THE IMPACT OF DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: EVIDENCE FROM LARGE DYADIC PANEL DATA

To increase inward foreign direct investment (FDI), policy makers increasingly resort to the ratification of double taxation treaties (DTTs). However, the effectiveness of DTTs in inducing higher FDI is still open to debate, as the empirical evidence of existing studies is anything but conclusive. In contrast to earlier approaches, we use a largely unpublished dataset on bilateral FDI stocks, covering a much larger and more representative sample of host and source countries. Controlling for standard determinants of FDI and employing various econometric specifications, our results indicate that DTTs do lead to higher FDI stocks and that the effects are substantively important as well.     

Does corruption hinder investment? Evidence from Russian regions

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and fixed capital investment in the setting of a corrupt country. Using different measures of corruption – registered cases of bribe taking and incidents of experienced corruption by the population – we find a negative relationship between investment and corruption. We then address the problem of endogeneity of corruption using an instrumental variables approach: when corruption is instrumented with freedom of the press and violations of journalists' rights, we find an even bigger negative effect. Disaggregating investment by ownership-type shows that only private investment is affected by corruption, but not investment made by state-owned companies. The negative effect is larger for companies with full or partial foreign ownership. Additionally, we look at the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI): similar to the investment in fixed capital, we find a negative relationship; however, its statistical significance varies across specifications with different data sources for FDI and different corruption measures.     

Market Size,Local Sourcing and Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment

This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign‐owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries.     

Home country effects of foreign direct investment: From a small economy to a large economy

Previous studies on home country effects mainly focused on FDI from large developed economies to other countries. But today's super recipient is a relatively larger economy than its investors and many of these investors are not classified as “developed economies.” A simple Ak type model implies that a small and more developed country investing in a large and less developed country will experience decreases in both employment and income disparity (compared to the recipient country) as the less-developed recipient country gains the higher technology of production through FDI inflows. The empirical results for the Four Tigers (source countries) and China (recipient country) are consistent with our theoretical model of FDI outflows. We also find that FDI outflows to China decrease the ratio of exports to GDP only for small source countries, even though a higher investment in China raises the share of these countries' exports-to-China to China's total imports.     

Hunting High and Low for Vertical FDI

Recently the horizontal and vertical models of foreign direct investment (FDI) have been synthesized into the knowledge‐capital (KK) model. Empirical tests, however, find that the horizontal model cannot be rejected in favor of the KK model. I suggest this is because the empirical specifications are too restrictive for vertical FDI to manifest itself. Using an alternative specification, I find evidence of vertical FDI. In particular, when I use the stock of FDI I can reject the horizontal model in favor of the knowledge‐capital model and identify countries for which FDI is dominated by vertical investment.     

An Assignment Theory of Foreign Direct Investment

We develop an assignment theory to analyse the volume and composition of foreign direct investment (FDI). Firms conduct FDI by either engaging in greenfield investment or in cross-border acquisitions. Cross-border acquisitions involve firms trading heterogeneous corporate assets to exploit complementarities, while greenfield FDI involves setting up a new production division in the foreign country. In equilibrium, greenfield FDI and cross-border acquisitions coexist within the same industry, but the composition of FDI between these modes varies with firm and country characteristics. Firms engaging in greenfield investment are systematically more efficient than those engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Furthermore, most FDI takes the form of cross-border acquisitions when production-cost differences between countries are small, while greenfield investment plays a more important role for FDI from high-cost into low-cost countries. These results capture important features of the data.     

Determinants of foreign direct investment

Empirical studies of bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) activity show substantial differences in specifications with little agreement on the set of included covariates. We use Bayesian statistical techniques that allow one to select from a large set of candidates those variables most likely to be determinants of FDI activity. The variables with consistently high inclusion probabilities include traditional gravity variables, cultural distance factors, relative labour endowments and trade agreements. There is little support for multilateral trade openness, most host‐country business costs, host‐country infrastructure and host‐country institutions. Our results suggest that many covariates found significant by previous studies are not robust.     

The impacts of PTA formation on small economies’ tax competition for FDI inflows

This paper examines why small economies are so eager to form or join preferential trade agreements (PTAs), as observed in the East Asia and the Central Europe, taking consideration of the strategic impacts of PTA formation on tax competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Based on a simple model where three asymmetric countries compete for FDI inflows, we demonstrate that PTA formation provides a strategic advantage to a small member country of PTA in competing for FDI inflows not only with respect to a non-member country but with a large member country when the integrated market size is large enough. In addition, it is shown that it might be an out-of-equilibrium path strategy for a non-member small economy to exert efforts to induce FDI inflows, because the excessive subsidies to induce FDI inflows might outweigh the gains from the FDI inflows due to strategic disadvantage in tax competition after PTA formation. These findings explain why small economies are mainly driven by the expected economic benefits including FDI inflows from joining PTA.     

Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Business‐cycle Fluctuations*

This paper investigates business‐cycle effects for a country’s foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows. Ordinary least squares and panel regressions show that volatility in economic growth has a negative and significant impact on FDI outflows. Furthermore, we find different types of shocks have asymmetric impacts on FDI outflows. In other words, fluctuations of the same magnitude in a boom and a recession have different effects on FDI outflows. This relationship is more evident in OECD countries. We also include exchange rate volatility, lagged business‐cycle measure, and control for potential endogeneity problems as robustness checks. Our findings are robust across different specifications.     

国际直接投资与开放型内生经济增长

本文应用内生经济增长理论框架 ,着重就国际直接投资 (FDI)对高收入国家、中收入国家和低收入国家三种不同类型国家经济增长的影响进行理论和实证分析 ,认为FDI能内生技术溢出和技术进步 ,从而成为内生经济增长的重要源泉。本文对 65个样本国家的实证研究结果表明 ,FDI流入增长对高收入的发达国家经济增长作用比对中低收入发展中国家作用更明显。但FDI流入增长对我国经济增长和全要素生产率增长具有明显促进作用 ,其原因与FDI流入规模和我国的人力资本水平有关     

DECISION TO INVEST ABROAD: THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREAN MULTINATIONALS

Recent firm‐based empirical studies examine whether firms serving foreign markets either through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI) are more efficient than their domestically‐oriented counterparts. The purpose of the present paper is to study the link between performance of multinational firms and the choice to participate in foreign investment. In so doing, this paper explicitly differentiates exports and FDI decisions. Using firm‐level data for large South Korean manufacturing firms, I provide evidence that the premium for FDI is huge compared to exports, and that good firms undertake FDI. Studying performance across firms, I find that firms that engage in FDI outperform other firms in the future in all possible dimensions; they are larger, pay higher wages, and are also more productive. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that good firms self‐select to engage in FDI. I also find clear evidence that past FDI experience has a strong positive effect on the probability of current investment abroad. This implies that the sunk cost involved in FDI plays a role in current decisions to undertake FDI.     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

International outsourcing versus FDI under contractual incompleteness

This paper empirically analyses the boundaries of a large sample of Italian multinational enterprises, with firm-level data from Capitalia, AIDA and Centrale dei Bilanci. Within the broad array of feasible contracts in a foreign country, we focus on the trade-off between international outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI), in a context of contractual incompleteness. Probit estimates reveal that Italian enterprises operating in highly relation-specific environments are more prone to international outsourcing than FDI, consistently with recent theoretical contributions on the topic. Results are robust to different specifications and alternative measures of contractual incompleteness and international outsourcing.     

THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

Using bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks around the world, we explore the importance of a wide range of institutional variables as determinants of the location of FDI. While we find that better institutions have overall a positive and economically significant effect on FDI, some institutional aspects matter more than others do. Especially, the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden, government instability and lack of commitment play a major role in deterring FDI. For example, the effect of a one standard deviation improvement in the regulatory quality of the host country increases FDI by a factor of around 2. These results are robust to different specifications, estimation methods, and institutional variables. We also present evidence on the significance of institutions as a determinant of FDI over time.     

ARE THERE PRODUCTIVITY SPILLOVERS FROM FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CHINA?

We review previous literature on productivity spillovers of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China and conduct our own analysis using a firm‐level data set from a World Bank survey. We find that the evidence of FDI spillovers on the productivity of Chinese domestic firms is mixed, with many positive results largely due to aggregation bias or failure to control for endogeneity of FDI. Attempting over 6000 specifications that take into account forward and backward linkages, we fail to find evidence of systematic positive productivity spillovers from FDI in China.     

Who Benefits from Voluntary Export Restraints?

Using a simple Cournot-oligopoly model, the paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on profits, market shares, consumers' surplus, and domestic welfare when the domestic market is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports from a third country. A VER may induce FDI from the VER-restricted country or exports from the third country. Under certain circumstances, the domestic firm loses from a VER. Even if the domestic firm gains, the increase in the market share of the domestic country induced by the VER could be less than that of the third country.     

National levels of corruption and foreign direct investment

We model the relationship between bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI) and the level of corruption in multinational firms’ (MCNs’) home and host countries. We construct and test a model of bilateral FDI between countries that differ in their levels of corruption. FDI is affected negatively both by the level of corruption in the host country and by differences in home- and host-country corruption. Our model emphasizes that MNCs develop skills for dealing with home-country corruption, and these skills become a competitive advantage in similarly corrupt host countries. We test the model using data on bilateral FDI stocks among a large number of home and host countries, using a variety of specifications and estimation strategies to provide robustness. Our results show that the effects of host-country corruption and of differences in corruption levels between home and host countries are statistically and economically significant.     

Do Multinational Enterprises Contribute to Convergence or Divergence? A Disaggregated Analysis of US FDI*

It is widely held that foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive effect on economic growth. To test this hypothesis, we perform convergence regressions derived from a theoretical model on the impact of FDI on endogenous technological change in small economies. The model includes FDI externalities that enhance growth, but also shows that FDI can crowd out host country income and reduce local innovation. The empirical analysis employs disaggregated US data for various FDI‐related activities—in addition to the conventionally used aggregate FDI stocks and flows. We estimate the net FDI impact on the convergence rate of per‐capita income to US levels, controlling for human development, financial development, and trade. We find that FDI accelerates convergence for high‐income countries only, otherwise slowing it down.     

THE POLITICS OF FDI EXPROPRIATION

I examine the role of political instability and fractionalization as potential explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich countries to poor countries (i.e., the Lucas Paradox). Using panel data from 1984 to 2014, I document that (i) developed countries exhibit larger inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), (ii) countries subject to high investment risk (IR) receive low FDI inflows, and (iii) IR is higher in fractionalized and politically unstable economies. These findings suggest a negative relationship between political instability and FDI through the IR channel. I inspect the theoretical mechanism using a dynamic political economy model of redistribution, wherein policymakers can expropriate resources from foreign investors. The proceeds are used to finance group‐specific transfers to domestic workers but hinder economic growth by discouraging FDI. I show that the political equilibrium exhibits overexpropriation and underinvestment.     

Foreign Direct Investment, Local Content Requirement, and Profit Taxation

We develop a partial equilibrium model of foreign direct investment (FDI) in which identical foreign firms locate themselves in a host country to compete in an oligopolistic market for a non-tradeable commodity. The host country, assumed to be small in the market for FDI, makes use of two instruments, viz., a profit tax and a local content requirement, to compete for FDI in the international market. We assume the existence of unemployment in the host country. The structure of optimal instruments and their relationship to the number, and the relative efficiency levels, of the domestic firms, are established