Impacts of Monetary, Fiscal and Exchange Rate Policies on Output in China: A Var Approach

Applying the VAR model and using the interest rate as a monetary policy variable, we find that in the long run, output in China responds negatively to a shock to the interest rate, the real exchange rate, government debt, or the inflation rate, and it reacts positively to a shock to government deficits or lagged own output. When real M2 is chosen as a monetary policy variable, long-term output in China responds positively to a shock to real M2 or lagged own output, and it reacts negatively to a shock to the real exchange rate, government debt, or government deficits. Its response to a shock to the inflation rate is negative when government debt is used and is positive when government deficits are considered. In the short run, fiscal policy is more important than monetary policy in three out of four cases. In the long run, monetary policy is more influential than fiscal policy in three out of four cases. Therefore, the government may consider conducting monetary and fiscal policies differently in the short run and long run. The government needs to be cautious in pursuing deficit spending as its long-term impacts depend on the monetary variable employed. The policy of maintaining a relatively stable exchange rate is appropriate as the depreciation of the Yuan may hurt the economy in the short run.JEL Classifications: E5, F4, H6     

The MTFS or the EMS: Which Way for Credible Monetary Policy?

Since the latter part of 1988, the primary policy objective has been to head off a rise to double digit inflation. To this end, interest rates have been raised from 7112 per cent to 14per cent, while the public sector is running a large fiscal surplus. Despite this apparently very tight policy stance, policy is deficient in a crucial respect: it lacks credibility. The all too public divisions within government have weakened the efficacy of monetary policy, especially in financial markets. The ongoing uncertainty over who is in charge of the conduct of policy - No. 10 or No. 11 - further undermines confidence. The most urgent priority must be to reassert clear priorities and guidelines. In this Viewpoint, we consider how best to restore the credibility of monetary policy. There are two main possibilities: first, to reassert the Medium Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) in an appropriate form; or to join the (Exchange Rate Mechanism of the) European Monetary System (EMS). We argue that it will be very hard to derive credibility benefits from a reassertion of the MTFS: because of the inflation record of the past decade and the twists and turns of past versions of the MTFS, a mere restatement will not resolve the uncertainties that result from known differences within the government. In particular, any restatement will rely on discretion and judgement in its implementation and this will weaken its beneficial effects on expectations. Instead we argue that entry into the EMS offers a tougher and more credible commitment for monetary policy. The Chancellor has been pushed to rule out UK entry until the second half of 1990 at the earliest, but the government should make a virtue of this by announcing a firm dale for entry next year. In the interim, it should encourage a debate about the appropriate rate for entry, a debate which will increasingly guide the foreign exchange market. The government should make it clear that in choosing this rate it will do so with the commitment to low inflation very much in mind, favouring a high exchange rate. Once in the EMS, the government should rule out the possibility of devaluing the pound in an EMS realignment. This provides a firm non- discretionary anchor for both monetary policy and inflation expectations. With this commitment, the principal gain from EMS entry will be establishing a regime of low inflation for the next decade: in this, choice of the exchange rate will be less crucial than the fact of entry.     

Monetary policy with interest on reserves

I analyze monetary policy with interest on reserves and a large balance sheet. I show that conventional theories do not determine inflation in this regime, so I base the analysis on the fiscal theory of the price level. I find that monetary policy can peg the nominal rate, and determine expected inflation. With sticky prices, monetary policy can also affect real interest rates and output, though higher interest rates raise output and then inflation. The conventional sign requires a coordinated fiscal–monetary policy contraction. I show how conventional new-Keynesian models also imply strong monetary–fiscal policy coordination to obtain the usual signs. I address theoretical controversies. A concluding section places our current regime in a broader historical context, and opines on how optimal fiscal and monetary policy will evolve in the new regime.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

The package that was announced just as we completed our June forecast has, for the time being, produced a more stable financial position. The exchange rate has stopped falling and by mid-July the Smithsonian index had reached 62, the highest level since March. Short- and long-term interest rates have stopped rising. We still emphasise, however, that control over DCE and the money supply has been achieved artificially through direct controls on the banks. The government has achieved short-run consistency between its fiscal and monetary policy, but in the longer term its fiscal policy is inconsistent with its hopes of keeping inflation in single figures. No incomes policy will succeed unless it is accompanied by policies designed to achieve a consistent exchange rate path. The issue has been given prominence by the recent proposals for a European currency system. In the June Economic Outlook we argued that the maintenance of exchange rate stability with the Deutschmark (unless West Germany can be persuaded to increase the growth of its money supply) would require major cuts in the Budget deficit over the next three years. The same monetary constraints would apply whether we joined a fixed exchange rate system or unilaterally decided to hold the exchange rate. If the government seriously wants to control inflation a reduction in the Budget deficit will be essential.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy

The dominant obsessions to watchers of the world economy at the moment are the weakness of the US dollar and the fear that the world economy is stagnating. In this ‘Briefing Paper’ we seek to put both events into the same intellectual framework, and to show that they are the consequence of monetary policies which are not logically related to each other, nor to a common objective of bringing world inflation steadily down to an acceptable level. Specifically, the US - which for reasons outlined below can warrant monetary growth rather below the world average if it is to preserve some dollar stability - is showing an above average outturn in its monetary aggregates. Germany and Japan, which can accommodate increases well above the average, are in fact adopting monetary targets which are leading to exchange rate appreciation, arid a reduction in both countries' expectations for real growth. The dangers for the world economy in this situation are very serious, particularly at a time when further dollar devaluation could be risky both from the viewpoint of US inflation wide the dollar's role as the key reserve asset. It could lead at worst to US protectionism and a monetaryled recession, rein forcing the slow growth rates already being widely predicted in 1978 for many other industrial countries. However, we show in this ‘Briefing Paper’ that this is not a necessity outcome of the present situation, given three vital perceptions. The first, required by statesmen as much as by technicians. is that the recent stagnation in European & Japanese output and exchange rate instability are essentially a monetary phenomenon, requiring essentially monetary (rather than fiscal) remedies. The second is acceptance of the need and practicability of some monetary consignation, based on reasonably common objectives among the major countries regarding inflation, bands for exchange rate movement and red rates of growth. the third, at the most practical level, is agreement on the actual monetary numbers which broadly reconcile these objectives and also take account of the very different ‘unwanted’ rates of monetary growth between countries which reflect their different underlying conditions of output, productivity and demand for money. It is the (ambitious) aim of this ‘Briefing Paper’ to substantiate these perceptions and to provide the numbers mound which a consideration of monetary policies can be framed. The numbers are necessarily based on trends established over a number of years and need to be supplemented by detailed understanding of each country's financial status But the monetary targets provided do, in our judgement, embody trade-offs between inflation, growth and exchange rate movements which should broadly satisfy national ambitions, and reset the world economy on a worthwhile growth path during 1978 or 1979.     

Fiscal Policy in the UK

Although the conduct of macroeconomic policy in the UK has been very good by historical standards, Brian Henry argues in this article that there are shortcomings in the framework which mean it is less well suited to adverse shocks than it should be. He recommends that an extension of the present framework be made setting up a committee charged with the independent assessment of fiscal policy. This would help mitigate the lack of balance between monetary and fiscal policy which is evident at present. Fiscal judgements based on cyclical adjustments are too heavily dependant on domestic factors and underestimate the effects of the cycle on revenues. In consequence, fiscal policy, rather than supporting monetary, has been loosened and this indirectly accounts for the continuing strength of the exchange rate.     

The UK and the Eurozone: Sovereign Debt Management and Monetary Policy

Events in the wake of the ‘credit crunch’ can be understood only against institutional structures within which interdependent monetary and fiscal policy are administered. In the Eurozone, the attempt to keep a central monetary authority (together with its associated national central banks) independent from 17 diverse fiscal authorities was flawed. When sovereign debt approaches unmanageable levels, the Maastricht Treaty presents austerity as the single option. In the UK, the electorate has an opportunity to choose between monetary financing (inflation) and fiscal consolidation (austerity). Policy choices within the Eurozone and the UK are set against Keynes's focus on unemployment and more recent concerns to retain (or restore) price and/or financial stability.     

The Narrow Band Option for Mr. Lamont

The dilemma facing Mr. Lamont as he prepares his first Budget is the conflict between the need to keep interest rates high to maintain the commitment to sterling's ERM band and the wish to reduce interest rates to ease the severe recession in the domestic economy. In large part, this conflict is intrinsic to the government's aim to bring down UK inflation to German levels through membership of the ERM: the process of reducing inflation is always painful and costly in terms of lost output and higher unemployment. But the dilemma is made worse by the uncertainties over future policy direction, reflected in the differential between UK and German interest rates. German monetary policy is set to remain tight to hold in check the inflationary pressures that might otherwise arise from German unification. Against this background success in reducing UK interest rates will depend on the government's success in establishing the credibility of its anti-inflation policy and of its ERM commitment. An expansionary Budget aimed at easing the recession would undermine this credibility, and remove the scope for additional interest rate reductions. An abandonment of the ERM commitment would signal the accommodation of inflation, and condemn the UK to continuing high inflation and interest rates. We argue in this Viewpoint that the best course open to the Chancellor is to adopt a broadly neutral Budget stance, and to strengthen the ERM commitment by moving to a narrow band for sterling within the ERM. This should enable the Chancellor to reduce UK interest rates again at around the time of the Budget and lay the basis for further subsequent cuts.     

Central Bank Independence and Co-ordinating Monetary and Fiscal Policy

In this article, Stephen Hall, Brian Henry and James Nixon review the arguments that granting a central bank independence to set monetary policy leads to low inflation. An important extension to the standard analysis considers the problem which may arise if monetary and fiscal policy are then not co-ordinated. A strategic analysis is needed to assess this. Using such a framework in an empirical analysis, the authors find that an uncoordinated policy may lead to less growth than a co-ordinated policy, and the main effects of this lack of co-ordination are an overvalued exchange rate and a reduction in net trade.     

Monetary policy in open economies: Practical perspectives for pragmatic central bankers

This paper reviews and interprets some of the key policy implications that flow from a class of DSGE models for optimal monetary policy in the open economy. The framework suggests that good macroeconomic outcomes in open economies are possible by focusing inflation targeting that is implemented by a Taylor type rule, a rule that in equilibrium is reflected in the exchange rate as an asset price. Optimal monetary policy will not be able deliver a stationary (‘stable’) nominal exchange rate – let alone a fixed exchange rate or one that remains inside a target zone – because, absent a commitment device, optimal monetary can’t deliver a stationary domestic price level. Another feature in the data for inflation targeting countries that is consistent with monetary policy via Taylor type rule is that it will tend push the nominal exchange rate in the opposite direction from PPP in response to an ‘inflation’ shock—the ‘bad news god news’ result of Clarida and Waldman (2008. Is Bad News about Inflation Good News for the Exchange Rate. In: John Campbell, (Ed.), Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press), Clarida and Waldman (2014. Bad News About Inflation is Good News for the Nominal Exchange Rate Under Optimal Monetary Policy: DSGE Theory and a Decade of Empirical Evidence). This is so even though in the long run of these models the nominal exchange rate must in expectation obey PPP.     

Fiscal Explanations for Inflation: Any Evidence from Transition Economies?

Recent arguments, motivated partly by the new fiscal theory of price level, suggest that fiscal deficits undermine price stability in transition economies. This paper addresses these claims by examining vector-autoregressive models of inflation for three transition economies (Bulgaria, Romania and Russia). The results indicate that fiscal deficits have increased inflation in Bulgaria and Romania but not in the case of Russia. In Bulgaria and Romania, money aggregates and exchange rate have also been more influential to inflation than fiscal deficits. The analysis based on this method therefore suggests that while fiscal deficits have some influence on inflation, monetary factors mostly determine inflation in these three countries.     

Monetary policy in a small open economy with fixed exchange rate: The case of Macedonia

This paper empirically applies the New Keynesian model for monetary policy analysis in a small open economy with a fixed exchange rate. Official reserves are included in the interest rate rule to account for the constraint that these impose on monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed. Also, the foreign interest rate is included in order to reflect the necessity of following the foreign monetary policy. The model is applied to Macedonian data from the period 1997 to 2011. In general, results indicate that monetary policy has been focused on domestic objectives during this period, despite the fixed currency. In addition, there seem to have been significant differences in the conduct of the monetary policy in the first and second half of this period. The response to inflation has been more aggressive in the earlier period, at a time when reserves appear less important, while the output gap is found to be important only in the latter period, possibly due to the stronger monetary policy transmission. Finally, results indicate that the monetary policy has likely moved from adaptive in the first period to rational in the second period.     

Alternative monetary policies and fiscal regime in new EU members

I investigate the relevance of a fiscal regime for disinflation in new EU member states (NMS). I generalize the framework of [Obstfeld, M., Rogoff, K., 1995. Exchange rate dynamics redux. Journal of Political Economy 103, 624–660] to incorporate the non-Ricardian fiscal regime and two monetary feedback rules: inflation targeting and depreciation targeting. Euro accession requires disinflation and stabilization of the exchange rate and thus restrictive monetary policy. The model illustrates that a sustainable and prudent fiscal policy is a necessary condition for successful stabilization of inflation. Thus, the lack of prudent fiscal policy, through its effects on inflation, may undermine the EMU accession of large NMS even when their fiscal outcomes fall within the Maastricht range.     

通货膨胀背景下的中国经济增长

当前我国物价水平仍然较高,与改革开放以来的前几次通货膨胀有所类似.本次通货膨胀的原因也可归结为中国传统增长模式中常出现的“两难困境”,即长期以来,中国经济增长过度依赖于政府投资,银行信贷与货币的发放难以受到控制,经济高增长的同时始终存在着高通货膨胀的风险,而高通货膨胀所带来的企业生产成本的上升反过来又挤压企业经营利润,从而降低经济增长率.可以预计的是,在货币政策作用空间有限的背景下,此次通货膨胀的压力将持续一段时间.能否处理好总量和结构、抑制通货膨胀和促进经济增长的关系,关键取决于货币政策与财政政策的有机配合.     

Toward Monetary Union of the European Community

A bstract . European Community monetary integration has received periodic attention often as a result of financial crises but has now evolved into its major aim. To achieve this goal the European Monetary System was established in 1979. It was designed to provide a tool, the Exchange Rate Mechanism , for exchange rate stabilization and convergence of economic and monetary policies. To give further impetus to monetary integration the Maastricht Treaty was approved in December 1991. Experiences with the operation of the European Monetary System show that there is no conclusive evidence that it has disciplined the monetary and fiscal policies of all its members. More recently, Germany's insistence on a tight monetary- policy, to fight the inflation that resulted from unification costs, has brought turmoil in European financial markets and has dealt a serious blow to the system. Furthermore, the ensuing recession and its impact on the European economies make improbable that the timetable of the Maastricht Treaty will be met.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Tightening the Fiscal and Monetary Controls

The Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) is a new departure in post-war policy-making. As David Smith's Briefing Paper shows the ideas behind it are well rooted in historical experience, but nevertheless it was inevitable that there would be a major element of trial and error in the early years of its use. The experience of 1980-81 however has produced some alarming results. The monetary limits have been drastically exceeded and the PSBR is likely to be far above the original target. There are two possible explanations. Either the control system is gravely defective or the government has deliberately followed the kind of short-term discretionary policies (and has indulged in the kind of ad hoc interventionism) which the strategy was expressly designed to avoid. We believe that both explanations are true. It is also probable that they reinforced each other. The first year of the strategy was likely to be the year of greatest strain. It involved a highly ambitious attempt to reduce inflation at a time when cost pressures from wages and higher energy prices were particularly strong. The strains rapidly revealed the defects in the control system. Since the government was alarmed at the short-term consequences of its policies, it chose to make a virtue of necessity and in effect suspended its commitment to the control of sterling M3. It is possible to look back at 1980 and to say that, in the event, the government's loss of control over its policies was justified as statesmanlike flexibility. But there always appear to be good reasons for sacrificing long-term objectives for short-term expediency. The MTFS was intended to avoid the chronic tendency to accept the easy option. It is essential that in 1981 the commitment to the MTFS should be re-established and that it should be reinforced, as appears to be necessary, by a system of indicators and controls to ensure that the errors of 1980 are not repeated. Otherwise there is a serious risk that the hard-won gains in the fight against inflation will be lost in the economic upturn. In the first part of this Viewpoint we examine what happened to fiscal and monetary policy in 1980 and discuss the general lines that policy should follow in 1981-82. We conclude that in order to get fiscal policy back on course the authorities should aim for a PSBR of £10 bn in 1981-82. In the second part we discuss in more detail the reasons why monetary policy went so badly astray in 1980, focusing particularly on the role of the Bank of England. We argue that just as ‘dirty floating’ (i.e. the pursuit of exchange rate objectives) may threaten the monetary targets, so ‘dirty monetarism’ (i.e. the pursuit of interest rate objectives) may prove an even greater threat. We conclude that the discretionary activities of the Bank of England contributed to the excessive monetary growth in 1980, and that it is necessary to ensure that in future the Bank should conduct its policy on a non-discretionary basis.     

Monetary Targets and the World Economy: A Progress Report

The recent changes in the value of the dollar and the talk of an interest rate ‘war’ demonstrate again that the world finds it difficult to cope with rapid exchange rate movements. In some ways the experience - and the reactions to it - are similar to the events of 1978. As now, the world was in a recession (though on a milder scale) and there were fears that exchange rate problems would obstruct economic recovery. The main difference is that in 1978 it was the strength of the Deutschmark which caused concern whereas this time the problems are associated with the rise in the value of the dollar. In a Briefing Paper in Economic Outlook, February 1978, ‘Monetary Targets and the World Economy’ we suggested that the problem arose from inconsistencies between national monetary policies and exchange rate objectives. In general, countries dislike exchange rate changes - in either direction - and there were problems because countries would not accept the exchange rate consequences of their own or other countries' monetary policies. We estimated the required monetary policies for stable exchange rates and suggested specific national monetary targets for 1978 which would at least move the world economy towards consistent monetary policies. In this Economic Viewpoint we return to those ideas. We consider what happened in 1978 and we also revise the underlying monetary rules. More recent experience suggests that although there has been some progress towards the convergence of monetary policies there will continue to be trend changes in exchange rates. It is also clear that there will be short-term fluctuations around these trends. We believe that greater convergence of monetary policies would be desirable but failing that it is important that countries should avoid abrupt changes in monetary policy. It is also important that countries should become accustomed to exchange rate changes. They should direct monetary policy towards their objectives for inflation and should not be diverted from it by temporary or permanent changes in their exchange rates.     

财政政策、货币政策调控与宏观经济稳定——基于新凯恩斯主义垄断竞争模型的分析

本文基于包含金融加速器的新凯恩斯主义垄断竞争框架,研究了财政政策和货币政策冲击对我国宏观经济的影响。实证结果表明,财政政策能够解释部分就业、消费和资本存量波动;货币政策冲击则能够解释大部分通货膨胀、就业波动,以及部分产出、消费和投资波动。总体上,模型能够较好地刻画中国宏观经济波动特征。本文认为今后一段时期内,应当将财政政策更多转向民生领域和基础设施建设,重视货币政策调控,从而更有效地调控宏观经济运行。     

Keeping the lid on inflation

James Nixon and Andrew Sentance examine the current monetary policy dilemma: whether to raise interest rates in response to sterling weakness, or pay more attention to subdued consumer demand. They conclude that interest rates should rise (from their rate at the time of writing of 6.75%), but that other changes to the monetary framework would enhance the credibility and effectiveness of current UK anti-inflationary policy.