COMPLEMENTARY MEASURES TO FOREIGN AID: TAIWAN AND THE PRC UNDER DIPLOMATIC RIVALRY

The competition on foreign aid, as a means for securing foreign policy and other benefits by the donor, can lead to diplomatic rivalry. This article utilizes a game theoretic model to analyze the existing rivalry for foreign aid and international status between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. Similar to the role of political contributions in the public choice theory, foreign aid is taken a means of international lobbying, to realize the donor's objective. Research results, based on the policy effect consideration, indicates that the equilibrium aid policy, which is endogenously determined, renders an inability on the part of the donors, which affects the recipient's optimal foreign policy. How does a donor obtain favorable outcomes when such rivalry exists? Strengthening diplomatic endeavors to realize the access effect has been proved an effective method. Analytical results have shown that this method not only complements aid rivalry but also increases the welfare of the donor.     

DEMOCRATIC AID AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF RECIPIENTS

We investigate whether democratic aid flows, which are directed toward the democratization of recipients by covering democracy‐related programs and government and civil society activities, affect the future political regime of recipient countries. We introduce a multinomial multivariate logit model and we use 5‐yr averaged data covering the period 1972–2004 for 59 democracy aid‐recipient countries categorized into three broad classes according to the prevalent political regime. We find strong evidence that democratic aid flows are positively associated with the likelihood of observing a partly democratic or a fully democratic political regime in democratic aid‐recipient countries and that this result is robust to the potential endogeneity of democratic assistance.(JEL D70, F35, C25)     

AID, ECONOMIC FREEDOM, AND GROWTH

Foreign aid has often been intended by donors to entice recipient nations into policy and institutional reforms favorable to private sector economic development. In this study, we investigate the relationship between aid and changes to economic freedom in recipient nations over the 1990–2000 decade. The evidence is mixed. In general, we find that foreign aid has no significant effect on economic freedom overall. However, using a hedonic approach on the different categories of economic freedom, we find that aid has still managed to contribute toward a policy and institutional environment favorable to growth, as the different categories of economic freedom improved by aid more than offset those which are harmed by aid, in terms of their impact on growth . ( JEL 010, 019)     

FOREIGN AID,TERRORISM AND GROWTH: CONDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM QUANTILE REGRESSION

In this study, we investigate the role of development assistance in reducing a hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on economic growth, using a panel of 78 developing nations with data for the period 1984–2008. The empirical evidence is based on interactive quantile regressions. Domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics are employed while development assistance measurements comprised bilateral and multilateral aid variables. With regard to the investigated hypothesis, we consistently confirm that: (i) In quantiles where terrorism is found to increase (decrease) economic growth, its interaction with foreign aid decreases (increases) economic growth. (ii) Comparing thresholds of the modifying aid variables for which the hypothesis is either rejected or accepted reveals that higher levels of multilateral (bilateral) aid are needed to reverse the negative effect of total (unclear) terrorism on growth, than the quantity needed to reverse the positive impact of transnational (domestic and total) terrorism(s) on growth. (iii) There is scant evidence of positive net effects. Overall the findings broadly indicate that foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for completely dampening the effects of terrorism on economic growth.     

Foreign aid and governance in Africa

This paper investigates the effect of foreign aid on governance in order to extend the debate on foreign aid and to verify common positions from Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’, Collier’s ‘Bottom Billion’ and Eubank’s ‘Somaliland’. The empirical evidence is based on updated data from 52 African countries for the period 1996–2010. An endogeneity robust instrumental variable Two-Stage-Least Squares empirical strategy is employed. The findings reveal that development assistance deteriorates economic (regulation quality and government effectiveness) and institutional (corruption-control and rule of law) governance, but has an insignificant effect on political (political stability, voice and accountability) governance. While, these findings are broadly in accordance with Moyo and Collier on weak governance, they neither confirm the Eubank position on political governance nor the Asongu stance on the aid-corruption nexus in a debate with Okada and Samreth. The use of foreign aid as an instrument to influence the election and replacement of political leaders in Africa may have insignificant results. It is time to solve the second tragedy of foreign aid and that economists and policy makers start rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is used to influence economic, institutional and political governance in recipient countries.     

WHAT DO CITIZENS THINK ABOUT PUBLIC ENTERPRISES? SUBJECTIVE SURVEY DATA ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC SECTOR

We analyse the legitimacy of public enterprises that perform economic activities by focusing on the citizens’ subjective preferences, i.e. determining their political legitimacy. Using data from a representative survey conducted among 318 citizens of the German state of Rhineland‐Palatine, we explore determinants for the support of either privatisation efforts or the instrumental thesis, a widespread principle in German‐speaking countries, which considers public enterprises solely as instruments to fulfil economic policy objectives. Our results indicate that the respondents’ perception of the efficiency of public enterprises as well as their personal economic situation are important factors for the support of privatisation. The influential factors for the use of public enterprises as policy instruments are political ideology, the perception of a higher security of supplying goods and services as well as opinions regarding corporate social responsibility. The subjective preferences of a (democratic) country's citizens are thus an important reason why the public sector should or should not play an active part in providing goods and services. This can play an important role when decision makers from the public sector are keen to take into account the citizens’ approval or disapproval of privatisation measures.     

THE IMPLICATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION SUGAR PRICE CUTS, ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT AID FOR FIJI

The objective of this paper is to use a set of varied scenarios related to the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the loss of European Union (EU) sugar preferences (in the form of partial and full price liberalization) in combination with the recently committed EU development aid to examine the impact on Fiji using a dynamic computable general equilibrium model. It is shown that without aid, the loss of sugar preferences has devastating impact on real output, exports, rural employment, and other macroeconomic indicators. Without aid, the EPA scenarios, on the other hand, lead to some growth in real output but depress rural employment and non-sugar agricultural exports. Although improvements are observed across the scenarios with aid, it is argued that aid would be more effective if it directly addresses the supply-side constraints in Fiji instead of focusing on the sugar sector. ( JEL C68, D58, F17, O56)     

CONDITIONING AID ON SOCIAL EXPENDITURES

Aid conditionality forces countries to adopt policies that they would not otherwise choose. We examine how government discretion should be so constrained when the donor cannot fully control public expenditures, but instead can influence a less disaggregated indicator of public policy, namely the allocation of public spending between the social sectors (e.g. education, health, etc.) on the one hand and more traditional public goods (e.g. infrastructure) on the other. We first show how budget allocations will be altered when recipient government preferences are known – i.e. we characterize what policies the donor should "buy"– and how a given aid budget should be allocated between different types of countries. When recipient government preferences are not known by the donor, the permitted policies are distorted due to incentive constraints, and the extent to which aid flows are optimally differentiated between different countries is reduced.     

IDENTIFYING THE EFFECTS OF SIMULTANEOUS MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS

Many central banks, particularly in the developing world, aim for exchange rate stability as a macroeconomic goal. However, most are reluctant to relinquish monetary policy autonomy, so they end up operating through both interest rate and foreign exchange interventions. But the use of multiple policy instruments does not necessarily equip monetary authorities with better tools to achieve their targets. On the contrary, their effects can potentially offset each other. Using daily data from the Central Bank of Colombia during the period of 1999–2012, I study the effects of simultaneous policies by first deriving new measures of monetary shocks and then determining their impact on economic activity. The main findings indicate that (a) while interest rate interventions have a significant impact on real and nominal variables, foreign exchange interventions tend to have limited effects; and (b) empirical anomalies, such as the positive relationship between output growth, inflation, and the policy rate are eliminated when properly accounting for the systematic responses of policy. (JEL E43, E52, E58, F31)     

Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?

This paper studies the pattern of allocation of foreign aid from various donors to receiving countries. We find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is dictated as much by political and strategic considerations, as by the economic needs and policy performance of the recipients. Colonial past and political alliances are major determinants of foreign aid. At the margin, however, countries that democratize receive more aid, ceteris paribus. While foreign aid flows respond to political variables, foreign direct investments are more sensitive to economic incentives, particularly good policies and protection of property rights in the receiving countries. We also uncover significant differences in the behavior of different donors.     

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: SOME LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD

The accelerating United States trade deficit has again focused widespread political attention on industrial policy issues. However, given the breadth and complexity of the industrial policy issues, we can be confident that strengthening the U.S. international trade position will not be sufficient to quell concern over this area of economic policy.     

PERSISTENT IDEOLOGY AND THE DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC POLICY OVER TIME*

This article investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico‐economic equilibria. To this end, I develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals’ intertemporal choice, and the evolution of political constituency. My main finding is that a right‐wing ideology may increase the size of government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countries confirm that after controlling for the partisan effect, there is a positive relationship between the right‐wing political constituency and government size. This is consistent with my theoretical prediction, but hard to explain by existing theories.     

Re-examining the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid: does political stability matter?

While past studies had conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of foreign aid on growth and development of a nation, recent studies have tried to delve deeper into the question, ‘what makes aid work?’ (see, Dutta, Leeson, and Williamson, 2013; Burnside and Dollar, 2000, 2004; Svensson, 1999). This paper tests how political stability (vis-à-vis political instability) affects the relationship between domestic investment and foreign aid. Applying dynamic panel estimators, our results show that political stability affects aid’s effectiveness on domestic capital formation. The paper considers alternative measures of political stability (vis-à-vis instability), focusing on the political characteristics of a system that have the potential to make a nation stable. Political stability affects policy selection by the government positively and, thus, public resources such as foreign aid are put to the desired use. The estimated marginal impacts show that foreign aid enhances domestic investment in the presence of a stable political climate, but there is a diminishing return to aid.     

INTEREST GROUPS AND ECONOMIC POLICY: EXPLAINING THE PATTERN OF PROTECTION IN THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

This article examines the determinants of the pattern of protection across products in the Brazilian agricultural sector from 1969 to 1989. Three key determinants of policy are explored: interest group pressure, government objectives, and structural change associated with economic crisis and a change in political regime. The principal agricultural policies are analyzed, and nominal protection coefficients (NPCs) and producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) are calculated. When NPCs are used as the dependent variable, econometric results indicate that interest group characteristics such as group size were an important determinant of the pattern of protection. With PSEs, government efforts to raise tax revenues, generate foreign exchange, and control inflation played a more significant role. The results of this paper suggest that future studies of the political economy of protection should pay more attention to the specification of the dependent variable because the conclusions can depend crucially on this choice.     

THE POLITICS OF PRECOMMITMENT WITH ELECTORAL UNCERTAINTY AND TRANSACTION COSTS

Despite the lack of legal channels through which binding commitments can be made by the government, economic and political factors enable it to affect future outcomes. In practice, large transaction costs are associated with any significant change of policy, and therefore the current government can adopt policies so that certain outcomes are more likely to be realized by its successor. In this paper it is argued that transaction costs combined with electoral uncertainty are likely to drive the current government to adopt a policy which is extreme relative to the preferences of the existing political parties. This policy is adopted in order to ensure that due to transaction costs, the future government will not depart radically from the most preferred policy of the current government. If the current policy is likely to affect the election outcome, then, in addition to the above considerations, the electorate attitudes would have to be taken into account by the government. Hence, the current government confronts two factors in choosing its policies: the behavior of the future government and the behavior of the electorate. The interplay between the two factors determines the choice of the current policy.     

河南省新农村建设中的思想政治工作浅析

农村思想政治工作在河南省新农村建设中占有重要地位。近年来,河南省农村思想政治工作在硬件建设、队伍结构、工作方式、工作效果等方面取得了一定成绩,但还存在思想认识缺位、相关投入不足、机制不够完善、文化阵地不足、队伍建设滞后、工作方式陈旧、理想信念淡化、观念意识落后等问题。要解决这些问题,就必须提高河南省农村思想政治工作中基层领导干部的思想认识,增加经济投入和政策支持,完善思想政治工作机制、注重思想政治工作普及性,健全思想政治干部队伍、讲究思想政治工作针对性,创新思想政治工作理念、提高思想政治工作趣味性,提高农村思想政治工作的地位、调动基层干部工作积极性。农村思想政治工作奖是今后一段时间内推动河南省农村思想政治工作的关键     

Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange

Regressions on data from 1948 to 1979 indicate that the US and the Soviet Union used foreign aid to stimulate international political support from the receivers of aid and that aid receivers allocated their political support to stimulate aid from these donors. The regressions are based on a game theoretical model in which aid donors provide aid to reach foreign policy goals and in which aid receivers in return give political support to the donors so as to raise foreign aid. With foreign policy ambitions, aid should be given the countries with low GDP levels, while if altruistic considerations determine aid, countries with low levels of GDP per capita should be the beneficiaries. Since foreign aid to some extent was the result of cold war rivalry, the changes in international relations which occurred with the fall of the Soviet Union, should lower total foreign aid.     

HIGH-SKILLED MIGRATION AND THE EXERTION OF EFFORT BY THE LOCAL POPULATION

The optimal design of immigration policy is a topical issue, both in the policy debate and the economic literature. In this paper, we present empirical evidence from a firm level dataset collected in 2000 on the demand for high-skilled workers, including foreign workers, in Europe and its determinants. Our major findings are that the fraction of high-skilled workers recruited from the international labour market is very small, and that foreign and domestic workers are very similar in terms of their formal education (measured by specialization subject) and their job characteristics. We suggest an efficiency wage model to explain why firms recruit foreign workers in small numbers, and why they are willing to pay immigrants the same wage as local workers, whilst at the same time also paying for their moving costs, despite the similar human capital profile of immigrants to domestic workers.     

Promoting Trade Liberalization: Theoretical Analysis of Foreign Aid as Prize

We investigate whether foreign aid can be used to induce trade policy reforms. We develop a two‐period political economic model where promise of aid in period 2 depends on chosen tariff in period 1. We consider three scenarios depending on whether the donor is passive/active and whether the two governments move simultaneously or sequentially. We find a sufficient condition for unconditional aid to increase the level of optimal tariff, and the possibility of unconditional aid increasing optimal tariff decreases when the donor is active rather than passive.     

Foreign aid preferences and perceptions in donor countries

We present original survey data on preferences for foreign aid in 24 donor countries from 2005 to 2008. On publicly-funded foreign aid (Official Development Assistance, or ODA), we find patterns that are consistent with a standard model of democratic policy formation, in which donations are treated as a pure public good. Controlling for perceptions of current ODA, we show that individual preferences for ODA are (i) negatively correlated with relative income within a country-year; and (ii) positively correlated with inequality at the country level. We extend the analysis to explain variation in the gap between desired aid and actual ODA, arguing that lobbying by high-income special interest groups can divert resources away from the median voter’s preferred level of aid. Consistent with this, we observe that ODA is significantly lower where policymakers are more susceptible to lobbying. Finally, we present a novel test of competing “crowding out” hypotheses. Self-reported private aid donations are negatively correlated with actual ODA, and positively correlated with perceived ODA. This finding is consistent with an emerging argument in the literature, whereby ODA crowds out private aid by enabling charities to forego fundraising activities and crowds in private aid through a signaling channel.