场权势实际上是争胜竞争过程的结果,并非垄断的市场结构所决定。如果将竞争理解为一个动态过程,市场权势具有竞争性和暂时性。自然垄断现象也是市场过程演化过程中的自然现象,无论源于规模经济还是范围经济,都表明自然垄断具有动态效率特征。除非政府人为阻碍争胜竞争过程的展开,通常市场过程内生力量能够有效制约非政府垄断现象。     

技术市场对产业结构调整的促进效应——以北京技术市场为例

针对技术市场对产业结构调整的作用机制,利用Granger因果关系检验、VAR模型、脉冲响应函数、方差分解等方法或工具,实证分析并对比了北京技术市场与全国产业结构和北京产业结构的作用关系。结果显示:北京技术市场与全国和北京的产业结构均存在因果联系,并对全国第一产业产值比重的提升起抑制作用,对全国第二、第三产业产值比重的提升起促进作用,对北京第一、第三产业产值比重的提升起促进作用,对北京第二产业产值比重的提升起抑制作用;北京地区的产业结构仍未发展到以第三产业为主导的阶段。     

上游垄断背景下厂商提成特许策略研究

在原料供应厂商占据垄断地位的假设下,通过对比下游创新厂商提成特许前后的收益,对下游创新厂商的特许策略选择和创新激励进行了研究。研究结果表明:当技术创新规模较小时,下游创新厂商进行技术创新的激励增大,会对下游其他无创新的厂商进行技术特许;当技术创新规模较大时,下游创新厂商则不会进行技术特许。     

内生经济增长理论框架下的市场失效与财政政策

内生经济增长理论认为,知识和人力资本的外部效应与创新带来的垄断势力推动经济增长的同时,也会带来非帕雷托最优的经济增长收入分配的不公平,将阻碍经济增长;加快知识和人力资本积累、促进技术进步以及缓解收入分配不公平的财政政策能纠正市场失效,使长期经济增长达到社会最优.     

Bailouts, Endogenous Financial Regimes, and Market Sentiments

The authors examine the role of strategic interactions among a small number of financial intermediaries who know that the current financial regime is subject to change. The current financial regime offers protection to the intermediaries against bad outcomes. Each financial intermediary's investment strategy is shown to depend on its rivals' strategies. It is shown that a small shock that causes an initially small deviation from an intermediary's equilibrium strategy can lead to a series of larger deviations by its rivals, thereby precipitating a change of financial regime.     

Social Status,Labour Market Frictions and Endogenous Growth

This paper develops an endogenous growth model that incorporates wealth‐enhanced preferences for social status and labour market frictions to investigate the role of social status in determining unemployment and long‐run growth. We show that the increase in the desire for social status reduces the unemployment rate, but its effect on long‐run growth is unclear. We then calibrate our model to the US economy and find that an increase in the desire for social status lowers the unemployment rate and enhances the economic growth rate in the long run.     

技术引进、市场结构、研发效率与二次创新

二次创新是实现技术引进向自主创新转变的重要环节,中国引进技术二次创新投入低下已经引起广泛关注。基于产品垂直创新内生增长理论,文章构建了二次创新的内生决定模型,讨论了技术引进选择、市场结构、企业研发效率等因素对二次创新的影响。在此基础上,文章运用1998~2004年我国30个省市大中型工业企业面板数据进行了实证分析,并提出加大引进技术二次创新的建议。     

Entry into a Foreign Market: Foreign Direct Investment versus Licensing

We compare foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology licensing as two modes of entry into a foreign market. While direct entry via FDI dissipates rents in the host country, opportunistic competition from a licensee may erode rents in the entrant's other markets. Since FDI increases competition in the host country while licensing stifles it. welfare is higher under FDI than under licensing.