Central Bank independence: Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise

The independent nature of the Central Bank is often associated with achieving low and stable inflation. Further to that the merits of independence are stretched to achieving low(er) output variability when compared to a government run monetary policy. In this paper we use the Alesina (1989) and Alesina and Gatti (1995) model to examine how often an Independent Central Bank can achieve an improvement on both counts. To do that we run numerical simulations where we change the ex ante probability of elections (and hence the degree of electoral uncertainty) with a view to determining how the private sector’s perceptions affect the level of output variability. Our conclusions agree with the Alesina and Gatti assertion that there will exist occasions when all political parties will be better off by consenting to the running of monetary policy by an independent institution but more often than not this comes at some cost to output. On theoretical grounds therefore, the trade-off between inflation and output variability (à la Rogoff) is still a valid one.     

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES FOR MODEL ROBUSTNESS

Using a New Keynesian model subject to misspecifications, we examine the accountability issue in a framework of delegation where government and private agents are uncertain about the central bank's preference for model robustness. We show that, in the benchmark case of full transparency, the optimal inflation targeting weight (or penalty) is decreasing with the preference for robustness. Departing from the benchmark equilibrium, the central bank has then incentive to be less transparent in order to reduce the optimal inflation targeting weight and thus to become more independent vis‐à‐vis the government. We also find that greater opacity will increase the sensibility of inflation and model misspecification to the inflation shock but will decrease that of output‐gap. Since macroeconomic volatility could be increased or decreased under more opacity, there could exist in some cases a trade‐off between the level and the variability of inflation (and output gap). Persistent inflation shocks could be associated with a higher inflation targeting weight as well as a higher sensibility of inflation and output gap to the inflation shock but a lower sensibility of model misspecification.     

Stabilisation, Policy Targets and Unemployment in Imperfectly Competitive Economies

This paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the Central Bank. In a model where the Central Bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy, we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output, money or nominal GDP. The intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target; we show that this leads to a lower mark-up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment.     

International spillovers of ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: the effect on Central Europe

We examine how unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) influences macroeconomic stability in three Central European economies. We estimate various panel vector autoregressions (PVARs) using monthly data from 2008 to 2014. Using the shadow policy rate and central bank assets as measures of unconventional policies, we find that output growth and inflation in Central Europe temporarily increase following an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock by the ECB. Using both impulse responses and variance decompositions, we find that the effect of unconventional policies on output growth is much stronger than the effect on inflation.     

Is There a Trade‐Off Between Inflation Variability and Output‐Gap Variability in the EMU Countries?

This paper examines the performance of monetary policy in eleven EMU countries for the whole period of the EMS. This is based on the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. To this end, we examine whether the introduction of an implicit inflation targeting by the EMU member countries after the Maastricht Treaty, changed the trade‐off between inflation variability and output‐gap variability. We employ a stochastic volatility model for two sub‐periods of the EMS (i.e. before and after the Maastricht Treaty). We find that the trade‐off varies amongst EMU countries. The implication of these findings is that there are asymmetries in the euro area, due to different economic structures among the member countries of the EMU.     

ROBUST MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY ABOUT CENTRAL BANK PREFERENCES

In this paper, we study the impact of central bank opacity on macroeconomic performances in a new Keynesian framework with model uncertainty using robust control techniques. We identify a new source of central bank opacity, which refers to the lack of information about the central bank's preference for robustness in the sense of Hansen and Sargent . We find closed‐form solutions for the robust control problem, analysing the impact of the lack of transparency about the central bank's preferences for robustness. We show that an increased transparency about the central bank's preference for robustness makes monetary policy respond less aggressively to cost‐push shocks, thus reducing the inflation and output gap variability. As a consequence, inflation and output gap are less volatile than under central bank opacity about its preference for robustness.     

Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB Words

This paper evaluates the predictive power of different information sets for the European Central Bank (ECB) interest-rate-setting behaviour. We employ an ordered probit model, i.e. a limited dependent variable framework, to take into account the discreteness displayed by policy rate changes. The results show that the forecasting ability of standard Taylor-type variables, such as inflation and output gap, is fairly low both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is comparable to the performance of the random walk model. Instead by using broader information sets that include measures of core inflation, exchange rates, monetary aggregates and financial conditions, the accuracy of the forecasts about ECB future actions substantially improves. Moreover, ECB rhetoric considerably contributes to a better understanding of its policy reaction function. Finally, we find that that the ECB has been fairly successful in educating the public to anticipate the overall future direction of its monetary policy, but has been less successful in signalling the exact timing of rate changes.     

Robust central banking under wage bargaining: Is monetary policy transparency beneficial?

We study the role of transparency in an environment of robust monetary policy under wage bargaining. The standard view from the game-theoretical literature is that, with unionised labour markets, monetary policy transparency is unambiguously “bad” (it induces increases in wage and price inflation, unemployment and may lead to higher inflation uncertainty). The empirical literature is instead ambiguous about the macroeconomic effects of transparency. By recasting the earlier theory into a robust monetary policy environment, and focusing transparency on the uncertainty about the preference for price stability, we show that the macroeconomic effects of transparency are more favourable than normally found. The impact on nominal wages, inflation and real variables (real wages and unemployment) is not parameter-free but depends on the public's informedness about this coefficient. The impact on real variables is found to disappear in case unions do not internalise the effect of wage decisions on the economy (i.e. in the case of atomistic unions). Finally, we find that the effect of transparency on inflation uncertainty is more complex than in the standard approach. We show that transparency may have the beneficial effect of reducing inflation variability not only when monetary uncertainty is low (as previously reported), but also when monetary uncertainty exceeds an upper threshold.     

The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts*

Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central‐bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency.     

Optimal Degrees of Transparency in Monetary Policymaking

According to most academics and policymakers, transparency in monetary policymaking is desirable. I examine this proposition in a small theoretical model emphasizing forward–looking private sector behavior. Transparency makes it easier for price setters to infer the central bank's future policy intentions, thereby making current inflation more responsive to policy actions. This induces the central bank to pay more attention to inflation rather than output gap stabilization. Then, transparency may be disadvantageous. It may actually be a policy–distorting straitjacket if the central bank enjoys low–inflation credibility, and there is need for active monetary stabilization policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; F 58     

The Limits of Transparency

This paper probes the limits of transparency in monetary policymaking along two dimensions: feasibility and desirability. It argues that, due to limited knowledge about the economy, even central banks (CBs) that are considered champions of openness are not very clear about their measurement of the output gap and about their beliefs regarding the effect of policy on inflationary expectations. Consequently, feasibility constraints on transparency are more serious than stylized models of the transmission mechanism would imply. In addition, no CB has made clear statements about its objective function, including in particular the relative weight on output versus inflation stabilization, the policy discount factor and the shape of losses from the inflation and the output gaps over the possible ranges of realizations of those variables.
The paper also argues that there is a trade-off between full transparency and full utilization of information in setting policy and that excessive transparency may facilitate the exertion of political pressures on the CB.
The last section of the paper abstracts from feasibility constraints and discusses the desirable levels of openness in various areas of the policymaking process. It is argued that the strongest case against immediate transparency arises when the CB has private information about problems within segments of the financial system. Premature release of information may, in such a case, destroy efficient risk-sharing arrangements and long-term investments by triggering a run on the financial system. This is illustrated within the context of the classic Diamond–Dybvig model of bank runs. The paper also probes the desirable levels of transparency in other areas of the policymaking process like the bank's objective function, the bank's output target, forecasts of economic shocks, disagreements within the CB board and the publication of CB interest-rate forecasts.     

A First Assessment of Some Measures of Core Inflation for the Euro Area

Abstract. Core inflation plays an important role in the deliberations of monetary policy-makers. In this paper we evaluate a number of measures of core inflation constructed using euro-area data. In addition to the traditional exclusion-type core measures, we examine two newer ones, documenting their properties and evaluating their performance in terms of their ability to track underlying or trend inflation in real time. We focus on core measures derived from the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) as the European Central Bank has chosen to define its mandate for price stability in terms of this index, and because this is the only index of consumer prices that is compiled in a comparable manner across all members of the European Union. We document significant excess kurtosis in the cross-section distribution of price changes in the euro area, and show that several categories of prices are more volatile than those typically excluded from traditional measures of core inflation. Contrary to what one might expect, traditional measures of core inflation are not significantly less volatile than headline measures. We document the superior performance of alternative measures of core inflation in tracking trend inflation on average, but show that none of the various measures of core gave significant advance warning of the pickup in trend inflation at the beginning of 1999.     

STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF CENTRAL BANK TRANSPARENCY

Using a New Keynesian framework, this paper shows that, under optimal discretion and optimal pre‐commitment in a timeless perspective, imperfect transparency about the relative weight assigned by the central bank to output‐gap stabilization generally reduces the average reaction of inflation to inflation shocks and the volatility of inflation, but increases those of the output gap in static and dynamic terms, and more so when inflation shocks are highly persistent. When inflation shocks are moderately persistent, opacity could improve social welfare if the weight assigned to output‐gap stabilization is low and this is more likely under pre‐commitment than under discretion.     

Inflation Targeting: What Can the ECB Learn From the Recent Experience of the Bank of England?

Establishment of the European Central Bank presents a rare opportunity to define the operations of a central bank without a prior track record. This paper asks what might be learnt from the recent experience of inflation targeting at the Bank of England before the ECB specifies an, as yet undefined, operational target. We consider whether there should be single or multiple targets and which inflation measure should be used, if at all. If inflation is targeted then a forecast of its value becomes the intermediate variable. This raises an issue of transparency and the compensating supply of information necessary to fill the gap, but too much 'openness' can also be problematic. The ECB must be accountable and the contracting approach may be useful although being seen to 'say' and 'do' the same thing is ultimately most important.     

公众预期、需求冲击与通货膨胀——兼论通胀持久性的地区差异

本文基于具有微观基础的混合式新凯恩斯菲利普斯曲线模型,利用1985-2009年的省际面板数据,分析了预期因素、需求冲击及产出缺口与通货膨胀之间的动态过程及其地区差异。研究发现：总体上,无论是适应性预期还是理性预期对当期通货膨胀都有较强的推动作用;作为需求冲击的居民消费支出、固定资本形成以及产出缺口对通货膨胀都具有正向拉动作用。从通货膨胀持久性的地区差异上看,西部地区的通胀持续性最长,中部最短。     

Inflation before and after central bank independence: The case of Colombia

In this paper we model the Colombian inflation rate in terms of excess demand effects from asset, goods and factor markets. In contrast to previous results for a group of industrial economies, we find that domestic factors are a far more powerful influence on inflation than are external factors. The paper pays particular attention to the potential effects of the Constitutional Reform of 1991, which created a Central Bank independent from other parts of government. We find that the creation of an independent Central Bank did change some of the parameters of the model, as the disequilibria in goods and monetary markets were found to have a smaller effect on inflation after Central Bank independence was granted.     

Inflation,real economic growth and unemployment expectations: an empirical analysis based on the ECB survey of professional forecasters

Expectations are at the centre of modern macroeconomic theory and policymakers. In this article, we examine the predictive ability and the consistency properties of macroeconomic expectations using data of the European Central Bank (ECB) Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). In particular, we provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for three key macroeconomic variables: the inflation rate, the growth rate of real gross domestic product and the unemployment rate.     

Optimal monetary policy and the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets

This study investigates the role of hybrid inflation-price-level targets as a solution to the well-known stabilization bias problem that arises under discretionary policies. The analysis shows that social welfare will be improved by employing a weighted average of inflation and price level as one of the central bank's target variables in addition to the output gap growth target. The reason is that imposing the optimal hybrid target will reduce inflation variability in a highly efficient way. In particular, the optimal hybrid regime outperforms other previously suggested regimes when the degree of inflation persistence is moderate.     

Forecasting inflation with an uncertain output gap

The output gap is a crucial concept in the monetary policy framework, indicating demand pressure that generates inflation. However, its definition and estimation raise a number of theoretical and empirical questions. This paper evaluates a series of univariate and multivariate methods for extracting the output gap in Norway, and compares their value added in predicting inflation. We find that models including the output gap have better predictive power than models based on alternative indicators, and they forecast significantly better than simple benchmark models. Furthermore multivariate measures of the output gap perform better than the univariate gaps. Comments from two anonymous referees, Q. Farooq Akram, Tommy Sveen, Ken West, Fredrik Wulfsberg and seminar participants in Norges Bank are gratefully acknowledged. All mistakes remain our own. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Norges Bank.