基于“营改增”改革背景下的中央与地方财政体制调整研究

自2013年8月1日起,交通运输业和部分现代服务业由营业税改征增值税在全国范围内推行。按我国现行的分税制财政管理体制,增值税属于中央与地方的共享税,而营业税基本属于地方政府。然而随着我国“营改增”改革实践的不断深入,1994年分税制改革局面将会受到影响．研究中央、地方财政体制调整的紧迫性与重要性日显突出。本文首要介绍现行的财政管理体制的内容．分析“营改增”全面推行对现行财政体制的影响．并根据“营改增”改革不同时期的要求,对我国财政体制调整方向和实施路径提出了建议。     

现行地方税制度存在的问题及改进建议

1994年的分税制财政管理体制改革,明确了中央政府和地方政府之间的基本财政分配关系,并首次从制度上确立了地方税体系。地方税制度的建立,一定程度上调动了地方政府的积极性,促进了税收收入整体的快速增长以及地方公共服务数量和质量的提高。但1994年至今,我国税制改革实际上始终围绕着中央税和共享税进行,长期忽视地方     

完善地方政府金融管理体制研究

地方政府金融管理体制是我国金融体制的重要组成部分。目前我国地方政府金融管理实践中还存在着重复监管、监管盲区、责权不对等、职能混淆等问题,基于对当前地方政府金融管理体制缺损主要原因的分析,借鉴国外经验及寻求理论指导,本文建议从中央地方政府统分结合、金融发展与风险防范关系、需求角度及基础性制度安排等方面入手,逐步完善地方政府金融管理体制。     

关于省管县财政体制需要探讨的几个问题

省管县财政体制是超越“下管一级”传统行政规则，在省级政府与县级政府之间建立直接财政关系的财政体制。它是针对现行“省管市、市管县”的弊端而对地方财政体制作出的重大调整。新中国成立后的大部分时期，我国一直实行的是“地管县”体制（在当时地区行署是作为省级政府的派出机构）。在改革开放初期，随着地市合并，市管县体制才真正确立起来，成为地方财政体制的主要形式。     

我国环境保护税收益权的纵向分配进路北大核心CSSCI

我国《环境保护税法》历经九年研讨,期间几经波折,终于在2016年12月25日审议通过。《环境保护税法》采"税负平移"原则,实现了我国环境保护"费"改"税"的制度转变,对治理我国环境污染和构建绿色税制具有显著意义。与《排污费征收使用管理条例》相比,《环境保护税法》在计税依据、税收优惠、法律责任等方面均有所完善或创新,但有关环境税收益权的纵向分配并无具体规定。考虑到当前我国中央和地方政府间事权、财权分配现状及环境税自身的特殊性,我国环境税宜作为中央与地方共享税,且在共享比例层面,环境税收益权宜由地方政府主享,即其分享比例应向地方政府倾斜。     

论转型期我国地方政府的经济职能

在现代市场经济体制下,政府的干预必不可少。然而,我国正处于由计划经济体制向社会主义市场经济体制的转型时期,地方政府经济职能还存在错位、越位和缺位的现象。因此,要促进区域经济的发展,克服当前我国地方政府职能与行为在区域经济发展中的主要偏差,必须规范地方政府的经济职能。     

增值税改革与财产税的协调

我国正在进行增值税的改革,扩大增值税的征收范围,远景是合并营业税,这预示着未来财政分配的重要变革。而且我国也正在研究开征房产税,准备把财产税作为地方政府主要财政收入来源。增值税作为地方政府主要收入来源,财产税作为地方政府主要来源,协调增值税和财产税作为地方政府主要收入来源是主要方案。采取增值税和财产税混合作为地方政府财产收入来源是解决方法。     

消费税收入归属之问:为何不宜地方化北大核心CSSCI

消费税的收入归属与其自身特质以及国家财政体制密切相关。当前的消费税改革,在收入归属上仍应坚持中央税的基本定位,其主要原因在于消费税所担负的经济调控功能以及地域税源上的巨大差异。消费税无论作为共享税还是地方税都是地方化的表现,而消费税地方化,虽然能够在一定程度上补充地方的财政收入,但同时也弱化了中央的财政调控能力,并且进一步加剧了地区财政不均衡。在我国社会主要矛盾已经发生转变,以及财政事权与支出责任改革着重强化中央事权的背景下,消费税更加不宜地方化。     

我国个人所得税改革的机制创新

我国个人所得税改革目前存在功能定位、方案设计、纳税人纳税意识、征管水平等约束条件。在我国已经确定建立综合与分类相结合的个人所得税制前提下,个人所得税制改革的推进需要一定的机制创新,划定改革路线图。本文建议由全国人大授权国务院先行试点;同时可以考虑将个人所得税作为中央税,地方政府征收附加税;最后,可以借助《税收征管法》修订时机,从法律层面推进涉税信息共享平台建设。     

浅析我国地方政府体制的创新

我国地方政府体制确立之后,随着我国改革开放市场经济的实施和发展,我国地方政府体制越来暴露其缺陷和不足,本文针对我国地方政府体制存在的问题进行分析并提出相应的对策建议.     

财产税税权划分的国际比较及对中国物业税的启示

本文将世界各国财产税税权划分状况分为四种不同的类型,即绝对集权型、相对集权型、相对分权型和绝对分权型,并分别描述了不同类型税权划分的特征,总结了各国在财产税税权划分上存在的共性,进而在分析我国房地产税税权划分现状及问题的基础上,对于拟议中的物业税的税权划分提出了几点建议。     

How to arrest the decline of local government

In political terms, the case for abolishing rates and substituting a local income tax has frequently been made, notably by the Layfield Committee of Inquiry into Local Government Finance: political independence of local government can only come through financial independence from central government grant. The financial case, which has so far tended to go by default, is based on the premise that local spending decisions can only be made responsibly if the cost of these decisions is felt on the authorities’ own tax base. With the existing level of government support, that is impossible ‐ at least with a Government which appears reluctant to follow through the logic of its new block grant and make rates take the strain of extra spending. Historically, local government has lost its powers in direct proportion to the decline in its tax base. Only local income tax will allow expansion of local responsibility in the longer term, and provide the basis for proper financial accountability. That should appeal to a Government which has often professed its support for such an expansion, and yet is also concerned with making sure that taxing and spending decisions are taken together.     

An examination of firms’ responses to tax forgiveness

This study uses state tax amnesties to examine how firms respond to forgiveness—particularly repeated forgiveness—by a taxing authority. We posit that tax forgiveness programs alter taxpayer perceptions of the probability of detection by enforcers or the probability of future forgiveness programs, either of which could affect future tax aggressiveness. We find that firms headquartered in an amnesty-granting state increase state income tax aggressiveness following the first instance of tax amnesty, relative to control firms in other states. Moreover, we find evidence that tax aggressiveness incrementally increases with each additional repetition of a tax amnesty. Finally, we find that the effect of amnesties on tax aggressiveness is more prominent for small firms, which face less scrutiny and for which the tax aggressiveness measures are less confounded. Our findings suggest that repeated programs of tax forgiveness have increasingly negative implications for corporate tax collections.     

Slowing Fossil Fuel Extraction: A Role for Taxation of Exports,Capital Gains and Interest Income

This paper develops a model of a growing open economy rich in non‐renewable resources, the extraction of which negatively impacts domestic productivity and whose sector competes with final production for capital. We analyse how tax rates on capital gains and interest income and the time trend of an export revenue tax rate could slow the extraction of resources for export. We find that taxing capital gains and interest income at the same rate and setting an export revenue tax rate to decline at the marginal social cost of extraction would defer extraction. An export revenue tax rate need not fall over time to curb depletion if capital gains are taxed at a lower rate than interest income, which is second best to taxing asset returns at the same rate when the resources sector competes for capital.     

对物业税公平功能的思考

物业税是一种财产税,因而在理论上具有调节贫富差距的公平功能。但实践中物业税能否发挥该功能,取决于其税负归宿是否具有累进性。在当前我国贫富差距持续拉大、现行税制体系公平功能缺失的背景下,应充分重视物业税的公平功能。以下政策建议将有助于物业税公平功能的发挥:将土地价值与房产价值合并为物业税课税对象;统一内外资企业房地产税制,实现平等国民待遇;扩大物业税征税范围;实行"双轨制"税率;统一以市场评估价值为计税依据。     

A case for taxing education

In this paper we establish, contrary to conventional wisdom, a case for taxing education, as a supplement to the labor income tax, by drawing on some informational feature of education, which the government may utilize. Discretionary decisions of individuals to acquire education may serve as an additional signal (to earned labor income) on the underlying unobserved innate earning ability, thereby mitigating the informational constraint faced by the government. JEL Classification H2 · D6     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Taxing Mobile Capital with Labor Market Imperfections

Taxing internationally mobile factors of production has been dismissed as an inefficient means of raising tax revenue. This paper addresses the question of whether it is efficient to tax capital at source when labor markets and the taxation of lumpsum income suffer from imperfections. Four reasons for taxing capital are identified: (i) institutional constraints rendering any taxation of profit income infeasible; (ii) market power in the demand for labor; (iii) market power in the supply of labor if it increases with the employment of capital; (iv) unemployment benefits that are not tied to net real wages. It is argued that the case for taxing capital is not particularly strong. By reinterpreting capital as energy the results are applicable to the discussion about ecological tax reforms.     

Designing Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Some Insights from the Recent Italian Reform

During the last decade, the Italian system of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been involved in a radical process of reform that is still under way. The reform has assigned Regions new taxing powers and has introduced a new system of interregional transfers. This paper provides a review of the recent reform and offers some tentative answers to the issues still open, relying on a series of simulations and projections. A number of conclusions have been reached. First, when the long‐run performance of the new financing systems is investigated, regional resources may no longer be adequate to meet future health needs. Second, the incentives for active tax policies seem either to prove too weak or even to cause undesirable results. Finally, the complete devolution to the Regions of some significant public expenditure functions risks strengthening the polarisation of financial flows between the Northern and Southern Regions in the long run.     

Local fiscal equalisation based on fiscal capacity: the case of Austria

This paper deals with local fiscal equalisation in Austria. The system of intergovernmental relations in Austria includes different regulations in order to equalise differences in the fiscal capacity of the municipalities. This leads to so‐called ‘compensation effects’, because additional revenues from a local government's own tax are (at least partly) compensated by losses from equalisation grants. This paper carries out a detailed analysis of these compensation effects. It is shown that they create strong fiscal disincentives for the local governments: on average, 55 per cent of additional revenues from the communal tax (which is the most important of a local government's own taxes) are compensated by losses of equalisation grants. In extreme cases, local governments can lose up to 144 per cent of the additional tax yields collected. These local governments would be better off if they made no effort to increase their tax base.