The value of institutions for financial markets: evidence from emerging markets

This paper investigates the value of political institutions for financial markets, using panel data from emerging market countries. We test the hypothesis that changes in political institutions, such as improvements in democratic rights and increased government accountability, have a direct effect on sovereign interest rate spreads. We find that financial markets value institutions over and above the economic and fiscal outcomes these institutions shape. Democracy and accountability generally lower sovereign spreads, political risk tends to increase them, and financial markets view election years negatively.     

China and the world financial markets 1870–1939: Modern lessons from historical globalization1

In this article we review the development of Chinese capital markets over a crucial period in the history of markets worldwide, and place that development in context. Despite fundamental differences between China today and China 100 years ago, it is still important to consider the effects of an imbalance between domestic and international investor markets, and the mismatch between domestic and foreign expectations about investor protection. The lessons of the last century suggest that China today should consider opening Chinese investor access to foreign capital markets in order to equilibrate the level of diversification between foreign and domestic investors. In addition, our analysis suggests that protecting of domestic corporate investor rights is at least as important as protecting foreign investor rights.     

Monetary Union, institutions and financial market integration: Italy, 1862–1905

Years into the single currency, EMU financial markets are not fully integrated. We argue that the phenomenon can be better understood by looking at financial markets’ behavior in the wake of Italy’s monetary unification (1862). Variables such as the spread of the telegraph, trade volumes, and the diffusion of the ‘single currency’ fail to explain why it took 25 years for prices across regional stock exchanges to converge. A single Italian financial market appeared only when the State prevailed upon local vested interests by enforcing nation-wide financial market legislation.     

The liquidity of the London capital markets, 1825–70†

This article examines the liquidity of the London capital markets in the decades following the liberalization of UK incorporation law. Using comprehensive stock and bond data, we calculate a measure of market liquidity for the period 1825–70. We find that stock market liquidity trended upwards but bond market liquidity did not increase over the sample period. Stock market liquidity during our sample period was partially influenced by the bond market, rather than fluctuations in economic output. In our analysis of the cross‐sectional determinants of individual stock liquidity, we find that firm size and the number of issued shares were important determinants of liquidity.  Finally, we find little evidence of an illiquidity premium, which is consistent with the view that investors did not price liquidity in this nascent market.