Bidding in an Electricity Pay-as-Bid Auction

One of the main elements of the recent reform of electricity trading in the United Kingdom is the change from a uniform price auction in the wholesale market to discriminatory pricing. We analyze this change under two polar market structures (perfectly competitive and monopolistic supply), with demand uncertainty. We find that under perfect competition there is a trade-off between efficiency and consumer surplus between the two auction rules. We also establish that a move from uniform to discriminatory pricing under monopoly conditions has a negative impact on profits and output (weakly), a positive impact on consumer surplus, and ambiguous implications for welfare and average prices.     

Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to bid higher on any license. With full revelation of bidding information, simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. These strategies can help bidders coordinate a division of the licenses, and enforce the proposed division by directed punishments. We examine solutions to mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions.     

考虑固定收益率的采购拍卖投标策略研究

本文分析了单物品多因素采购拍卖中的供应商投标问题,在考虑供应商存在固定收益率的前提下,建立了相应的多因素拍卖中存在固定收益率的投标策略模型。本模型在Che建立的多因素拍卖打分函数模型的基础上,引入Lorentziadis考虑的固定收益率。分析表明,模型中存在3种类型的供应商,且各类供应商具有相应的投标策略。同时,分析了不同类型的供应商的投标策略与其市场竞争力之间的相互关系。     

招投标中的激励机制设计

本文应用博弈论中的不完全信息博弈理论与信息经济学中的激励机制理论，探讨了招投标过程中业主与承包商之间的激励机制的设定问题，建立了承包商的合理报价模型。本模型建立在业主对承包商施加参与约束与激励约束的基础上，承包商可根据这一模型进行合理、科学的报价，从而实现甲乙双方“双赢”的目标。     

Laboratory Testbeds and Non-Market Valuation: The Case of Bidding Behavior in a Second-Price Auction with an Outside Option

Researchers now use the lab to examine the behavioral underpinnings of valuation before the field application which some argue has less experimental control. But lab valuation work raises its own set of concerns when it uses private goods to explore non-market valuation behavior because private goods have substitutes often unaccounted for in the lab. Therefore, the lab as a tool to testbed field valuation work may be limited. Herein we design an induced valuation experiment to explore bidding behavior in a second-price auction with an outside option that is a perfect substitute for the auction commodity. Theory predicts that rational bidders will consider the prices of outside options when formulating bidding strategies, and will reduce their bids whenever their resale value exceeds the price of the outside option. Our results suggest that bidders account for outside options when formulating bids with behavior following comparative static predictions. In addition, we provide evidence concerning hypothetical versus actual behavior with induced values – the data suggesting a hypothetical bias in the level of bids but not in bid shaving.     

向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制设计

通过深入分析统一价格密封双向拍卖机制的诸多缺陷,充分借鉴单向拍卖市场上时钟拍卖的基本思想,将时钟拍卖引入双向拍卖市场,构建了一个无论从分配效率方面考虑还是从竞价风险方面考虑都优于统一价格密封双向拍卖机制,不仅为同类物品确定统一价格,还可以为不同类的物品确定其不同的价格的向上叫价时钟双向拍卖机制。     

The Dynamic Vickrey Auction

We study the efficient allocation of a single object over a finite time horizon. Buyers arrive randomly over time, are long-lived, and have independent private values. The valuation of a buyer may depend on the time of the allocation in an arbitrary way. We construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which (A) there is a single financial transaction (with the buyer), (B) ex-post participation constraints are fulfilled, (C) there is no positive transfer to any agent and (D) payments are determined online. We exploit that under the efficient allocation rule, there is a unique potential winning period for each buyer. This reduces the multidimensional type to one dimension and the payment of the winner can be defined as the lowest valuation for the potential winning period, with which the buyer would have won the object. In a static model, this payment rule coincides with the payment rule of the Vickrey Auction.     

组织中的破坏性领导理论与启示

组织中领导权力的滥用和不当领导行为所导致的严重后果引起了人们对破坏性领导的关注。破坏性领导是指领导者反复表现出来的伤害组织成员、损害组织利益的行为。本文首先介绍了破坏性领导的内涵与结构,接着分析了破坏性领导产生的原因,并指出了破坏性领导的影响后果及应对破坏性领导的策略,最后,探讨了该理论的启示意义以及需进一步关注和研究的问题。     

碳配额拍卖机制设计:基于多主体模型的研究

本文在回顾欧盟碳市场拍卖机制的基础上,建立了基于多主体的碳配额拍卖模型(CAAM),讨论拍卖出清价格是应该采取统一价格拍卖还是歧视性价格拍卖这个问题。研究结果对中国在未来设计碳市场相关机制有一定的参考意义。     

Destructive Entrepreneurship: The Cost of the Mafia for the Legal Economy

This article focuses on the infiltration of legitimate businesses by the mafia and on the existence of “legal mafia-owned enterprises” (i.e., legal, declared enterprises owned — directly or indirectly — by mafiosi). Crime economics often limits itself to the destructive aspects stemming from merely illegal activities. Mafia investments in the legal economy and mafia entrepreneurship are also an underestimated source of latent conflict that is costly to the economy and society. This article shows that mafia-owned legal enterprises establish a lasting, unproductive, and even destructive entrepreneurship. The mafia strives to create an artificial scarcity that affects only its non-members, and thus the mafia manages to dominate markets and other entrepreneurs. The mafia then turns from its initial appropriative functions into a rule-producing function in order to shape markets. More specifically, the mafia asserts itself as a competing sovereign thanks to its power to withhold resources obtained through property over productive entities.     

国有企业资本结构问题及与企业经营间相互影响的研究

企业资本结构问题的探讨研究一直是公司金融领域内最重要的课题之一，也是最复杂的课题之一，在我国理论界也曾有过国有企业的债务负担过重即资本结构问题是构成国有企业经营困难主因的认识。本文将从现代资本结构理论的分析与介绍入手，首先对国有企业资本结构存在的具体问题进行简要的分析，结合现代公司理论对国有企业资本结构问题进行理论上的解释，并提出“所有者缺位”造成国有企业的资本结构优化目标上的偏差，以及资金成本的扭曲是造成国有企业资本结构问题的机制性因素。同时也指出了国有企业经营困难及国有企业资本结构问题是由企业自身经营机制和客观经济环境所导致，而国有企业债务负担过重不可能成为企业经营困难的主因。     

基于PSO算法的股权拍卖机制设计及仿真分析

运用PSO群体智能算法模拟信息交互条件下外部投资者报价决策的学习机制和演化规律,在此基础上设计了实现风险投资退出的股权拍卖机制。Netlog仿真结果表明,所设计的股权拍卖机制能在一定程度上揭示股权的真实价值,并降低竞买人和卖方之间的信息不对称程度。进一步的仿真分析结果表明:适当的激励力度对外部投资者的投标报价具有显著影响;引入更多的竞买人能产生更有利于风险投资家的拍卖结果;即使外部投资者过于强化单一的学习能力,最终也可得到相对理想的拍卖结果,从而证明了所设计的股权拍卖机制具有广泛的适用性。     

Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats

The prevalent term “auction fever” visualizes that ascending auctions – inconsistent with theory – are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment in the four formats rank as expected if bidders have private uncertain values (the private information of a bidder is the distribution of her value). A control treatment supports our view that the traditional private certain values approach prevents auction fever in the laboratory. Another control treatment with a procurement auction relates the auction fever bids to bids in a one-shot auction with real endowments. We conclude that, when bidders are uncertain about their valuations, auctions that foster pseudo-endowment may raise bids and revenues.     

Thinking Ahead: The Decision Problem

We propose a model of costly decision making based on time-costs of deliberating current and future decisions. We model an individual decision-maker's thinking process as a thought-experiment that takes time, and lets the decision maker 'think ahead' about future decision problems in yet unrealized states of nature. By formulating an intertemporal, state-contingent, planning problem which may involve costly deliberation in every state of nature, and by letting the decision maker deliberate ahead of the realization of a state, we attempt to capture the basic observation that individuals generally do not think through a complete action plan. Instead, individuals prioritize their thinking and leave deliberations on less important decisions to the time or event when they arise.     

The Effect of Bidder Heterogeneity on Combinatorial Conservation Auction Designs

In an iterative combinatorial auction, bidders can submit bids on individual and/or on combinations of projects in a series of intermediate rounds, where bid prices are revised before a final allocation is made. The iterative format is useful for conservation service procurement as landholders can rely on market information revealed through the rounds to evaluate their choices of projects and bid prices. However, there is no single way of providing the market information. Different designs for generating price information have been proposed. Little is known about the performance of iterative combinatorial auction designs when heterogeneous bidders, with different cost structures, participate in an auction. Using an agent based model, we evaluate a selected set of designs under different bidder heterogeneity scenarios. We observe that higher degrees of heterogeneity lead to lower auction efficiency and that auction outcomes are highly sensitive to price feedback design choices.     

网络拍卖的法律风险及对策

当前,越来越多的拍卖网站开始从事拍卖活动,但在目前我国对这些网络拍卖行为还没有明确的法律法规对之进行调整,网络拍卖行为存在着很大的法律风险。因此,应从网络拍卖的概念界定出发,探讨网络拍卖所面临的法律风险及其对策。     

Auction Design for the Allocation of Emission Permits in the Presence of Market Power

To the extent that emission permits have been allocated using market mechanisms, this has been done using a sealed-bid auction design, typically with discriminatory prices. However, several authors have recommended the ascending auction format. Basically, two competing ascending auction designs have been suggested, the standard ascending auction (with clock or demand schedules), or an alternative ascending-clock implementation of Vickrey-pricing. The latter design was introduced as a response to problems of bid shading under the sealed-bid and the standard ascending auction format. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the allocation of permits under these two alternative mechanisms. The auction process and the resulting market outcome in the presence of oligopolistic competition are simulated. In this setting, it is not obvious that bid shading is the optimal strategy under the standard design, nor is it obvious that sincere bidding is the optimal strategy under the alternative ascending auction design. The alternative auction format makes it less costly to pursue a strategy to increase market shares through the acquisition of emission permits, thus increasing the competitor's costs, leading to overbidding as the optimal strategy.     

The Informational Role of the EPA SO2 Permit Auction

We consider the ex ante informational implications of the mandatory surrender feature of a stylized emission permit auction, similar to that in the U.S. EPA SO₂ permit scheme, but modeled as a uniform price auction. The theory suggests that generally the auction gives misleading signals concerning the expected price of permits in the post-auction permit market; in the cases where the permit auction is designed to correctly predict the post-auction permit market equilibrium price, the permit auction preempts the permit market, and all trading occurs in the auction. Ex post auction/market experience suggests that the market may have enabled the auction and consequently raises the possibility that the market may have worked in spite of the auction and not because of it.     

股票市场收盘集合竞价对市场有效性的影响——来自深圳证券交易所的证据

笔者基于深圳证券交易所于2006年7月1日收盘采用集合竞价事件,选择事件日前后两个窗口期的交易数据,运用价格同步法分析方法,研究了收盘集合竞价对市场有效性的影响。研究发现:收盘采用集合竞价后,市场交易量、波动性和相对买卖价差均有显著下降,市场模型的解释力显著提高;第二阶段和第三阶段回归方程中的关键参数检验,以及构造的虚拟事件的稳健性检验结果均证明收盘集合竞价显著促进了市场有效性。