Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations

This paper offers an explanation for why a principal may demand too much paperwork from a subordinate: due to limited liability and moral hazard a principal is unable to appropriate all rents. Internal paperwork allows a more accurate monitoring of the agent and enables the principal to appropriate a larger part of the agent’s rent. In her decision the principal disregards the agent’s cost increase of more internal paperwork. Consequently, the requested amount of internal paperwork may be too high from both the agent’s personal point of view and the organization as a whole.     

Efficient moral hazard

This paper presents an infinite-horizon, discounted dynamic programming model of the endogenous opportunity costs of an agent’s effort that is allocated among an endogenous number of principals. An agent allocates effort between evaluating new principals and attending to current principals. Since each principal’s return is not maximized by the agent’s optimal allocation, moral hazard occurs in equilibrium. However, since the agent maximizes the total expected value of all undertaken projects, the agent’s allocation of effort is efficient. If the agent chooses a single principal, then moral hazard does not occur and the allocation is efficient. These results are contrary to the inefficient moral hazard results in bilateral principal-agent (P-A) and common agency (C-A) models.     

Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

The appeals process in principal–agent relationships

The appeals process is employed in many organizations including administrative agencies, regulatory authorities, sports organizations, and private companies. This paper examines the dual role of the appeals process in enhancing fairness and inducing performance in principal–agent relationships in the presence of imperfect performance evaluation. Some surprising results emerge. For example, the merit of the appeals process depends on the agent’s aversion to unfairness, and appeals may be optimally denied even if the appeals process is more accurate than the initial evaluation and is costless. An increase in the accuracy of the initial evaluation may reduce the principal’s welfare. Furthermore, the principal’s welfare can increase as the cost of the appeals process increases.     

Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents

A setting in which a single principal contracts with two agents who possess perfect private information about their own productivity is considered. With correlated productivities, each agent's private information also provides a signal about the other agent's productivity. In contrast to the setting in which there is only one agent, it is shown that such private information may be of no value to the agents. It is only if the agents are risk-averse that their private information may allow them to command rents. Moreover, when the agents are constrained only to reveal their private information truthfully as a Nash equilibrium, the Pareto optimal incentive scheme may induce the agents to adopt strategies other than truth-telling. This leads to the consideration of truth-telling equilibria that are not Pareto dominated in the subgame played by the agents. Among all such equilibria, the one preferred by the principal restricts one agent to tell the truth as a dominant strategy and the other as a Nash response to truth.     

A note on capital markets and bankruptcy constraints in contracting

This note considers the extent to which state-contingent bankruptcy constraints in a standard contracting problem with adverse selection can be mitigated by a risk-neutral third party. It shows that if payoffs of principal and agent are quasi-linear, the third party can only affect the constraints if it has complete information about the agent's type — observing a correlated signal is not enough.     

“Tell me what you need”: signaling with limited resources

We study the project allocation mechanisms trade-off between minimizing the waste of resources in the application process and maximizing the match of needs and projects when the recipient’s needs and resources are private information. We propose a signaling mechanism where the set of signals available to each agent is constrained by his capacity and by his truthful need of the project. The principal can control, at a given cost, the agent’s application cost and the utility of receiving the project by non-needy agents. Our findings suggest that there exists a threshold in the principal’s budget such that for smaller budgets, all instruments are used in the optimal mechanism, while for bigger budgets the optimal application complexity is independent of the budget and waste of resources is a decreasing share of the resources available.     

Individual preferences and the effect of uncertainty on irreversible investment

This paper considers a relationship between investment behavior and an agent’s preferences in a stochastic one-sector growth model with irreversible investment. Further, it explores the effect of uncertainty in investment policies by using a non-expected utility function. Since uncertainty has an impact on investment policies not only through an option value but also through a risk-adjusted time preference rate in a general equilibrium framework, it is significant to distinguish the two preference parameters of the agent. While the previous partial equilibrium models with irreversible investment have exhibited a negative relationship between the desired capital stock and uncertainty, this paper implies that it is possible to generate a positive relationship for the appropriate parameters. This shows that the results of Hartman and Abel have been robust even in a general equilibrium model.     

On the difficulty of eliciting summary information

The revelation principle asserts that, in principle, the allocative performance of direct mechanisms (institutions in which an exhaustive report of privately held information is elicited from each agent) is at least as good as that of any other class of institutions. The distinction between the incentive properties of such exhaustive reporting and of summary reporting is studied here. It is shown that, unless strong restrictions are placed on an agent's utility function, the incentive properties of truthful summary reporting about a multidimensional parameter (e.g., reporting of its first coordinate) are extremely fragile.     

The employment contract when the firm can utilize a free resource

The output of a free resource, like Open Source programming or basic research, may influence the firm’s revenue by reducing costs or through market interaction. Under moral hazard, if the principal determines how much to utilize the free resource, he will utilize it more, profits are higher and the agent’s effort is lower than when the agent makes the decision. Contrary to the standard result, the incentive coefficient is increasing in the variance of the free resource’s output. Utilization of the free resource and the agent’s effort are always substitutes.     

For how long to tie your hands? Stable relationships in an unstable environment

The Kreps–Wilson–Milgrom–Roberts framework is one of the most renowned ways of modeling reputation-building. Once the number of repetitions of the game is considered as a choice variable, such a framework can fruitfully be employed to study the optimal length of the commitment to a relationship. We analyze a model where a principal plays with an agent a finitely repeated trust game, characterize the optimal length of the relationship between principal and agent when the principal’s preferences on the agent’s type stochastically change over time and show that a commitment to a stable relationship may be optimal (even) in very unstable environments.      

Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism

This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal–agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance imperfectly, i.e., she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent's effort, provided that the principal's stake in the project is small.     

Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism

This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal–agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance imperfectly, i.e., she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent's effort, provided that the principal's stake in the project is small.     

Agency theory: choice-based foundations of the parametrized distribution formulation

This paper develops choice-theoretic foundations of the principal’s and the agent’s behaviors underlying the parametrized distribution formulation of agency theory. Both the principal and the agent are expected-utility maximizers and their action-dependent subjective probabilities are defined directly on the outcomes. The results are used to evaluate and interpret the common prior assumption. I am grateful to Simon Grant and, in particular, to Peter Wakker for their comments and suggestions, and to the NSF for financial support under grant SES-0314249.     

The forecasting ability of a cointegrated VAR system of the UK tourism demand for France, Spain and Portugal

This paper uses the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology as an alternative to Deaton and Muellbauer’s Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), to establish the long-run relationships between I(1) variables: tourism shares, tourism prices and UK tourism budget. With appropriate testing, the deterministic components and sets of exogenous and endogenous variables of the VAR are established, and Johansen’s rank test is used to determine the number of cointegrated vectors in the system. The cointegrated VAR structural form is identified and the long-run structural parameters are estimated. Theoretical restrictions such as homogeneity and symmetry are tested and not rejected by the VAR structure. The fully restricted cointegrated VAR model reveals itself a theoretically consistent and statistically robust means to analyse the long-run demand behaviour of UK tourists, and an accurate multi-step forecaster of the destinations’ shares when compared with unrestricted reduced form and first differenced VARs, or even with the structural AIDS model.     

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under No-Commitment to Periodic Auditing and a Non-retrospective Penalty System

This paper generalizes Khalil’s (1997) static model to a multiperiod one. The associated optimal dynamic contracts are derived and analyzed. At every-period’s equilibrium, the principal conducts no sure auditing. While duplication of the Baron-Myerson-type (1982) contract cannot be optimal, duplication of the Khalil-type (1997) contract can be optimal when the cheating penalty is large or discount factors are small. This implies that static contracts with no-commitment to auditing can describe players’ long-run behavior only under specific conditions. Moreover, our separating and pooling equilibria are compared with Baron and Besanko’s (1984a) and Laffont and Tirole’s (1987) equilibria, respectively.     

A note on the recoverability and uniqueness of changing tastes

This paper demonstrates that it will be impossible, by observing an agent's demand behavior, to either refute or confirm the general taste change hypothesis without substantially restricting the class of eligible preferences.     

How an ineffective agent can increase his budget

A principal aware that an agent exerts little effort will nevertheless fund the agent, because the principal values the output the agent produces. The agent in turn decides how hard to work by anticipating how his behavior affects the budget the principal will give him. Under some conditions, the principal gives the agent large budgets anticipating that the agent will not work hard. The corrupt environment aggravates the problem. An agent who can set the budget ameliorates the problem, though incompletely.     

Performance measurement in multi-task agencies

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent’s performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper investigates the improvement of the agent’s performance evaluation by contrasting two alternatives for the principal: (i) to invest in assets which can be utilized to generate additional measures about the agent’s performance; and (ii), to delegate this task to a supervisor. This paper demonstrates that delegation is superior whenever the costless available performance evaluation is sufficiently incongruent.     

Trade liberalization, heterogeneous firms and the soft budget constraint

We analyze the interaction between the soft budget constraint (SBC) and international trade by placing Segal’s (1998) SBC model within Melitz’s (2003) framework of international trade with heterogeneous monopolistically competitive firms. As in Segal’s model, SBC may result in moral hazard. The opening to international trade adds another sort of inefficiency. Some firms that would have become exporters in the absence of SBC choose to apply low effort and not export in order to extract a subsidy from the government. This effect takes place when the trade costs are sufficiently low. Overall, however, trade liberalization reduces inefficiencies generated by SBC. The number of firms subject to moral hazard SBC decreases, aggregate effort level increases and aggregate profits lost due to SBC-induced sub-optimal effort decline as trade costs decrease.