管理者过度自信与企业投资现金敏感度——基于英国上市公司的实证研究

本文以英国上市公司为样本,发现融资约束公司普遍表现出管理者过度自信与投资现金流敏感性之间显著的正相关关系。与此相反,这种积极的关系不能在融资无约束公司中找到。这个结果和预期相一致,即在融资约束公司中过度自信的管理者的投资决策应该比非过度自信的管理者投资决策对现金流更加敏感。因为,现金流的增加能够促使过度自信的管理者加大投资并达到他们想要的水平。     

“One person’s decision” or “collective voting”: Evidence of overconfident investing in Chinese listed companies

This study explores the collective voting of Chinese listed companies by examining whether the overconfidence of the board chairperson could affect the relationship between overconfidence and investment–cash flow sensitivity by the board of directors. On average, the board of directors’ overconfidence leads to increased investment–cash flow sensitivity. However, this influence is driven by state-controlled listed companies only if the chairperson is overconfident. The results suggest that the chairperson’s overconfidence may impact the relationship between the board of directors’ overconfidence and investment–cash flow sensitivity. Furthermore, the investment distortion due to the board’s overconfidence behavior may be alleviated by supervising the chairperson.     

融资约束与公司投资关系研究综述

公司的融资约束和投资-现金流量敏感性之间的关系成为财务管理的焦点问题。本文通过对国内外融资约束与投资关系众多文献的分析,研究了融资约束的影响因素,探讨了不同情况下融资与投资的关系,并分析了现存的投资-现金流敏感性模型的应用现状。最后,对我国进行投资-现金流敏感性问题的研究提出了建议。     

管理者过度自信与权益资本成本——来自我国证券市场的经验证据

以深圳证券市场A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理者过度自信与权益资本成本之间的关系。研究发现,高管层过度自信的心理特征是通过影响企业的投资行为造成过度投资,进而影响到投资与融资现金流之间的敏感性,导致激进融资,使企业权益资本成本增加。     

管理者过度自信的量化指标研究

随着行为财务理论的兴起,过度自信理论倍受人们的关注。而在这一类研究中,实证研究远远滞后于理论研究,其中的主要原因是研究者们难以找到一个可行的方法来度量管理者的过度自信。本文将对我国现有的关于管理者过度自信量化指标的研究做以梳理,并在此基础提出适合中国实际情况的量化指标。     

CEO股票期权激励与并购决策关系研究——代理成本的中介作用和CEO过度自信的调节作用

运用美国上市银行1998—2014年的数据,将股票期权激励、代理成本、CEO过度自信与并购决策纳入统一的框架进行研究,以代理成本为中介变量,CEO过度自信为调节变量,以检验股票期权激励是否会影响并购决策,以及股票期权激励、代理成本、CEO过度自信与并购决策之间的关系。实证结果表明:CEO股票期权激励能够有效刺激其做出并购决策;代理成本对股票期权激励与并购决策的关系存在部分中介效应;CEO过度自信能显著调节股票期权激励与并购决策的关系;CEO过度自信对于股票期权激励与并购决策的关系的调节作用会通过代理成本起作用。     

Overconfidence and Disappointment in Decision‐making under Risk: The Triumph of Hope over Experience

Overconfidence in economic decision‐making is a well‐established phenomenon; however, assessment of its scale and impact are largely absent from the literature. This paper uses Bell's disappointment metric to quantify its impact on individual decision‐makers in a risky investment setting. We are able to quantify the sensitivity of disappointment to overconfidence. We examine disappointment in both deterministic and stochastic models, finding that in the most likely cases, individual investors experience lower disappointment when variance is higher. We are also able to quantify and compare calibration‐based overconfidence and better‐than‐average overconfidence. Contrary to prior research, we find that their magnitudes are the same. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

中国能源投资效率的测度分析

运用双边随机前沿分析方法,构建异质性双边随机模型,从内外部融资、温室气体减排等角度测度和分析中国能源投资效率。结果表明,能源工业内部融资约束和金融机构外部融资支持对能源投资具有正反两个方面的显著影响,两者的综合影响为负,这将导致能源投资往往低于最优水平。山西、陕西等资源型地区的能源投资—现金流敏感性不强,未来应以传统能源建设为主;江苏、浙江等沿海发达地区能源自给率偏低,应重点发展可再生能源。     

An Exploration of Two Competing Perspectives on Informational Contexts in Top Management Strategic Issue Interpretation

Two disparate theoretical views of how informational contexts affect managerial sensemaking and decision making appear in organizational research. An organizational information processing perspective posits that increasing the flow of information within and between organizations will enhance environmental awareness. In contrast, behavioural decision making and social cognition research suggest that information may increase the occurrence or magnitude of overconfidence and illusions of control. These competing predictions were examined by means of an investigation of the relationship between informational contexts and top managers' strategic issue interpretation. Findings indicate that managers whose organizations have environmental information readily available to them perceive higher control over issues than managers in organizations with lower informational availability. Moreover, managers in top management teams with higher information processing capacity seem to perceive higher degrees of control and manageability, and search for less data in issue interpretation, than managers in teams with lower information processing capacity. These results offer some support for the behavioural decision making and social cognition perspective, and question the organizational information processing prediction that organizations engaging in active information processing are more aware of the environment and more likely to assess environmental developments, trends or events in a more vigilant manner.     

Capital expenditure announcements and anti-takeover barriers

In this paper, we compare capital budget announcements by firms with anti-takeover mechanisms in place to announcements by firms without takeover barriers during the period 1980 to 1995. We find that anti-takeover provisions do not affect investors’ average reactions to investment choices. Market responses are heterogeneous; however, and differ according to size, growth opportunity, the availability of free cash flow and exposure to the capital markets. We find evidence consistent with managerial entrenchment when firms are insulated from the threat of takeover and have enough free cash flow to avoid raising external capital. We also find that for small firms, the reaction to capital investment announcements are positively related to free cash flow when managers have high growth opportunities, but negatively related when investment opportunity is small. This result is consistent with Noe (1988), who shows that restricting managers’ investment choices to positive NPV projects is necessary to obtain the pecking order results of Myers and Majluf (1984).     

Overinvestment,inflation uncertainty,and managerial overconfidence: Firm level analysis of Chinese corporations

We study corporate investment by considering both external economic factor and managerial behavior, in particular the dynamic interaction between inflation uncertainty and managerial overconfidence by employing a sample of Chinese companies. The empirical findings demonstrate that lower inflation uncertainty increases over-investment, and managerial overconfidence exacerbates such effect. Further analysis shows that over-investment in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is mainly driven by managerial overconfidence, and the negative association between inflation uncertainty and overinvestment is due to managerial overconfidence. The effect of managerial overconfidence is mute in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). In addition, we find asymmetric impact of inflation uncertainty on corporate over-investment during different economic cycles.     

CEO Overconfidence and Overinvestment Under Product Market Competition

How does product market competition influence whether CEOs with greater or lower levels of overconfidence are hired and whether CEOs overinvest in innovation? In a Cournot model in which firms hire a CEO to take charge of research and development (R&D) investment and production decisions, this paper shows that CEO overconfidence and overinvestment can be explained as an equilibrium outcome. More importantly, the intensity of product market competition and the equilibrium CEO overconfidence level (and R&D investment) exhibit an inverted U‐shaped relationship. As the product market tends toward perfect competition, all firms hire a realistic CEO and do not overinvest. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

投资现金流敏感性研究述评

大量的经验文献支持了流动性假说,认为内部现金流是影响公司投资的一个重要因素。文中基于信息不对称下的融资约束理论与自由现金流的代理成本假说,回顾了关于投资现金流敏感性存在及其根源的国内外相关研究成果,梳理了该领域的研究脉络,并对主要结论进行了总结与评论。对文献研究发现,大多数研究均证实了投资与现金流之间具有较强的敏感性,但挖掘这种敏感性的根源却尚未达成一致的结论。尤其随着股权结构的引入,考虑到管理层内部持股的激励与堑壕效应、股权集中下控股股东的监督与侵占效应,该领域的研究纷繁复杂。但基于股权结构的研究是揭示这种敏感性的根源、探索非效率投资治理机制的有效途径。     

职业经理人引入对公司非效率投资的影响——基于上市家族企业的数据

以沪深两市2010—2015年上市家族企业作为研究对象,实证检验我国上市家族企业引入职业经理人对公司非效率投资的影响,并进一步研究在成长性水平不同的企业中职业经理人引入对企业投资效率影响的差异。实证研究结果表明：非效率投资普遍存在于我国上市家族企业中;上市家族企业引入职业经理人对公司非效率投资具有抑制作用;与低成长性企业相比,高成长性企业引入职业经理人对公司非效率投资的抑制作用较弱,即企业成长性水平的逐步提高会削弱职业经理人引入对企业非效率投资的影响。     

R&D investment and future firm performance: The role of managerial overconfidence and government ownership

We investigate the relationship among managerial overconfidence (MO), government ownership, and research and development (R&D) investment using data from Vietnamese public companies for the period 2007–2016. We also investigate how R&D investment, given MO and government ownership, affect future firm performance. Our results indicate that MO and government ownership are positively related to R&D investment. Conceptually, this study investigates novel factors affecting of R&D investment and their role in improving firm performance. Overall, this study emphasizes the importance of R&D investment in the corporate world, improving firm performance and, ultimately, economic prosperity.     

Financial competence,overconfidence, and trusting investments: Results from an experiment

Financial transactions sometimes occur in an environment where third-party enforcement is lacking. Behavioral explanations typically allude to the social preferences, where an individual’s utility is directly affected by another’s outcome, as the driver of the trusting investments and reciprocal returns. We hypothesize that, in part, these decisions are determined by an individual’s financial literacy and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Experimental evidence is coupled with an innovative financial literacy assessment, which measures general competence, numeracy skills, and overconfidence in one’s knowledge. Results indicate that overconfidence is a significant determinant of behavior. Specifically, overconfident individuals make larger contributions in the investment game. We also document that there is an escalated effect in overconfident individuals who are also exhibit risk loving preferences.     

The effects of corporate antitakeover provisions on long-term investment: empirical evidence

This paper's empirical results indicate that the average effect of antitakeover provisions on subsequent long‒term investment is negative. The interpretation of these results depends on whether one thinks that there was too much, too little, or just the right amount of long‒term investment prior to the antitakeover provision adoption. We use agency theory to devise more refined empirical tests of the effects of antitakeover provision adoption by managers in firms with different incentive and monitoring structures. Governance variables (e.g. percentage of outsiders on corporate boards, and separate CEO/chairperson positions) have an insignificant impact on subsequent long‒term investment behavior. However, consistent with agency theory predictions, managers in firms with better economic incentives (higher insider ownership) tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less incentive alignment. Furthermore, managers in firms with greater external monitoring (due to higher institutional ownership) also tend to cut subsequent long‒term investment less than managers in firms with less external monitoring. Thus, the decrease in subsequent long‒term investment is significantly less for firms where the managers have greater incentives to act in shareholders' interests. Finally, there are interesting effects of the control variables. First, high book equity/market equity firms cut total long‒term investment more. Second, firms that were takeover targets or rumored to be takeover targets cut long‒term investment more. These results suggest that inefficient firms cut long‒term investment more when an antitakeover provision is adopted. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

现金持有与研发投入的相关性研究——基于我国A股上市公司数据

采用2007—2013年沪深两市A股上市公司作为样本,对现金持有与研发投入的关系进行分析,结果显示:研发投入越多的企业的现金持有水平越高;期初现金持有越多的企业研发投入越多,研发-现金敏感性越显著,而且随着现金持有量的增加该敏感性会逐渐下降;相比于成熟期公司,成长期公司现金持有与研发投入之间的正相关性更强,而且成长期公司的研发-现金敏感性不会随着现金持有水平的增加而下降。     

管理者过度自信对企业跨行业并购的影响

管理者作为企业的最高决策层,是制定企业发展战略、实施投融资决策、进行企业日常经营活动以及执行企业日常经营管理的主体,其在决策过程中的过度自信心理对企业的发展至关重要。而跨行业并购交易作为公司市值管理的重要手段之一,研究管理者的过度自信与企业跨行业并购对公司价值最大化的影响十分重要。     

投资效率、企业产权与高管变更——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

从投资效率和企业产权的角度考察了高管变更的影响问题及相应的经济后果。研究结果表明,总体来说,高管因为投资效率低下而被更换的证据较微弱;高管被更换后,投资效率并没有得到明显的改善。区分企业产权后,我们发现,相对于国有公司来说,民营公司的"高管变更-投资效率"敏感性更大,但高管变更之后投资效率并没有得到显著改善;然而,相对于地方政府控制的国有公司来说,中央政府控制的国有公司在高管变更之后投资效率得到了显著改善。