How well does a small structural model with sticky prices and wages fit postwar U.S. data?

In this paper, we ask whether a small structural model with sticky prices and wages, embedding various modelling devices designed to increase the degree of strategic complementarity between price-setters, can fit postwar U.S. data. To answer this question, we resort to a two-step empirical evaluation of our model. In a first step, we estimate the model by minimizing the distance between theoretical autocovariances of key macroeconomic variables and their VAR-based empirical counterparts. In a second step, we resort to Watson's [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.] procedure [Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101 (6), 1011.1041] to quantify the model's goodness-of-fit. Our main result is that the combination of sticky prices and sticky wages is central in order to obtain a good empirical fit. Our analysis also reveals that a model with only sticky wages does not perform well according to Watson's criterion [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.].     

Realitic and Analytic Syntheses of Macro- and Microeconomics

We study the impact of employer's opportunism on wage rigidity in capitalist companies by arguing that the need to fix wages is crucially influenced by the asymmetric distribution of decision-making power and information in favor of the stronger contractual party — the employer, and against the weaker contractual party — employees. The capitalist entrepreneur can make decisions, whose negative consequences are borne by workers in terms of lower wages and more intense work pace. Excessive wage reductions in the face of negative exogenous shocks or too risky investment decisions represent the main instances of such opportunistic behavior. Fixed wages can represent workers' best response to the emerging risk of the employer moral hazard, but this implies a heightened risk of layoffs since wages and employment levels cannot be fixed at the same time. Besides discussing piece rate contracts, profit-sharing and codetermination as counterexamples, we observe worker cooperatives which depart from the presence of contrasting interests and private information in the principal-agent framework. Indeed, several empirical studies have shown greater employment stability and wage flexibility in worker cooperatives vis-à-vis the capitalist firm.     

The Hotelling rule in non-renewable resource economics: A reassessment

Harold Hotelling's 1931 contribution is known for providing a basic principle—the Hotelling rule—to the economics of non-renewable resources. Nearly 90 years later, empirical tests conclude the rule lacks empirical validity, requiring strong amendments to describe the long-term, aggregate behaviour of its target object. On the basis of Hotelling's unpublished archival material, this paper revisits the place given to the Hotelling rule in non-renewable resource economics. Our reconstruction shows that Hotelling's 1931 paper has been misinterpreted: from the outset, the Hotelling rule was not valid for mineral resources. In contrast, the consideration of two inherent geological constraints, alongside exhaustibility, offered the opportunity for an alternative basic framework, capable to generate bell-shaped and U-shaped equilibrium trajectories for supplies and prices, respectively. Inspired by this unknown aspect of Hotelling's work brought to light by our archival investigation, we sketch this alternative basic model, enabling non-renewable resource economics to circumvent the empirical shortfalls of the Hotelling rule.     

The Role of Income Effects in Early Retirement

We provide a long‐term perspective on the individual retirement behavior and on the future of retirement by emphasizing the role of (negative) income effects. We consider a political economic theoretical framework, with actuarially “fair” and “unfair” early retirement schemes, and derive a political equilibrium with positive social security contribution rates and early retirement. A reduction in the wages in youth, consistent with the recent labor market trends since the massive introduction of temporary jobs, induces workers to postpone retirement, and—in the “unfair” system—leads to lower contribution rates. A reduction in the growth rate of the economy has opposite effects on the retirement decisions, leading—in the “unfair” system—to more early retirement. Aging induces a negative income effect, but has also an opposite political effect on social security contributions and retirement decisions. For an actuarially “fair” social security system, we provide conditions for the political effect to dominate; in an “unfair” scheme, numerical simulations confirm a slight predominance of the political effect, as contribution rates increase. These results may shed some light on the future of early retirement in aging societies.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.     

NETWORK SEARCH: CLIMBING THE JOB LADDER FASTER

We introduce an irregular network structure into a model of frictional, on‐the‐job search in which workers find jobs through their network connections or directly from firms. We show network‐found jobs have higher wages, and thus better‐connected workers climb the job ladder faster. The mean field approach allows us to formulate heterogeneous workers' recursive problem tractably. Our calibration is consistent with several empirical findings because of a composition—not information—effect. We also introduce new model‐consistent evidence: Job‐to‐job switches at higher ladder rungs are more likely to use networks.     

Public expenditures and the unemployment rate in the American states: panel evidence

We reexamine the Unemployment Rate (UR) – government expenditure nexus in a panel of 50 State and Local Governments (SLGs) over the period 1977–2006 to provide new pre-recession empirical evidence that helps put the expectations on the effects of the federal relief to SLGs in a broader context. We found that: (1) per capita real public spending (total and capital, assistance and subsidies, wages and salaries, and social insurance categories) was part of a cointegrating relationship with UR and real per capita state personal income. (2) With the exception of social insurance, other spending variables, when statistically significant, actually had a depressing effect on UR. The magnitude of this effect, however, was generally small. UR was most sensitive to increases in wages and salaries. (3) Long-term causality analysis based on panel error-correction coefficients provided consistent evidence of a causal effect from spending to UR, but less consistent evidence of such effect in the opposite direction. Social insurance, however, drove UR. (4) The size of the error-correction coefficients suggested a slow response of UR to deviations from the cointegrating relationship. (5) The marginal effect of spending on UR increased with the amount of the federal grants received. Our results suggest that public spending may not serve as a quick fix in relation to UR. They also seem to favour allocation of the federal funds to wage and salaries and assistance and subsidies, but not to capital and social insurance expenditures to lower UR.     

Wage,income and consumption inequality in Japan, 1981–2008: From boom to lost decades

In this paper we document the main features of the distributions of wages, earnings, consumption and wealth in Japan since the early 1980s using four main data sources: the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS), the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES), the National Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (NSFIE) and the Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC). We present an empirical analysis of inequality that specifically considers the path from individual wages and earnings, to household earnings, after-tax income, and finally consumption. We find that household earnings inequality rose substantially over this period. This rise is made up of two distinct episodes: from 1981 to 1996 all incomes rose, but they rose faster at higher percentiles; from 1996 to 2008 incomes above the 50th percentile remained flat but they fell at and below the 50th percentile. Inequality in disposable income and in consumption also rose over this period but to a lesser extent, suggesting taxes and transfers as well as insurance channels available to households helped to insulate household consumption from shocks to wages. We find the same pattern in inequality trends when we look over the life cycle of households as we do over time in the economy. Additionally we find that there are notable differences in the inequality trends for wages and hours between men and women over this period.     

SHIRKING,STANDARDS AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION

By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non‐shirkers, we show that the uniformly positive (negative) supply‐side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance) and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.     

中国基本养老保险的地区分配差异研究——基于省际面板数据的实证分析

运用2000～2009年省际面板数据对我国基本养老保险地区分配差异进行实证分析,发现人均基本养老金和地区平均工资之间存在协整关系,因此,中央和各地方政府应大力发展经济,缩小地区工资差异,加大社会基本养老保障制度改革的力度,促进社会基本养老保障服务地区均等化,努力构建中国经济、社会和谐发展。     

Fiscal Effects of Minimum Wages: An Analysis for Germany

Abstract. Against the background of the current discussion of statutory minimum wages in Germany, this paper analyzes the potential employment and fiscal effects of such a policy. Based on estimated labor demand elasticities obtained from a structural labor demand model, the empirical results imply that minimum wages in Germany will be associated with significant employment losses among marginal and low- and semi-skilled full-time workers. Even though minimum wages will lead to increased public revenues from income taxes and social security benefits, they will result in a significant fiscal burden, due to increased unemployment benefits and decreased revenues from corporate taxes.     

MEASURING THE IMPACT OF VALUING HEALTH INSURANCE ON LEVELS AND TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND HOW THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 COULD AFFECT THEM

A substantial part of the U.S. inequality literature focuses on yearly levels and trends in pre‐tax, post‐transfer cash income and its distribution over time and finds that median income appears to be stagnating, with income growth primarily coming at higher income levels. When we use data from the Current Population Survey for 1995–2008 and add the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance coverage, not only does it increase the upward trend in the level of resources controlled by Americans, but also reduces the level of inequality in these resources and its upward trend. We then provide a highly stylized example of this broader income measure's value in capturing the impact of two key provisions of the Affordable Care Act of 2010—an expansion in Medicaid and the provision of subsidies to lower‐income families for purchasing private coverage on state‐run exchanges. Even though these incremental expansions build on existing systems of government‐provided health insurance, we find that the vast majority of the benefits would still accrue to the bottom three deciles of the income distribution when we include the value of employer‐ and government‐provided health insurance in our expanded yearly income measure. (JEL D31, H51, I14)     

The Labor Contract Law,Macro Conditions,Self‐Selection,and Labor Market Outcomes for Migrants in China

China introduced a new Labor Contract Law (LCL, 2008) to protect employees’ working conditions and welfare. Early evaluations of labour market outcomes suggest positive effects for workers. In the same period, however, China faced labor market tightening, which facilitated the LCL's introduction and enforcement. Existing evaluations of the LCL treat the introduction of the LCL as being exogenous. We show that labor market tightening and individuals’ self‐selection into jobs whichcomply with the Law have affected migrant labor market outcomes. Taking these factors separately into account suggests that, the LCL has had varying effects on labor market outcomes: a negative effect on wages and hours; an unclear effect on having a written contract, and a positive effect on social insurance participation. Data inadequacies prevent us from considering these factors simultaneously.     

关于申报职工个人工资收入合理扣除的探讨

随着我国社会保险制度以及其他方面改革的不断深化,企业职工工资中逐渐增加了不少强制性的代扣代缴项目,由此也产生了一个问题,即企业在为确定职工个人缴费工资基数而申报职工个人工资收入时,是否应将这些代扣代缴项目予以扣除,到目前为止还没有明确的政策依据。为此,本文从企业的社会保险管理工作方面,对这一问题进行了理论与实务的探讨,以期有关部门对此能有明确的政策规定。     

Micro Foundations for Wage Flexibility: Wage Insurance at the Firm Level*

To what extent do firms insulate their workers' wages from fluctuations in product markets? Which firm and worker attributes are associated with wage flexibility at the micro level? We first rely on Guiso, Pistaferri and Schivardi (2005) to estimate dynamic models of sales and wages, finding that in Portugal, workers' wages respond to permanent shocks on firm performance, as opposed to transitory shocks. We then explore the factors associated with wage flexibility, finding that collective bargaining and minimum wages are associated with higher wage insurance by the firm, while the threat of firm bankruptcy reduces it. Managers receive less protection against permanent shocks than other workers.     

The politics of redistributive social insurance

This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect private insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk. The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribution with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selection problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance. Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general majority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible, regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests.     

Price dispersion in the private health insurance industry: The case of Catalonia

This paper presents a vertical and horizontal product differentiation model that explains price dispersion among different kinds of health care insurance firms. Our model shows large insurance firms engaging in price competition with small mutual organizations that serve only a local area and charge lower premiums. We found that, although the market allows the entry of an excessive number of firms, the presence of local insurance companies increases social welfare by increasing the range of products available to consumers. Our conclusions are applicable to OECD countries in general although we rely on Catalonia's data.     

What did Medicare do? The initial impact of Medicare on mortality and out of pocket medical spending

We study the impact of the introduction of one of the major pillars of the social insurance system in the United States: the introduction of Medicare in 1965. Our results suggest that, in its first 10 years, the establishment of universal health insurance for the elderly had no discernible impact on elderly mortality. However, we find a substantial reduction in the elderly's exposure to out of pocket medical expenditure risk. Specifically, we estimate that the introduction of Medicare was associated with a 40% decline in out of pocket spending for the top quartile of the out of pocket spending distribution. A stylized expected utility framework suggests that the welfare gains from such reductions in risk exposure alone may be sufficient to cover almost two-fifths of the costs of Medicare. These findings underscore the importance of considering the direct insurance benefits from public health insurance programs, in addition to any indirect benefits from an effect on health.     

Trade,tasks and training: The effect of offshoring on individual skill upgrading

We offer a theoretical explanation and empirical evidence for a positive link between increased offshoring and individual skill upgrading. Skill upgrading takes the form of on‐the‐job training, complementing the existing literature, which mainly focuses on the retraining of displaced workers. To establish a link between offshoring and on‐the‐job training, we introduce an individual skill upgrading margin into the Grossman and Rossi‐Hansberg ( 2008 ) model of offshoring. By scaling up worker's wages, offshoring creates previously unexploited skill upgrading possibilities, which lead to more training. Using data from German manufacturing, we establish a causal link between industry‐level offshoring growth and increased individual skill upgrading.     

Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

We investigate the effect of intra-group competition and risk marginal per capita returns on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one-shot public good game—following the well-known approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the Colasante et al. (2018, 2019) parametrization. We study the interaction between environment and social preferences and test the existence of a causal relationship of risk and competition over cooperative behavior when an individual's benefit of the public good is heterogeneous and uncertain. Our results report experimental evidence about competition fostering cooperative behavior leading to a rise in contribution for all the subjects regardless of their social preferences. However, risk has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior due to encouraging free riding.