The impact of competition on bank orientation

How do banks react to increased competition? Recent banking theory significantly disagrees regarding the impact of competition on bank orientation—i.e., the choice of relationship-based versus transactional banking. We empirically investigate the impact of interbank competition on bank branch orientation. We employ a unique data set containing detailed information on bank–firm relationships. We find that bank branches facing stiff local competition engage considerably more in relationship-based lending. Our results illustrate that competition and relationships are not necessarily inimical.     

Interbank relationship lending revisited: Are the funds available at a similar price?

Under the market discipline hypothesis, monitoring by interbank lenders may induce changes in either the price or availability of new interbank funds to borrower banks. However, the presence of interbank relationship lending has been evaluated based on the availability of funds only—disregarding their price. We revisit relationship lending in unsecured interbank lending markets by simultaneously evaluating the availability and price of funds. We calculate the survival ratio of networks containing the price of daily interbank lending in Colombia from 2014 to 2020. Under this framework, an interbank relation survives from one day to the next if the funds are available at a price that does not increase too much; that is, either a halt in interbank funding or a sizeable increase in the price of interbank funding mark a break in the relation between two banks. We find that about 38 percent of relations in the Colombian unsecured interbank lending market survive from one day to the next. Therefore, from a comprehensive market discipline perspective, we find evidence of interbank relationship lending in Colombia.     

Balancing liquidity and returns through interbank markets: Endogenous interest rates and network structures

In this article, we develop a model of interbank lending based on liquidity and return on equity considerations of homogeneous banks. We derive the reservation prices of interbank lending and its properties before exploring how, because of an idiosyncratic liquidity shock, banks engage in bilateral lending to form an interbank network. We establish that the resulting networks exhibit realistic properties, including a core-periphery structure. Banks in the core and the periphery of this network differ not only in the amounts of interbank lending and borrowing but also in the interest rates applied to their transactions.     

Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?

How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.     

Cross-border interbank networks,banking risk and contagion

Recent events have highlighted the role of cross-border linkages between banking systems in transmitting local developments across national borders. This paper analyzes whether international linkages in interbank markets affect the stability of interconnected banking systems and channel financial distress within a network consisting of banking systems of the main advanced countries for the period 1994–2012. Methodologically, I use a spatial modeling approach to test for spillovers in cross-border interbank markets. The results suggest that foreign exposures in banking play a significant role in channeling banking risk: I find that countries that are linked through foreign borrowing or lending positions to more stable banking systems abroad are significantly affected by positive spillover effects. From a policy point of view, this implies that in stable times, linkages in the banking system can be beneficial, while they have to be taken with caution in times of financial turmoil affecting the whole system.     

Mapping the UK interbank system

We present new evidence on the structure of interbank connections across key markets: derivatives, marketable securities, repo, unsecured lending and secured lending. Taken together, these markets comprise two networks: a network of interbank exposures and a network of interbank funding. Network structure varies across and within these two networks, for reasons related to markets’ different economic functions. Credit risk and liquidity risk therefore propagate in the interbank system through different network structures. We discuss the implications for financial stability.     

Do interbank customer relationships exist? And how did they function in the crisis? Learning from Italy

Using 11 years of monthly Italian bank-by-bank data, this paper correlates the bilateral amounts and the identity of each interbank borrower and lender with a long list of explanatory variables. The results show that interbank customer relationships, i.e. stable and strong relationships between pairs of borrowing and lending banks, do exist in Italy, that they persist over time, and that they functioned well during the crisis, enabling the healthier banks to provide and the troubled ones to receive funds.     

Liquidity creation and funding ability during the interbank lending crunch

This study examines the portfolio response of US banks to the interbank lending collapse during the global financial crisis. The paper documents that a bank's response to the collapse of interbank markets is related to whether or not the bank was a net borrower or lender of funds. In particular, we find that typical borrowers had lower loan growth than typical lenders, but that the crisis did not differentially affect borrowers and lenders with respect to loan growth. However, borrowing and lending banks were differentially affected by the crisis in terms of their liquid asset growth. The typical borrowers reduced their liquid asset growth relative to lending banks during the crisis. We interpret this finding as saying that borrowing banks had to reduce their risky asset holdings because access to interbank funds had been reduced. The paper presents analogous analyses of the possible differential response of borrowers and lenders to changes in counterparty risk and lending through the Fed's TAF facility.     

基于复杂网络的同业拆借市场特性研究——以金融危机时期（2007~2009年）数据为例

运用复杂网络的系统科学方法,选用2007~2009年金融危机期间我国同业拆借市场相关数据,构建相应的同业拆借网络对我国同业拆借市场进行实证研究。结果表明：我国同业拆借市场具有典型的小世界和无标度特性,同时,在应对金融危机过程中,同业拆借利率表现出基准利率所具有的市场性和稳定性特点。     

Does Interbank Borrowing Reduce Bank Risk?

In this paper we investigate whether banks that borrow from other banks have lower risk levels. We concentrate on a large sample of Central and Eastern European banks that allows us to explore the impact of interbank lending when exposures are long term and interbank borrowers are small banks. The results of the empirical analysis generally confirm the hypothesis that long-term interbank exposures result in lower risk of the borrowing banks.     

Interbank market failure and macro-prudential policies

This paper analyses the effects of several macro-prudential policy measures on the banking sector and its linkages to the macroeconomy. We employ a dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, in which banks trade excess funds in the interbank lending market. We find that an increase in the liquidity requirement effectively reduces the impact of an interbank shock on the real and financial sector, while an increased capital requirement propagates only through nominal variables as inflation and interest rates. We conclude that stricter liquidity measures which limit inside money creation, dampen the severity of a breakdown in interbank lending. Targeting interbank financing directly through liquidity measures along with a moderate capital requirement generates lower welfare losses. We thereby provide a comprehensive rationale in favor of the regulatory measures in Basel III.     

2007年度全国银行间同业拆借市场交易活跃前100名

根据全国银行间同业拆借中心交易系统对全国银行间同业拆借市场参与者信用拆借交易笔数的年度统计,2007年度全国银行间同业拆借市场交易活跃前100名的机构及排名如下：     

Funding Modes of German Banks: Structural Changes and their Implications

We investigate the funding modes of German banks and the implications for lending and profitability during 1992–2002. We find that at many banks, deposits from customers decrease in relative terms while interbank liabilities increase as a source of funding. We cannot detect a negative impact of the relative decline in deposits on lending. The decreasing ability of banks to collect deposits and the substitution of deposits by interbank liabilities unfavorably affects the net interest result of banks that exhibit a deposit deficit, especially savings banks. Our findings indicate a structural lengthening of the intermediation chain, which has broader implications for the functioning and stability of the financial system.     

Explaining breakdowns in interbank lending: A bilateral bargaining model

The paper provides a simple model for interbank loans. Since interbank trades are usually over-the-counter transactions, we use a bilateral bargaining model and apply the Nash bargaining solution. We determine the threat points and the bargaining frontier of debtor and creditor banks. We ask under which conditions interbank lending will break down.     

Can the U.S. Interbank Market Be Revived?

The U.S. interbank market essentially disappeared as the reserve supply dramatically increased after the 2007–2008 crisis. We build a model to study whether the interbank market can revive if the reserve supply decreases sufficiently. The market may not revive due to balance sheet costs associated with recent banking regulations. Although interbank volume may initially increase as reserves decline from abundant levels, the balance sheet costs may engender changes in market structure that completely replace interbank trading by nonbank lending to banks. This nonmonotonic response could lead to misleading forecasts about future interbank volumes.     

On the efficiency of bilateral interbank insurance

This paper studies banks’ incentives to engage in liquidity cross-insurance. In contrast to previous literature we view interbank insurance as the outcome of bilateral (and non-exclusive) contracting between pairs of banks and ask whether this outcome is socially efficient. Using a simple model of interbank insurance we find that this is indeed the case when insurance takes place through pure transfers. This is even though liquidity support among banks sometimes breaks down, as observed in the crisis of 2007–2008. However, when insurance is provided against some form of repayment (such as is the case, for example, with credit lines), banks have a tendency to insure each other less than the socially efficient amount. We show that efficiency can be restored by introducing seniority clauses for interbank claims or through subsidies that resemble government interbank lending guarantees.     

2007年全国银行间本币市场交易活跃前100名

根据全国银行间同业拆借中心交易系统对全国银行间本币市场参与者信用拆借,债券质押式回购、债券买断式回购,现券买卖,债券远期和利率互换交易六项交易笔数的年度统计,2007年全国银行间本币市场交易活跃前100名的机构及排名如下：     

Corruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing

Building on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299–329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption.     

Interbank contagion risk in China under an ABM approach for network formation

This paper uses an agent-based model to construct an interbank network for the Chinese interbank market using a sample of 299 commercial banks from 2014 to 2019. We analyze the importance and vulnerability of banks using the DebtRank algorithm. Our results show that the Chinese interbank market bears a certain level of systemic risk, especially among lower-tiered banks. The results also show a bank is more vulnerable if it has a higher interbank lending ratio and greater financial connectivity. Meanwhile, a bank is more influential if it has a larger net worth and greater financial connectivity.     

Relationship Banking, Fragility, and the Asset-Liability Matching Problem

We address a fundamental question in relationship banking: whydo banks that make relationship loans finance themselves primarilywith core deposits and when would it be optimal to finance suchloans with purchased money? We show that not only are relationshiploans informationally opaque and illiquid, but they also requirethe relationship between the bank and the borrower to endurein order for the bank to add value. However, the informationalopacity of relationship loans gives rise to endogenous withdrawalrisk that makes the bank fragile. Core deposits are an attractivefunding source for such loans because the bank provides liquidityservices to core depositors and this diminishes the likelihoodof premature deposit withdrawal, thereby facilitating the continuityof relationship loans. That is, we show that banks will wishto match the highest value-added liabilities with the highestvalue-added loans and that doing so simultaneously minimizesthe bank's fragility owing to withdrawal risk and maximizesthe value the bank adds in relationship lending. We also examinethe impact of interbank competition on the bank's asset-liabilitymatching and extract numerous testable predictions.