The Asian crisis: what did we learn and when did we learn it?

This paper steps back from the detail of the Asian crisis, to ask whether the 1997 crisis advanced our broad understanding of the age‐old problem of economic crises. Some immediate lessons were learned from the failures of the crisis‐response in Indonesia, which was the worst‐affected economy. It is notable, however, how little changed to address the ongoing systemic weaknesses. Three areas of unresolved vulnerability can be identified. First, the sudden stops and reversals of international capital flows. Second, the intrinsic fragility of a financial system that borrows short and lends long. Third, unanchored exchange rates, where the market's price‐discovery can take the rate to levels far from equilibrium, for sustained periods. For more than a decade after the Asian crisis, international capital flows continued to be seen as unambiguously beneficial, with any attempts at capital flow management rejected. At a global level, it was not until the 2008 financial crisis that widespread financial fragility was addressed through tighter regulation and higher capital requirements. On exchange rates, misleading advocacy of corner solutions—either pure floating exchange rates or immutable fixed rates—continued in the face of the real‐world experience that sometimes intervention is needed to maintain an exchange rate close to equilibrium.     

Do exchange rate arrangements and capital controls influence international capital flows and housing prices in Asia?

This paper investigates the influence of international capital flows on housing prices in eight Asian countries, including China. We focus on determining whether exchange rate arrangements and capital regulations influence capital inflows and housing prices. Our results show that an arrangement to restrain the fluctuation of the exchange rate and capital controls has the potential to raise housing prices in Asia. The strong prospect of the Chinese yuan's appreciation also pushed up housing prices in China. Another expected reason for the increase in capital inflows into Asian markets is the expansion of global liquidity. Such capital flows often have a sensitive reaction to market sentiment, and an increase in asset market volatility caused by the liquidity squeeze decreases Asian housing prices. These results suggest the need to review capital controls and future exchange rate system options for Asian countries.     

Capital Inflows Problem in Selected Asian Economies in the 1990s Revisited: The Role of Monetary Sterilization*

This paper develops a simple model to examine the reasons behind the capital inflow surges into selected Asian economies in the 1990s prior to the financial crisis of 1997–98. The analytical model shows that persistent uncovered interest differentials and consequent capital inflows may be a result of complete monetary sterilization, perfect capital mobility, sluggish response of interest rates to domestic monetary disequilibrium, or some combination of all three. Using the model as an organizing framework, the paper undertakes a series of related simple empirical tests of the dynamic links between international capital flows, the extent to which they are sterilized and uncovered interest rate differentials in the five crisis‐hit economies (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) over the period 1990:1–1997:5.     

Risk Sensitivity of Bank Stocks in Malaysia: Empirical Evidence Across the Asian Financial Crisis

The present study examines the sensitivity of commercial banks' stock excess returns to their volatility and financial risk factors, measured by interest rates and exchange rates, across the recent Asian financial crisis. In general, we found that there were no significant differences among Malaysian commercial banks in their risk exposure prior to and during the Asian financial crisis. The introduction of selective capital controls, a fixed exchange rate regime and a forced banking consolidation program, however, had increased the risk exposure of both large and small domestic banks. The effects of these risk factors were significantly detected in both large and small banks.     

Fear of Floating Needn't Imply Fixed Rates: An OCA Approach to the Operation of Stable Intermediate Currency Regimes

The criteria of the theory of optimum currency areas suggest that many countries are not good candidates for either of the poles of genuinely fixed exchange rates or freely floating exchange rates. Thus, many countries should have an interest in intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, in a world of substantial capital mobility most forms of intermediate exchange rate regimes have proven to be highly crisis prone. This essay argues that the unholy trinity paradigm doesn't imply that intermediate exchange rate regimes are inherently unstable, but rather that exchange rate and monetary policies need to be jointly determined. The difficulties of maintaining such consistency are as much political as economic since temporarily pegged or managed rates create a time inconsistency problem. It is argued that OCA theory provides the framework for determining the appropriate weights and limits on the amount of sterilized intervention to maintain the consistency between exchange rate and monetary policies necessary to avoid currency crises. The paper also considers a number of the issues involved in integrating this approach with the literature on open economy aspects of inflation targeting.     

A tale of Asian exchange rate management: Romance of the three currencies

Asian currencies lack regional policy coordination and are therefore subject to volatilities such as the Asian currency crisis of 1997/99. As the Asian currencies have already been observed to be ‘flying-in-unison’, a stable exchange rate arrangement can be helpful as the next step of evolution for regional financial stability. We consider that creating a cluster effect from coordinated efforts/policies of policy-makers can lead to regional exchange rate stability. To demonstrate this cluster effect, a three-party-game is computed for an Asian bloc, viz-á-viz US dollar and the Euro, based on a Nash and a cooperative equilibrium. The cluster effect would generate external and internal pressures that work towards the formation of a regional currency, although the exact form of exchange rate regime would have to await political consensus. There are substantial welfare gains within Asia network economy through currency cooperation. The formation of an Asian currency bloc would also create counter-balance to the current dominance of the US dollar and the Euro. Like the epic story of Three Kingdoms who sought hegemony in Chinese history, the Asian currency bloc will contend with many possible outcomes of competition as well as cooperation.     

Some Methodological Issues on Estimating Foreign Exchange Exposure of US Multinational Firms: Evidence from the Asian Crisis

Abstract

This article asks whether sample specification of firm, period, and exchange rate matters in estimating foreign exchange exposure of US multinational firms. By sampling US firms that had Asian sales and assets from 1996 to 1998, we find that the firms’ returns are more likely to be significantly exposed to the Asian-oriented exchange rate changes for the Asian crisis, when the exchange rate changes were unexpectedly sizable. Also, by examining firms’ exposure in the share of Asian sales and assets, we find that the firms are more exposed as their operations are more involved in the Asian region.     

The Asian currency crash: were badly driven fundamentals to blame?

This paper examines the extent to which a number of currencies central to the Asian currency crisis were misaligned at the end of 1996. A well-known fundamentals-based exchange rate model, the monetary approach to exchange rate behavior, is used to produce estimates of equilibrium exchange rates for a number of Asian currencies. The estimates, calculated using panel methods, are shown to be consistent with the underlying model. Most significantly, very little evidence of misalignment is found to exist in 1996. This suggests that the cause of the Asian crash cannot be attributed to traditional fundamentals.     

The Asian currency crash: were badly driven fundamentals to blame?☆

This paper examines the extent to which a number of currencies central to the Asian currency crisis were misaligned at the end of 1996. A well-known fundamentals-based exchange rate model, the monetary approach to exchange rate behavior, is used to produce estimates of equilibrium exchange rates for a number of Asian currencies. The estimates, calculated using panel methods, are shown to be consistent with the underlying model. Most significantly, very little evidence of misalignment is found to exist in 1996. This suggests that the cause of the Asian crash cannot be attributed to traditional fundamentals.     

The East Asian Crisis and International Capital Markets

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical evidence about international capital mobility. The authors find that its potential benefits depend on certain assumptions about market structures and institutions. Many of these conditions were absent in the economies worst affected by volatile capital movements. The main features of the recent East Asian financial crisis are described, and the principal distortions that led to the crisis. In some instances, these distortions were due to government policies; in others, they stemmed from market failures that had not been adequately addressed either by individual governments or by international financial institutions.     

Determinants of bond market development in Asia

One of the major reasons behind the Asian financial crisis in 1997 was the excessive dependence of the Asian economies on commercial banks for domestic financing. The region failed to diversify its sources of corporate financing as it relied mainly on banks since its other types of financing, namely bond markets, were still underdeveloped and their sizes were quite small. On the other hand, the 2008 global financial crisis and the ongoing European debt crisis have led to constraints in acquiring local currency and foreign currency liquidity in the corporate sector in Asia as foreign banks withdrew investments from Asia. Furthermore, Asia needs large long term capital (US$ 750 billion per year for 2010–2020) for developing infrastructure connectivity within and across its economies. Local and regional capital can be channeled for long-term infrastructure projects and other productive investment through bond markets. Having a well-developed local currency bond markets can enhance the resilience of domestic financial sector to external shocks and it can facilitate better intermediation of savings into productive investments in Asia. To enhance corporate bond financing, it is important to examine factors that affect the effective development of bond markets in Asia. The study attempts to identify the determinants of bond market development in Asian economies through examining the relationship of bond issuance with selected key financial and economic factors. It also intends to provide policy recommendations for the further development of the Asian bond market. Major determinants for bond market development in Asia include the size of an economy, the stage of economic development, the openness of an economy, the exchange rate variability, the size of the banking system, and interest rate variability.     

International Capital Mobility in the Short Run and the Long Run: A Daily Data Study for Japan,Singapore and Taiwan*

Using daily data from between 1993 and 2003, covered interest differential and cointegration tests are applied to examine short‐run and long‐run international capital mobility for Japan, Singapore and Taiwan, and, for comparison purposes, the UK. Despite the high short‐run mobility in Japan (Singapore and Taiwan), being slightly (significantly) lower than in the UK, perfect long‐run mobility exists in all three Asian economies, especially when the Asian currency crisis is excluded. Different short‐run and long‐run mobility implies the existence of a response lag in the financial market. As expected, although the impulse response reaches the significant long‐run equilibrium level shortly after the shock in the UK, lagged responses appear in the three Asian economies, particularly in Singapore and Taiwan.     

High‐Frequency Contagion of Currency Crises in Asia*

Using daily data from the Asian currency crisis, the present paper examines high‐frequency contagion effects among six Asian countries. The ‘origin’ (of exchange rate depreciation, or decline in stock prices) and the ‘affected’ (currencies, or stock prices) in the daily spillover relationship were defined and identified. Indonesia is found to be the main origin country, affecting exchange rates of other countries. Contrary to conventional wisdom, evidence of high‐frequency crisis spillover from the Thai exchange rate to other currencies was weak at best. There exists a high‐frequency contagion in stock markets among East Asian countries. Contagion coefficients are positively correlated with trade indices, indicating that investors lower their financial assessment of a country that has trade linkage to a crisis origin country within days, if not hours, of a shock.     

What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis?

The paper explores the view that the Asian currency and financial crises in 1997 and 1998 reflected structural and policy distortions in the countries of the region, even if market overreaction and herding caused the plunge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more severe than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. The first part of the paper provides an overview of economic fundamentals in Asia on the eve of the crisis, with emphasis on current account imbalances, quantity and quality of financial ‘overlending’, banking problems, and composition, maturity and size of capital inflows. The second part of the paper presents a reconstruction of the Asian crisis from the antecedents in 1995–1996 to the recent developments in early 1999 in parallel with a survey of the debate on the strategies to recover from the crisis, the role of international intervention, and the costs and benefits of capital controls.     

Managing the Monetary Consequences of Reserve Accumulation in Emerging Asia

Abstract

The huge increase in international reserve holdings by Asian countries since the 1997 crisis has been one of the most important recent developments on the international financial scene. These buildups have contributed substantially to concerns about the creation of excessive global liquidity. How justified these concerns are depends heavily on the extent to which the reserve accumulating countries have been able to sterilize the effects on their domestic monetary aggregates. We use a unified theoretical framework to undertake dynamic estimations of the magnitude of sterilization and offset coefficients (which measure the degree of capital mobility) for a large set of Asian economies. We find that despite substantial capital mobility there has been a high degree of effective sterilization to date.     

J. Soedradjad Djiwandono,Bank Indonesia and the crisis

Soedradjad Djiwandono, Governor of Bank Indonesia during the critical early months of the Asian crisis, had already written extensively on the period (including in this journal), but this book brings a more comprehensive version of his story to a wider audience. His focus is on central bank issues—the exchange rate, interest rates, capital flows and the insolvency of the banking system—but as these are the defining issues of the crisis, the book provides a rare and valuable contribution to the still-incomplete history of this painful period. This review puts his account in context and offers some commentary on the issues.     

固定汇率下资本账户开放对经济的影响——基于修正的Mundell模型的动态分析

本文拓展了蒙代尔(1960)的模型,并用该模型分析了固定汇率体系下资本账户开放对实际汇率和利率的影响,以及资本完全流动时经济的动态稳定性。本文的主要发现是,随着资本账户的开放,资本流动性的加强将会引起实际汇率和利率相对于初始状态的调整。而且,随着资本账户的放开,国内货币政策越来越受制于外部因素。模型的另一个发现是,当资本完全流动时,固定汇率体系呈现一种稳定的稳态。     

International monetary transmission in East Asia: Floaters,non-floaters,and capital controls

This paper analyzes the impacts of the United States (US) monetary shocks on East Asian countries using structural vector-autoregression (VAR) model. We find that the impacts of the US monetary shocks on East Asian domestic interest rates and exchange rates contradict conventional wisdom. The conventional exchange rate channel is unlikely to play much role in the transmission of the US monetary policy shocks to floaters in East Asian countries, excluding Japan. In these countries, the domestic interest rates respond strongly to the US interest rate changes, by giving up monetary autonomy, probably because of fear of floating. However, the domestic interest rate does not respond much in countries with fixed exchange rate regimes and capital account restrictions, such as China and Malaysia. This may suggest that the countries with fixed exchange rate regimes enjoy a higher degree of monetary autonomy, most likely with the help of capital account restrictions.     

An introduction to problems of economic development in the CMEA countries

Through the Asian financial crisis, many key international economic issues have come to the forefront the stability of the international financial system under the IMF, “Asian values”, the universal validity of the Asian Economic Development Model, China's leadership in the regional world economy, Japan's role in the region, and the immunity of Greater China from the current financial crisis. Currently, most Asian countries seem eager to redress structural problems involving the government sector, banking, and corporate governance. In the process of this full scale restructuring, Korea must reevaluate its economic relationship with Central Asia. This paper argues that Korean financial crisis stems basically from the system failure. Furthermore, since a small open economy carries with it intrinsic vulnerabilities, the government should be more careful in securing optimal foreign exchange, opening capital markets based on the economy's absorption capacity. In this respect, the banking industry should be run based on the profitability of capital. Once banking industries are distorted by the practice of government‐led policy loans, it is more difficult to correct those customized distortions. The banking industry should play a larger role as the “brain of the economy”, sensing abnormalities of the economy. Moreover, in today's increasingly interdependent global economic system, no single country can solve its problems without close coordination of its policy with the outside world. An early warning system to signal financial instability would help developing economies in modernizing and strengthening their domestic financial institutions and would also work as a supplement to the IMF standby fund. Also, human resource management has proven too important to be neglected. Central Asia could derive lessons from the above Asian “failure”, not the Asian “miracle”, to avoid inappropriate policies and to deepen its economic development.     

Causes of the financial crisis and the need of monetary cooperation in East Asia

The Main causes of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997–98 can be divided into domestic and foreign ones. The domestic cause stems from structural and liquidity problems, with growing share of non‐performing loans in the financial sector, posing as the most visible manifestation of such problems. On the other side, there is the foreign cause, the sudden fall of the yen against the dollar under the region's unstable foreign exchange system and also its over‐dependency on the dollar. Unfortunately, these causes have not yet disappeared. In order to prevent another financial economic crisis from recurring and to secure the regional currency stability in the long run, an external safety device is indispensable. The purpose of the East Asian monetary cooperation device is not only to absorb the external shocks caused by abrupt changes in the dollar/yen rate and sudden flow of capital, but also to settle international liquidity problems among the regional countries. If a device for the East Asian monetary cooperation is established, transparency in both financial and physical markets will be augmented and in the process, so will be the stability of financial and physical transactions.