TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, INFORMATION AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC GROUPS

A domestic ratification game nested within an international bargaining game establishes that domestic politics influences the outcome of international negotiations. When information on the domestic side is incomplete, an informational role of lobbies is established. Cooperation is more likely when domestic lobbies provide information to Congress about a treaty presented for ratification, especially when cooperation would not otherwise occur. As government becomes more divided, cooperation is less likely; when it does occur, the legislature is better off – internal divisions worsen the external leverage of states, while a united home front is the executive's best chance for obtaining her ideal agreement.     

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY: SOME LESSONS FROM THE U.S. AND ABROAD

The accelerating United States trade deficit has again focused widespread political attention on industrial policy issues. However, given the breadth and complexity of the industrial policy issues, we can be confident that strengthening the U.S. international trade position will not be sufficient to quell concern over this area of economic policy.     

THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro-labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro-capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left- and right-leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left-leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right-leaning governments.     

美国对华贸易政策的决策和形成因素-以PNTR议案投票结果为例的政治经济分析

本文运用贸易政治经济学的分析框架,对2000年美国国会投票表决是否给予中国永久性正常贸易关系(PNTR)地位这一事件进行经验检验,以此来分析国会议员的投票行为(直接决定了对华贸易政策的形成)受哪些因素影响,并指出这些影响因素的重要程度。通过分析,我们得出如下结论:美国对华贸易政策是政府和利益集团共同作用的均衡结果,议员的个人因素在政策的决策过程中几乎不能发生任何作用,经典贸易模型所预测的不同群体对贸易自由化的态度不能完全被议案的投票结果所证实。     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PEEL'S REPEAL OF THE CORN LAWS

The repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain in 1846 has been much debated as to whether interest groups or ideology contributed most to this policy reform. This paper examines a conventional view that Sir Robert Peel, in proposing repeal, converted from protection to free trade under the influence of the ideas of political economy. It is shown that economic ideas had a crucial influence on Peel, but that he remained skeptical of political economy as a doctrine.     

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE EFFICIENCY OF COMPENSATION FOR TAKINGS

To assess compensation for regulation-induced "takings," the authors model political support for regulation as a function of externalities, landowner wealth, and tax burdens. When competing social interests have equal influence on political outcomes, compensation should not be paid. However, when environmentalists and property owners have unequal influence, the model yields several counterintuitive implications. For example, disenfranchised environmentalists should support takings compensation, since it reduces landowner opposition to regulation. The authors also show how compensation rules can limit the deadweight social costs of income transfers, while recognizing their effects on regulator and landowner behavior. (JEL K11 , D72 , L51 )     

THE NONPROFIT SECTOR OF THE U.S. ECONOMY: A METHODOLOGICAL STATEMENT

United States input-output accounts identify and measure the interrelationships between the various industries in the United States economy. However, these accounts do not identify nonprofit activities from their for-profit counterparts in the service-producing sector. This paper, prepared by Gabriel Rudney and Paula Young, presents the methodology and summary data produced by disaggregating the service-producing industries to identify separately nonprofit activities.
The input-output accounts for 1977 produced in this study include 107 industries, but in this paper the results are summarized into 14 industries showing only nonprofit and for-profit components. The GNP and total outputs in this study are consistent with the revised input-output accounts for 1977 prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS

In Leachman et al. (2005) we use the multicointegration approach to test for sustainable fiscal budgeting processes in a stochastic setting in 15 industrialized countries. In this paper, we extend the analysis in order to rank these same countries as well as an additional three, according to the degree to which their budget processes are sustainable. Rankings are related to theories regarding the political economy of budget deficits. Evidence clearly indicates that fiscal performance is better where fiscal budgeting institutions are strong. Additionally, we find that in conjunction with fiscal strength, greater degrees of federalism positively affect intertemporal budget management.     

ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION*

In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions.     

SALMON STOCK VARIABILITY AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON TREATY

Since the mid-1970s, changes in the marine environment along the west coast of North America and in the Northeastern Pacific appear to have greatly enhanced the productivity of Alaskan salmon runs while contributing to declining runs of some salmon spawning in Washington, Oregon, and California. These inverse fluctuations in northern and southern salmon stocks may have aggravated a recent break-down in cooperation between the United States and Canada in setting harvest allocations under the Pacific Salmon Treaty. This paper examines the establishment of fishing regimes by the Pacific Salmon Commission. A game theoretic model is used to analyze the possible contribution of stock variability to the current conflict. Shifts in the parties' incentives to manage the fishery cooperatively, together with significant transaction costs, explain much of the recent difficulty in negotiating mutually acceptable fishing regimes. The paper concludes by addressing the question of whether the regime-setting process can be made more resilient to such stresses.     

地方政府债务理论：国内外研究比较与国内研究展望

国外地方政府债务的研究伴随着财政联邦主义理论的出现而开始受到学者关注,无论在研究内容,还是在研究方法上,都形成了系统的体系和严密的逻辑。国内地方政府债务研究从21世纪初开始进入学者的视野,并在美国金融危机和欧洲债务危机爆发后成为理论界的热点研究领域。与国外研究相比,国内研究尚未建立起或运用鲜明的逻辑,研究的深度还需加强,研究方法也存在较大差距。基于国内研究的不足与差距,本文提出了国内地方政府债务研究展望,包括债务形成与发展的动态考察,债务规模决定因素的定量研究,债务可持续性分析与融资平台研究,债务管理的制度安排与体系设计。