NEGATIVE INTRA‐GROUP EXTERNALITIES IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS*

Two types of agents interact on a pre‐existing free platform. Agents value positively the presence of agents of the other type but may value negatively the presence of agents of their own type. We ask whether a new platform can find fees and subsidies so as to divert agents from the existing platform and make a profit. We show that this might be impossible if intra‐group negative externalities are sufficiently (but not too) strong with respect to positive inter‐group externalities.     

WELFARE‐MAXIMISING PRICING IN A MACROECONOMIC MODEL WITH IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES

This paper develops a simple macroeconomic model with imperfect competition and consumption externalities, and uses it to examine whether the marginal cost pricing rule in the partial equilibrium framework can apply to the general equilibrium framework. It is shown that, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set equal to marginal cost if consumption externalities are either absent or positive. However, for welfare to be maximised, average revenue should be set higher than marginal cost in the presence of negative consumption externalities.     

INTER‐TEMPORAL LABOUR FORCE PARTICIPATION AMONG MARRIED WOMEN IN JAPAN*

This paper investigates the components that affect inter‐temporal labour force participation among married women in Japan. We estimate linear probability models and simple, dynamic probit models with a variety of specifications. We find that serially correlated transitory errors have a significant effect on the participation behaviour of married women, while the first‐order lagged dependent variable has no significant effect. The result that serially correlated transitory errors influence married women's inter‐temporal labour force participation suggests that exogenous rather than endogenous causes have a significant effect on long‐term economic disparity among married women.     

GROWTH AND BUBBLES WITH CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES*

This paper explores the role of consumption externalities in an overlapping generations economy with capital accumulation. If consumers in each generation are concerned with other agents’ consumption behaviours, there exist intergenerational as well as intragenerational consumption externalities. It is the presence of intergenreational consumption externalities that may produce fundamental effects both on equilibrium dynamics and on steady‐state characterization of the economy. This paper demonstrates this fact in the context of a simple model of endogenously growing, overlapping‐generations economy with or without asset bubbles.     

MISERY LOVES COMPANY: EQUILIBRIUM PORTFOLIOS WITH HETEROGENEOUS CONSUMPTION EXTERNALITIES*

The present article extends the Arrow–Debreu portfolio model to consumption externalities. It is assumed that each investor has a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility that is a function of her own consumption and of the average consumption in the group to which she belongs. Individual degrees of risk aversion and conformism are heterogeneous within each group and between the different groups in the economy. We show that, under some conditions on the degree of conformism in the economy, the optimal portfolio and consumption choices observed at equilibrium in each group with consumption externalities are equivalent to those that are optimal without any externality, but with an adjusted degree of risk aversion. If these conditions are not fulfilled, groups have no representative agent and the demand for pure zero‐mean lotteries may be positive, thereby showing that not all diversifiable risks are washed away at equilibrium. We characterize the relationship between the distribution of conformism in the economy to the competitive allocation of risk and to the equity premium. We provide conditions for the two‐fund separation property to hold.     

JOB DISPLACEMENT AND THE INTER‐TEMPORAL MOVEMENT OF WORKERS THROUGH THE EARNINGS AND INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS

This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to examine how job displacement influences intragenerational earnings and income mobility. Job displacement increases the probability of downward labor earnings mobility for several years after separation occurs. Furthermore, the probability of being in the bottom half of the earnings distribution increases significantly, not only in the year of displacement, but also for several years afterwards. However, after considering additional measures of financial well‐being (income from other family members and government transfer payments), the short‐ and long‐term impact of displacement on movements throughout the distribution is reduced. (JEL J63, J65)     

DUALITY WITH SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES UNDER SOCIAL CONSTANT RETURNS*

We develop dual approaches to quantity and price relationships of production in a general multisectoral model with sector‐specific externalities. The production of each good exhibits socially constant returns to scale but privately decreasing returns. We find that the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the social perspective and that the Rybczynski theorem holds for factor intensity ranking from the private perspective. The price‐output dual fails to hold in general. Moreover, we re‐establish the Heckscher‐Ohlin theorem in the two‐sector case, as well as the factor endowment–factor price and price‐output comparative statics in the high‐dimension case under proper conditions.     

DYNAMIC ASSET ALLOCATION AND CONSUMPTION CHOICE IN INCOMPLETE MARKETS*

We study the optimal investment and consumption problem of a CRRA investor when the drift and volatility of the stock are driven by a correlated factor. The myopic and non‐myopic components of the optimal portfolio process are characterised in terms of the market price of traded and non‐traded risk of the minimax martingale measure. We find that the optimal policies depend crucially on the nature of the agent, aggressive versus conservative, and the market incompleteness, improving versus deteriorating investment opportunities. Furthermore, we show that the original problem cannot be decomposed into a pure consumption and a pure terminal wealth problem, unless the market is complete.     

SUSTAINABLE CONSTANT CONSUMPTION IN A SEMI‐OPEN ECONOMY WITH EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCES*

To sustain constant consumption, Hartwick's rule prescribes reinvesting all resource rents in reproducible capital. However, Hartwick's rule is not necessarily the result of optimization. In this paper, we address this insufficiency by deriving a constant consumption path endogenously in a semi‐open economy with an exhaustible resource, which has full access to world goods and capital markets, while the resource flows are not internationally tradable. Our findings show that, due to the essentiality of both capital and resource to the production process, the economy transforms its domestic assets into foreign ones, consuming a constant interest flow from the latter.     

PLATFORM PRICING IN MIXED TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

When a consumer can appear on both sides of a two‐sided market, such as a user who both buys and sells on eBay, the platform may want to bundle the services it provides to two sides. I develop a general model for such “mixed” two‐sided markets and show that a monopolist platform's incentive to bundle and its optimal pricing strategy are determined by simple formulas using familiar price elasticities of demand, which embody the bundling effect, and price‐cost margins adjusted for network externalities, which incorporate “two‐sidedness.” The optimal pricing rule in such markets generalizes the familiar Lerner formula.     

浙江专业市场空间扩张过程及其机制探析

浙江专业市场经历了本省扩张、省外扩张、国外扩张三个扩张阶段,在开拓新的生存和发展空间、拓展边境贸易、占领贸易战略高地、顺应国家区域开发战略的需要等发展动机的驱使下,浙江专业市场在我国市场经济发展过程中创造了奇迹,市场成交额连续16年排名全国第一.专业市场的发展形成和积累了领先的价值观与经营理念、成功的市场定位、以商促工工商联动的发展战略、高效的市场管理方法与交易方式等发展理念.作者全面总结了浙江专业市场空间扩张的经验,同时对浙江专业市场扩张过程中存在的问题和发展趋势进行了系统分析.     

SECTOR‐SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES AND STATUS PREFERENCES IN THE UZAWA‐LUCAS MODEL*

This paper shows that introducing preferences for social status based on human capital holdings modifies the finding of Gómez (2004 ) that sector‐specific externalities associated with human capital in the goods sector do not violate the optimality of the competitive economy in the Uzawa–Lucas model. The effect of an increase in the degree of sector‐specific externalities is qualitatively the same as that of an increase in the strength of the desire for status. Hence, paradoxically, a greater degree of sector‐specific externalities makes human capital accumulation more excessive from the social point of view.     

桂林国际客源市场时空演替规律研究

通过应用亲景度指标、竞争态指标和集中度指标，对桂林国际客源市场1994年至2002年统计数据进行分析，揭示国际客源时空演替规律。指出桂林主要的6个国际客源市场是日本、韩国、美国、德国、法国和英国，并针对性的提出拓展国际客源市场的建议。     

UNIQUENESS AND INDETERMINACY OF THE EQUILIBRIUM GROWTH PATH IN THE UZAWA‐LUCAS MODEL WITH SECTOR SPECIFIC EXTERNALITIES*

We introduce sector specific external effects of human capital on production in an otherwise Uzawa‐Lucas model of endogenous growth; and show that the problem of indeterminacy of the competitive equilibrium growth path does not exist even if the production function satisfies the increasing returns to scale at the social level.     

ENDOGENOUS CYCLES IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH LAGGED EXTERNALITIES ON PRODUCTIVITY

This paper presents a simple model of endogenous cycles. In the model, working experience creates learning‐by‐doing externalities that improve labor productivity but it takes long time before the externalities come into effect. In addition, individuals have preferences with a subsistence consumption level. In the presence of the subsistence consumption requirement, a productivity increase generates the income effect that surpasses the substitution effect, and individuals choose to increase leisure time at the expense of supplying labor. The interactions between productivity changes through the lagged externalities and labor supply generate cycles endogenously. The model analysis shows that the dynamics exhibit cyclical fluctuations around a unique steady state.     

NESTING VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DIFFERENTIATION IN TWO‐SIDED MARKETS

We merge the two‐sided markets duopoly model of Armstrong (2006) with the nested vertical and horizontal differentiation model of Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2012), which consists of a linear city with different consumer densities on the left and on the right side of the city. In equilibrium, the high‐quality platform sells at a higher price and captures a greater market share than the low‐quality platform, despite the indifferent consumer being closer to the high‐quality platform. The difference between market shares is lower than socially optimal. A perturbation that introduces a negligible difference between the consumer density on the left and on the right side of the city may disrupt existence of equilibrium in the model of Armstrong (2006).     

ARE CHINESE STOCK MARKETS INCREASING INTEGRATION WITH OTHER MARKETS IN THE GREATER CHINA REGION AND OTHER MAJOR MARKETS?

This paper investigates the cointegrating and long-term causal relationships between the Shanghai A and B-share market, and between these two markets and the Hong Kong, the Taiwanese, the Japanese and the US market of two sub periods between July 1993 and March 2007. On the basis of a new Granger non-causality test procedure developed by Toda-Yamamoto (1995) and Johansen's (1988) cointegration test, my results suggest that a long-term equilibrium relationship measured by cointegration has been merged between the Chinese A-share market and the other markets in greater China region as well as the US market during the post-crisis period which covers the period since Chinese A-share market was opened to the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII) in 2002. I also found that the Shanghai A-share market uni-directionally Granger-causes the other regional markets after the Asian financial crisis, while the A-share market and Hong Kong H-share market have had a significant feedback relationship since then. However, I found no evidence there has been cointegrating relationship between Shanghai B-share market and any other market ever since the B-share market was opened to the local retail investors in 2001.     

VALUE OF INFORMATION IN COMPETITIVE ECONOMIES WITH INCOMPLETE MARKETS

We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incomplete markets. We show that generically the welfare effect of a change in the information available prior to trading can be in any direction: There exist changes in information that make all agents better off and changes for which all agents are worse off. In contrast, for any change in information, a Pareto improvement is feasible, that is, attainable by a planner facing the same informational and asset market constraints as agents. In this sense, the response of competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal.     

THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

The existence of a pure‐strategy subgame‐perfect equilibrium in qualities and prices is investigated in a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where quality improvements require a quadratic variable cost and network externalities operate. We show that there exists a parameter region where the incentive to predate at the quality stage prevents firms from reaching a pure‐strategy non‐cooperative equilibrium with prices above marginal costs. If network externalities are sufficiently large, a Bertrand equilibrium with zero profits may arise, although the amount of product differentiation is strictly positive.     

FOUR CHARACTERIZATIONS OF CONSTRAINED PARETO EFFICIENCY IN CONTINUUM ECONOMIES WITH WIDESPREAD EXTERNALITIES*

In continuum economies, widespread externalities are those over which each individual has negligible control. Nash-Walrasian equilibria with lump-sum transfers are defined, and their existence proved. They are then characterized by the property of “f-constrained Pareto efficiency” for finite coalitions. More general “private good” Nash-Walrasian equilibria are characterized as private-good constrained-Pareto efficient. Introducing complete Pigou taxes or subsidies leads to equilibria that are characterized by constrained efficiency and f-constrained efficiency for given levels of the widespread externalities. But full efficiency requires resolving the public-good problem of determining those aggregate externalities or, equivalently, of setting appropriate Pigou prices.