CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A PANEL GRAVITY MODEL APPROACH

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of 15 transition countries by using a panel gravity model approach and suggests that corruption does not deter FDI.     

东道国ESP系统与东道国外商直接投资特征研究--以中国为例

国际直接投资地域结构的时空差异性对忽视东道国因素的传统国际投资理论提出了挑战。文章研究了东道国因素对国际生产资本地域运动的影响，提出了国际直接投资是东道国因素与投资主体三优势综合作用的结果，东道国环境、体制、政策系统的状态特征决定了东道国外资特征等观点，并实证研究了中国改革开放进程与外商对华投资规模和结构的内在互动性。     

THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Using bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks around the world, we explore the importance of a wide range of institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI. While we find that better institutions have overall a positive and economically significant effect on FDI, some institutional aspects matter more than others do. Especially, the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden, government instability and lack of commitment play a major role in deterring FDI. For example, the effect of a one standard deviation improvement in the regulatory quality of the host country increases FDI by a factor of around 2. These results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and institutional variables. We also present evidence on the significance of institutions as a determinant of FDI over time.     

外商直接投资、技术外溢与经济增长-对广东数据的实证分析

本文运用计量模型对广东省1997—1999年39个行业和21个城市数据进行实证分析,考察外商直接投资(FDI)技术溢出效应与经济增长的相关关系。结果显示:广东省FDI外溢过程中,示范—模仿效应和联系效应的效果较为显著,且形成了一定的聚集效应;FDI在行业中外溢效应小于在地区内的效应;各城市的经济技术水平和政策因素强烈影响FDI的外溢效果。因此,外资政策的制定不应该一味强调引入外资的数量,重点应在于其对国内企业的技术外溢效应。     

外商直接投资、技术外溢与经济增长-对广东数据的实证分析

该文运用计量模型对广东省1997-1999年39个行业和21个城市数据进行实证分析,考察外商直接投资(FDI)技术溢出效应与经济增长的相关关系.结果显示:广东省FDI外溢过程中,示范-模仿效应和联系效应的效果较为显著,且形成了一定的聚集效应;FDI在行业中外溢效应小于在地区内的效应;各城市的经济技术水平和政策因素强烈影响FDI的外溢效果.因此,外资政策的制定不应该一味强调引入外资的数量,重点应在于其对国内企业的技术外溢效应.     

THE POLITICS OF INVESTMENT PARTISANSHIP: AND THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper explores the existence of partisan cycles in foreign direct investment performance. Our theoretical model predicts that the incumbent government's partisanship should affect foreign investors' decision to flow into different sectors of the host country: pro-labor governments would encourage the inflow of the type of investment that complements labor in production; pro-capital governments would promote the entry of investment that substitutes for labor. Empirical evidence from a sample of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries reveals a pattern of foreign investors' response to partisan cycles consistent with the predictions of the model. First, foreign investment systematically flows into different sectors of the host economy under left- and right-leaning incumbents. Second, we find a positive correlation between foreign investment and changes in average wages under left-leaning incumbents, but no effect on wages under right-leaning governments.     

中国资本外逃与外国直接投资关系的实证分析(1984-1999)

该文分别采用相关分析、因子分析和因果分析三种计量分析方法,分析了中国资本外逃与外国直接投资之间的关系.该文的研究表明,中国资本外逃与外国直接投资之间存在着显著性很强的正相关关系,并且因子分析与因果分析的结果也支持这一结论,说明驱动中国资本外逃的主要因素不是投资环境恶化,中国资本外逃在很大程度上是由于对内资和外资采取的差别政策待遇所引起的,并据此提出了相应的政策启示.     

中国资本外逃与外国直接投资关系的实证分析(1984-1999)

本文分别采用相关分析、因子分析和因果分析三种计量分析方法,分析了中国资本外逃与外国直接投资之间的关系。本文的研究表明,中国资本外逃与外国直接投资之间存在着显著性很强的正相关关系,并且因子分析与因果分析的结果也支持这一结论,说明驱动中国资本外逃的主要因素不是投资环境恶化,中国资本外逃在很大程度上是由于对内资和外资采取的差别政策待遇所引起的,并据此提出了相应的政策启示。     

THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ENDOGENOUS PROTECTION AND DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT

This paper studies the endogenous relationship between direct foreign investgment (DFI) and trade restriction. A domestic labor union interested in both employment and wages bargains with a foreign firm and lobbies against foreign imports. By endogeneizing the wage rate and incorporating resource-using lobbying, we show that more DFI results in higher lobbying efforts and lower imports under fairly general conditions, i.e. a reversal of quid pro quo DFI. We also conduct comparative statics analysis on wages and lobbying efforts.     

THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC INPUTS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

A small open economy model is developed that incorporates direct and indirect effects on multinational location decisions associated with public input provision. It is shown that when agglomeration externalities are present in local intermediate goods markets, public input provision can affect multinational firms directly by lowering the fixed costs of production and indirectly by decreasing the costs of intermediate inputs, but growth is contingent on achieving a critical mass of investment. It is further shown that the effectiveness of a policy of public input provision over a policy of subsidy incentives is critically dependent on key market parameters in the host country . ( JEL F2, H4, O1)     

外国直接投资与经济增长的关系及影响

从中国和其他23个发展中国家总量时间序列资料的分析中可以看出,国内生产总值与外国直接投资之间存在着相互影响、相互促进的互动关系。除经济因素以外,稳定可靠的组织机构和城市化的发展在吸引外国直接投资方面发挥着相当重要的作用,它们是促进经济增长的重要因素。     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,NON‐TRADED GOODS AND REAL WAGES

Using a three‐sector general equilibrium model with non‐traded goods, we investigate the impact of foreign direct investment on the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers. We show that foreign direct investment increases the real wages of skilled and unskilled workers alike, but widens the gap between the two under plausible conditions.     

EC INTEGRATION AND JAPANESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC

This study proposes two hypotheses to identify the cause(s) behind the short-term cyclical Japanese manufacturing foreign direct investment in the European Community (EC) in the late 1980s and early 1990s: (i) a catch-up process of Japanese firms in anticipation of EC single market integration in 1993 and (ii) the so-called bubble economic phenomenon caused by the overheated economy following expansionary monetary policy in Japan in the late 1980s. Applying multinomial logit models to the data on parent firms of 283 Japanese manufacturing subsidiaries established in the EC from 1988 to 1992 reveals strong support for the bubble economy hypothesis but not for the catch-up hypothesis. Results also show that under a bubble economy situation, tax-related incentive policies in host countries—e.g., an investment tax allowance for foreign direct investment—are quite important in attracting Japanese firms.     

AN OLIGOPOLISTIC HECKSCHER–OHLIN MODEL OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*

We develop a 2 × 2 × 2 trade model in which one of the two sectors is perfectly competitive and the other is oligopolistic. The oligopoly sector consists of a given number of identical firms for each country, but they are free to locate in either country. The allocation of the firms between the two countries is endogenously determined, and changes in factor prices play a crucial role in establishing this equilibrium. Under this framework we examine the validity of factor price equalization, patterns of trade and gains from trade. Effects of technological progress and preference changes on firm locations are also analysed.     

GLOBAL AND DIPLOMATIC POLITICAL RISKS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

This paper investigates whether multinational enterprises (MNEs) take into account both global and diplomatic political risks when investing abroad. Whereas global political risk is common to all foreign investors, diplomatic political risk is dyad-specific as it is related to the overall diplomatic climate between the home and host countries. The main result of this study is that both global and diplomatic political risks matter for U.S. MNEs investing in developing countries. Their required return on investment rises when the political risk faced by all foreign investors worsens or when diplomatic tensions arise between the United States and their host countries, presumably because in both cases uncertainty about future returns increases.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR: THE CASE OF THE SMALL DEVELOPING COUNTRY

Historically, the lack of competition in developing countries has resulted in highly concentrated domestic industries that suffer from diseconomies of scale but prosper behind high walls of protection. Liberalization is expected to reverse this trend but at what cost? This article utilizes an import demand framework to examine the potential impact of trade liberalization on the manufacturing sector in the Caribbean using the case of Barbados. The results indicate that the manufacturing industry could encounter tremendous price competition, which could compromise the future survival of these industries. The study recommends that industries reorganize production processes to increase efficiency, which will allow them to compete effectively in the new global trading environment. These results may also be applicable to the wider Caribbean.     

TARIFF JUMPING FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DECISION IN A QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED MARKET

Using a product differentiation model, this paper discusses the issue of transnational firms evading tariffs and investing directly in a host country (through foreign direct investment (FDI)). Where product quality is differentiated between foreign and host country firms and assuming a firm's quality requirement is a long‐term strategy and is not affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, we obtain the following findings. First, whether or not a host country firm produces high or low quality products, raising the quality requirement for foreign products will increase the possibility of a foreign firm choosing FDI instead of exporting a product to the host country. Second, raising the quality requirement for domestic products will lower the possibility of foreign firms choosing FDI without regard to the product's quality. Finally, given a competitor in the host country, in FDI, a foreign high‐quality product‐producing firm has an advantage over a low‐quality product‐producing firm. We also find that even when firms' quality decisions are affected by a foreign firm's trade decision, most of the above results will still hold.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.