Bertrand Price Competition in a Social Environment

We analyze the dynamic behaviour of firms that locally interact through price competition in a social environment in an evolutionary game-theoretic model. These firms update their prices according to the behavioural rule Win Cooperate, Lose Defect (WCLD), which is often observed in experimental economics. It can be regarded as a generalized Tit-for-Tat strategy. The model can explain the simultaneous emergence of collusive behaviour, price dispersion and occasional local price wars. Price wars only last for a short period of time after which the firms start to collude again.     

Toegepaste welvaartseconomie en de marginale kostenregel

Enkele opmerkingen naar aanleiding van F. Hartog, Toegepaste welvaartseconomie, Stenfert Kroese N.V., Leiden 1964 216 blz     

Rational spirits and the post Keynesian macrotheory of microeconomics

Summary The argument that post Keynesian theory rejects rationality and maximization as a basis of agent behaviour and is thus non-rational and lacking micro-foundations is contrasted by reference to Keynes' use of his early work on probability in the General Theory. Instead of presuming rational choice over perfectly known events, post Keynesian theory builds on Keynes' explanation of agents' rational beliefs in uncertain propositions about their knowledge of the world. These rational spirits lead to the recognition of the macro constraints to individual action or a macrofoundations of microeconomics linked to the role of money and to the role of liquidity preference as both a measure of rational belief and a determinant of money prices which equate the rates of return on all existing and newly produced goods. In this equilibrium prices will generally diverge from costs of production, in contrast to perfect competition but in concordance with the post Keynesian microeconomic theories of mark-up pricing.Comments by L. Hoogduin are gratefully acknowledged. He is relieved from any responsibility for my impressionistic presentation of Keynes' views on probability.     

Problemen van planning op middellange termijn,gezien uit het gezichtspunt van het bedrijfsleven

Voordracht gehouden op 7 november 1964 in het kader van een door de Nederlandse Economische Hoogeschool te Rotterdam georganiseerde post-doctorale leergang over het onderwerp Problemen met betrekking tot de planning op middellange termijn in Europa.     

The golden rule of accumulation and the open economy

Summary This paper examines the factors which determine the volume of consumption per capita in a small open economy in the long run. The analysis is based on a neoclassical model. It is proved that-in general — Phelps' golden rule of accumulation does not hold for an open economy. This conclusion follows from the decline in the terms of trade, which is generated in an open economy by an increase in the share of investment. The influence of labour supply and world expenditure on the consumption per capita also depend heavily on the induced change in the terms of trade. The analytical results of the model are illustrated by means of a few numerical examples.This paper is written within the framework of the research program Possibilities and Limitations of National and International Economic Policy, code K.H.T. XIII-85-44.     

Trade uncertainty and specialization. Social versus private planning

Summary A small trading economy which produces and trades an arbitrary, but finite, number of goods and faces given terms of trade in combination with an uncertain volume of trade is studied. An exogenous probability of trade disruption forces both public and private decision-makers to specialize to a lesser extent in accordance with their comparative advantage. A unique optimal point of production exists for each probability of trade disruption. A private competitive economy will not produce at this point: it produces too much of the good with a comparative advantage.Notation C ² class of twice continuously differentiable functions - C _i consumption of goodi - f free-trade utility function - g autarky utility function - p international relative price of goody - p _d domestic relative price of goody - Q solution set of - U utility function - U marginal utility of goodi - U _x marginal utilities of lastn goods - x goodx - x ^* autarky production of goodx - x free-trade production of goodx - x _pr private production of goodx - x ₀ optimal production of goodx - x _m maximal production of goodx - y goody - Y income function - private economy equilibrium function - difference function - production possibility function - _x derivative of - probability that free trade occurs - indirect utility function - solution function to optimality problem - c consumption vector - p relative price vector - x goods vector - t transpose - R ₊ ⁿ n-dimensional positive orthant This article communicates the opinion of the author. The views expressed herein are not necessarily shared by his employer.Comments by Willem Buiter, Casper de Vries and participants at the Buiter Workshop Series at the University of Groningen (May 1989) were very useful.     

ECB Foreign Exchange Intervention and the EURO: Institutional Framework,News, and Intervention

Using a unique intervention news data set, this paper investigates the impact of ECB intervention and intervention-related news (newswire reports) on the Euro exchange rate. A time-series study of news generated by ECB officials and market participants regarding intervention and the value of the Euro as well as an event study of firm reports of ECB intervention is conducted. Both studies find significant short-run effects on the Euro value, while only negative statements (official statements denying past intervention or ruling out future intervention) appear to have persistent effects.     

Economische orde,economische politiek en sociale politiek

Naar aanleiding van een bundel opstellen van dr J. Zijlstra, Economische Orde en Economische Politiek, H. E. Stenfert Kroese N.V., Leiden 1956, 143 blz. en een bundel opstellen van dr G. M. J. Veldkamp, Economische Orde en Sociale Politiek, H. E. Stenfert Kroese N.V., Leiden 1957, 156 blz.     

Public pensions and political decision-making

Summary A simple decision-making model regarding the financing method and benefit level of a public old age pension is developed. In line with existing literature, the decision-making process is supposed to be in the form of direct democracy, initially, In order to apply the model to a situation of a representative democracy, to wit the Netherlands, five social groups are considered which may be assumed to influence the decisions taken by the government organization. The empirical results show unanimous support for the PAYG system actually chosen at the start of the pension scheme in 1956. The results are highly suggestive, furthermore, as regards the fact that the financing method of the pension scheme has recently become a parliamentary issue. If one endorses the view that long-term considerations should be given a more preeminent place in this context, which would demand a change of the decision-making structure in favour of the young, then the political support for such a change would seem to be present at the moment.The research reported in this paper is part of the project Economic Policy and Conflicts of Interests of the University of Amsterdam (PEPCI paper 85.03). Helpful comments by Professor P. Hennipman and by participants in the workshop on The Origin and Future of Social Security Schemes at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, December 13–14, 1984, in particular by Professor Charles Blankart, are gratefully acknowledged.     

Fiscal Pacts

Fiscal pacts have recently played important roles in stabilization policies, particularly in Latin America. The ability of pacts to achieve austerity is examined in a game of competition among pressure groups for fiscal influence. Coalitions can freely communicate about what strategies to play and make contingent threats to the strategies of others. The credibility of fiscal pacts (strong, coalition-proof and far-sighted strong equilibria) is shown to depend critically on how acquiescence to private sector pressure enters the government's payoff function. We interpret these results in the context of austerity successes and failures in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Real Exchange Rate Interlinkages

This paper examines theoretically and empirically the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and the real exchange rate. It is found that in large countries with freely floating currencies, such as the USA, the UK and Japan, causality runs from the real exchange rate to FDI. These results are consistent with the predictions of models of financial behavior. Causality runs both ways in small countries with fixed or quasi fixed currencies, such as the EU countries. These results are consistent with models, which emphasize on trade integration. It is shown that a weaker euro will not have uniform effects on FDI inflows across the unified Europe.     

Incorporating inventories into supply and demand analysis

Conclusion In the microeconomic portions of principles and intermediate macroeconomics, supply and demand analysis is presented as the truth. However, the simple Keynesian macroeconomic model virtually ignores market clearing, while the standard microeconomic model of supply and demand assumes perfect market clearing. Since hidden assumptions are a major source of confusion and misunderstanding between economists and the general public, students should be exposed to stock-flow analysis at the intermediate level as a separate or integrated chapter on supply and demand.     

Interpretation of error covariances with nonrandom data: An empirical illustration of returns to college education

Conclusion This paper reviews two models of selectivity and gives an interpretation of the covariance terms that are particular to self-selectivity models. While the second model examined in this paper has been discussed elsewhere, the estimates presented for the first model have not been discussed in previous papers. More importantly though, the paper proposes an hypothesis about the expected relationship between error covariances. According to this hypothesis, if all individuals who are faced with the choice between two regimes (1 and 2) choose the regime which yields a maximum value, then the expected relationship between covariances is ₁ < ₂ . If all individuals choose that regime which yields a minimum value, then the expected relationship between covariances is ₁ > ₂ . This relationship holds for a very general class of selectivity models, so long as individuals are choosing between regimes by comparing the expected value (to them) of each regime.This paper was written while I was working under the professional development program at CNA.     

Expectation formation: Criteria and an assessment

Summary This paper presents three requirements which hypotheses on expectation formation should meet. These three criteria refer to the data used, to the learning process and to the identification of structural parameters. In the second part of the paper these criteria are used for assessing various expectation hypotheses and estimation procedures of models incorporating expectational variables. The analysis reveals that only weak forms of the rational expectation hypothesis and some proxy variable methods with time-varying parameters meet all three criteria.This research forms part of the author's dissertation and of the project Exchange-rate and Monetary Policy in International Dependence. Preliminary versions of this paper were presented at seminars at the University of Amsterdam and the University of Groningen and at the European Meeting of the Econometric Society, Copenhagen, August 24–28, 1987. Comments and suggestions by seminar participants, especially Willem H. Buiter, by members of the above-mentioned project and by an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Returns to scale,imperfect competition and aggregate demand and trade policy effects in a two-country model

This paper constructs a simple general equilibrium two-country model with flexible exchange rates, specialization in production, and oligopolistic firms. The model is simulated in order to investigate how returns to scale and imperfect competition influence the process through which the aggregate demand and trade policy effects are transmitted internationally. The possibility that aggregate demand and trade policies enacted by one country can have beggar my neighbor effects on the other country cannot be excluded.     

De Europese Economische Gemeenschap en de Minder Ontwikkelde Wereld Buiten de Geassocieerde Landen

Voordracht gehouden op 2 november 1963 te Amsterdam voor de postdoctorale leergang Externe economische betrekkingen van de E.E.G. De tekst is op enkele plaatsen bijgewerkt.     

Game equilibrium modelling

Summary Non-cooperative game theory has in recent years become one of the main tools in the social sciences and economics. It deals with decision problems of more than one (rational) player. The actions of those players result in outcomes that are the best that may have happened to a player, given the actions of the other players. This is precisely the content of the 'Nash equilibrium' concept. It would be nice when each game had a unique Nash equilibrium. Unfortunately, both non-existence and multiple equilibria occur. An important role in game theory is played by the information available to the players. Among the economic applications are: the Theory of Industrial Organisation, Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Information.Comments by Eric van Damme and Casper de Vries on an earlier draft of this paper have greatly improved the presentation. I have benefited from the comments of the editor and an anonymous referee ofDe Economist. For all omissions, all possible errors and the revealed views in this paper, I alone am responsible.     

Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game model of two identical countries. Policy-makers of both countries have quadratic intertemporal objective functions and want to stabilize domestic output, domestic inflation, and the real rate of exchange. We present different analytical and numerical solutions for this policy game. Noncooperative open-loop equilibria are interpreted as requiring unilateral commitment and policy-makers' credibility. Potential gains from cooperation are present, as the noncooperative equilibrium solutions are not Pareto-optimal. Under an information pattern that admits memory strategies, the possibility of obtaining cooperative results without coordination and commitment arises.     

Testing Korteweg's rational expectations model for a small open economy

Summary Korteweg extended the Barro, Lucas, Sargent, Wallace type of rational expectations model to a small open economy. This paper tests Korteweg's model with Dutch data. A major error in the specification and estimation is pointed out and corrected: the differenced expected variables are not defined consistently. This error implies that Korteweg's and Bomhoff's previous empirical results on the model are invalid. The test results for the corrected model indicate that this model has to be rejected for The Netherlands. The restrictions implied by an extremely simple empirical alternative are, however, not rejected.I would like to thank Dr. Th.E. Nijman, Professors F. van der Ploeg, W.H. Buiter and J.J.M. Theeuwes and Dr. A. J. de Zeeuw for their stimulus and helpful comments on previous versions of this paper, and Professor P. Korteweg for his open-minded attitude towards this research. Responsibility for the contents remains, of course, with the author. Financial help, from the Stichting Bekker-La Bastide-Fonds and the Stichting A.A. van Beek-Fonds is gratefully acknowledged.     

The identification of liquidity effects in the EMS: Italy 1991–1992

We study the impact of liquidity shocks in Italy in the 1991–1992 period, when the lira belonged to the narrow ERM band with no exchange controls. We conduct our analysis by constructing (not simply assuming) predetermined measures of liquidity supply shocks, taking into account the institutional features of the money market and the reserve requirements' average computation system. We find that the supply of liquidity did significantly affect short-term interest rates; however, in contrast to earlier periods, most of the interest rate variations were attributable to foreign-exchange-related factors, as predicted by the asymmetric view of the ERM.