TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF NON-MARKET ACTIVITIES*

Recent attempts to measure value of household work and other non-market activities have been based on a simplistic interpretation of Opportunity Cost of Time Theory; this paper attempts to refine this and develop practical definitions from basic Utility Theory. First a distinction is made between economic and other activities, the former being the only ones subject to dollar-measurement; we recognize economic activities can occur outside the market and focus our analysis upon these latter. In the framework of Becker-Lancaster a Household-Production Function is posited which produces jointly such non-market economic activities-called indirect utility-and welfare or satisfaction- called utility. A criterion for identifying the indirect utility activities (Third-Person Criterion) is outlined, and related to time-use survey data. Finally, four practical estimation methods are outlined: simple opportunity cost of time; gross replacement cost; individual function replacement cost; and the full production function approach. This latter, which includes evaluation of capital contributions, is deemed theoretically most valid but for present purposes least practical because of lack of data on domestic capital stock. The paper concludes that there exists both a theoretical basis for valuing non-market activities, and the necessary data to apply the formulas developed.     

DOES THE ECB HAVE A TIME‐INCONSISTENCY PROBLEM? A NOTE

A standard time‐inconsistency model of monetary policy, extended to include a time‐varying natural rate of unemployment, implies cointegration between the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. An application of the model to data for the EMU countries does not yield strong evidence of cointegration. In addition, the sign of the estimated coefficient of cointegration is not in line with a sign restriction imposed by the time‐inconsistency model.     

A NOTE ON ADVERSE SELECTION

A model of a labour market in which workers cannot signal their productivity is set up. The nature of adverse selection (too few good trades, too many bad trades, neither or both) is found to depend on the pattern of reservation wages.