Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach

This paper examines the potential for contagion within the Czech banking system via the channel of interbank exposures of domestic banks, enriched by a liquidity channel and an asset price channel, over the period March 2007 to June 2012. A computational model is used to assess the resilience of the Czech banking system to interbank contagion, taking into account the size and structure of interbank exposures as well as balance sheet and regulatory characteristics of individual banks in the network. The simulation results suggest that the potential for contagion due to credit losses on interbank exposures was rather limited. Even after the introduction of a liquidity condition into the simulations, the average contagion was below 3.8% of the remaining banking sector assets, with the exception of the period from December 2007 to September 2008. Activation of the asset price channel further increases the losses due to interbank contagion, showing that the liquidity of government bonds would be essential for the stability of Czech banks in stress situations. Finally, the simulation results for both idiosyncratic and multiple bank failure shocks suggest that the potential for contagion in the Czech banking system has decreased since the onset of the global financial crisis.     

流动性对中国商业银行业绩影响的实证研究

金融危机反映了银行在面对资金压力时持有的流动性资产不足,同时也凸显了银行流动性监管的重要性。为了建立既能够确保金融体系稳定,又能够兼顾银行盈利能力最大化目标的监管标准,有必要对银行流动性资产对业绩的影响进行实证研究,本文利用2003～2010年中国14家上市商业银行数据,检验了流动性资产对于银行业绩的影响,研究发现流动性资产和银行业绩之间存在非线性关系,而且四大国有商业银行和十家股份制商业银行流动性管理行为存在显著差异。     

The granularity of the Brazilian banking market

Bank size distributions concentrate in a few large banks – the big “grains.” This fact means idiosyncratic shocks at the bank level do not cancel out, thus affecting the business cycle. Here, we present evidence of granularity in the banking market using Brazilian data. We examine the explanatory power of the granular banking residual of the five largest banks on quarterly GDP changes from 2010 to 2019. We conservatively find that shocks to revenues of these top five banks explain nearly one-fifth of GDP fluctuations.     

Liquidity indicators,early warning signals in banks,and financial crises

This research compares the performance of three liquidity indicators, namely liquidity ratio (LiqR), liquidity creation (LiqC) and net stable funding difference (NSFD), for sending early warning signals for distressed banks. Recent evidence has shown that LiqR appears incapable of measuring the liquidity condition of banks. However, LiqC and NSFD have not yet been fully examined. Thus, which indicator is more useful in an early warning model becomes an interesting issue. We classify distressed banks as banks that have experienced a bank run, bailout, or failure. Sample data are collected from the United States and the European Union from before and after the financial crisis. We then estimate model predictive value using the sample before the crisis to predict liquidity shortages. Evidence shows that the academic (LiqC) and officially recommended indicators (NSFD) outperform LiqR as early warning signals. Furthermore, LiqC performs best when banks actively engage in income diversification but not fund diversification. Therefore, a well income-diversified bank with high LiqC tends to have high distress probability in the next period.     

Does CEO gender matter for bank risk?

This paper addresses the relation between CEO gender and bank risk. We exploit a unique dataset of 365 Polish cooperative banks, 42% of which are run by female CEOs. We find that banks headed by female CEOs are less risky: they report higher capital adequacy and equity to assets ratios. Credit risk in female-led banks is not different from male-led banks, and therefore higher capital adequacy does not stem from lower asset quality and is likely to be linked to higher risk aversion of female CEOs. Our evidence supports the view that women are more risk averse bank CEOs than men. Our findings suggest that gender quotas in bank boards can contribute to reduce risk-taking behavior.     

Bank fee-based shocks and the U.S. business cycle

Efficient liquidity matching requires from banks to track external shocks (e.g., GDP growth shocks, stock market shocks and monetary policy shocks) in order to optimally allocate their assets between loans and other business lines. Profit maximizing banks have to rebalance their product-mix to take advantage of these changes. However, even though banking is cyclical, and contemporaneously reacts to shocks outside the banking sphere, there may also be some feedback effects at play, whereby bank changes, in turn, could affect economic and financial conditions. Generalizing the results of Marcucci and Quagliariello (2006, 2009), who indeed find an asymmetric impact of credit shocks on economic and financial time series in recession, we use a similar VAR framework to show that an even stronger feedback effect is prevalent for fee-based shocks. If the feedback effects of credit and fee-based shocks might have been both at play before the subprime crisis, the feedback effect of credit shocks seems to have faded away during the subprime crisis, whereas the feedback effect stemming from fee-based shocks has gained further strength.     

Systemic risk governance in a dynamical model of a banking system with stochastic assets and liabilities

We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in an assets–liabilities dynamical model of a banking system. In the model considered, each bank is represented by its assets and liabilities. The net worth of a bank is the difference between its assets and liabilities and bank is solvent when its net worth is greater than or equal to zero; otherwise, the bank has failed. The banking system dynamics is defined by an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose independent variable is time and whose dependent variables are the assets and liabilities of the banks. The banking system model presented generalizes those discussed in Fouque and Sun (in: Fouque, Langsam (eds) Handbook of systemic risk, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 444–452, 2013) and Fatone and Mariani (J Glob Optim 75(3):851–883, 2019) and describes a homogeneous population of banks. The main features of the model are a cooperation mechanism among banks and the possibility of the (direct) intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics. By “systemic risk” or “systemic event” in a bounded time interval, we mean that in that time interval at least a given fraction of banks have failed. The probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated via statistical simulation. Systemic risk governance aims to maintain the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval between two given thresholds. The monetary authority is responsible for systemic risk governance. The governance consists in the choice of assets and liabilities of a kind of “ideal bank” as functions of time and in the choice of the rules for the cooperation mechanism among banks. These rules are obtained by solving an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of the banking system model. Governance induces banks in the system to behave like the “ideal bank”. Shocks acting on the banks’ assets or liabilities are simulated. Numerical examples of systemic risk governance in the presence and absence of shocks acting on the banking system are studied.

     

Liquidity creation and bank profitability

This paper examines the effect of liquidity creation on bank profitability. Using a panel of US banks, we find that liquidity creation is associated with higher profitability. This result holds during normal times and the financial crisis, and for banks of different sizes. When we decompose liquidity creation into its individual components, we find that liability-side and off-balance sheet liquidity creation are positively related to profitability, while asset-side liquidity creation is negatively related to profitability.     

Risk contagion in the banking network: New evidence from China

Based on data from 111 Chinese banks over the 2013–2016 period, this paper estimates the interbank bilateral lending matrix using the maximum entropy method. The estimated matrix is used to simulate the effects of credit and liquidity shocks on China’s banking network. Simulation results show that, under the extreme pressure scenario, the contagion arising from a liquidity shock is significantly stronger than the effect of a credit shock, indicating the importance of liquidity in the banking system. The contagion effect arising from a credit shock does not vary much over the sample period. However, the contagion effect arising from a liquidity shock decreases significantly, which could be attributed to contraction in interbank business due to stricter interbank business supervision. The simulation results also identify the most important and most vulnerable nodes of the banking system. An increase in the level of capital level can enhance the ability of banks to withstand credit and liquidity shocks. Our analysis also suggests that risk contagion faced by China’s banks varies across banking network structures.     

How important can bank lending shocks be for economic fluctuations?

We analyze the quantitative importance of bank lending shocks on real activity fluctuations in Norway and the UK, using structural VARs estimated on quarterly data from 1988 to 2010. We find that an adverse bank lending shock causes output to contract, and that such shocks can account for a substantial share of output volatility. This suggests that financial intermediation is an important source of shocks. The empirical analysis comprises the Norwegian banking crisis (1988–1992) and the recent period of banking failures in the UK. However, the results are also non-trivial when omitting periods of systemic banking distress from the sample.     

BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS AND THE BASEL ACCORDS: A SYNTHESIS

Abstract.  In order to survey the mechanisms through which the introduction of Basel II bank capital requirements is likely to accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, this paper brings together the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propagation of exogenous shocks and the literature on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the Basel Accords. We conclude that the theoretical models that revisit the bank capital channel under the new accord generally support the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis and that the magnitude of the procyclical effects essentially depends on (i) the composition of banks' asset portfolios, (ii) the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements, (iii) the nature of the rating system used by banks, (iv) the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time, (v) the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions, (vi) the improvements in credit risk management and (vii) the supervisor and market intervention under Basel II. The recent events and instability in financial markets all over the world have led the procyclicality issue to enter the agendas of several political international  fora  and some measures to mitigate procyclicality are being put forward. The bank capital channel literature should now play an important role in evaluating their effectiveness.     

Federal Home Loan Bank advances and bank risk

The Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) has evolved into a major source of liquidity for the banking system with the demonstrated ability to borrow over a trillion dollars in world financial markets based on an implied U. S. Treasury guarantee. The FHLB loans the borrowed funds to commercial banks at reduced rates that are not adjusted for the risk of an individual bank. Moral hazard could cause member banks using FHLB loans to increase financial leverage and exposure to high risk assets. Conversely, the FHLB offers banks additional liquidity and specialized debt instruments that help them manage interest rate risk. We use dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimation to test the relation between FHLB advances and bank risk. We find that if banks have relatively normal default probabilities, advances are not associated with increased bank risk but, instead, advances are related to decreased interest rate risk. However, when bank default probabilities are high, our evidence suggests advances and higher bank risk are related.     

Bank ownership and cost efficiency: New empirical evidence from Russia

This paper investigates the cost efficiency of Russian banks with regard to their heterogeneity in terms of ownership form, capitalization and asset structure. Using bank-level quarterly data over the period 2005–2013, we perform stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and compute cost efficiency scores at the bank and bank group levels. We deduct from gross costs the negative revaluations of foreign currency items generated by official exchange rate dynamics rather than by managerial decisions. The results indicate that the core state banks, as distinct from other state-controlled banks, were nearly as efficient as private domestic banks during and after the crisis of 2008–2009. Foreign banks appear to be the least efficient market participants in terms of costs, which might reflect their lower (and decreasing over time) penetration of the Russian banking system. We further document that the group ranking by cost efficiency is not permanent over time and depends on the observed differences in bank capitalization and asset structure. We find that foreign banks gain cost efficiency when they lend more to the economy. Core state banks, conversely, lead in terms of cost efficiency when they lend less to the economy, which can result from political interference in their lending decisions in favor of unprofitable projects Private domestic banks that maintain a lower capitalization significantly outperform foreign banks and do not differ from the core state banks in this respect.     

Indirect Convertibility,Equity‐Based Banking and Financial Stability

Banking reform proposals put forward in the wake of the recent financial crisis maintain that equity‐based banking would be stable and would prevent bank runs. This article argues that complementing this form of banking with an indirect convertibility monetary standard and thereby dispensing with base money would enhance financial stability further. Banks would not hold a distinctive asset (base money) that would be called upon by customers at short notice, thereby removing the possibility of bank runs. No discrepancy in value between the two sides of a bank's balance sheet would arise as its assets (securitised loans) would be marked to market. Unlike other recent contributions, the intermediation model outlined here is not ‘limited purpose’ in nature as banks would not be restricted in the form of lending activity they can pursue. Common sources of banking and financial instability – liquidity risk, solvency risk, moral hazard – would be absent.     

What makes Islamic banks different? A multivariate approach

Using data from 8615 banks (including 123 Islamic banks) in 124 developed and developing countries for the period between 2006 and 2012, we examine the financial characteristics that distinguish between conventional and Islamic banks. As banks’ financial characteristics are multi-faceted concepts, our indicators are constructed using principal component analysis. We find that Islamic banks are more capitalized, more liquid and more profitable, but have more volatile earnings compared to US and European banks. However, similarities in terms of liquidity and earnings volatility are more noticeable when the sample is limited to banks operating in countries where both systems coexist. Finally, we find that higher capital makes the returns of Islamic banks more volatile, while higher liquidity decreases the profitability of conventional banks.     

Impact of Basel III liquidity regulations on U.S. Bank performance in different conditional profitability spectrums

We study the impact of the Basel III liquidity constraints, represented by the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), on bank profitability, by employing the simultaneous quantile regression framework with time fixed effects. We find a positive and significant relationship between the LCR and profitability and the NSFR and profitability over most quantiles. However, the small magnitudes of the coefficients on LCR and NSFR across all quantiles of profitability suggest that LCR and NSFR have a minor quantitative impact on bank profitability. We then test and find that the Basel III liquidity constraints have a significantly different impact on banks with very low profits compared to banks who enjoy high profitability, emphasizing the need to use a quantile approach. We plot the coefficients to illustrate the impact of liquidity constraints across different conditional profitability spectrums. Lastly, we find that small banks are more vulnerable to short term liquidity risks (LCR) and big banks are more susceptible to medium to long term liquidity risks (NSFR). This suggests that considerations should be given to tailoring liquidity regulations based on the bank size and the relative bank profitability. The quantitatively small impact of the constraints suggest that Basel III has successfully set liquidity requirements to minimize the impact on bank profitability and the likelihood of an industry-wide liquidity crisis.     

Efficiency,growth and market power in the banking industry: New approach to efficient structure hypothesis

We extend the work of Homma, Tsutsui, and Uchida (2014) to provide empirical evidence on nexus of relationships in efficient structure (ES) hypothesis. In this framework, we test causality from cost efficiency to bank growth and then from bank growth to market concentration. We apply this approach to banking industry in Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) over the period of 1999–2014. The efficiency scores have been estimated by employing Slack Based Measurements Data Envelopment Analysis (SMB DEA). We apply Two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and Panel Vector Auto Regression (PVAR) to account for endogeneity in estimation models. The results show that cost efficiency enables the banks to grow and obtain higher market share. The resultant growth then leads to higher market concentration/bank market power. There is also some evidence to support for quiet life (QL) hypothesis. Therefore, both ES and QL hypotheses may coexist in ASEAN banking industry.     

Does the bank risk concentration freeze the interbank system?

Probably, one test of the stability of the banking system is to evaluate how risky assets are distributed across banks’ portfolios and the implications for the contagion via interbank relations. This paper explores theoretically a bank sector with risks concentration and the functioning of interbank markets. It employs a simple model where banks are exposed to both credit and liquidity risk that suddenly correlate over the business cycle. We show that risk concentration makes interbank market breakdowns more likely and welfare monotonically decreases in risk concentration.     

Does bond market development enhance the banking sector’s efficiency in resource allocation? Industry-level evidence from Korea

Korea’s financial system used to be bank-based, with banks playing the leading role in financing corporations. As highlighted by Park et al. (2019), however, bond markets have developed rapidly in Korea and other Asian countries. The corporate bond market competes with banks as a source of finance for large borrowers. As such, bond markets may affect banking sector operation, a process known as disintermediation. In this paper, we examine whether bond market development improves the efficiency of resource allocation in Korean bank lending. We propose two channels through which bond market development affects the efficiency of bank lending. Since the two channels have opposing effects on the efficiency of banking, the issue must be settled by empirical analysis. We find that bank loans are much less efficient than bond financing in allocating resources across industries. Furthermore, banks are particularly inefficient in resource allocation in industries that rely more on bond financing. This suggests that competition from bond financing does not improve allocative efficiency of bank loans.     

Factors influencing bank risk in Europe: Evidence from the financial crisis

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone banking system. Our results indicate that capitalization, profitability, efficiency and liquidity are inversely and significantly related to bank risk. However, the recourse to wholesale funding by banks seems to increase their risk. We also find that less-concentrated markets, lower interest rates, higher inflation rates and a context of economic crisis (with a falling GDP) increase bank risk.