Integration, Fragmentation and the Geography of Welfare

The welfare effects of trade integration with endogenous production technology are examined in a monopolistic competition framework. In addition to explaining industry location, trade patterns and accompanying effects on local welfare, the analysis highlights the endogenous change in the costs of supervising fragmented production when economies open up to trade. By regarding fragmentation as a skill‐intensive activity, factor proportions (rather than size) strongly affect the international distribution of gains from trade. Nevertheless, albeit not generally, for a wide range of parameter values, even a skill‐poor country can participate in the gains—despite loss of industry.     

Globalization,product differentiation,and wage inequality

Abstract This paper develops a two‐country, general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which the degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by firms’ strategic investments in product innovation. Consumers seek variety and product innovation is more skill intensive than production. Stronger import competition increases innovation incentives, and thereby the relative demand for skill. An intra‐industry trade expansion following trade liberalization can therefore increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers. As long as some industries remain shielded from international competition, the welfare implications of globalization are found to be generally ambiguous.     

Differences in the degree of unionization as a source of comparative advantage in open economies

This paper considers two integrated countries that differ only in their labour markets: one country hosts unions, whereas the other one pays competitive wages. These institutional differences are a source of comparative advantage, which crucially impact inter‐industry trade and welfare in the open economy. In this setting, deunionization exerts opposing welfare effects in the two economies. Increasing product market competition is beneficial for the unionized country and detrimental for its trading partner. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong support for the main hypotheses of our theoretical model.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization and the Environment

This paper examines how trade liberalization affects national and global pollution in a multi‐country model incorporating monopolistic competition and intra‐industry trade as well as inter‐industry trade. Each country produces skill‐intensive differentiated goods and labor‐intensive goods. Pollution is a by‐product of production but pollution abatement can be undertaken. Regardless of country characteristics, if the differentiated‐good sector is sufficiently cleaner (dirtier) then, without any change in environmental taxes, a multilateral reduction in import protection accorded to the differentiated good or to both goods typically leads to a decline (rise) in pollution in all countries. Pollution havens tend not to arise.     

DOMESTIC COMPETITION POLICY AND TARIFF POLICY COMPARED*

M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.     

Free Trade versus Autarky under Asymmetric Cournot Oligopoly

The paper compares free trade with autarky in an asymmetric multi‐country world under Cournot competition with constant returns to scale and linear demand. We derive respective conditions under which free trade will hurt a country's consumers, benefit its firms, induce it to export, increase its output and raise its welfare. We show that these conditions are linked in a clear order, with one implying the next. We further demonstrate that free trade can reduce world total output and total consumer surplus as well as world welfare. Along the way, we correct several oversights in the literature.     

Fragmentation and Welfare in Monopolistic Competition

We examine the welfare effect of fragmentation with a general‐equilibrium model of monopolistic competition. Using the efficiency property of monopolistic competition models, we develop a diagram that is used to show that fragmentation of production arises, i.e. firms in a country specialize in developing blueprints and out‐source the manufacturing of their products to the other country. Such fragmentation allows countries to benefit from trade due to two different sources: comparative advantage and product diversity. We show how these two sources result in gains from trade induced by this production fragmentation.     

On Chamberlinian-Ricardian Trade Patterns

This study provides a simple, many‐industry model of trade which emphasizes the interaction between cross‐country technical heterogeneity (i.e., a Ricardian aspect) and monopolistic competition among producers of differentiated products (i.e., a Chamberlinian aspect) as determinants of trade patterns. It is shown that the emergence of intra‐industry trade is crucially dependent on the shape of the technology index schedule, which is obtained as a step‐function.     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

Asymmetric Monotone Comparative Statics for the Industry Compositions

Within a standard model of international trade with heterogenous firms and two asymmetric countries, we derive sufficient conditions for monotone comparative statics (MCS) for the industry composition. This model outcome is defined as first‐order stochastic dominance shifts in the equilibrium distributions of all activities across active firms. MCS for the industry composition occurs in a country that experiences a decline in its costs of serving the foreign market and meanwhile experiences an increase in its level of competition. In the other country, the industry‐level implications are exactly opposite. These clear industry‐level results hold while firms respond asymmetrically to the trade shock.     

Deconstructing the Gains from Trade: Selection of Industries vs Reallocation of Workers

In a Ricardian model with general distributions of industry efficiencies, the welfare gains from trade can be decomposed into a selection and a reallocation effect. The former is the change in average efficiency as a result of the selection of industries that survive international competition. The latter is the rise in the weight of exporting industries in production, owing to the reallocation of workers from non‐exporting industries. This decomposition, which is hard to calculate in the general case, simplifies dramatically with Fréchet‐distributed efficiencies, providing easy‐to‐quantify model‐based measures of these two effects. Selection (reallocation) turns out to matter mostly when welfare gains are small (large).     

Welfare effects of competition for FDI between technologically asymmetric countries with varying trade costs

Given the traditional argument that host countries' excessive competition for FDI (foreign direct investment) deteriorates the host countries' welfare, this paper examines the impact of policy competition for FDI on social welfare considering varying trade costs. Based on a model where two technologically asymmetric countries compete for FDI, we determine an equilibrium where a multinational firm relocates to a less efficient country. Moreover, we demonstrate that the policy competition for FDI between less integrated economies might improve social welfare when the multinational firm relocates to a country with a lower technology and a less competitive market. Nonetheless, we show that the traditional argument can be true when the policy competition for FDI between highly integrated economies deteriorates host countries' welfare, as supported by the empirical evidences of moderated competition for FDI within EU member countries.     

Spillovers from Foreign Exporters

We develop a general equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous firms that accounts for productivity spillovers transmitted by foreign exporters. Everything else equal, stronger spillovers increase welfare. We embed the model framework into a trade policy scenario where countries strategically set inter‐country variable trade costs for the trading partner. In the strategic Nash‐equilibrium policy, governments trade‐off welfare gains from protectionism and those that are due to spillovers from foreign exporters. The equilibrium degree of protectionism is decreasing in the strength of the spillover. Policy coordination induces welfare gains but these gains can be hump‐shaped in the spillover strength.     

Who benefits from China’s coal subsidy policies? A computable partial equilibrium analysis

Using a computable partial equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and based on global coal production, trade and consumption data in 2014, this study simulates the economic and welfare impacts of China’s coal subsidies at the industry level. Simulation results show that, first, the government’s subsidies have greatly promoted China's coal output, but may aggravate the overcapacity in China’s coal industry. Second, China's coal subsidies have significant trade destruction effects and its coal imports fall by more than 20% annually. Third, if considering the environmental cost, China's coal subsidies cause not only huge net welfare loss to China, but also harm to the global environment, thus no country benefits from China's coal subsidies.     

Maximum-revenue tariffs versus free trade

Welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is compared to free-trade welfare under Cournot duopoly with differentiated products; under Bertrand duopoly with differentiated products; and under perfect competition in the case of a large country able to affect its terms of trade. Under Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, assuming linear demands and constant marginal costs, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff is always higher than free-trade welfare. Under perfect competition, assuming linear demand and supply, welfare with the maximum-revenue tariff will be higher than free-trade welfare if the country has sufficient market power.     

考虑港口收费管制的进出口贸易竞争研究

考虑港口的收费管制因素,建立了进出口贸易竞争模型。该模型由一个出口国和两个进口国组成,且各国都拥有一个港口,位于出口国的两家公司均向两个进口国销售商品,并在各个进口国展开市场竞争（古诺竞争或伯川德竞争）,各贸易国的港口根据其是否存在价格管制确定港口收费。针对进出口公司的每种竞争模式,得到了不同的港口收费管制组合下各贸易国的港口收费、港口利润和社会福利,并将竞争均衡结果进行了比较。研究发现： （1）在进出口公司古诺竞争模式下,若三个贸易国的港口都无收费管制（有收费管制）且进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,各贸易国的社会福利和港口利润均更高; （2）在进出口公司伯川德竞争模式下,若进出口产品的差异较大 （小）,则出口国的港口利润主要取决于港口收费 （贸易量）,而进口国恰好相反; （3）当进出口产品的差异较大 （小）时,进出口公司在古诺 （伯川德）竞争模式下各贸易国的社会福利、港口利润以及港口使用费都更高。     

PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS AND FALLING TRADE COSTS: BOON OR BANE?*

This article looks at two features of globalization, namely, productivity improvements and falling trade costs, and explores their effect on welfare in a monopolistic competition model with heterogenous firms and technological asymmetries. Contrary to received wisdom, and for reasons different from adverse terms of trade effects, it is shown that improvements in a partner's productivity must hurt us. Moreover, falling trade costs can raise welfare in the technologically advanced country while reducing it in the backward one, if technological asymmetries are large enough.     

An Eaton–Kortum model of trade and growth

We combine a multi‐country, continuum‐good Ricardian model of Eaton and Kortum (2002) with a multi‐country AK model of Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) to examine how trade liberalization affects countries' growth rates and extensive margins of trade over time. Focusing on the three‐country case, we obtain three main results. First, a permanent fall in any trade cost raises the balanced growth rate. Second, trade liberalization increases the liberalizing countries' long‐run fractions of exported varieties to all destinations. Third, the long‐run effects of trade liberalization are different from its short‐run effects, which can reverse the welfare implications of the static Eaton–Kortum model.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.