Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Dynamic Free Trade Networks: Some Numerical Results

To help predict whether the proliferation of free trade agreements (FTAs) continues until global free trade is effectively attained, this paper investigates dynamic paths of FTAs, generated by numerical simulations of a model of an FTA network formation game with many countries. The characteristics of the final FTA network naturally depend on how the proposer of an FTA is chosen in each period. The paper finds that if the country that has the largest incentive to form an FTA is chosen as a proposer in each period, the network evolution always leads to a unique final FTA network, which may or may not be the complete network of FTAs. FTA networks often evolve to a partition of the world into a small number of groups of asymmetric size owing to the negative network externality caused by preference erosion.     

Trade, Multinational Sales, and FDI in a Three-factor Model

The overwhelming importance of multinational activities as well as the coexistence of exporters and multinationals within the developed countries demand for theoretical models which provide a convincing explanation of simultaneous two‐way trade and horizontal multinational activities. We present a model with three factors of production to disentangle the two‐fold role of headquarters for their affiliates into a know‐how (headquarters services) and a capital‐serving part (FDI). We simulate the model to derive predictions about the impact of trade costs, plant set‐up costs, fixed multinational network costs, relative country size and factor endowments on exports, multinational sales and FDI. The effects are not uniform for multinational sales and FDI. Whereas exports and affiliate sales increase with the similarity in country size, FDI is more likely to increase monotonously with the sending country's size.     

Bilateral versus Multilateral Free Trade Agreements: A Welfare Analysis

Why is a proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between certain types of countries observed instead of progress in attaining global free trade through a multilateral FTA? This paper answers this question by exploring the enforceability of different types of FTAs through comparing minimum discount factors that are necessary to sustain them in an infinitely repeated game framework. The authors search for the globally welfare maximizing trade agreements that are sustainable under different conditions. The results depict that transportation costs, differences in country sizes and comparative advantages are all obstacles for having a multilateral FTA. Accordingly, international development policies conducted for the removal of such obstacles should be the main goal toward achieving a multilateral FTA, which is shown to be the first‐best solution to the maximization problem of global welfare.     

Barriers to Global Free Trade through Bilateral Agreements

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a dynamic noncooperative bargaining game with a random proposer. We show that global free trade (a grand coalition) does not necessarily occur unless transfer payments among countries are allowed. When transfer payments are possible, bilateral FTAs always achieve global free trade, but the ex‐ante and ex‐post inequalities of social welfare among countries are larger than those when all countries are independent because of the strategic bargaining behavior.     

Neoclassical Growth, Manufacturing Agglomeration, and Terms of Trade

This study reverses the prediction of geography and growth models that trade integration may cause income divergence. Moreover, a new dynamic welfare gain of trade openness is identified. These results are obtained from embedding a new economic geography model into a neoclassical growth model. Starting from symmetric countries, a country that accumulates more capital than the other increases its home market size, improves its terms of trade, and lowers its relative consumption price index, because trade costs drive a wedge in between relative producer and consumption price indices. Both effects in turn tend to increase its marginal revenue product of capital relative to the other country (divergence forces), while factor substitution diminishes its marginal revenue product of capital (convergence force). Reducing trade costs decreases the wedge and weakens the divergence forces, while the convergence force is unaffected. Hence, divergence is more likely with higher rather than lower trade costs.     

Free Trade Agreements and the Prospects for Regional Integration in East Asia

Trade policy in East Asia has switched from non-discriminatory unilateral liberalization, reinforced by General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) commitments, to discriminatory free trade agreements (FTA). The paper surveys the FTA activity of the major regional players: China, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and South Korea. It concludes that emerging FTAs are weak and partial. A hub-and-spoke pattern of dirty FTAs will not drive regional economic integration or further integration with the global economy. Rather, it could be a force of regional economic disintegration – especially if the multilateral trading system weakens further. At the same time, FTA activity is distracting attention from the WTO, and, more fundamentally, from unilateral liberalization and domestic structural reforms. Hence, East Asian trade policies need to be rebalanced, with better-quality FTAs and more focus on the WTO. However, more important than the WTO and FTAs is a fresh spurt of unilateral liberalization and structural reform outside trade negotiations.     

Do Preferential Rules of Origin Reverse Trade Creation and Trade Diversion?

Restrictive preferential rules of origin (PROOs) moderate the ‘trade diversion and trade creation’ effects of free trade agreements (FTAs). Moderation effects occur because restrictive PROOs reverse the increase in the relative price of non-member country goods initially caused by FTAs. Such a reversal arises because high compliance costs associated with restrictive PROOs lead to a lower utilization of tariff preferences by member countries. With a lower utilization, the increase in the relative price of non-members country goods would be smaller than it could have been with a full utilization. Thus, restrictive PROOs will lead to less than full trade diversion from non-members to member countries, and less than complete trade creation to member countries. This paper infers the effect of restrictive PROOs on intra-regional trade from the estimated parameters of the revenue function, on the presumption that trade diversion refers to a decrease in the elasticity of substitution between import sources, and that trade creation refers to a difference between the change in import price elasticity and the trade diversion effect. Empirical results support the conjecture that restrictive PROOs move in the opposite direction of FTAs partly undoing the trade diversion and trade creation effects of FTAs.     

Dynamic formation of preferential trade agreements: The role of flexibility

In practice, free trade agreements (FTAs) vastly outnumber customs unions (CUs). Nevertheless, the literature traditionally views CUs as optimal for members because CU members coordinate external tariffs. I show that a dynamic FTA flexibility benefit can help explain the prevalence of FTAs: individual FTA members have the flexibility to form their own future FTAs whereas CU members must jointly engage in future CU formation. I show how the relative prevalence of FTAs versus CUs depends on the structure of market size asymmetry across countries and use these predictions to shed some light on FTA versus CU formation in Europe and South America.     

Sectoral FTA gains,conflicts, and the role of interindustry factor mobility: Evidence from Korea's free trade agreement

Free trade agreements (FTAs) can ignite domestic conflicts between export- and import-competing industries over trade gains. However, if the factors of production, such as capital and labour, move freely across industries, the returns to factor owners will quickly converge. Then, sectoral conflicts over FTAs will be less likely to arise. We analyse the case of South Korea's FTAs to measure (a) sectoral FTA gains and (b) interindustry factor mobility and to examine (c) the role of interindustry factor mobility in mitigating sectoral conflicts over trade policies. South Korea is an ideal case study due to the low barriers to domestic geographic mobility and high trade dependence. Based on data on its trade with 252 countries and factor returns between 2002 and 2017, we find that export industries did not gain much from the FTAs, while the import-competing agricultural sector was the winner. Sectoral conflicts greatly decreased over 2008–2010. Interindustry capital mobility plays a significant role in weakening the sectoral conflicts, while the impact of interindustry labour mobility is limited.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Trade policy and productivity

Previous studies on the determinants of productivity emphasized the role of trade and institutions but omitted trade policy due to endogeneity concerns. This paper considers the role of one important element of trade policy: free trade agreements (FTAs). Based on recent work on the determinants of FTAs, we suggest an instrument which is based on the propensity to enter an FTA due to (exogenous) geographical characteristics. We find that differences in institutional quality and trade, due to variations in geography and trade policy, have a sizeable effect on productivity and can explain the huge variation in per capita income across countries.     

Parallel Trade and its Ambiguous Effects on Global Welfare

The regulation of parallel trade is a fiercely debated issue in the global trading system. This paper investigates the welfare effects of parallel trade freedom for different levels of trade costs and market size. It is found that parallel trade freedom has a positive effect on global welfare if countries are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of market size and trade costs are sufficiently low. Contrary to intuition, this result even holds in a situation where parallel trade freedom implies the closure of the smaller market. If, however, countries are virtually homogenous in terms of market size, parallel trade freedom may be detrimental to global welfare for specific levels of trade costs.     

Exempted sectors in free trade agreements

Almost all participants in free trade agreements (FTAs) exclude at least a few products or sectors from complete tariff removal on the exports of their FTA partners. The positive tariffs that remain within an FTA are often the highest tariffs that the countries apply on an MFN basis. It seems plausible that such exclusions may be chosen because the domestic producers of these products are viewed as especially vulnerable to competition from imports from the partner country. In brief, they are especially “sensitive sectors.” We develop this idea theoretically and then test it empirically on data from 37 countries in 240 importer–exporter pairs within FTAs. We find support for the sensitive‐sector hypothesis only in the high‐income countries. We find that low‐income countries, in contrast, exempt sectors where bilateral tariff removal would be more likely trade‐diverting and therefore harmful. Our explanation for this, supported empirically, is not that they are following the advice of trade economists, but rather that they are avoiding loss of tariff revenue and may also perhaps be influenced by the greater bargaining power of richer and/or larger partners in their FTAs.     

Economic Determinants of Free Trade Agreements Revisited: Distinguishing Sources of Interdependence

One of the most notable international economic events since 1990 has been the enormous increase in the number of free trade agreements (FTAs). While Baier and Bergstrand were the first to show empirically the impact of a country‐pair's economic characteristics on the likelihood of the pair having an FTA, the literature has been extended to demonstrate the importance empirically of FTA “interdependence”—the effect of other FTAs on the probability of a pair having an FTA. In the context of the Baier–Bergstrand framework, this paper delves deeper into the sources of interdependence—an “own‐FTA” effect and a “cross‐FTA” effect. The authors argue that the own‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between two countries owing to either already having other FTAs) likely dwarfs the cross‐FTA effect (the impact on the net welfare gains of an FTA between the pair owing to other FTAs existing in the rest of the world, or ROW). Augmenting a parsimonious logit model with simple “multilateral FTA” and “ROW FTA” terms to differentiate the own and cross effects empirically, it is shown that the marginal impact on the probability of a country‐pair having an agreement of either country having one more FTA with a third country is 50 times that of one more FTA between another pair in ROW. The results suggest that “domino (own‐FTA) effects” have far exceeded “competitive liberalization (cross‐FTA) effects” in the proliferation of FTAs.     

Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’

This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames’; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office.     

Do Customs Union Members Engage in More Bilateral Trade than Free‐Trade Agreement Members?

This paper provides the first empirical analysis directly comparing the effects of customs unions (CUs) and free‐trade agreements (FTAs) on members’ bilateral trade, while addressing the biases arising from log‐linearization of the gravity model and crucial time‐invariant unobservables. Since Fiorentino et al. (2007 ) question the popularity of CUs relative to FTAs, considering the latter to be more practical in the current trading climate, such a comparison seems especially relevant. While Baier and Bergstrand (2007 ) find an FTA to approximately double members’ bilateral trade after 10 years, the results of this paper find CUs to have had a much larger impact than FTAs.     

Rules of origin and gains from trade

Free trade areas (FTAs) involve unharmonized tariffs and rules of origin that have prevented proving the formal general equilibrium existence of a welfare-enhancing FTA. This paper identifies the most restrictive limit that rules of origin can enforce and still continue to guarantee gains from trade for FTA formation. We note that many commonly used rules of origin exceed this condition in practice. We apply the identified welfare-supporting rules of origin and prove the existence of a FTA general equilibrium involving only within-FTA transfers that is at least as satisfactory for every consumer as an arbitrary original world trade allocation. The analysis also helps to explain why hub-and-spoke extensions of FTAs cannot be expected to guarantee gains from trade for all participants in general.     

外部关税约束、自由贸易区规模与世界自由贸易

该文在外部关税约束条件下分析了几种不同类型的自由贸易区与世界自由贸易的关系,该文结果显示,一个实行开放成员国地位的自由贸易区可以实现世界自由贸易,但是当自由贸易区以追求成员国福利最大化为目标时,在世界规模大于4时,该自由贸易区的扩张不可能最终实现世界自由贸易.该文还研究了对称的自由贸易区是否可以通过进一步的融合从而把世界变成一个一体化的自由贸易区,结果显示,具有对称市场能力的自由贸易区可以通过进一步的融合提高成员国福利,从而最终实现世界自由贸易.     

Distance and trade: Disentangling unfamiliarity effects and transport cost effects

This paper provides evidence supporting Grossman's (Comments on Alan V. Deardorff, Determinants of bilateral trade: Does gravity work in a neoclassical world?. In: Jeffrey A. Frankel (Ed.), The regionalization of the world economy. Chicago: University of Chicago for NBER; 1996) claim that not only transport costs but also unfamiliarity can explain the negative correlation between geographic distances and bilateral trade volumes. A gravity model that controls for as many natural causes of trade as possible reveals that countries high in uncertainty-aversion (based on Hofstede's survey) export disproportionately less to distant countries (with which they are presumably less familiar). More important, this result is mainly driven by differentiated products, not by products with international organized exchanges or with reference prices. For transport costs alone to explain such a trade pattern, one would have to assume that distance-related ad valorem transport costs are higher when a trade route originates from a high uncertainty-aversion country, which is unlikely. This trade pattern is easy to explain, however, if one accepts that geographic distance is a proxy for unfamiliarity and that exporters in high uncertainty-aversion countries are more sensitive to informational ambiguity. A further result is that high uncertainty-aversion countries trade less and thus grow poorer in the long run, which suggests that cultural factors are as important as geographic ones in determining trade openness and prosperity.