She'‐e‐os: gender effects and investor reactions to the announcements of top executive appointments

This study uses Kanter's token status theory to link announcements of top executives to shareholder reactions, highlighting possible gender effects. Using a sample of top executive announcements from 1990 to 2000, our results show that investor reactions to the announcements of female CEOs are significantly more negative than those of their male counterparts. Furthermore, women who have been promoted from within a firm are viewed more positively than women who come from outside. To supplement our analysis of investor reactions, we also analyze the text of popular press articles surrounding the announcements of male and female CEOs. These results show that articles about the appointment of a female CEO tend to emphasize gender, gender‐related and other job or organizational considerations. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive Compensation and Ethnic Minority Status

We examine the compensation of ethnic minority executives in listed U.S. firms. The total pay of African American executives is 9 percent lower than that earned by Caucasians. This is due to lower base salary, lower bonus, and lower restricted stock grants. The lower bonus is due to a lower sensitivity to above‐average firm performance. African Americans also earn significantly less on the exercise of stock options, increasing the pay gap to 17 percent for total ex‐post pay. In contrast to African Americans, the compensation of Hispanic and Asian executives is comparable to Caucasians.     

Major Matters: A Comparison of the Within‐Major Gender Pay Gap across College Majors for Early‐Career Graduates

I use data from the 1993 National Survey of College Graduates and appended 1990 Census on about 11,000 men and women college graduates (8400 with bachelor's degrees only, and 2800 with graduate degrees) who earned degrees in a 5‐year period (1984–1988), to address questions regarding the link between college major and early‐career gender pay differentials. I look at within‐major gender pay differentials for two groups of college graduates: those whose highest degrees are bachelor's and those who hold graduate degrees. Among those whose highest degrees are bachelor's, I find that within‐major gender pay penalties are virtually zero for professional majors. Gender pay penalties are large for general studies majors: social sciences, history, and humanities, and business administration (except accounting). For these, jobs account for a large portion of the unexplained gap. Among individuals who hold graduate degrees, I find that within‐major gender pay penalties are zero for all fields. My findings suggest that pay penalties to women in the aggregate can be traced to relatively large penalties in a couple of key fields (bachelor's degree–level general studies fields): social sciences and humanities, and business administration (except accounting). These findings are important, as they contradict the prevailing view. Existing empirical research suggests that women are uniformly disadvantaged compared to men regardless of field of study and, thus, field of study explains little or none of the gender gap in pay. I conclude that supply‐side mechanisms are important factors in producing gender inequality among college graduates, and suggest that we further focus our attention on the “supply side” in understanding segregation and gender pay inequality.     

Salary increases for the marketing executive

This article discusses how marketing executives view their pay raise. A study of 491 marketing executives examined their views on what is a meaningful salary increase and the reasons why their companies give pay raises.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Gender Pay Gap for Private‐Sector Employees in Canada and Britain

The gender earnings differentials for private‐sector employees in Britain and Canada are similar, substantial and significant. Using linked employer–employee data, we show that women are more likely to be employed in low‐wage workplaces than men in both counties. After accounting for the workplace, women continue to earn less than comparable men. Although men and women face a more equal pay structure within their workplace than they do across workplaces, a substantial portion of the gender pay gap in both countries remains unexplained by the individual characteristics or workplace effects considered in this study.     

Who gets the carrot and who gets the stick? Evidence of gender disparities in executive remuneration

This paper offers a new explanation of the gender pay gap in leadership positions by examining the relationship between managerial bonuses and company performance. Drawing on findings of gender studies, agency theory, and the leadership literature, we argue that the gender pay gap is a context‐specific phenomenon that results partly from the fact that company performance has a moderating impact on pay inequalities. Employing a matched sample of 192 female and male executive directors of U.K.‐listed firms, we corroborate the existence of the gender pay disparities in corporate boardrooms. In line with our theoretical predictions, we find that bonuses awarded to men are not only larger than those allocated to women, but also that managerial compensation of male executive directors is much more performance‐sensitive than that of female executives. The contribution of attributional and expectancy‐related dynamics to these patterns is highlighted in line with previous work on gender stereotypes and implicit leadership theories such as the romance of leadership. Gender differences in risk taking and confidence are also considered as potential explanations for the observed pay disparities. The implications of organizations' indifference to women's performance are examined in relation to issues surrounding the recognition and retention of female talent. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organizational‐Level Gender Dissimilarity and Employee Commitment

This study explores the extent to which gender dissimilarity in the workplace affects employees' commitment to their organization, using data from the British (1998) Workplace Employee Relations Survey. The results showed that the effects of organizational‐level gender dissimilarity on organizational commitment were more complex than has commonly been assumed in the literature. The relationship between organizational‐level gender dissimilarity and employee commitment was U‐shaped for women whereas it was not significant for men. The relationship was moderated by the respondents' status as measured by their level of pay. For men, the relationship between gender dissimilarity and commitment was negative for high‐paid individuals but not for low‐paid ones, while for women the U‐shaped relationship was weaker for high‐paid individuals than for low‐paid individuals.     

CEO political ideologies and pay egalitarianism within top management teams

Research summary : We examine the influence of CEO and compensation committee liberalism on top management teams (TMT ) pay arrangements. Given that politically liberal individuals tend to value egalitarianism, we test whether firms with liberal CEO s tend to (1) reduce pay dispersion among non‐CEO executives; and (2) reduce pay gaps between CEO and non‐CEO executives, and whether compensation committee liberalism moderates these relationships. We find some evidence of a direct effect of CEO liberalism on TMT pay arrangements as well as some interaction between CEO and compensation committee liberalism on the pay arrangements. This study provides a better understanding of the antecedents of TMT pay arrangements and empirical evidence showing the influence of values at the top of organization . Managerial summary : Do the values of the CEO and compensation committee influence the pay of other top managers? Our study provides evidence that political ideology affects top manager pay. We examine whether CEO liberalism produces more egalitarian pay arrangements among top managers, and whether the liberalism of the compensation committee affects that relationship. We find that CEO liberalism reduces differences in the total pay among top managers, but does not influence the difference between CEO total pay and the total pay of top managers. We also find that compensation committee liberalism strengthens the negative influence of CEO liberalism on differences in total pay among top managers. Finally, we find that CEO liberalism reduces the difference between CEO bonus pay and the bonus pay of other top managers . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

转轨经济下管理层权力影响高管-员工薪酬差距的研究

企业高管薪酬一直是学术界热议的话题之一,近几年学者把目光更多地放在了研究高管薪酬与普通员工薪酬差距的方面。产品市场竞争作为一种非标准的外部治理机制,正日益受到越来越多学者的关注。本文以2006-2010年我国上市公司为研究样本,对企业内高管与普通员工薪酬差距越来越大的现象进行实证研究。结果表明,在国有企业中,管理层权力对薪酬差距的影响大于非国有企业,而产品市场竞争程度在非国有企业中对薪酬差距扩大有较好的缓解作用。在产品市场竞争越激烈、管理层权力越高的国有企业,高管与普通员工薪酬的差距依然很大。     

Revisiting the gender gap in CEO compensation: Replication and extension of Hill,Upadhyay, and Beekun's (2015) work on CEO gender pay gap

Research Summary: The increasing number of women chief executives motivates considerable interest in examining possible gender differences in CEO compensation. Recently, Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun reported that female CEOs receive greater compensation than male CEOs, which runs counter to common wisdom that the gender pay gap in the labor market favors men over women. With the goal of contributing to cumulative knowledge development in this area, we seek to reexamine Hill et al.'s finding about gender differences in CEO compensation by extending the analyses further in time, using a larger sample of firms and more rigorous empirical analyses. Our findings, which are robust to different statistical procedures and econometric specifications, do not reveal reliable evidence for differences in compensation paid to male and female CEOs. Managerial Summary : For years, a lively debate has centered on the issue of gender pay gap. The ubiquity of the pay gap between men and women has recently been questioned by Hill et al. who identify the chief executive officer (CEO) role as a workplace position where women receive greater compensation than men. Our investigation examines whether women CEOs are indeed compensated substantively more than male CEOs. We seek to replicate earlier work by Hill and colleagues, using an expanded dataset over a longer period of time and with more rigorous analytical tools. We do not find reliable evidence for a difference in compensation paid to male and female CEOs, suggesting that claims about gender gap in CEO compensation favoring women over men may be premature.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy

We use survey data to investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first empirical study on the compensation of Italian executives. Our key hypothesis is that the characteristics of the Italian capital market, corporate governance and the specific relationship between banks and firms imply a low fraction of incentive pay over total compensation and a low sensitivity of incentive pay to firm performance. We find evidence that supports this hypothesis. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of upper and middle managers by only 31 thousand lire, more than the increase found for lower management (6 thousand). Furthermore, pay–performance sensitivity is higher in foreign-owned firms, in listed firms, and in firms affiliated to a multinational group.     

Matching compensation and organizational strategies

This study examines the impact of organizational strategies (at both the corporate and business unit level) on pay strategies, and their interactive influence on the effectiveness of the compensation system. The empirical findings are based on the survey responses of 192 human resource management executives in business units of large manufacturing firms. Corporate strategy was a significant predictor of pay package design, pay level relative to the market, and pay administration policies. Business unit strategy was a significant predictor of pay package design and pay level relative to the market. The findings are supportive of congruency notions which suggest that the effectiveness of the compensation system is partly a function of the fit between pay strategies and organizational strategies.     

Marketing executives' perceptions of equitable salary increases

Employees' perceptions of fair and equitable salary increases is the subject of this article. Factors hypothesized to be the major determinants of the “perceived amount of pay that should be received” in Lawler's model of pay satisfaction are employed as predictor variables in a multiple regression equation context to explain the observed variation in executives' perceptions of fair and equitable salary increases. A national sample of industrial marketing executives were surveyed. A significant relationship was observed between employees perceptions of fair and equitable salary increases and a number of perceived personal job input and job demands related variables, current salary and wage history, and perceived non-monetary outcomes which are theorized in Lawler's model to be among the major determinants of the perceived amount of pay that should be received.     

Corporate tournaments and executive compensation: Evidence from the U.K.

This study tests the implications of tournament theory using data on 100 U.K. stock market companies, covering over 500 individual executives, in the late 1990s. Our results provide some evidence consistent with the operation of tournament mechanisms within the U.K. business context. Firstly, we find a convex relationship between executive pay and organizational level and secondly, that the gap between CEO pay and other board executives (i.e., tournament prize) is positively related to the number of participants in the tournament. However, we also show that the variation in executive team pay has little role in determining company performance. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The UK Gender Pay Gap 1997–2015: What Is the Role of the Public Sector?

The Labour Force Survey is used to examine the influence of sector on the UK gender pay gap 1997–2015. The assessment is twofold: first comparing gender pay gaps within sectors and second through identifying the contribution of the concentration of women in the public sector to the overall gender pay gap. The long‐term narrowing of the gender pay gap, which predominately reflects relative improvements in women's productivity‐related characteristics, is found to stall in 2010 within each sector. This is considered in the context of claims that public sector austerity represents a critical turning point in progress toward gender equality at work.     

Performance Pay in China: Gender Aspects

We provide an in‐depth analysis of gender differences in performance pay in China based on a unique dataset — the Life Histories and Social Change in Contemporary China — that provides information on the different components of pay including performance pay and base pay as well as a wide array of pay determining characteristic. The share of performance pay is documented and its determinants, including gender, analysed. Particular attention is paid to gender differences in the different dimensions of performance pay: the probability of receiving it; the magnitude conditional upon receiving it; and their product being the overall unconditional magnitude. Gender differences in these dimensions are decomposed into components due to male–female differences in the endowments of characteristics that explain these dimensions of pay, and gender differences that arise even when men and women have the same endowments of such characteristics with the later component, often taken to reflect discrimination.     

UK Executive Bonuses and Transparency — A Research Note

High levels of executive pay in the USA and the UK have attracted journalistic and academic criticism to the effect that they constitute rent extraction by self‐interested executives rather than rewards for raising shareholder returns. The focus of most criticism has been on salary, severance payments and various long‐term incentives (particularly share options). However, executive bonuses have attracted little attention and have been only lightly regulated. This raises important questions. Has lighter regulation been associated with significant levels of rent extraction through bonuses, that is, a weak relation between bonus pay and shareholder returns? Have more transparent performance conditions attached to bonuses strengthened the relation, making rent extraction more difficult, or have they acted as camouflage for rent extraction, associated with higher bonus pay but lower pay‐performance responsiveness? Are measures of CEO power associated with larger bonuses? This empirical note provides the first, preliminary answers to these questions.     

How middle managers' group‐focus emotions and social identities influence strategy implementation

The literature on top‐down strategy implementation has overlooked social‐emotional factors. The results of a three‐year field study of a large technology firm show how top executives who favor an affect neutral task approach can inadvertently activate middle managers' organization‐related social identities, such as length of time working for the company (newcomers versus veterans) and language spoken by senior executives (English versus French), generating group‐focus emotions. These emotions prompt middle managers—even those elevated to powerful positions by top executives—to support or covertly dismiss a particular strategic initiative even when their immediate personal interests are not directly under threat. This study contributes to the strategy implementation literature by linking senior executives' actions and middle managers' social identities, group‐focus emotions, and resulting behaviors to strategy implementation outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.