Cost Savings of Contracting Out Refuse Collection

The article discusses the possible cost savings of contractingout refuse collection in the Netherlands. Our findings indicate that similar to foreigneconometric studies cost savings ofapproximately 15–20% apply to the Netherlands.Moreover, compared with the existing literature we show thatdifferent production technologies apply to internal municipal waste collection units and externalrefuse collection firms. Different cost functions have to be estimated for the sub-samples.Though significant cost savings exist on contracting out wastecollection, households will not experience these cost savings on a one to one basis. Privaterefuse collection firms must pay VAT while public entities are exempted. Thus, the fiscal systemhinders a more pronounced role for private refuse collection firms.     

Efficiency,access, and the mixed delivery of health care services

Universal health systems often rely on both pubic provision and contracting arrangements with private hospitals. This paper studies the optimal mix of public and private provision of health care services. We propose a model in which the regulator acts as athird-party payer, and aims to ensure universal access to treatment at minimal cost. Patients need one unit of medical services and differ in the severity of illness. A private and a public hospital are available. Under incomplete contracts, ownership affects the regulatory constraints and the power of managerial incentives. Only the private manager internalizes profits, and has incentives to reject costly patients and to exert effort in cost reduction. Contracting with the private hospital is optimal when managerial effort is relatively effective in reducing costs. By using the public hospital as a last resort provider, the regulator can ensure access, provide incentives to the private manager, and internalize part of the resulting cost savings. Imposing a no-dumping constraint on the private hospital reduces the power of incentives and is not always optimal.     

London bus tendering: the impact on costs

Bids for cost contracts in London Regional Transport bus routes between 1986 and 1993 are analysed for three purposes: to estimate costs for different types of bus operation; to test hypotheses about bidding under competition; to estimate cost savings attributable to tendering. There is no statistically significant difference in costs of operation between public and private sector operators on the tendered network. Bidding behaviour conforms to some features predicted by theoretical models. The estimated cost saving from tendering is 20%.     

THE EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM IN THE MIXED MARKET FOR FOSTER CARE

ABSTRACT ** : This paper uses proprietary quality of care data to examine the consequences of organizational form in privatized US foster care services. The contract failure hypothesis generically proposes that nonprofits should provide higher quality services, relative to for‐profits, when output is costly to observe. Advocates argue that the nonprofits offer important consumer protections when public services are contracted to private agencies. Contrary to expectations, we find that nonprofit firms do not offer higher quality services. We explore the possibility that monitoring efforts by state regulators or competition among foster care agencies effectively mitigate the influence of organizational form in this particular mixed market.     

CLASSIFICATION PROBLEMS AND THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET: AN EXAMINATION OF NHS FOUNDATION TRUST CLASSIFICATION IN THE UK

ABSTRACT: In this paper we argue that national accounting categories provide an inadequate basis for evaluating differences between public and private sector services. This is because accounting categories rely on economic concepts such as market price but do not take account of substantive public policy goals such as universality. The argument has important consequences for the structures and systems of delivery especially where nonprofit providers and social enterprise models are substituted for public bodies formerly integrated into the government's delivery system. Using an example taken from the UK's National Health Service, we show that the mechanisms for ensuring universality through redistribution are not sufficiently taken into account for classification purposes.     

Labour hoarding,employment and unemployment in British manufacturing industry

The impact of the provision of public infrastructure on private economic activity is examined. Using a flexible functional form of a cost function with public infrastructure as an additional external input the paper estimates the shadow-price of public infrastructure services for the manufacturing, trade and transport and the construction industries. The results indicate significant cost savings that result from the provision of public infrastructure services. In addition, the paper investigates both empirically as well as theoretically, the question whether the neglect of the provision of public capital within the growth accounting framework provides an explanation for the generally observed productivity slowdown.     

BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTENSIVE FOSTER CARE SERVICES: THE CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS COMPARED TO STATE SERVICES

The foster care system attempts to prepare children and youth who have suffered child maltreatment for successful adult lives. This study documents the economic advantages of a privately funded foster care program that provided longer term, more intensive, and more expensive services compared to public programs. The study found significant differences in major adult educational, health, and social outcomes between children placed in the private program and those placed in public programs operated by Oregon and Washington. For the outcomes for which we could find financial data, the estimated present value of the enhanced foster care services exceeded their extra costs. Generalizing to the roughly 100,000 adolescents age 12-17 entering foster care each year, if all of them were to receive the private model of services, the savings for a single cohort of these children could be about $6.3 billion in 2007 dollars. ( JEL D61, H75)     

Injecting Competition into Public-Sector Return to Work: Prospects for the "Ticket to Work" Initiative

The Ticket to Work legislation (1999) introduces private-sector competition into the provision of return-to-work services for persons with disabilities who receive Disability Insurance (DI) payments. This article examines the likely effects of the Ticket to Work initiative using data from the Social Security Administration's Project NetWork experiment (1993–98). The analysis demonstrates that the efficacy of the Ticket to Work program will depend on whether the private sector replaces the vocational rehabilitative services currently provided by the public sector, or whether it expands the delivery of services—both in terms of the level and range of services provided, as well as increasing the portion of DI beneficiaries receiving services. (JEL H4 , I0 , J2 )     

Market power,private information,and the optimal scale of pollution permit markets with application to North Carolina's Neuse River

We extend the analysis of optimal scale in pollution permit markets by allowing for both market power and private information. We characterize the total costs (abatement costs and damages) under market power and private information and compare them to total costs under competition. It is possible for both market power and private information to lead to lower total costs than competition, but generally the differences between the three market structures will be small. We also conduct an optimal scale analysis of nitrogen pollution from waste water treatment plants (WWTP) into North Carolina's Neuse River System. An economic model of damages and abatement costs is integrated with a hydro-ecological model of nitrogen flow through the Neuse. We determine the optimal number of trading zones and allocate the WWTP into these zones. Under the most likely regulatory scenario, we find cost savings of 1.55 million dollars per year under the optimal market design relative to the typical 303(d) regulation in which the WWTP are not allowed to trade.     

THE USE OF PPP ARRANGEMENTS IN STREET LIGHTING: A WIN‐WIN OPTION?

Street lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States’ first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.     

The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.     

声誉激励、社会监督与质量规制——城市垃圾处理行业中的博弈分析

我国实施市政公用事业市场化改革以来,民营企业通过竞标等方式从政府手中获取特许经营权,凭借其垄断地位和信息优势降低服务标准,导致垃圾处理行业陷入质量规制的困境。本文针对城市垃圾处理行业的问题,先是构建以规制机构与垃圾处理特许经营企业为参与者的博弈模型,分析了声誉激励和社会监督对博弈参与双方损益及其策略的影响;然后构建纳入举报机制的由社会民众、规制机构和特许经营企业三方参与的序列博弈模型。研究得出四点结论：（1）减少规制成本,增加对违规垃圾处理企业的惩罚力度,可减少企业违规概率;（2）声誉激励和社会监督均可减少垃圾处理特许经营企业违规概率;（3）社会监督有助于节约规制成本,减弱规制机构与企业间信息不对称程度,提高规制效率;（4）规制机构的检查行为与公众举报行为之间存在明显的互补性。最后针对性地提出了提高城市垃圾处理行业质量规制效果的政策建议。     

MULTIPLIER EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SERVICES IN A TWO‐SECTOR MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

In a two‐sector model of monopolistic competition, this paper explores what impacts an expansion of government spending on public services has on national income. In the short run where entry and exit of firms are restricted, a rise in government spending on services like health care (which has only a role of substituting for market services) increases national income, but that on services like elderly care (which has not only this role but also another role of contributing to home production of services) decreases it. These results are reversed in the long run. Welfare effects of public services are also examined.     

Contracting out refuse collection

In this paper we seek an explanation for the reservations of local authorities towards contracting out. Although empirical evidence suggests that contracting out results in a significant cost decrease, a majority of Dutch municipalities provides for waste collection services themselves. Based on theoretical insights we model the choice between private, public, in-house, and out-house refuse collection. The models are estimated using a database comprising nearly all Dutch municipalities. We find evidence that the number of inhabitants, the transfer by central government, and interest group arguments are important explanations. Interestingly, ideology seems to play a minor role.  Compared to earlier studies we estimate more general models. Although the same qualitative results are found for parametric and semiparametric models, we find strong statistical evidence that a parametric specification is far too inflexible. Differences between the parametric and the semiparametric marginal effects are substantial. Thus, more attention is needed for the implications of model specification. First version received: November 2000/Final version received: May 2002 We thank two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version.     

AUCTIONS,EX POST COMPETITION AND PRICES: THE EFFICIENCY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

ABSTRACT ** : Using an original database concerning 1102 French local public authorities in 2001, we explore the relationships between prices charged by private operators in water contracts and ex post competition. We show that prices charged in contracts in which operators are in a monopoly situation throughout the duration of the contract, are not affected by a ‘competition effect’ between private operators. However, a competition effect between private operators and public management appears to be crucial in explaining prices combined with a ‘termination effect’, reflecting the fact that the contract is close to being renewed, and hence re‐auctioned.     

Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Procurement Contracting

A model of procurement contracting is developed and tested in laboratory experiments. Market performance results are presented for both fixed-price and cost-sharing contracts. Contracts are awarded with first-price sealed-bid or second-price sealed-bid auctions. The environment contains post-auction cost uncertainty and opportunity for unmonitored effort in contract cost reduction. Cost-sharing contracts are found to reduce procurement expense but also to be inefficient because of their induced moral hazard waste and cost overruns.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92, D44, D61, D82, H57, L14.     

城市生活垃圾单流程回收利用的生态环境效益分析

借鉴发达国家城市垃圾回收的成功经验,以成都市4个居民小区为试点,采用单流程回收运行模式进行了垃圾分类收集和资源化利用的研究;根据试点结果统计与计算,分析了城市生活垃圾单流程回收利用所产生的生态环境效益。结果表明:城市居民参与程度高(77.1%),回收可利用成分高(91%),平均每月每户回收量达2.2kg;以废纸再生利用为例,全国每年再生新纸182.9万t,节省木材731.8万m3、水18 296.8万m3、填埋场548.9万m3。推广应用该模式不仅可节约资源和能源,而且保护生态环境的效果显著,是城市生活垃圾资源化回收利用行之有效的模式。     

EXPERIENCE OF PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN GERMANY*

ABSTRACT^**: The analysis of the experience of privatization in Eastern Germany shows that the boundaries between the private and public sectors will become increasingly blurred, with the public sector becoming more like the private sector. One may also expect that employment will fall and productivity greatly increase. The legislature's urge to regulate everything will ultimately subside but the public sector will continue to be of vital importance for the economy as a whole. A modernized public sector will be able to deploy its services to make an important contribution to economic growth and employment.     

QUALITY AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A SEMIPARAMETRIC SMOOTH COEFFICIENT ESTIMATION

This paper proposes a semiparametric smooth coefficient cost model to study the university cost structure where coefficients are an unknown function of the university's overall quality. A local least square method with a kernel weight function is used to estimate the cost function, and a simple statistic for testing a parametric model of the additive quality versus the semiparametric smooth coefficient model is applied. Empirical results from 56 universities in Taiwan show that, taking quality into account, higher education is subject to diseconomies of scale. In all categories—comprehensive and science/technology and public and private universities—the current university scale in Taiwan is too big to be cost efficient. (JEL I21, H52, 9120)