Countervailing Power and Chain Stores

The countervailing power of large buyers subdues the market power of sellers, but price concessions won by large buyers in upstream markets may or may not translate into lower prices downstream as Galbraith (American capitalism: The concept of countervailing power. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1952, Am Econ Rev 44:1–6, 1954) once contended. This paper presents a model that formalizes certain previously neglected elements of Galbraith’s argument, and shows that upstream price concessions may lead to lower downstream prices. In this model, a large retail chain store with countervailing power plays one large supplier off against another to win lower prices. An indirect effect of these interactions is that small retailers also pay lower prices, although not as low as the chain. Finally, competition among the retailers drives retail prices lower. The retail-price-restraining effect of the chain is stronger than the effect that is produced by the entry of an additional supplier.     

Why Do Suppliers Charge Larger Buyers Lower Prices?

The phenomenon of input suppliers charging larger buyer firms, relative to smaller buyer firms, lower prices is commonly explained in terms of supplier economies of scale, supplier competition for larger buyers, and the larger bargaining power of larger buyers. This paper provides an alternative explanation, and shows that the observed direction of differential pricing can benefit the supplier by lowering the level of tacit collusion its buyers can sustain in their output market. This result also provides a new mechanism through which a ban on price discrimination by input suppliers may lower consumer welfare.     

Interfirm Bundled Discounts as a Collusive Device

This paper investigates whether and how firms competing in price with homogeneous goods (i.e., Bertrand competitors) can achieve supernormal profits using interfirm bundled discounts. By committing to offering price discounts conditional on the purchase of a specific brand of other differentiated good, the homogeneous good suppliers can separate consumers into distinct groups. Such brand‐specific discounts help the firms relax competition and attain a collusive outcome. Consumers become worse off due to higher effective prices. Our result shows that in oligopolies it is feasible to leverage other's market power without excluding rivals.     

Power,buyer trustworthiness and supplier performance: Evidence from the Armenian dairy sector

The paper presents a Multiple Indicators and MultIple Causes (MIMIC) model for explaining the relationships between buyer-seller power, buyer trustworthiness and supplier satisfaction / performance. The model draws on an organizational supply chain perspective of power and is verified using data relating to dairy farmers’ relationships with their main buyer in Armenia. The analysis indicates that buyers are more trustworthy where there is greater competition for supplies. Buyer trustworthiness is also positively correlated with both the size of a supplier, as well as a supplier being a member of a marketing cooperative. Buyer trustworthiness has a positive impact on suppliers’ satisfaction (regarding their relationship with their main buyer) and enhances the quality and quantity of suppliers’ output.     

An antitrust analysis of bundled loyalty discounts

Consider a monopolist in one market that faces competition in a second market. Bundled loyalty discounts, in which customers receive a price break on the monopoly good in exchange for making all purchases from the monopolist, have ambiguous welfare effects. Such discounts should not always be treated as a form of predatory pricing. In some settings, they act as tie-in sales. Existing tests for whether such discounts violate competition laws do not track changes in consumer surplus or total surplus. We apply a new test to an illustrative example based on SmithKline that assumes the “tied” market has homogeneous goods. If the tied market is characterized by Hotelling competition, bundling by the monopolist causes the rival firm to reduce its price. In numerical examples, we find that this can deter entry or induce exit.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

Streamlining inventory flows with time discounts to improve the profits of a decentralized supply chain

We consider a decentralized supply chain, whereby a supplier sells a product to a group of independent buyers, and develop a strategy for the supplier to offer an all-units price discount or cash rebate for orders that are synchronized with its replenishments. As synchronized orders can be met with inventory directly from receiving to shipping without warehousing, the proposed strategy streamlines system inventory flows to minimize inventory and, hence, the related costs. On the other hand, by increasing the replenishment interval of the supplier, the proposed strategy is able to induce buyers to order in large quantities and hence achieve the objectives of quantity discounts. We show that the proposed strategy can achieve nearly optimal (minimum) system cost, and is much more effective than the existing coordination strategies for decentralized supply chains in the literature.     

Group purchasing, nonlinear tariffs, and oligopoly

Loyalty discounts are nonlinear tariffs that condition rebates or marginal prices on meeting aggregate purchase or market share targets. These discounts are widespread, and are often the impetus for consumers to form buying groups, or group purchase organizations (GPOs). This paper models the competitive effects of the introduction of a GPO into a market within which the preferences of the GPO's members are horizontally differentiated. While nonlinear tariffs are an effective way for a monopolist to extract consumer surplus, when two suppliers compete using such schedules, the results are far more competitive in comparison to simple Bertrand–Nash competition with linear tariffs. This result holds when the product of each of the suppliers is attractive to a substantial portion of consumers. In our model, the nonlinear schedule puts all customers “in play” to a degree that contrasts sharply with the competition at the margin characteristic of constant per unit prices. Moreover, competing in nonlinear tariffs removes allocative inefficiency that can result from single price competition.     

Incorporating uncertainty into a supplier selection problem

Supplier selection is an important strategic supply chain design decision. Incorporating uncertainty of demand and supplier capacity into the optimization model results in a robust selection of suppliers. A two-stage stochastic programming (SP) model and a chance-constrained programming (CCP) model are developed to determine a minimal set of suppliers and optimal order quantities with consideration of business volume discounts. Both models include several objectives and strive to balance a small number of suppliers with the risk of not being able to meet demand. The SP model is scenario-based and uses penalty coefficients whereas the CCP model assumes a probability distribution and constrains the probability of not meeting demand. Both formulations improve on a deterministic mixed integer linear program and give the decision maker a more complete picture of tradeoffs between cost, system reliability and other factors. We present Pareto-optimal solutions for a sample problem to demonstrate the benefits of the SP and CCP models. In order to describe the tradeoffs between costs and risks in an analytical form, we use multi-parametric programming techniques to more completely analyze the alternative Pareto-optimal supplier selection solutions in the CCP model. This analysis gives insights into the robustness of the solutions with respect to number of suppliers, costs and probability of not meeting demand.     

Risky Business or Competitive Power? Supplier Involvement in Japanese Product Design

Notwithstanding the alleged risks of outsourcing design work, leading manufacturers in the Japanese automotive industry collaborate closely with their key suppliers. Despite widespread recognition of the effectiveness of these close-knit supplier networks, however, little research exists on the factors that affect the purchase of design work from suppliers. S. Nazli Wasti and Jeffrey K. Liker fill this gap by exploring the factors that affect Japanese automotive firms' purchase of design work from their component suppliers. Using data from a survey of 122 Japanese automotive component suppliers, their study addresses two key questions. First, what factors lead Japanese buyers to involve some suppliers heavily in design while giving others relatively little control over design decisions? And second, does the Japanese practice of involving suppliers in design offer performance benefits? The study focuses on first-tier suppliers of parts, assemblies, and complete subsystems (e.g., audio, fuel and emissions, heating and air conditioning). The study does not include suppliers of raw materials and chemicals, assembly and processing equipment, indirect materials, tooling and dies, computers and software, or engineering and business consulting services. The study breaks down the broad concept of supplier involvement in design work into three measurable elements: the extent to which the supplier influences decision-making during the early stages of product development; the amount of control the buyer retains over the design; and the frequency of design-related communication between the buyer and the supplier. Factors that have a positive effect on the level of supplier involvement among the companies studied include technological uncertainty of the component and the supplier's in-house technical capabilities. For companies in the study, the level of competition in the supplier market has a negative effect on the degree of supplier involvement in design. The responses indicate that supplier involvement offers performance benefits for both the supplier and the buyer. For the supplier firms studied, increased involvement in the design process permits greater focus on design for manufacturability (DFM). And of course, supplier-generated design improvements clearly benefit the buyers, allowing these firms to capitalize on the experience and the insight that their suppliers have regarding the parts that they supply.     

基于改进TOPSIS法的供应商选择模型研究

为有效地帮助企业快速找到合适的供应商合作伙伴,采用直觉模糊集、评分函数等方法对TOPSIS评估法进行优化,并以此为基础建立了一种供应商选择模型。首先,采集和评估供应商的产品质量、产品价格、产品交货的可靠性、供应位置、财务情况、库存水平、劳资关系、发展能力和技术能力等相关信息,由专家给出主观评估信息,汇总为综合属性值;然后,通过直觉模糊熵确定各评估指标的权重;最后,综合考虑供应商选择决策过程中的多个目标和标准,应用改进TOPSIS法的对供应商进行分类选择。结果显示,基于改进TOPSIS法的供应商选择模型能够较准确地反映出各供应商的真实水平和对企业的潜在价值,可以有效地解决不确定条件下对供应商的选择问题,提高了供应商选择结果的可靠性。改进后的模型简便易行,具有良好的稳定性,对于合理制定企业供应商选择标准以及进一步优化决策模型具有一定的借鉴意义。     

Multilateral Vertical Contracting with an Alternative Supply: The Welfare Effects of a Ban on Price Discrimination

Rey and Tirole [Handbook of Industrial Organization. Amsterdam: Elsevier (2005)] considered a model in which a monopolist sells to downstream firms using nonlinear contracts. They showed that banning price discrimination fully restores the supplier’s ability to leverage its monopoly power by enabling it to commit not to offer side discounts. I show that the situation changes when the supplier competes against a fringe of less efficient rivals rather than being a monopolist. Then banning price discrimination may cause per-unit prices to fall and welfare to increase. The dominant supplier can take advantage of a strategic bargaining effect: reducing the per-unit price makes the outside option of buying from the fringe less profitable, allowing the dominant supplier to extract more bargaining surplus through the fixed fee.     

论买方垄断势力下跨国公司对当地配套企业的纵向压榨

在通过吸收外来投资发展当地配套企业的新工业化道路中，处于价值链下游的跨国公司利用买方垄断势力对当地配套企业的纵向压榨．可能使后者失去生存空间。本文构建了一个简单的纵向压榨模型．并以苏州IT产业中台资企业对当地配套企业的纵向压榨为例．分析了影响跨国公司纵向压榨的因素．认为纵向压榨起因于跨国公司的买方垄断势力和双方市场势力的严重不对等。而采取相应措施形成抵消性的市场势力，是避免当地配套企业被纵向压榨的重要手段。     

Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests

We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of the discount-attribution test to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. (The discount-attribution test is a variant of the price-cost test, where the discount is attributed only to the share of total demand that is regarded as effectively contestable.) In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses market-share discounts to boost the demand for its own products. In this framework, we show that the attribution test is misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-cost tests to loyalty discount cases.     

A multi-item supply chain with credit periods and weight freight cost discounts

It is possible to realize considerable savings by aggregating the replenishment of a variety of items in a multi-item supply chain. This joint multi-item replenishment policy has already been widely applied in a variety of industries. This type of policy may make it possible for the retailer to take advantage of transport economies of scale by the utilization of freight discounts for greater weight. In addition, a supplier will often extend forward financing to a retailer. In this paper, a multi-item supply chain with a credit period and weight freight cost discounts is considered. The retailer bears the freight costs, but the freight carrier provides freight-transport discounts that are positively related to the weight of the cargo transported. From both the individual and the channel perspectives, we deal with the dual problems of determining the ideal supplier credit period, and of the best way for the retailer to make multi-item replenishment and pricing decisions, while still maximizing profits. We outline the optimal properties and develop algorithms for solving the problems described, as well as discuss the impact of the freight cost discounts, the inventory holding cost, and the interest rate on the behavior of both parties.     

Performance feedback and supplier selection: A perspective from the behavioral theory of the firm

Drawing upon the behavioral theory of the firm, this study explores the behavioral antecedent of buying firms' decisions in supplier selection through relational referrals, beyond the predominant argument from relational network theory. Centering on the risk and uncertainty of searching for new suppliers, this study attempts to integrate the behavioral theory and relational network theory in explaining buying firms' supplier selection. Data from 112 Chinese manufacturing firms were used to test the hypotheses. The results suggest that performance feedback triggers buying firms' decision on the extent of reliance on relational referrals to select suppliers. Outperforming firms are more likely to use relational network to select suppliers while underperforming firms are less likely to use. This relationship will be strengthened when the intensity of market competition and specific investment in buyer-supplier relationship are high.     

Development and implementation of customer solutions: A study of process dynamics and market shaping

A broad, dynamic network perspective on solution processes remains scarce. This article presents the process of developing and implementing customer solutions and its effects on the wider business environment by investigating customers and suppliers in the global mining industry (Australia, Chile, and Sweden), analyzing the deployment of a new customer solution, and assessing the changes to the competitive environment and focal firms' relationships with other customers and suppliers. It shows that the forces that drive customer and supplier interests and motivation to co-develop customer solutions may change over time, thus redefining the aim and scope of solutions and creating failure risks. Customers present problems; suppliers respond, on the basis of not only the feasibility of the customer-specific solution but also of their evaluation of future solutions in a broader market; then suppliers aim to standardize successful solutions across markets. Customers want close supplier relationships and unique solutions but also like standardized and repeatable solutions, so they can share development costs with competitors and expose the supplier to competition to avoid lock-in effects. From a network perspective, a novel solution can have a market-shaping effect and evoke reactions from other actors who want to enhance their market position. However, these changes are not necessarily deliberate, and the dynamics that market introductions of solutions trigger may be difficult to predict.     

The Chinese paradigm of global supplier relationships: Social control,formal interactions and the mediating role of culture

This paper reports the results of a study that examined how firms can establish successful business relationships with Chinese suppliers. Its aim is to explore salient characteristics of the nature of buyer supplier relationships with the emergence of China as a dominant economic power. Two surveys have been conducted that investigated several factors that inhibit and enable effective supplier relationship management (SRM) between organisations sourcing from China and Chinese suppliers, and explored the impact of cultural characteristics of Chinese management on the nature and performance of supplier relationships. The research highlights the importance of the social control aspect of governance structure of supplier relationships and stresses that both social and formal control mechanisms should be implemented for more effective relationships with Chinese suppliers. It also demonstrates the need for companies to recognise the importance of guanxi and several cultural characteristics of the Chinese style of management in SRM and advocates the need for the development of a hybrid Sino-Japanese and global supplier relationship management paradigm that incorporates elements from the existing SRM models. It generates insights into how the cultural context of emerging markets affects the nature of business relationships and generates a research agenda in the field of supply chain management that can explore the development of new paradigms in supplier relationships management. The main theoretical argument put forward centres on the need for the development of a new global supplier relationship management paradigm that will take into account the cultural elements of the Chinese society.     

Forecasting the Discounts of Market Prices from Appraised Values for Real Estate Limited Partnerships

A vexing problem for the appraisal industry has been estimating an appropriate discount for the value of real estate limited partnerships (RELPs) relative to their appraised value. This research develops a linear regression model that explains over 80% of the cross-sectional variation in discounts across 60 RELPs using characteristics of each partnership. Among a holdout sample of 41 RELPs, the model provides forecasts of discounts that are superior to assuming no discount or applying a mean discount to all partnerships. Discounts are greatest for RELPs with low current yields, low leverage and high trading ranges for their market prices.