Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections

The existence of a large incumbency advantage in the winner-takes-all plurality system of the United States is well documented. It is unclear whether incumbents in proportional systems should enjoy such a large advantage. Multi-seat constituencies make it difficult for individual incumbents to claim credit for the provision of local public goods and services. Moreover, multiple incumbents may dilute media attention thereby limiting name recognition advantage. We use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency using election data from Ireland’s system of proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV). Incumbency causes an eighteen percentage point increase in the probability that a candidate in Ireland’s lower house of parliament wins a seat in the next election. Our results indicate that the protection of vulnerable incumbents from intra-party competition may be a source of incumbency advantage in multi-member district elections.     

Political salaries,electoral selection and the incumbency advantage: Evidence from a wage reform

Incumbents tend to gain solid electoral advantage in many voting systems. In this study, we examine the relationship between salaries prescribed to politicians and the incumbency advantage by exploiting a political wage reform and data from close elections in a proportional semi-open list system in the Czech Republic. We show that higher salaries reduce the average incumbency advantage, as they increase the probability to run again for previously non-elected candidates much more than for incumbents. Still, we find that higher wages improve candidate selection, especially by encouraging repeated candidacy from university-educated incumbents. Higher wages also improve relative positions of re-running incumbents on candidate lists compared to previously non-elected re-running candidates. Our results overall suggest that incumbency per se changes the relationship between political wages and candidate selection.     

Incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament

Abstract We apply a regression discontinuity approach to determine incumbency advantages in the Canadian Parliament, finding that incumbents enjoy a 9.4–11.2% increased probability of winning over non‐incumbents. Owing to the presence of multiple parties, an incumbency advantage in terms of vote share does not always translate to an increased probability of winning, because incumbents do not necessarily obtain votes from their closest opponent. Also, under the assumption that strategic exit is not an issue, we are able to split the incumbency advantage into party incumbency and individual candidate incumbency components, finding that the advantage is almost entirely due to the individual.     

Political accountability and public service delivery in decentralized Indonesia: Incumbency advantage and the performance of second term mayors

To what extent do voters hold local elected leaders accountable for public service delivery in fiscally and politically decentralized environments, as theory suggests should be the case? We examine political accountability and service delivery in subnational Indonesia, through the lens of mayoral incumbency advantage. We apply regression discontinuity methods to a unique data set on local elections to identify the causal impact of incumbency on election outcomes and relate those effects to changes in citizen access to local public services. We find that voters in Indonesia are, in general, very willing to return incumbents to office compared to their counterparts in other countries. We also determine that the incumbent advantage is conditional on advances in local service provision: as service access expands more quickly, voters are more likely to vote incumbents back into office. Finally, we find that electorally successful incumbents—second term mayors—spend substantially less on education and health and more on infrastructure, manage their budgets less prudently, and deliver public services neither more nor less effectively than their first term equivalents. We conjecture that term limits and the attendant lack of electoral incentives leads to the disappointing second-term mayor performance.     

The Effect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities

I investigate if political alignment between central and local governments brings financial benefit to local governments, using financial data from Portuguese municipalities (1992–2005). I use regression discontinuity design to determine the effect of political alignment per se on transfers to municipalities. Municipalities aligned with the central government receive 19% more targetable transfers than unaligned municipalities. I test for electoral motivation of this transfer bias: extra transfers increase the vote share of incumbents in local elections for one of the two Portuguese major parties; however, municipal incumbency does not lead to better results in national elections.     

The Economics of Bipartisan Campaign Reform

This essay evaluates two provisions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA): raising contribution limits and banning soft money. The model highlights the importance of marginal cost ratios for candidates and their parties. The results suggest that raising contribution limits protects incumbents. Importantly, this generates efficiency gains that come at the expense of electoral competitiveness. When a party has an advantage in a large number of districts, the soft money ban may also reduce rent‐seeking effort while exacerbating existing advantages. Ultimately, the two provisions underscore an “equity‐efficiency” trade‐off. While restricting rent‐seeking effort, they probably lead to less competitive elections.     

Growth and Election Outcomes in a Developing Country

We offer the first test of the hypothesis that rapid growth helps incumbents win elections for a developing country, India. We generalize the Fair (1978) model to allow for multiple candidates and test it using cross‐state data on 422 candidates in the 2009 parliamentary elections. We find quantitatively large and statistically robust effect of growth on the prospects of the candidates of the state incumbent parties to win elections.     

Divided government versus incumbency externality effect—Quasi-experimental evidence on multiple voting decisions

This paper explores the causal relationship between vote outcomes in different elections. We ask: (1) Does the partisan identity of the mayor influence the voter's decision in subsequent town council elections? (2) Do voters condition their vote for the mayor on the result of the last council election? The analysis mainProd. Type: FLPly relies on a regression discontinuity design focusing on close election outcomes based on municipal level data for Germany. We find that the party of the mayor can receive a significant bonus in the next town council election. Moreover, voters punish mayor candidates of parties that performed strongly in earlier council elections. Throughout the paper, we highlight how these findings can be related to an incumbency externality effect and to the theory of divided government.     

Fixed-mobile integration

Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. This result is robust to changes in the competitiveness of the fixed market and to the presence of fixed-mobile substitution. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation, and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.     

Elections, Opportunism, Partisanship and Sovereign Ratings in Developing Countries

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) considerations explain election‐period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk‐ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presidential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election‐period policies detrimental to post‐election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election‐period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right‐wing (left‐wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election‐period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign‐based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world.     

Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage

We present a model of (re)elections in which an incumbency advantage arises because the incumbent can manipulate issue salience by choosing inefficient policies in the policy dimension in which he is the stronger candidate. The voters are uncertain about the state of the world and the incumbent's choice of policy. Under complete information they would reelect the incumbent if and only if the state is sufficiently high. Undesirable policy outcomes may be due to either a bad state or the incumbent's choice of inefficient policies. The incumbent uses inefficient policies in intermediate states, whereby he creates uncertainty about the true state in such a way that voters are better off in expectation reelecting him. Hence the equilibrium exhibits an incumbency advantage that stems from asymmetric information and the use of inefficient policies.     

REAL EXCHANGE RATE CYCLES AROUND ELECTIONS

We develop the implications of devaluation cycles for real exchange rates in a two-sector small open economy with a cash-in-advance constraint. Policy-makers are office-motivated politicians. Voters have incomplete information on the competence and the opportunism of incumbents. Devaluation acts like a tax, and is politically costly because it can signal the government is incompetent. This provides incumbents an incentive to postpone devaluations, and can lead to an overvalued exchange rate before elections. We compare the implied cycle of appreciated/depreciated exchange rates with empirical evidence around elections from Latin America.     

The Informational Value of Incumbency

This paper exploits the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. We propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage, ideological bias, and terms in office. Our argument emphasizes that incumbency affects candidates' chances of winning even if they had no opportunity to strategically utilize policies.     

Higher turnout increases incumbency advantages: Evidence from mayoral elections

We analyze the effect of electoral turnout on incumbency advantages by exploring mayoral elections in the German state of Bavaria. Mayors are elected by majority rule in two-round (runoff) elections. Between the first and second ballot of the mayoral election in March 2020, the state government announced an official state of emergency. In the second ballot, voting in person was prohibited and only postal voting was possible. To construct an instrument for electoral turnout, we use a difference-in-differences strategy by contrasting turnout in the first and second ballot in 2020 with the first and second ballots from previous elections. We use this instrument to analyze the causal effect of turnout on incumbent vote shares. A 10-percentage point increase in turnout leads to a statistically robust 3.4 percentage point higher vote share for incumbent mayors highlighting the relevance of turnout-related incumbency advantages.     

Signaling in Political Budget Cycles: How Far Are You Willing to Go?

A key assumption in the literature on political cycles with rational voters and opportunistic politicians is that opportunism is common knowledge. In this framework, political cycles have been interpreted as a signal of competency. However, if opportunism is not common knowledge, cycles may no longer indicate competency, but rather opportunism. This is because highly opportunistic incumbents are willing to go farther to be reelected. Since political cycles require discretionality to reallocate budget items, a decrease of discretionality curbs cycles. It may also make elections more effective at selecting competent incumbents.     

ECONOMIC VOTING AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR: HOW DO INDIVIDUAL,LOCAL, AND NATIONAL FACTORS AFFECT THE PARTISAN CHOICE?

What impact do income and other demographic factors have on a voter's partisan choice? Using post‐election surveys of 14,000 voters in 10 Australian elections between 1966 and 2001, I explore the impact that individual, local, and national factors have on voters' decisions. In these 10 elections, the poor, foreign‐born, younger voters, voters born since 1950, men, and those who are unmarried are more likely to be left‐wing. Over the past 35 years, the partisan gap between men and women has closed, but the partisan gap has widened on three dimensions: between young and old; between rich and poor; and between native‐born and foreign‐born. At a neighborhood level, I find that, controlling for a respondent's own characteristics, and instrumenting for neighborhood characteristics, voters who live in richer neighborhoods are more likely to be right‐wing, while those in more ethnically diverse or unequal neighborhoods are more likely to be left‐wing. Controlling for incumbency, macroeconomic factors do not seem to affect partisan preferences – Australian voters apparently regard both major parties as equally capable of governing in booms and busts.     

SEQUENTIAL OR SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS? A WELFARE ANALYSIS

Should all voters vote on the same day or should elections be staggered? Using a model of voting and social learning, we illustrate that sequential elections place too much weight on early states but also provide late voters with valuable information. Simultaneous elections equally weigh states but place too much weight on voter priors, providing an inappropriate advantage to front‐runners. Simultaneous elections are thus preferred if the front‐runner advantage is small, but sequential elections are preferred if the advantage is large. Our quantitative welfare analysis of presidential primaries suggests that simultaneous systems slightly outperform sequential systems.     

Entry and market selection of firms: A laboratory study

We study how markets adjust to the entry of new firms under different conditions. Two incumbents face entry by three other firms. When firms’ costs are equal, entry always leads consumer surplus and profits to their equilibrium levels. When entrants are more efficient than incumbents, entry leads consumer surplus to equilibrium. With cost asymmetries, market behavior is satisfactory from the consumers’ standpoint but does not yield adequate signals to other potential entrants. Simultaneous entry is in the short run more favorable to consumers than sequential entry. A longer incumbency phase favors consumers after entry.     

Elections as a conflict processing mechanism

We examine the conditions under which societal conflicts are peacefully processed by competitive elections when the contending parties can revert to force as an alternative. We show that the viability of the electoral mechanism depends on the balance of military force, the sharpness of divisions within a society, and institutions that moderate policies implemented by winners of elections. For elections to be held and their outcomes to be respected, the probabilities that they would be won by incumbents must bear an inverse relation to the magnitude of policy changes resulting from elections. Elections are competitive when their outcomes make some but not too much difference. Constraining the scope of policy divergence increases the range of the balance of force under which elections are competitive in divided, but not in homogeneous, societies. Hence, competitiveness of elections and constitutional constraints on policies – the norms being promoted as essential for democracies – do not always go together.     

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. This paper reports an analysis of municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982 to 2000 and finds empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.