Price and Investment Dynamics: Theory and Plant-Level Data

We construct a model of a firm competing for market share in a customer market and making investments in physical capital. The firm is financially constrained and there are implementation lags in investment. Our model predicts that product prices should depend on costs and competitors' prices but respond weakly to demand shocks. Also, prices should be strongly related to investment. We estimate price and investment equations on panel data for Swedish manufacturing plants and find results that are qualitatively in line with these predictions, though the relation between investment and prices is stronger than predicted by our model.     

Free Cash Flow,Issuance Costs,and Stock Prices

We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and external financing costs, and derive an explicit solution for the firm's optimal balance sheet dynamics. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the value of cash holdings, and the dynamics of stock prices. The model predicts that the marginal value of cash varies negatively with the stock price, and positively with the volatility of the stock price. This yields novel insights on the asymmetric volatility phenomenon, on risk management policies, and on how business cycles and agency costs affect the volatility of stock returns.     

Corporate Risk Management as a Lever for Shareholder Value Creation

Firm value is influenced in many direct and indirect ways by financial risks which consist in unexpected changes of foreign exchange rates, interest rates and commodity prices. The fact that a significant number of corporations are committing resources to risk management activities, however, represents only an indication for the potential of corporate risk management to increase firm value. This paper presents a comprehensive review of positive theories and their empirical evidence regarding the contribution of corporate risk management to shareholder value. It is argued that because of realistic capital market imperfections, such as agency costs, transaction costs, taxes, and increasing costs of external financing, risk management on the firm level (as opposed to risk management by stock owners) represents a means to increase firm value to the benefit of the shareholders.     

Do investors forecast fat firms? Evidence from the gold‐mining industry

Conventional economic theory assumes that firms minimize costs given output, but news articles and managers indicate that firms cut costs when they are in economic distress and grow fat when they are relatively wealthy. Under conventional theory, firm value is convex in the price of a competitively supplied input or output, but we find that the stock values of many gold‐mining companies are concave in the price of gold. We show that this is consistent with fat accumulation when a firm grows wealthy. We then address alternative explanations and discuss where fat in these companies might reside.     

The Global Impact of Brexit Uncertainty

We propose a text-based method for measuring the cross-border propagation of large shocks at the firm level. We apply this method to estimate the expected costs, benefits, and risks of Brexit and find widespread reverberations in listed firms in 81 countries. International (i.e., non-U.K.) firms most exposed to Brexit uncertainty (the second moment) lost significant market value and reduced hiring and investment. International firms also overwhelmingly expected negative first-moment impacts from the U.K.'s decision to leave the European Union (EU), particularly related to regulation, asset prices, and labor market impacts of Brexit.     

Labor unemployment risk and corporate financing decisions

This paper presents evidence that firms choose conservative financial policies partly to mitigate workers' exposure to unemployment risk. We exploit changes in state unemployment insurance laws as a source of variation in the costs borne by workers during layoff spells. We find that higher unemployment benefits lead to increased corporate leverage, particularly for labor-intensive and financially constrained firms. We estimate the ex ante, indirect costs of financial distress due to unemployment risk to be about 60 basis points of firm value for a typical BBB-rated firm. The findings suggest that labor market frictions have a significant impact on corporate financing decisions.     

Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices

Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first‐price, common‐value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first‐price and second‐price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing first‐price formats. The number of bidders has a more significant impact on revenues in optimal auctions. I also find invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal second‐price auctions.     

The real effects of a new accounting standard: the case of IFRS 15 Revenue from Contracts with Customers

International Financial Reporting Standard 15 (IFRS 15) Revenue from Contracts with Customers has significantly changed the philosophy of revenue recognition, not only to provide a fairer representation of corporate revenues, but also to inhibit the use of revenues for ‘earnings management’ purposes. We provide a framework to analyse the various effects of new and amended accounting standards. Changes in how companies recognise, measure, present and disclose their revenues (accounting effects) can affect how companies and their transactions are understood, both internally and externally (information effects), can change security prices (capital market effects) and can change how companies operate, and their costs and cash flows (real effects). We provide empirical evidence, based on a review of corporate annual reports, comment letters and interviews, on the effects of IFRS 15. We find evidence of accounting, information and, to a lesser extent, real effects, although, outside a few industries, IFRS 15 has had relatively little impact on the recognition and measurement of revenue.     

The Value of Enterprise Risk Management

Enterprise risk management (ERM) has been the topic of increased media attention in recent years. The objective of this study is to measure the extent to which specific firms have implemented ERM programs and, then, to assess the value implications of these programs. We focus our attention in this study on U.S. insurers in order to control for differences that might arise from regulatory and market differences across industries. We simultaneously model the determinants of ERM and the effect of ERM on firm value. We estimate the effect of ERM on Tobin's Q, a standard proxy for firm value. We find a positive relation between firm value and the use of ERM. The ERM premium of roughly 20 percent is statistically and economically significant.     

Valuation of the Debt Tax Shield

In this study, we use cross–sectional regressions to estimate the value of the debt tax shield. Recognizing that debt is correlated with the value of operations along nontax dimensions, we estimate reverse regressions in which we regress future profitability on firm value and debt rather than regressing firm value on debt and profitability. Reversing the regressions mitigates bias and facilitates the use of market information to control for differences in risk and expected growth. Our estimated value for the debt tax shield is approximately 40 percent (10 percent) of debt balances (firm value), net of the personal tax disadvantage of debt.     

Financing and the demand for corporate insurance

In this paper we examine the insurance decision of a firm with private information regarding its cash flows and insurable losses. We show that, even in the absence of bankruptcy costs and information production by insurers, the firm's attempts to hedge its information risk can induce it to demand insurance. If higher operating revenues are accompanied by a lower insurance risk, the firm will choose to self-insure. In contrast, if higher operating revenues are accompanied by a higher insurance risk, the firm will demand insurance. In fact, if its insurable losses are relatively small, the firm will fully insure its losses. Further, if there exists considerable uncertainty regarding the firm's insurance risk, the level of coverage demanded by the firm is dependent on its private information, with higher levels of coverage signaling favorable information regarding the firm's future operations.     

Operating Hedge and Gross Profitability Premium

We show theoretically that variable production costs reduce systematic risk of firms' cash flows if capital and variable inputs are complementary in firms' production and input prices are procyclical. In our dynamic model, this operating hedge effect is weaker for more profitable firms, giving rise to a gross profitability premium. Moreover, gross profitability and value factors are distinct and negatively correlated, and their premia are not captured by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). We estimate the model by simulated method of moments, and find that its main implications for stock returns and cash flow dynamics are quantitatively consistent with the data.     

An accounting-based valuation approach to valuing corporate governance in Taiwan

We estimate the proportion of firm value that is related to governance mechanisms in a cointegrated system based on the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) accounting-based valuation model. Using a comprehensive set of 32 governance measures in five categories for Taiwan firms, we find that governance measures related to ownership structure and the divergence between cash flow rights and control rights capture variations in stock prices over time. Controlling for book value, net operating assets, and abnormal operating earnings which account for up to 59% of firms’ equity value over time, the governance measures in addition track at least 39% of the equity value of these firms. We further identify that the shareholdings of board directors and supervisors, shareholdings of the controlling family, the critical control level of a firm, and the voting rights of the largest shareholder for ultimate control are sufficient governance measures to track changes in firm value. Our results shed some light on the extent of the equity value that can be generated by a firm’s governance practices and the types of corporate governance mechanisms that are especially important for firms with similar ownership structure and controls.     

Do Managers Always Know Better? The Relative Accuracy of Management and Analyst Forecasts

We examine the relative accuracy of management and analyst forecasts of annual EPS. We predict and find that analysts’ information advantage resides at the macroeconomic level. They provide more accurate earnings forecasts than management when a firm's fortunes move in concert with macroeconomic factors such as Gross Domestic Product and energy costs. In contrast, we predict and find that management's information advantage resides at the firm level. Their forecasts are more accurate than analysts’ when management's actions, which affect reported earnings, are difficult to anticipate by outsiders, such as when the firm's inventories are abnormally high or the firm has excess capacity or is experiencing a loss. Although analysts are commonly viewed as industry specialists, we fail to find evidence that analysts have an information advantage over managers at the industry level. The two have comparable abilities to forecast earnings for firms with revenues or earnings that are more synchronous with their industries.     

Cost of capital effects and changes in growth expectations around U.S. cross-listings

This paper examines whether cross-listing in the U.S. reduces firms’ costs of capital. We estimate cost of capital effects implied by market prices and analyst forecasts, which accounts for changes in growth expectations around cross-listings. Firms with cross-listings on U.S. exchanges experience a decrease in their cost of capital between 70 and 120 basis points. These effects are sustained and exist after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We find smaller reductions for cross-listings in the over-the-counter market and for exchange-listings from countries with stronger legal institutions. For exchange-traded cross-listings, the cost of capital reduction accounts for over half of the increase in firm value, whereas for other types of cross-listings the valuation effects are primarily attributable to contemporaneous revisions in growth expectations.     

Local Risk,Local Factors,and Asset Prices

Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.     

Franchising and real estate brokerage

This paper examines the value of franchise affiliation to real estate brokerage firms. It uses a national sample to estimate models of brokerage firm sales and revenues. The results suggest that franchisees sell more properties than nonaffiliates, but that the average franchise sale results in less revenue. The net benefit of franchise affiliation is a 9.0 percent increase in net revenue to the average firm. We compare the initial cost of affiliation with the benefits and find that the up-front fees charged by franchisors are substantially lower than the present value of the stream of incremental profits generated by franchise affiliation.     

The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk‐adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB‐rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000) . Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively.     

A SPECIALIST'S QUOTED DEPTH AS A STRATEGIC CHOICE VARIABLE: AN APPLICATION TO SPREAD DECOMPOSITION MODELS

Although there is a sizable literature demonstrating that liquidity and transaction costs are multidimensional, researchers continue to estimate adverse‐selection costs using only prices. We present a model of a profit‐maximizing specialist who posts prices and depths. The model is simulated to measure changes in the adverse‐selection component of the spread that result under different levels of informed trading. We find that spread decompositions fail to capture the full extent of adverse‐selection risk when specialists choose depth. We recommend that researchers use adverse‐selection measures that account for depth as well as spread to mitigate this problem.     

Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure

The interrelationship between top-management compensation and the design and mix of external claims issued by a firm is studied. The optimal managerial compensation structures depend on not only the agency relationship between shareholders and management, but also the conflicts of interests which arise in the other contracting relationships for which the firm serves as a nexus. We analyze in detail the optimal management compensation for the cases when the external claims are (1) equity and risky debt, and (2) equity and convertible debt. In addition to the role of aligning managerial incentives with shareholder interests, managerial compensation in a levered firm also serves as a precommitment device to minimize the agency costs of debt. The optimal management compensation derived has low pay-performance sensitivity. With convertible debt, instead of straight debt, the corresponding optimal managerial compensation has high pay-to-performance sensitivity. A negative relationship between pay-performance sensitivity and leverage is derived. Our results provide a reconciliation of the puzzling evidence of Jensen and Murphy ( 1990 ) with agency theory. Other testable implications include (1) a relationship between the risk premium in corporate bond yields and top-management compensation structures, and (2) the announcement effect of adoption of executive stock option plans on bond prices. The model yields implications for management compensation in banks and Federal Deposit Insurance reform. Our results explain the dynamics of top-management compensation in firms going through financial distress and reorganization.