The new merger guidelines of the department of justice

The statement of antitrust enforcement criteria regarding mergers issued by the Justice Department in June 1982 embodies not only a significant change in policy but also an important improvement in the quality of the underlying economic analysis. The statement clearly sets forth the overall objective of the policy, its underlying rationale, and the criteria to be followed in deciding whether to proceed against horizontal and non-horizontal mergers respectively. As compared with the 1968 Guidelines, the new statement devotes less attention to long-term economic effects, contemplates a more extensive “behind-the-scenes” consideration of economic benefits, and confines probable challenge to a smaller range of transactions. Neither set of criteria provides a satisfactory basis for predicting the actual incidence of enforcement; neither is based on a demonstration that the implied policy will probably produce net economic benefit. The valuable contribution of the new statement to both law and economics is its realistic treatment of the problem of market definition.     

The 1984 justice department guidelines toward horizontal mergers

This paper examines the treatment of economic efficiency in the 1984 revision of the Department of Justice's antitrust Merger Guidelines. An overview of the evolution of the guidelines toward horizontal mergers is presented emphasizing three key areas where changes have occurred. A model is developed following O. Williamson framework is extended to link changes in market concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) that result from a horizontal merger to changes in market power (as measured by price-cost margins). Finally, the cost reductions (economies) required to offset increases in market power are developed in a simulation model. The paper concludes with an application of the model to the LTV-Republic Steel merger.     

The two economics of vertical restraints

This paper reviews the economics of vertical restraints. There are two economics of these restraints where the different explanations follow from different sets of motivating factors. The first economics presumes that these restraints are imposed by manufacturers on their distributors. Free rider arguments fall in this category. In contrast, the second economics presumes that retailers and other distributors have substantial power over their suppliers. One means to exercise this power is to require supplying manufacturers to enforce vertical restraints. In these circumstances, vertical restraints increase prices and restrict outputs, and thereby have the same economic effects as horizontal restraints.     

Vertical restraints in the Australian Trade Practices Act

Vertical restraints are singled out for detailed legislative treatment in the AustralianTrade Practices Act. Resale price maintenance and third-line forcing (tying another firm's products) are illegal per se while price discrimination and non-price vertical restraints (apart from third-line forcing) are subject to a competition test. Most vertical restraints may be either authorised by the Trade Practices Commission or given statutory exemption from the Act under a notification procedure unique to vertical restraints. The ability to seek an authorisation or to notify the Commission about a vertical practice has meant that the economic issues in this area have been dealt with mainly in administrative processes outside the courts. While issues of economic efficiency have been important, the main objective of the Commission has been to benefit consumers by promoting competition as a process. This paper briefly overviews what is probably the most complex area of antitrust in Australia yet, which has received negligible academic comment.     

The Australian merger guidelines: A comparison with the U.S. merger guidelines

Modern Australian antitrust had not begun when the first U.S. merger guidelines appeared in 1968. Even now, twenty five years later, no similarly detailed, formal administrative guidelines have been developed in Australia. This paper reviews the way in which the AustralianTrade Practices Act 1974 handles mergers and market definition, and considers how the Courts and the Trade Practices Commission, Australia's sole antitrust enforcement agency, have handled market definition and evaluated mergers. The key role played by the Trade Practices Tribunal, a quasi-judicial body, in influencing the Australian approach to mergers and market definition is highlighted. Contrasts are made with the 1992 American guidelines, and reasons for the different approaches are suggested.     

The engineering department matrix organization

This paper describes the development of an organizational structure within the Engineering Department of the Sperry Gyroscope organization. A matrix form of structure has been operating in the last 15 years or so in various forms. However, the power balance between the project and function teams has been carefully changed over this period to meet changing circumstances, it is accepted that this structure may not necessarily be suitable for all time, but its flexibility has proved of tremendous value in enabling the Engineering Department to perform effectively.     

The effects of procedural and informational justice in the integration of related acquisitions

This study explores the independent and interactive effects of procedural justice and informational justice on post‐deal value creation in large, related acquisitions. Our results show that informational justice and procedural justice affect different components of value creation. Procedural justice is critical in realizing market position improvements following the integration process, while informational justice is essential in achieving market position gains during integration and financial return gains both during and post‐integration. Indicating that the interrelationships between different justice dimensions may be more complex than previously thought, we find that procedural justice reduces the positive effects of informational justice on financial return during the integration process, while it magnifies the effects of informational justice on the combined firms' market position during integration efforts. We explore the implications of these results for future research on the acquisition integration process and for practicing managers engaging in large, related acquisitions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Erratum: The effects of procedural and informational justice in the integration of related acquisitions

The above article (DOI: 10.1000/smj728) was published online on 20 November 2008 in Wiley Interscience ( www.interscience.wiley.com ). Printing errors were subsequently identified in the article: Page 14. Table 1: row 13 should be labelled ‘Post‐integration financial return’. Page 14. Table 1: row 14 should be labelled ‘Post‐integration market position’. Page 17. lines 48‐50: ‘Improving financial return requires removal of critical organizational elements with which organization members feel tightly connected.’ should read ‘Improving financial return requires removal of critical organizational elements such as company names, departments, products, and people with which organization members feel tightly connected.’     

The impact of vertical integration on losses from collusion

Upstream collusion that increases the price of an input can harm an independent downstream producer (D). We ask whether this harm is more or less pronounced when D’s downstream rival is a vertically integrated producer. We find that such vertical integration increases D’s loss from collusion when D is not a particularly strong competitor. However, when D is a sufficiently strong competitor, vertical integration can reduce D’s loss from collusion when price competition prevails downstream.     

The impact of market liberalization on vertical scope: the case of Argentina

This paper analyzes the impact of market liberalization on the vertical scope of firms. Using the case of Argentina, it is shown how the opening of the economy can improve contracting abilities and heighten competition, increasing the ability and incentive of firms to outsource. Survey findings support the main hypothesis as well as the specific importance of reforms relating to inflation, import costs, and heightened demand standards in increasing the use of outsourcing. A case study of the steel producer Siderar, highlights that while firms may reduce their presence in peripheral activities, they may also increase their presence in core areas so as to increase their value proposition. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Marketing strategy and the efficacy of procedural justice: The mid-level marketing manager in industrial service firms

A principal challenge confronting the senior marketing team in B2B firms is how to ensure that the marketing strategies they develop are implemented effectively. The literature indicates that mid-level marketing managers' perceptions of the procedural justice within the firm may be critical in this respect. However, there has been little empirical research on this issue. The authors develop and test a conceptual model of the key drivers and consequences of marketing managers' procedural justice perceptions. The findings show that if mid-level marketing managers trust their senior marketing colleagues and simultaneously operate within moderately organic structures, then procedural justice will thrive. A consequence of this is more effective implementation of marketing strategy which, in turn, leads to increased market performance.     

施工企业工程项目部亏损的原因

近年来,许多施工企业亏损的工程项目部(以下简称项目部)不断出现,且有愈演愈烈之势.这些项目部的亏损,直接影响了企业的经济效益,并有可能危及企业的生存与发展.因此,如何控制项目部的成本开支,遏制项目部的亏损,提高企业的经济效益,已成为施工企业目前非常紧迫的任务.     

The organizational form of vertical relationships: Dimensions of integration

In this paper we argue that the organizational form of a buying firm's vertical relationship with a supplier can be defined as a configuration of four distinct, but related dimensions of integration. These dimensions pertain to ownership integration (the extent that the firm owns the upstream component supplier), coordination integration (the intensity of information exchange to align the two stages of production), task integration (the extent that the buying firm performs upstream tasks), and knowledge integration (the extent that the buying firm possesses knowledge about the upstream component). Ranging from fully integrated to fully disintegrated, these dimensions can be combined to form various organizational configurations that better reflect the true nature of organizational forms than one-dimensional conceptualizations. Drawing on distinct fields of research (e.g. transaction costs economics, information-processing theory, and learning) the goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the four dimensions of integration and their interrelationships. This is an important step for future processes of configurational theory building and normative testing.     

On the vertical integration of successive monopolies

This essay studies the private incentives for, and welfare consequences of, the vertical integration of successive monopolies. When the merged firm is as efficient as its pre-merger components, private and social interests coincide and the merger raises welfare by eliminating the double mark-up. When the merger leads to higher costs it is possible that some mergers will be privately profitable but not socially desirable and that some will be socially desirable but not privately profitable. These results suggest that a laissez-faire approach to this type of merger by antitrust authorities will not always be appropriate.     

The influence of secondary production on industry definition in the extended vertical market model

Secondary production is defined and its role in the estimation of an extended vertical market model b examined. Two impacts on the subject industry are identified, called primary product dominance and primary product focus. A simultaneous equations model consisting of a profit equation and two secondary production equations is estimated using data from the interindustry transactions accounts. The profit equation captures the impact on industry profit of secondary production and of extended market structure. The dominance equation captures the relationship between secondary production and industry profit and scale of production. The focus equation captures the relationship between secondary production and industry profit and excess capacity. The model is estimated for all industries, and the common specification is then applied to industries grouped by type.     

立式平压模切机的压力调整与闷车故障的排除方法

立式平压模切机的主要作用是将纸板按要求完全切断和清晰压痕.由于纸板尺寸往往很大,要求机器两大平板平面度很高,平行度也很高.虽然设计与制造者努力按要求去做,但由于大平板衬板的平度、模切板的平度以及受力变形等因素,仍很难做到一次全部切断,要完全切断和压痕清晰就需要调整压力.本文就如何进行压力调整和可能出现的闷车现象及排除方法做一阐述.     

A multilevel analysis of the role of interactional justice in promoting knowledge-sharing behavior: The mediated role of organizational commitment

Knowledge sharing behavior has received increased attention in the context of business due to its important role in enhancing organizational competitive advantage. This study aimed to identify possible predictors of knowledge sharing behavior and its underlying mechanisms from a multilevel perspective. The results showed that interactional justice positively related to knowledge sharing behavior both at the individual and the team levels. And organizational commitment took a mediated role between them. This study is the first to highlight the role of organizational commitment and interactional justice in knowledge sharing behavior, enriching current understanding of organizational knowledge management and providing further suggestions as how managers can improve knowledge sharing behavior in their organizations.     

The competition effects of industry-wide vertical price fixing in bilateral oligopoly

This paper examines the competition and welfare effects of vertical price fixing through industry-wide resale price maintenance (RPM) arrangements, such as those benefiting from exemption from a general prohibition against RPM. A bilateral oligopoly framework is employed incorporating differentiation between manufacturer products and between retailer services. Transactions between the stages involve prices being determined through bargaining. We do not find RPM to be universally undesirable. However where retailer power is strong, the social effects of RPM are likely to be adverse, since the practice can assist in coordinating final price levels and prevent socially desirable countervailing power arising.