A paper economy of faith without faith in paper: A reflection on Islamic institutional history

This article contributes to the literature on Islamic institutional history by examining how the discounting of documents in Islamic legal practice constrained the organization of early modern Muslim trade. It is argued that the reliance on literacy, on the one hand, and an Islamic legal framework, on the other, gave early modern Muslim traders a comparative advantage in economic organization, but the lack of faith in paper as documentary evidence in Islamic law posed fundamental constraints to the development of Muslim economies.     

Measuring legal systems

Factor-analytic models can substantially improve the measurement of comparative legal systems and thereby our understanding of how legal systems influence economic outcomes. These methods yield better estimates of latent constructs, allow us to evaluate whether institutional features are representative of a theoretical construct and whether allegedly distinct theoretical constructs can be separated empirically. We illustrate these points through a re-analysis of a 2003 study by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, using a factor-analytic method that combines continuous and categorical indicators. Our results strengthen these authors' findings with respect to how legal formalism relates to legal origin and the quality of the legal system. Yet, the results also show that many of the original index items are not significantly positively related to formalism. The results thus shed light on what institutional features should be prioritized for reform if we seek to make legal systems less formalistic. Moreover, we question the evidence that the formalism model better predicts the quality of the legal system than does the alternative “incentives” model. We argue, instead, that formalism and incentives may both relate to the tendency of a legal system to use bureaucratic rule-making. Our approach can readily be applied to the analysis of legal concepts other than formalism. Journal of Comparative Economics 35 (4) (2007) 711–728.     

效率、公平、社会稳定与住房问题——基于世代模型的政治经济学分析

土地和住房是劳动者历史共同体的公共物品。社会是否能够按照效率与公平的原则解决住房问题,其本质是社会是否能够解决劳动者现实具体利益与历史一般利益的矛盾,即个体理性与国家理性的矛盾。公共权力通过经济制度对租金的抽取和使用是解决住房问题的基本途径,不同制度模式具有等价性。在社会稳定的约束条件下,公共权力对租金的抽取和使用并不必然保证住房问题的解决符合效率与公平的原则,为此社会还需要具备公共权力良好的政治性质、法律约束力以及劳动者对国家理性道德自觉的条件。     

Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?

This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state and this has repercussions for financial development. The adaptability channel holds that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial development more effectively. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 653–675.     

Indigenous livelihoods, slash-and-burn agriculture, and carbon stocks in Eastern Panama

Improved crop–fallow systems in the humid tropics can simultaneously sequester atmospheric carbon emissions and contribute to sustainable livelihoods of rural populations. A study with an indigenous community in eastern Panama revealed a considerable biophysical potential for carbon offsets in small-scale slash-and-burn agriculture through longer fallow periods, improved fallow management, secondary forest development, and agricultural intensification. Based on soil and biomass carbon measurements, estimated annual sequestration rates amount to 0.3−3.7 t C ha^− 1 yr^− 1. Despite such potential, the economic benefits of initiatives aimed at sequestration of carbon in the community are likely to be rather unequally distributed within the community. Heterogeneity in livelihood strategies and uneven asset endowments among households – factors often overlooked in the ongoing carbon and sustainable development debate – are expected to strongly affect household participation. Indeed, only the better-endowed households that have also managed to diversify into more lucrative farm and non-farm activities are likely to be able to participate in and thus benefit from improved crop–fallow systems that capture carbon. Economic, ethical, institutional, and technical concerns need to be taken into account when designing community carbon management and investment plans.     

Islamic Economics in the Late Ottoman Empire: Menâpirzâde Nuri Bey's Mebâhis-i İlm-i Servet

The existing literature on Islamic economics suggests that Islamic economics is a twentieth-century phenomenon with its roots in medieval Islamic intellectual and theological history, thereby leaving a centuries-long gap in the history of Islamic economic thinking. This study aims at taking a first step towards filling this gap by examining a nineteenth-century example of Islamic economics in late Ottoman economic literature. Suggesting a broader definition of Islamic economics, this article investigates a prominent Ottoman intellectual's efforts to define, reveal, and revive a tradition of Islamic economics in historical and intellectual context.     

Islamic Charitable Giving in the UK: A ‘Radical’ Economic Alternative?

ABSTRACT

Muslim financial actions have faced increased scrutiny as financial links to ‘terrorism’ have risen in political rhetoric with anything labelled as ‘Islamic’ being perceived to be in requirement of study in terms of its relation to ‘fundamental British values’ (Kundnani, A., 2014. The Muslims Are Coming! Islamaphobia, Extremism, and the Domestic War on Terror. London: Verso.). Exploring Muslim charitable giving in the UK, it will be posited that much of Islamic charitable practices sustains a relationship with neoliberalism without being entirely reduced to it. The post-9/11 environment ‘has led to renewed scholarly interest in the relationship between the economy and Islam and more specifically the incorporation of Islamic value in daily economic life’ (Rethel, L., 2019. Corporate Islam, Global Capitalism and the Performance of Economic Moralities. New Political Economy, 24 (3), 350–364, 2). Islamic charitable practices potentially offer a resistance to the inegalitarian effects of neoliberalism whilst simultaneously being both a part, and a consequence of, neoliberal dominance. Moreover, Islamic charity in the UK acts as an expression of the Muslim community against a backdrop of security and surveillance. Thus, while potentially offering a ‘radical’ alternative to neoliberalism it is a non-violent and non-conflictual alternative.     

Islamic Banking in Malaysia: Unchartered Waters

This paper explores the Islamic banking business in Malaysia since its beginning in 1983. The Islamic banking sector has achieved its target of 20% market share in assets and deposits in 2010. To boost the industry's competitiveness and efficiency, the demands of the market forces will have to be delicately balanced with the dictates of the Shari'ah. The search for niche Islamic banking products warrants enhancements in the current regulatory, legal, and fiscal infrastructure for Islamic banking, without which these products cannot be a viable alternative to the conventional ones. While the prevailing infrastructure is conducive to Islamic banking products that hold similar characteristics with interest‐bearing loans, Shari'ah compliance can be a futile exercise when the purpose of the law (maqasid al‐shari'ah) is overlooked, for there is much more to Islamic banking than the elimination of interest.     

European influence and economic development

The development accounting literature identifies political institutions as fundamental development determinants. Forms of government or executive constraints are thought to shape economic institutions (e.g., property rights) that provide necessary incentives for economic growth. One strand of the literature suggests that European influence is a crucial economic development determinant, presumably through the adoption of European institutions. But how exactly did European influence in the distant past induce positive economic outcomes today? Previous approaches rely on “language,” “settler mortality,” “legal origins” or the “number of European settlers” as indirect proxies of European influence. We propose a direct and quantifiable mechanism: the adoption of European constitutional features. We construct a dataset of all constitutional dimensions from 1800–2008 for all countries and find that nations experience growth accelerations after adopting features of European constitutions. The growth effects are influenced (negatively) by periods of political turmoil, but they are independent of colonial backgrounds. These results show how European influence may have fostered growth, and they imply that countries were able to overcome adverse initial conditions over the last 200 years by adopting European constitutional features. Our constitutional dataset is sufficiently detailed to identify the specific dimensions of European constitutions that matter most for development: legislative rules and specific provisions that curtail executive powers.     

科研不端行为处理程序研究——兼评《科研诚信案件调查处理规则(试行)》

2019年9月由科技部等20个部委联合发布的《科研诚信案件调查处理规则（试行）》从整体上构建了科研不端行为调查处理程序,是我国科研诚信建设的里程碑文件,但其并未真正解决调查主体多元、事实问题与学术问题混淆、程序规则公正性欠缺与救济途径缺失等问题。有必要借鉴美国科研不端的规制经验,通过法律程序弥补科学共同体自律约束的不足,在内生机制方面不断完善科研不端处理程序,在外部约束方面通过立法与司法介入倒逼调查部门规范内部调查和处理程序,构建科学共同体自律约束与法律规则外部约束相结合的科研诚信建设体系,从而真正净化学术界和推动“科教兴国”。     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.     

The economics of shortage and problems of reform in Chinese industry

This paper employs the economics of shortage framework to examine post-Mao reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. Performance has been disappointing because reforms through 1985 failed to fundamentally alter economic agent behavior. The “soft” budget constraints at the enterprise and local government levels continue to generate “quantity” and “expansion” drives. The resultant inflationary pressures have necessitated administrative interventions and thwarted reform progress. The Maoist legacy of active participation by local governments in economic management is high-lighted as a major obstacle to the elimination of paternalism in state-enterprise relations.     

Ex post implementation

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and—in economic environments—sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints.We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is it implied by Maskin monotonicity. The single unit auction with interdependent valuations is shown to satisfy ex post monotonicity but not Maskin monotonicity. We further describe a Pareto correspondence that fails ex post monotonicity but satisfies Maskin monotonicity.     

维吾尔族民众信任的权威格局分析——以四个地区个案为基础的实证研究

权威格局是各种权威要素因地位差异构成的功能互补的社会秩序协调机制，对权威格局的研究是从合法性角度对社会政治稳定必须具备的民众基础的考量。调查结果显示：新疆社会政治稳定具备牢固的维吾尔族民众基础。维吾尔族民众信任的权威格局中。以领导干部为代表的法理型权威在个人和社会事务两个领域普遍受到信任，占据权威格局的主导地位，辅之以在社会事务方面越来越受到信任的知识能力型人才代表的新型权威。经济愈发达的地区，情况愈是如此。宗教人士所代表的传统权威能够发挥的作用主要局限在社会事务领域中的道德规范，在经济欠发达地区的作用相对更大。     

Learning to Learn, Pattern Recognition, and Nash Equilibrium

The paper studies a large class of bounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models on strategic-form games. The main assumption is that players “recognize” cyclic patterns in the observed history of play. The main result is convergence with probability one to a fixed pattern of pure strategy Nash equilibria, in a large class of “simple games” in which the pure equilibria are nicely spread along the lattice of the game. We also prove that a necessary condition for convergence of behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the players consider arbitrarily long histories when forming their predictions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D83.     

“Constitutionalizing” the corporation

To become effective instruments in the attainment of a sustainable society, corporations should have their constitutional status settled. Thus far, mainly by Supreme Court decisions, corporations have an uncertain status. They are “persons” under the Constitution and have certain rights; but unlike natural persons, they do not have concomitant constitutional duties. Corporations should be viewed as “private” governments exercising substantial power in society. They are, however, considered to be associations of individuals rather than divisions of society. The need is to legitimate their governing power by “constitutionalizing” them. That can be done by corporations accepting, or having imposed upon them, two principal constitutional duties. First, means should be developed whereby corporate officers routinely take the general good into account. That duty could be implemented by making “social impact statements,” analogous to but broader than the familiar environmental impact statements, before making important corporate decisions. Secondly, as “sociological communities,” corporate officers wield considerable power over members of those communities. A bill of rights similar to the Constitution's Bill of Rights is recommended so as to make corporate power that is necessary for achievement of societal goals as tolerable and decent as possible. Acceptance of those duties would make corporations parts of, not separate from, the greater corporation called society. They would be private, profit-making entities with a definite public function. Preferably, the duties should be voluntarily accepted. Congress, however, has undoubted constitutional power to impose both, should it so desire.     

Allowing communities to trade in imperfectly competitive pollution-permit markets

Citizens and organizations representing them play an increasingly important role in markets for environmental quality, but much remains to be learned about how their participation affects these markets. We analyze the effects of allowing a community of citizens to trade pollution permits in an imperfectly competitive permit market. Allowing the community to trade directly reveals its preferences, which enhances welfare. However, community participation may also exacerbate distortions due to market power, even though the community itself trades competitively. Including the community in permit distribution may exacerbate market power distortions by affecting a dominant trader’s propensity to participate in the permit market. Second, the community’s demand/supply for permits may be more inelastic than other traders and worsen distortions due to market power. We illustrate in an example that these negative effects on competition can dominate the positive effect from preference revelation through the market place.      

Contract networks for electric power transmission

A contract network extends the concept of a contract path to address the problem of loop flow and congestion in electric power transmission systems. A contract network option provides an internally consistent framework for assigning long-term capacity rights to a complicated electric transmission network. The contract network respects the special conditions induced by Kirchoff's Laws; accommodates thermal, voltage, and contingency constraints on transmission capacity; and can be adopted without disturbing existing methods for achieving an economic power dispatch subject to these constraints. By design, a contract network would maintain short-run efficiency through optimal spot-price determination of transmission prices. Through payment of congestion rentals, the contract network makes a long-term capacity-right holder indifferent between delivery of the power or receipt of payments in a settlement system. to]Everybody talks about the weather, but nobody does anything about it.Often attributed to Groucho Marx, but earlier from Charles Dudley Warner, Hartford Courant, Editorial, August 24, 1897.     

Propping and tunneling

In countries with weak legal systems, there is a great deal of tunneling by the entrepreneurs who control publicly traded firms. However, under some conditions entrepreneurs prop up their firms, i.e., they use their private funds to benefit minority shareholders. We provide evidence and a model that explains propping. In particular, we suggest that issuing debt can credibly commit an entrepreneur to propping, even though creditors can never take possession of any underlying collateral. This helps to explain why emerging markets with weak institutions sometimes grow rapidly and why they are also subject to frequent economic and financial crises. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 732–750.